 this evening, everyone. Thank you for joining us, we are on our six信 lecture in our special 50th anniversary inaugural lecture series. What a great anniversary it is turning out to be. My name is Professor Kevin Hethertington. I'm the provise Chancellor for Research, Enterprise and Scholarship here at the Open University, and I'm proud and privileged to be hosting one of the university's 50th anniversary events here today. ac ydych chi'n dweud y cwmwneud y lefnodd yn ymddangos y mynd i gweithio'r holl yn ymddangos ymddangos ymddiadau ac ymddangos ymddangos ymddiadau. Nid yma, wrth gwrs, y cyfnodd y vice-chynllun yn sfeidio gweld a chynlluniau a ffroeddau'r profef ymddangos ymddangos ymddangos ymddangos ymddangos. Yn fod y gwrs yma, y seresiynau ymddangos ymddangos ymddangos yn ymddangos ymddangos a'r yw'r bobl, acedemig i gael eu lleol, a gael eich lector yn ymgyrchun y llifon yn y cyfrifau ac yn yw'r bobl. Mae ydych yn ddiweddol i'r Llyfrgell Pwyddiol i ddweud o gyngorol gyda'r Fyafolwyd Pwyddiol a'r pethau o ddweud o'r dyfyn effeithiol a'r dyfyniad, o'r bydau o'r bydau o'r ysgrifennu o'r cyfrifau o'r sgwrsau yn ymgyrch. Mae'n ddig兴gyrchu'n i'n ei wneud o'r anoddolion ar gyfer y teimlo cyflawni, oedd y gyrfaen gŵr yn ddefnyddio'r ffordd a'r byw, yn ddiweddolion i'r Unedig Ysbydd. Theo eich profesor eich anoddolion a'r anoddolion a'r anoddolion a'r arwain yn y gyflawni a'r anoddolion o'r anoddolion o'r anoddolion o'r anoddolion, oedd yn gwerthod. Roedd y rhagwyr hefyd yn ymdyn nhw i'w cyflawni i'r anoddolion i'r anoddolion i'r anoddolion ..y'r brifysgol ymdeg y technologig yn ymweld yn y dyfodol ymwyngh. Prof. Pabaiwانw'r ysgolion gyda'r cyfrannu sylwyddiad yw'r cyfrannu cyfrannu cyfwyrd... ..y'r cyfrannu cyfrannu cyfrannu cyfrannu cyfrannu cyfrannu cyfrannu cyfrannu cyfrannu. Theo er fydd yn sicr iawn cyfwyr a thyrist... ..y hynny'n cyfrannu cyfrannu cyfrannu cyfrannu cyfrannu cyfrannu cyfrannu... Mae'r rhanigol yn fawr yn gywir y cwmwysgol i'r sgwmwysgol yn ym 50, a'r rhanigol yn ymwysgol i'r llwyddau. Yn 2000, mae'n ein gwneud hynny'n gweld ar gyfer y Fflaen iawn yn ysgrifennu ym 2,00, mae'n ein gwneud hynny'n gweld y Fflaen iawn ac yn ymwysgol i Berkbeck yn Llywodraeth. Mae'n iddyn nhw'n ad안u'r cystech chi'n byw'r cyfrifennu in the U.S., Canada, Central and Eastern Europe and Southeast Asia. He joined the Department of Development Policy and Practice and Inagent here at the Open University in 2005. He is also an active member of several professional associations including the Association for Studies in Innovation, Science and Technology and the Development Studies Association. Theo's teaching interests are in global justice, politics and policy of technological innovation and international development. He is currently working on a new masters in global development policy and practice and he teaches the postgraduate module with our code T878 capacities for managing development and the undergraduate module TD223 international development making sense of a changing world. Perhaps there are some students either here or online who are watching this, who are familiar with his work through that. Now it gives me great pleasure to introduce Professor Theo Papuwaanu. Thank you for this generous introduction. Good evening everyone and thank you for joining me in this inaugural lecture. I must confess I should have given this lecture some years back when I was promoted to professor but I must say it was worth the waiting because I can now give this lecture as part of the Open University's 50th anniversary. An anniversary of course of an institution that consistently promotes social justice through innovative teaching and research. So my lecture tonight is also about social justice but about a particular idea of social justice which is the idea of justice and innovation. So my aim is to address some questions around this idea especially with focus on emerging technologies. What is the idea of social justice first of all? How does it apply in innovation and what does it imply for emerging technologies? What does it mean for global development? However before I try to address these questions and probably raise more questions instead of answering them. I would like to thank really everyone who has helped me to arrive in this stage of my career. Of course my parents who cannot be here but have been very supportive of me all these years. My family, my wife there, my son who have been very patient with me. Academic mentors in other of universities but particularly in the development policy and practice group. Hazel Johnson there and Dave Wild and Peter Robbins. And of course I would like to thank many friends around the world who have been very helpful all these years. I would like also to say a few things about my intellectual background so you can understand where I come from. So I studied politics and international relations as my first degree in the Padding University of Athens. A little university there in the heart of Athens specializing in social and political sciences. And in 1994 I moved to the University of Sussex where I studied the social and political thought of liberal and Marxist theories. And then in the year 2000 I was appointed research fellow in innovation policy at the University of Brighton. Where I sort of started working on some kind of application of political theoretical ideas in my own understanding of institutional aspects of technological innovation. Particularly with focus on public policy, comparative public policy what we used to call at that point policy benchmarking. Eventually I moved to the Open University in the year 2005. At Sussex and at Brighton these were very interdisciplinary intellectual environments and I spent a number of years analyzing and criticizing the epistemological and methodological foundations of two particular theories. One was Robert Nozick's theory of the minimal state. The other was Friedrich Haygex's theory of the idea of the market as a spontaneous order. Both theories morally defend absolute private property rights. So for example strict intellectual property rights and limited government regulation. And provide in a way a very dominant framework for libertarian or neoliberal market based approach to innovation and development. So by identifying the epistemological and methodological problems in their arguments what I tried to do really was to demonstrate the importance of politics and the state in securing socially just outcomes in innovation and development. So the findings of that early work were published in two books, one on Robert Nozick where I argue that it's important to refute the key arguments of his theory on fundamental grounds, epistemological grounds. The other was a book on Haygex where I started with a very ambitious statement that 21st century world neoliberalism will somehow become vulnerable to its own contradictions. That was not a safe prediction. We're still here. But I think that both books provide the theoretical basis for bringing some kind of critical political thinking into innovation and development studies. Especially innovation studies that tends to be more technical instead of political discipline. And this has been my main aim since coming to the Open University in the year 2001. Trying to bring critical political thinking into innovation and development. In a way I moved from a rather abstract preoccupation with politics and political theory into more concrete and grounded application of these disciplines into development policy and practice. Something like moving from this stage of my life into that one, which is more mature phase, I suppose. Anyway, in the next 30 minutes or so I would like to do exactly that to use a bit of politics and political theory to explore the idea of justice in innovation. So I'll start with a few introductory remarks then I'll explain what I think about the idea of justice or social justice. How does it apply in innovation particularly with regards to emerging technologies and what does it mean for global development? So, of course, the idea of social justice has preoccupied a number of political theories. From platter to local the way to human roles, young and sane, the idea of justice has been defined as a moral and political standard of how people ought to live and relate to one another within a framework of fair institutions. But although principles of justice and related theories have been applied to govern various social and political actions, technological innovation remains a difficult area for the application of justice. This is not only because of complexity of emerging technologies and their unpredictable impact on social institutions and our life and social relations. But also because of perceptions of value and neutrality in the innovation process. So in a recent paper myself and Professor Smita Srinivas pay closer attention to such perceptions analyzing the relationship between technological change and values. What becomes clear from this analysis is that innovation is a human action that is predominantly intentional, guided not only by epistemic norms of ethics and economic values and interests, but also by moral and political values. So then, as a value laden human action, innovation is significant for social justice. Indeed, as Alan Buchanan, Anthony Cole and Robert Keohan also point out, innovation creates opportunities for promoting justice, but also poses risks of injustice. So it can worsen existing injustice or it can create new injustice. However, innovation as such is not a mere instrument of justice, rather it presupposes justice in order to be legitimized. So in this lecture I would like to argue that justice is a non-ideal standard which is significant for the deployment and acceptance of emerging technologies. By using the term non-ideal, I simply mean here non-obstruct or concrete or real. I hope in the process of this lecture the meaning of justice in innovation as a non-ideal standard will become clearer. When principles of justice are embedded in incremental or radical innovations, different publics tend to support their consolidation and scaling up for the sake of the public good. Of course, the idea of justice in innovation is not just about distributing fairly the fruits of emerging technologies. It's also about the process of generation and application of new knowledge. It's about equalizing relations in that process. This means that when it comes to innovation we have reasons to ensure not only the fair share of new products and services, but also the equality of relations between the different members of society and especially those who are involved in innovation, the innovators, the regulators, the publics. So reducing or eliminating relations of domination in the process of generation and application of new knowledge should be the main objective of a non-ideal theory of justice in innovation. But let me just say a few words how I understand the idea of justice. The modern idea of social justice is really historically linked to successive scientific and technological revolutions which have introduced new products and services and paved the way to the early industrialization of societies. In his last work, Why Social Justice Matters, Brian Barry argues that although until about a century and a half ago justice was understood as a virtue of individuals, the early industrialization of societies shifted the focus of justice on societies and social relations. So according to Barry, what this meant in practice was that a challenge could be mounted to the power of owners of capital and to the dominance of the entire system within which capitalism was embedded. So the justice of the unequal relations between employers and employees could be called into question as could the distribution of income and wealth. Now Barry's argument points towards defining justice as an ideal that is about the institutional treatment of all inequalities. And this treatment needs to be impartial, otherwise fairness might be compromised. So the idea of justice as impartiality, defended by Brian Barry and other liberal egalitarians in the Rawlsian tradition of political thought, sort of requires taking everyone's situation and interest on board in order to determine what is to count as a just outcome. So for example, in order to determine what is to count as a just outcome of distribution of an innovative resource, say self-driving cars, one needs to take account of the situation of everyone including the situation of disabled people, of course. Indeed, political theory has come up with various constructions in order to secure plausible answer to this question of impartiality. So as British philosopher Jonathan Wool formulated the question, how would you like it if you were in that situation? How would you like it if you could imagine yourself in a situation of disadvantage? Okay, what kind of principles would you choose? Clearly Adam Smith's impartial spectator who sympathizes with someone's disadvantage or John Rawls' veil of ignorance that helps individuals to agree on impartial principles of distributive justice are the most well-known examples of constructivism political theory. However, this constructivism has recently come under fire for its ideal nature, prompting the formulation of a counter movement of a non-ideal theory of social justice. And of course there is a little bit of dispute around whether it's non-ideal theory or literalist theory, but authors from Amartya Sen to Elizabeth Anderson seem to agree that normative theorizing about justice cannot be based on constructions or philosophical devices which are fact insensitive. Instead it can be based on empirically true assumptions which succeed to pass a feasibility test. So the aim of such theorizing should be to mitigate current injustices instead of moving us from the current unjust state of the world to a perfectly just one. Although a non-ideal theory at first glance appears to be less ambitious than ideal theory, it takes on board issues of partial compliance with principles of justice and unfavorable circumstances. So Anderson explains this in terms of the imperfections of human nature. So she argues that a system of principles that would produce a just world if they regulated the conduct of perfectly rational and just persons will not do so when we ask human beings with all our limitations and flows to follow them. What do you think about this quote? What does this imply? Any idea? You can put hands up. Yes. Well I think it implies that a perfectly just world is empirically impossible. So motivational and cognitive deficiencies in human beings prompt us to empirically investigate the underlying causes of injustices and then develop a theory, probably a realist theory of social justice that provides us concrete solutions to problems. And in this sense a realist theory of justice or a non-ideal theory of justice tends to be more effective in terms of guiding agency in empirically contingent circumstances. Agency of course is the main focus of non-ideal theory of justice. So for instance Sen stresses that the idea of justice is ultimately about the way people's lives go and whether people can become capable of doing what they choose to do. However his own notion of agency mainly includes goals of individual well-being and not goals of political agency that are focused on changing social relations and institutions in accordance with the demands of justice. And this has implications. It has implications for public action. Public action that is focused on addressing relational and institutional injustices. Quite often the notion of public action is treated as synonymous with the notion of state action. However that's not correct. Public action is considerably wider than state action. It includes civil society organizations, NGOs, movements, different publics. It's about proposed collective action for public goods. Oppressive social relations through which people exercise power, dominate, marginalize others can be effectively changed through collective action including campaigns and actions of mass social movements. So a non-ideal theory of justice should therefore subscribe to pragmatism by endorsing public action as important means of change. Public action emerges when empirical identification and causal explanation of injustice raises the question of what and ought to be done about that and who should be charged with changing it, with correcting it. And this requires both evaluation and attribution of political responsibility for change. In terms of evaluation it might be argued that judgments about social injustices can be based on normative reflections which are both historically and socially contextualized. And this is what I think Marion Young regards as critical theory. She argues that critical theory presumes that normative ideals used to criticize society are rooted in experience of and reflection on that very society and that norms can come from nowhere else. So I think Young's critical theory and Anderson's non-ideal theory converts in one key point and that is their understanding of normative principles of justice as bottom-up developments of public action. And this is one key message I would like you to take home today that principles of social justice are really bottom-up developments of public action. Now, how does this idea of justice apply in innovation? Innovation, as I have already said, is a human action. And this kind of human action is about novelty. And as I have said in many different other occasions, whether doing something new or something old in new ways, innovation really describes the restless efforts of human beings to provide novel solutions to problems and to transform their technical and socio-economic environment to change the ways of production in order to meet human needs. So the prominence of innovation in the 21st century is evident, emerging technologies ranging from artificial intelligence to machine learning to the Internet of Things, new life sciences such as gene editing increasingly transform our productive capacities, health and social relations. But as I have stressed earlier, these technologies are not necessarily value neutral. Rather they embody values and interests which often, not always but often, are in line with hegemonic moral and political narratives including that of neoliberalism, failing to meet the requirements of social justice. So, for example, certain advances in new life sciences don't automatically trickle down from big pharmaceuticals and developed countries to smaller firms and developing countries. Also, current automated machines, robots and artificial intelligence tend to impact very unfairly on labour markets, displacing not only low-skilled jobs but also high-skilled services. There is now growing evidence that suggests that the beneficiaries of accelerated innovation in the 21st century is just a tiny group of privileged people. In the developing world, the impact of automation might even be more negative bearing in mind that in the developing world there are much more manual jobs which might actually go because of labour substituting innovation. The world bank prediction is about 1.1 billion jobs which are at risk because of accelerated innovation. Now, in their very well-known article Justice in the Diffusion of Innovation, Alan Buchanan, Tony Cole and Robert Cughan clearly define justice innovation as the conformity of both the distribution of the fruits of the processes of innovation and of the character of the innovation process itself to the requirement of justice. Why the character of the innovation itself? Are you still with me? Any views on that? Why the character of the innovation process itself? Well, I think it's because the innovation process itself is unequal and adjust. It's very much hierarchical. And therefore, we need to encourage empirical diagnosis of relational inequalities in the process of new knowledge generation and exploitation. What are these inequalities? Well, they range from marginalisation of certain types of knowledge, indigenous knowledge for example, to domination of multinational companies in global value chains and the development of new methods for controlling research. Also, current regulatory framework such as intellectual property rights tend to promote the unequal appropriation and commodification of new products and services. And these inequalities are clearly unjust in virtue of our concern for securing equal relations in innovation. What might be matching solutions? Well, openness towards research, non-research and development generated knowledge from the bottom up. Participation of marginalised groups in innovation processes. Empowerment of local producers in global value chains. And in some context also abolishment of intellectual property rights such as patents. Take for example what has come to be defined as grassroots or below the radar innovation or frugal innovation. This is about the public actions of low and middle income groups which draw on indigenous knowledge and networks of other activists in order to introduce alternative innovations that solve practical problems in local communities and meet needs. Such innovations might represent incremental changes in existing technological products. However, they have collective significance. They have collective significance because they underline innovation as a participatory process that creates opportunities for promoting social justice in local context. So, to put it another way, whether we think of grassroots or below the radar or frugal innovation, one thing is clear that these initiatives from below have introduced alternative innovations which embody some principles of justice as alternatives to radical technologies from the top down which eventually fail to meet their own needs. In my last book or rather in my latest book, hopefully not the last one, I tried to formulate these principles as equity recognition and participation. These are bottom up principles that can be defended as principles on non-ideal grounds. They are principles of justice because everyone who follows them in his and her particular innovation context has an effective voice in their consideration and is able to agree on them without question. So, for innovation to be just, there is a need for following some of these principles meeting needs. And in this sense, principles of justice in innovation ought to be egalitarian. And this also implies democratisation of innovation. Now, historical evidence suggests that not only incremental and low-tech innovations, but also radical and high-tech innovations tend to face issues of legitimacy when they are not guided by principles of justice. So, unjust and exclusive innovations are eventually challenged through public action. And one of my favourite examples here is the case of antiretroviral drugs in South Africa. Back in 1996, medical researchers found that a combination of three drugs could actually control HIV-AIDS. However, this radical innovation was patented and the result was that the cost of ARVs exceeded US$10,000 per patient. And of course, this was unaffordable in countries like South Africa. So, in 1997, South Africa introduced the Medical Control Act to allow compulsory licensing or parallel importation of ARVs. In response, 39 pharmaceutical companies represented by the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association filed a lawsuit against the South African government insisting that the Medicines Control Act breached intellectual property rights. And this case went down as the big pharma versus nurse Madela case. For the US and the EU, putting increased pressure on South Africa effectively acting in favour of big pharmaceuticals. But public activists and campaigners, motivated mainly by commitment to equity and fairness, mobilised global opinion against this illegitimate lawsuit, succeeding eventually in turning this dispute into a major public relations disaster for the pharmaceutical companies. And their argument was mainly about social justice. It was an argument about social justice that framed this mountain of public pressure that eventually led to the withdrawal of the lawsuit. There are, of course, many other examples of radical and high-tech innovations which suggest that unless some kind of legitimacy of innovative technologies is achieved through pragmatist principles of justice, the deployment and acceptance of these technologies is extremely hard. And in the 21st century, public activists' claims for justice and innovation appear to be gathering some momentum in both the global north and the global south. And this is because advances in science and technology directly lead to relational and distributional concerns which are framed as concerns about justice. This is, of course, not to say that public activists always enable social justice technologies. There are also cases in which public activists have blocked or opposed technologies with huge potential to social justice. And I have in mind the discussion about GMO food technologies. I have in mind the medical application of genetic engineering technologies. I mean, in these cases, concerns were not so much about social inclusion. Concerns were more about risk and safety, but they are quite interesting in how some kind of public action here blocked them. Let me move to the last part of this lecture to think a little bit more about emerging technologies. We live in the fourth industrial revolution, in the digital revolution as they call it. And there is consensus for the need to steer accelerated technological shifts towards more inclusive outcomes, especially in the developing world. This need is obvious. It's obvious because we still have 1.2 billion people who lack access to electricity. We still have 4 million people dying each year from indoor air pollution due to lack of clean energy. We still have thousands of children dying each year from preventable diseases. And what is more worrying is that the rate of poverty reduction has halved since 2013, and extreme poverty is on their eyes. So if you look at this latest figure from the World Bank, you realize that the gap between those earning below US dollar per day and those earning above is basically widening. And of course, this injustice is a major obstacle for achieving UN sustainable development goals. Because as such, sustainable development goals seem to reflect the consensus for the need of justice in innovation. In this sense, they redefine the mission of science, technology and innovation as the further reduction of poverty and elimination of extreme deprivation. So to put it another way, sustainability seems to go hand in hand with this idea of justice innovation. Clearly then, if justice isn't ought to be a foundational concept in innovation and development, it's crucial for us to investigate the non-ideal obligations of emerging technologies as well as the role of government and regulation. First of all, in an increasingly digital world, big data analytics, artificial intelligence, the Internet of Things, all these challenge traditional models of freedom and equality threatening the very essence of human rights as one American philosopher put it, which is human life itself. Take for example big data, it potentially undermines equal rights to security and privacy. And given that individuals are producers and users of data through interconnected devices which can now monitor their everyday lives and health, the question of who really owns the data is quite crucial. In fact, it's a question about power, who owns the freedom of whom really. So as this American philosopher, his name is Matthias Ries pointed out, an equal ownership of data will have detrimental consequences for many people in society. And if the power of companies such as Alphabet and Apple and Facebook and Tesla is not harnessed for the public good, we might eventually find ourselves in a world dominated by big companies. Such a just relations of domination are no longer future scenarios of course because recent scandals such as those of Cambridge Analytica and Facebook reveal the need for governance and regulatory frameworks which follow some realist principles of justice and innovation. Because the advantage of these principles is that they can address not only issues of their ownership but also issues of equal relations respect and participation. So according to Ries, emerging technological innovations using data including particular types of artificial intelligence such as machine learning technologies question the very implicit assumption of hierarchical superiority of humankind. So he mentions two interesting examples. One is a humanoid robot called Sophia with capabilities to participate in interviews that was developed by Hanson Robotics and by the way she became a Saudi citizen in October 2017. The other is a very recognizable figure Jeff Bezos who recently adopted a robot dog called Spot Mini. How can we make sense of these innovations? I would argue that apart from deeper philosophical questions of consciousness and morality of super intelligence that Ries asks, there are also questions about social justice which go beyond the risk for individual harm and really concern the kind of world these innovations create. Do they really create a just world? To be sure, none of these innovations has been developed by taking into consideration issues of relational equality and respect, let alone of course involving the poor, especially in the developing world in the process of knowledge generation and exploitation for these technologies. On the contrary, as some researchers now point out, the risk of inequalities embedded in the technologies themselves. So if you take this line of argument then, it's almost certain that both Sophia and Spot Mini kinds of super intelligent entities would satisfy the needs of rich people probably for insignificant luxuries and exclude the needs of poorer people for significant and fundamental improvements in food, energy, health and the environment. Because the fact is that the latter set of needs are simply not regarded as priorities for global R&D investment. The world's R&D spending was about $1 trillion in 2010 and it was mainly focused on the global north and responded mainly to global market demands for such technologies. So global innovation policy is driven really by global market forces and not really by global priorities. And therefore global innovation policy tends to serve the interests of the better off and the powerful. And this is one reason of course why some emerging technologies display complete lack of equal concern and respect for the poor and other worst of groups. If you think about the application of some of these technologies, we have a major issue of injustice. Recently in Herbook automating inequality, Virginia Eubank shows how some of these technologies, especially data mining, policy algorithms, predictive risk models, impact very unfairly on poor communities. So according to Her, migrants, unpopular religious groups, sexual minorities, the poor and other oppressed and exploited populations bear much higher burden of monitoring and tracking than advantage groups. And Eubanks uses the term digital poor house to describe the unjust outcome of artificial intelligence and automation for low income communities. At global level, a number of public activists and NGOs such as Practical Action have called to public action for changing technology, for challenging technology injustice, demanding urgent paradigm shift in the top-down approach to innovation. And they argue that we must increase access to technologies. We need new governance mechanisms for emerging technologies. And yes, we need technological innovation that can reduce the environmental and social impacts of existing technology use. It might be maintained then that such a paradigm shift in the global approach to innovation and development really presupposes public action and campaigning to succeed to legitimize technologies which comply to some realist principles of equity recognition participation. Global policy, governance and regulation ought to respond to public action not by blocking innovation, but by ensuring that these principles and especially principles of equality are embedded in the innovation process. And so there is fair share of benefits and risks of these technologies. And this is crucial for changing the direction of innovation systems towards delivering both incremental and radical technologies for just social, economic and environmental outcomes. Failure to do so might actually exacerbate technological anxiety in the era of technological revolution. In his last book, The Late Calestezuma, has argued that such anxiety and controversies arise from the tension between novelty and stability. So the tension, the need on the one hand to innovate constantly and the pressure on the other hand to maintain some kind of continuity, some kind of social order. And of course, maintenance of continuity and social order and stability very much depends on whether transformational or disruptive innovations eventually benefit everyone or just few people. And Azuma clearly recognizes in most cases opposition to new technologies arises from a sense of exclusion. It's not surprise he says that the absence of inclusive strategies leads to intense debates over questions of justice. So justice then and inclusion are key obligations which lead to both legitimacy and scaling up of emerging technologies. Claims for equal participation and recognition and access to these technologies very much depend on politics really. So public activists and academics I suppose like myself try to make explicit that innovation really is inherently political. Very often conflictual politics of innovation is veiled by value neutral and technocratic approaches to emerging technologies. But the fact is that innovations shape people's lives and impact on social and political institutions in profound ways. And this is the main reason why they have to meet some basic requirements of justice. So just to conclude then this lecture, I have argued that innovation really presupposes justice in order to be accepted and legitimized. Non-ideal principles of equity participation and recognition can embody solutions to empirical problems of unequal generation diffusion of emerging technologies. The normative direction of innovation systems in the 21st century really depends on such principles. The normative direction of innovation systems cannot ignore some of these principles of justice. The idea of justice innovation of course is predominantly political. It's because it focuses on social relations. And I think lack of empirical foundations of justice innovation can lead to sustained idealism. Because inclusion is not just an abstract ideal but a concrete and relational condition framed in non-ideal terms of justice. I was asked to acknowledge the sources of my images in order to respect intellectual property rights. And so thank you very much for your attention. Thank you very much Theo. It's now time for your questions both here in the room and online. So Theo, come and join me over here and we'll take some questions. Okay so we have some microphones I think available and when people put their hand up we'll get a microphone to you. So when it's your turn to ask a question could you please say who you are and where you're from and try and keep your questions short so that we can get through as many as possible. So who would like to start with the first question? Yes. Hello I'm Paul Burns. I'm from Milton Keynes also University of Bedfordshire. Very good talk, very interesting. But I'm also interested to explore with you the differences between the West and the East in particular about data mining, the use of data mining for AI purposes and the use of algorithms then to teach AI things to machines. And you've got the two contrasting systems. In the West it seems to me that a lot of the data mining replicates what society likes, what society does, what society has prejudices about. So for example you said in your talk particularly in the USA it replicates some prejudices about the people who are likely to be criminals and undertake criminal acts and AI replicates those people as being potential criminals. In other words it's quite a democratic way of using that data but it replicates the cultural norms, the prejudices of this society that it's in. Now you contrast that with the East and China in particular where they're actually trying to undertake social engineering through their social credit system and implementing that social change through AI and other incentives that people use. Now you've got a dilemma there, you've got a dilemma between what is justice, is it imposed by the state somehow coming through the politics of that state or is it implemented straight from the people without any intervention where I would say often it comes out as being very prejudiced. How do you differentiate between the two and is there a good and a bad way, is there always going to be a dilemma attention here? Well I think I don't have any data about data mining in China but I think that's an important dilemma. I mean my argument has been that we look at principles for justice as they come from the bottom up, from the people. But it's not always certain that these principles of justice are plausible. The state operates with principles of justice with particular institutions but what I've argued is that we need really to do substantial empirical research in order to see how these principles of justice are followed and implemented. So in that case, as you say, some of this engagement of the people has led to prejudice. Are these just outcomes? They are not. And therefore I think it's important to look at each particular case in each particular context. In the context of the US it has been this empirical research that highlighted this kind of prejudices. And therefore we have to think very carefully about how to address these prejudices in the application of new technologies. I do want to give other people a chance. One person's prejudice is another person's justice and vice versa. And I just want to understand a little better how you reconcile those two conflicting points of view. I mean I wouldn't say yes, definitely in some context one person's prejudices is the other person's views of social justice. But I think there is an increasing kind of movement that we all agree on some basic principles and how to implement those principles. The question is how do we articulate those principles in order to drive those technologies. I mean I mentioned the example of those emerging technologies that they seem to address issues of justice from below simply because top-down technologies have excluded them. So they try to build these principles of justice of equity of recognition in the technologies themselves. But I do think that there is much more work to be done empirically in order to actually answer these particular questions and come up with some acceptable principles of justice for these technologies. Can we take another question? Thank you very much for the wonderful talk, very interesting. I'm Dimitri Sotiropoulos. I work at the Open University and I'm a senior lecturer in finance. A great deal of your talk was about innovation and justice and social processes. You try to put forward an idea of a bottom-up process when it gets to justice in a sense that the way that justice is somehow reveals itself into a social context is by and large. I hope I do not mis-present your argument as a result of a bottom-up process, which means essentially that if there is an amount within quotation of justice, an amount of social justice remains outside control. So you cannot control a spontaneous bottom-up process. So the question is that can the same principle be applied to innovation as well and how this reflects into your argument? Well, that's the question I've been trying to ask really, because again if you look at some public actions, some movements, they tried really to think of social justice in terms of particular innovations. They tried to build this element of respect, this element of equity in those innovations and they did that in a particular way. So for example, they engaged people. They respected their indigenous knowledge and they took on board their needs. Whether this can scale up, it's an open question, but the fact is that we do have examples of social justice movements in innovation that manage to actually achieve some kind of accepted equity among the members. So if you look at grassroots types of innovation, for example, if you look at what was happening in Brazil with the social technologies movement, it's another example of that. I think the key question is whether we can expect these kinds of movements really to disrupt this top-down process of innovation that is pretty much exclusive, that is pretty much hierarchical. Can they change the paradigm? Question at the front there, please. Hi, Peter Robbins from Development Policy and Practice, and I guess it was a follow-up just from that, is the extent to which these movements of innovation for justice do at a time when the powerful seem to be major corporations controlling innovation. To what extent do these bottom-up movements? Will they always be fringe, niche kind of events or will they actually have the prospect to really transform society in more equitable ways? I think there is also the role of science and technology in innovation policy. To what extent science, technology and innovation policy should actually pay attention to these movements and try to engage and try to support these kinds of movements. Of course, the Sustainable Development Goals help towards that direction because in essence the Sustainable Development Goals put forward the mission of science, technology and innovation to address issues of inequality and innovation. There has been progress in places like India, for example, where you have certain types of movements supported by science and technology policy, and there is recognition in other countries that is increasingly work about developing indicators for inclusive innovation, but this is still developing, I think. Next question in the middle, and then I'll come to I think one online after that. Thank you. My name is Adam and I am a business consultant. There are two thoughts in my head. One is, is there a difference between public and private sector? So one of the challenges of innovation is it is inherently wasteful. Lots of people are trying lots of things that fail lots of times, and so that trend towards only big organisations that have scale can afford such waste in order to get credible innovation is that part of the dimension. So that was one train of thought that you really sparked, and then the other train of thought was you covered a whole range of technologies, and I was just wondering whether, for instance, a drug that has been developed is very clearly a thing that one can get one's hands around that can regulate, that can register and licence or not versus a technology like artificial intelligence is simple. It's simply there. It's in multiple different forms. It's being used in multiple different ways, and it's much less easy to imagine how one could regulate the concept of artificial intelligence whereas a specific drug might be. So those are my, I don't have a specific question, but those are two things that I was reflecting on as you were talking. Thank you. Thank you. I mean these are these are very, very important points. Is there a difference between public and private? I guess when you try to develop an ecosystem of innovation, you expect mix of the public and the private. But then again, because as you say, there is lots of risk involved there, you do need to have the role of policy to incentivise and mitigate the risk of this kind of innovations. So develop, for example, for regulatory frameworks for enabling financially those bottom up innovations to flourish. To think about the intellectual property rights framework around say indigenous knowledge and how indigenous knowledge can be used. But the other question you raise is really about complexity, and it's a question that all kinds of regulation ask when it comes to emerging technologies. But I guess my point in that lecture was more about can we think of these new technologies in a participatory way so that these technologies don't really serve the interests of just few people. Because by getting people to participate in the development of knowledge or the application of these technologies, what you do really is to include the needs of these people. Unless you get the people to participate in the development of those technologies, you don't really manage to include their needs. So therefore those technologies, the spot mini example really addresses the needs of people who want someone to open the fridge that's fine. But what about someone who really needs a fridge to keep the drugs in a place far away from the city in a developing country? I guess that's the point I'm trying to make. I think we've got time for one final question Helen from online. This is a question that's come in on Twitter from Madeline Gabriel. I'd like to know more about governance mechanisms for promoting justice and innovation. What sort of institutions do we need? Can we adapt existing institutions? Yes, I guess that's a very good question as well. I do think that we can adapt existing institutions as long as we have the right indicators in place and the right ways to think, to collect data about what's actually happening on the ground. And then as I said, think about a theory that actually can correct particular injustices with regards to those technologies. We really need to think empirically about what actually works in terms of those innovations in place. And we really need to come up with new kinds of indicators so that we can actually help the governance and the institutions of what we tend to call innovation system. Because the innovation system so far has been basically focused on top-down R&D driven technologies. It's not capable to deal with those new technologies emerging simply because the innovation system doesn't even have help from our work from the research side to deal with this. OK, thank you very much. Can we thank Theo one more time and then I'll make some concluding comments. It remains for me to say thank you for joining us this evening and for supporting the OU and the way that you have. Thank you to those who are here in person and there will be an opportunity for you to join us downstairs in a moment for some drinks and some food. And thank you everyone who's joined us online as well and the comments that they've made.