 Chapter 11 of Book 1 of Rhetoric, this is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Jeffrey Edwards. Rhetoric by Aristotle, translated by Thomas Taylor. Chapter 11 of Book 1 We must assume, therefore, how many and what things are useful and pleasant. Concerning what is useful, therefore, or advantageous, we have already spoken in the discussion of things pertaining to counsel. Let us, therefore, now speak of what is delightful, but it is requisite to think that rhetorical definitions are sufficient if, about the object which they define, they are neither obscure nor inaccurate. Let it, therefore, be supposed by us that pleasure is a certain motion of the soul and a sudden and sensible disposition of the soul in a state conformable to nature. But the pain is the contrary. Hence, if pleasure is a thing of this kind, it is evident that the pleasant is that which is effective of the above mentioned disposition. But that which is corruptive or is effective of a contrary disposition is painful. It necessarily follows, therefore, that it is pleasant to accede to that which is according to nature, as being that which has a frequency of subsistence, and especially when those things which take place according to nature have assumed their own nature. Those things also are pleasant which are done from custom. For that to which we are accustomed becomes now as it were natural, since custom is something similar to nature. For that which is frequently is near to that which is always done. But nature pertains to that which always and custom to that which frequently takes place. That likewise is pleasant which is not violent, for violence is preternatural. Hence also necessities are painful and it is rightly said, quote, painful is every necessary work, close quote. Sedulity likewise, study and strenuous endeavor are painful, bracket, for these things are necessary and violent, close bracket, unless we are accustomed to them. But thus custom renders them pleasant and the contrary to these are pleasant. Hence indolence, cessation from labor, freedom from care, mirth, recreation and sleep are in the number of pleasant things, for no one of these is attended with necessity. Everything likewise which we desire is pleasant, for desire is the appetite of that which is pleasant. Of desires, however, some are irrational, but others are attended with reason. But I call those irrational through which we do not desire things because we are rationally of opinion that they are proper for us. And desires of this kind are such as are said to be inherent in us naturally, as are those which exist through the body, such for instance as the desire of food, thirst and hunger, and also the desire of every kind of food. This is likewise the case with the desires of gustable substances, of venereal pleasures and in short of tangible objects and of what pertains to the smell of fragrance, to the hearing and the sight. But the desires attended with reason are such as are the result of persuasion, for men desire to behold and possess many things from report and persuasion. Since, however, the being delighted consists in the sensible perception of a certain passion, but the fantasy or imagination is a certain debile sense. And, both to him who remembers, and him who hopes, a certain imagination is consequent of that which he remembers or hopes. If this be the case, it is evident that pleasures are present with those that have strong memories and hopes, since sensible perception is also present with them. Hence it is necessary that all pleasant things must either consist in the sensible perception of what is present, or in the remembrance of what is past, or in the hope of what is future. For present things are the objects of sensible perception, but past things are remembered, and future events are the subjects of hope. Things therefore which are preserved in the memory are pleasant, not only such as were then delightful when they were present, but some also which were then not delightful, if afterwards they are attended with the beautiful and the good. Hence also it is said by Euripides, quote, it is pleasant when from danger free to recollect past misery, close quote. And also by Umias in the Odyssey, book 15, quote, for he who much has suffered much will know, and pleased remembrance builds delight in woe, close quote. But the cause of this is that it is also delightful not to be in possession of evil. With respect however to such things as pertain to hope, those which when present appear greatly to delight or benefit, or at least to benefit without pain, and in short such things as afford delight when present, of these the hope and the remembrance are for the most part delectable. Hence also it is pleasant to be enraged as Homer in Iliad 18 says of anger, quote, far sweeter to the soul than honey to the taste, close quote. For no one is enraged with a circumstance which it appears impossible to revenge, nor are men at all enraged, or they are enraged in a less degree with those that are far superior to them in power. A certain pleasure likewise is consequent to most desires, for men rejoice with a certain pleasure, either from remembering what they have obtained, or from the hope of what they may obtain. Thus for instance, those that in fevers are afflicted with thirst are delighted with remembering how they have drunk, and with the hope that they shall again drink. Those also who are in love are always delighted with some circumstance pertaining to the beloved object when they converse, or write, and in short in all their actions. For in everything of this kind, by recollection they fancy that they have a sensible perception as it were of the object of their love. The beginning itself likewise of love is produced in all persons when they are not only delighted with the beloved object when present, but also with the recollection of it when absent. Hence also, when they are afflicted from the absence of the object of their love, a certain pleasure is ingenerated in their grief and lamentation. For the pain which they feel arises from the beloved object not being present, but the pleasure from the remembrance and perception in a certain respect of this object, and of what he did, and what kind of a person he was. Hence also, the poet says of Achilles in Iliad 23, Thus having said, he raised in everyone and ardent wish his sorrows to be mown. Revenge likewise is pleasant, for that of which the frustration is painful, the obtaining is pleasant, but those who are enraged are pained in a transcendent degree if they cannot take revenge, but they are delighted with the hope of vengeance. To conquer also is pleasant, not only to those who are lovers of victory, but to all men, for there is an imagination of transcendency in vanquishing, of which all men possess the desire, either more or less ardently. Since however it is pleasant to conquer, those sports also must be delightful which relate to war, to playing on the pipe, and to verbal contests, for in these victory is frequently obtained. This is likewise the case with the games of dice, tennis, tables, etc., and in a similar manner with serious games. For some of these become pleasant from custom, but others are immediately pleasant, such for instance as every kind of hunting. For where there is contention, there also there is victory. Hence, the pleading of causes and contentious disputes are pleasant to those that are accustomed to, and are able to engage in them. Honor likewise and reputation are among the number of things most pleasant, because everyone imagines that he is a man of this kind, and that he is a worthy person, and more so when others assert this of him, whom he considers as persons of veracity. Such are neighbors rather than those that live at a distance, friends, acquaintances, and fellow citizens rather than foreigners, such as are now in being rather than such as are yet to be born. The prudent rather than the imprudent, and the many rather than the few, for it is more likely that the above mentioned persons should speak the truth than those of a contrary description. For with respect to such things as a man very much despises, as children or wild beasts, no one pays any attention to the honor or opinion of these, for the sake of the opinion itself, but if he does it, it is for the sake of something else. A friend likewise is among the number of delightful things, for friendly love is delectable, since no one is a lover of wine who is not pleased with wine. To be beloved also is delightful, for this causes the person beloved to imagine that he is a good man, which is desired by all men that are endued with sense. But to be beloved is for a man to be dear to another person, himself on account of himself. To be admired also by others is pleasant, on account of being honored, as the consequence of being admired. To be flattered likewise, and the flatterer himself are pleasant, for a flatterer is an apparent admirer, and an apparent friend. To do the same things frequently likewise is delightful, for what his customary is pleasing. Change also is pleasing, for it is pleasant to return to a natural condition, which is affected by mutation. For to remain always in the same state too much increases habit, and produces satiety, whence it is said by Euripides in his Orestes, quote, sweet is the change of all things, close quote. For on this account, things which are performed through intervals of time are pleasant, and the sight of our acquaintance is pleasing after some time has elapsed. For this is a mutation from the present time, and likewise that is rare which takes place through an interval of time. To learn also and to admire are for the most part delectable. For in admiration there is a desire of learning something, so that what is admirable is the object of desire. But in learning there is a transition into a condition according to nature. To benefit likewise, and to be benefited are among the number of things delectable. For to be benefited is to obtain the objects of desire. But to benefit is to possess and transcend, both which are desirable. Because however it is pleasant to have the power of benefiting, hence men are delighted in correcting the miscarriages of their neighbors, and in completing what is deficient. Since also to learn and to admire are delectable, those things must necessarily be pleasant which consist in imitation, such as painting, sculpture, and poetry, and whatever is well imitated. Though that of which it is the imitation should not be pleasing. For in this case we are not delighted with the imitation, but with the reasoning by which we know what that is which is imitated. So that it happens that we learn something. A variety likewise of unexpected accidents and narrow escapes from danger are delectable, for all these are admirable. And because that which is according to nature is pleasant, but things which are allied are naturally conjoined with each other, hence all things that are allied and similar are for the most part delightful, as man with man, horse with horse, and the young with the young. Hence also, the proverb, sameness of age is delighted with sameness of age, and always like to like, and beast knows beast, and always the blackbird to the blackbird, and others of the like kind. Since however that which is similar and allied to anything is delightful to it, but every man is especially thus affected towards himself, it necessarily follows that all men are lovers of themselves more or less, for such things as similitude and alliance are especially present with a man towards himself. But because all men are lovers of themselves, hence those things which are their own must necessarily be delightful to all men, such as their works and their orations. Hence for the most part they love their flatterers, and those that love them, they are ambitious and love their children, for children are their own works. It is likewise pleasant to give completion to things which are deficient, for it now becomes our own work, and because it is most pleasant to govern, it is likewise delightful to seem to be wise, for to be wise is a thing of a ruling nature, but wisdom is the science of many and admirable things. Further still, since men are for the most part ambitious, it necessarily follows that they are delighted to rule over and reprove their neighbors. It is likewise delectable to a man to be conversant with that in which he thinks he particularly excels. As Euripides also says, In length manner, because all recreation and relaxation is pleasant, and laughter also is among the number of things that are delectable, it necessarily follows that ridiculous things are pleasant, as well ridiculous men, as ridiculous speeches and works. Ridiculous things however are separately discussed by us in the treaties on poetry, and thus much concerning things which are delectable, but things which are painful will be manifest from the contrary to these, such therefore are the particulars for the sake of which men act unjustly. Chapter 12 Let us now consider what the condition is of men that do an injury, and who those are whom they injure. They are therefore, then indeed, prepared to do an injury, when they fancy the thing is possible to be done, and it is possible to be done by them, whether they can do it latently, or so as not to suffer punishment, though it should not be done latently. Or when they think that they may suffer punishment, indeed, but that the loss which they shall sustain by it will be less than the gain which will accrue to themselves, or to those who are the objects of their care. With respect therefore, to what appears possible to be affected, and what not, this will be afterwards explained, for these things are common to all the parts of rhetoric. These men, however, fancy themselves especially able to do an injury with impunity, who are able both to speak and act, and who are skilled in a multitude of forensic contests. Those also fancy they can escape with impunity, who have a great number of friends, and especially indeed, if they imagine themselves to be powerful in what we have mentioned, or if they are not, if they're friends, or assistants, or accomplices, are persons of this description. For through these, they may be able to affect their purpose latently, and without suffering punishment. This will also be the case if they are the friends of those that are injured, or of the judges, for friends are careless of injuries, and are reconciled before prosecution. The judges also are willing to gratify their friends, and either entirely acquit them, or inflict a small punishment. But those are adapted to be concealed, who have a disposition contrary to the alleged crimes. As for instance, a feeble man, when accused of striking another, and a poor and deformed man, when accused of adultery. This is also the case if the crime is committed very openly, and in the eyes of all men, because in short, no one would think it to be true. Or if the crimes are so great, and so many, as not to have been committed by any one person before. For men are not aware of such injuries, since all men shun those that are accustomed to act ill, in the same manner as they shun diseases. But no one avoids him that has not yet been afflicted with disease. Those likewise think they shall be concealed, who injure those who have none, or those who have many enemies. For if they injure the former, they fancy they shall be concealed, because they are not suspected. But if they injure the latter, that they shall be concealed, because it seems incredible that they would attack those who are aware of them. And because they might urge, in their defence, that they did not make the attempt, because they were certain they should find resistance. The like may be said of those who are provided with the means of concealment, or of some place, or mode of escape, which is at hand. And also of such who, if they cannot conceal themselves, can put off the cause by delay of justice, or by corrupting the judges. This too may be said of those who, if they are immersed, delay or buy off the payment, or who through poverty have nothing to lose. And of those whose gains are apparent, or great, or near, but their punishments either small or unapparent, or at a distance. Likewise, where the punishment is not equal to the profit, as appears to be the case in a tyranny, and also with those that gain by the injury, but are only disgraced by the punishment, and also with those to whom the contrary happens, that the injuries procure them a certain praise, as if it should happen, as it did to Zeno, that a man in avenging an injury, at the same time, revenges an injury done to his father or mother. But the punishments are either a fine or banishment, or something of this kind. For both these do an injury, whether it be done this way or that, though they are not the same persons, but contrary in their manners. Those likewise are audacious in committing injuries who have frequently either been concealed, or not been punished. This is likewise the case with those who have frequently failed in their attempts. For in things of this kind, in the same manner as in warlike concerns, there are some who are still prepared to renew the fight, and also with those to whom the delightful is immediately present, but the painful follows afterwards, or gain is immediate, but punishment posterior. For the intemperate are persons of this description, but there is intemperance with respect to all such things, as are the objects of desire. Those likewise confidently do an injury to whom, on the contrary, the painful is immediately present, or punishment, but the delightful and the advantageous are present afterwards and later. For the continent, and those who are more prudent, pursue things of this kind. This is also the case with those who may seem to have acted from fortune or necessity, from nature or from custom, and in short, who have erred, but have not done any injury. The like too may be said of those who have been able to obtain an equitable decision, and of such as are in want, but men are in want in a two-fold respect, either as being in want of necessaries, as is the case with the poor, or as being in want of superfluities, as is the case with the rich. Those also are prone to do injuries, who are renowned, and also those who are very infamous. The former indeed, because it will not be supposed, that they have done an injury, and the latter because they will not become at all more infamous by doing the injury. Under these circumstances, therefore, they attempt to act unjustly. Chapter 13 Men, therefore, injure those who possess things of which they are in want, whether they pertain to the necessaries, or to the superfluities of life, or to the enjoyment of pleasures. They also injure those that live at a distance, and those that live near them, for the plunder of the latter is rapid, and the punishment attending the injury done to the former is slow, as was the case with those who plundered the Carthaginians. Men likewise injure the unwary, and those who are not on their guard, but are credulous, for it is easy to deceive all these. They also injure the indolent, for it is the province of a diligent man to avenge the injuries he has received, and likewise the bashful, for these do not contend about gain. They also injure those that have been injured by many, and who do not avenge the injuries they have received, as being according to the proverb, the Michian Pray. Likewise those whom they have never, and those whom they have frequently injured, for both these are incautious, the former indeed, as having never been injured, and the latter because they expect to be injured no more. And those who are, or may easily be, scandalized, for persons of this description neither deliberately choose to avenge an injury being afraid of the judges, nor are able to persuade others that they have been injured. Among the number of which are those who are hated and injured. Likewise, men injure those against whom there is a pretext, either because they themselves, or their ancestors, or friends have acted ill, or would have acted ill, either to themselves or to their ancestors, or to those that are under their protection. For, as the proverb says, depravity only wants a pretense. Men also injure both their enemies and friends, for to injure the one is easy, and the other pleasant. Likewise, those who are without friends, and who are not skillful in speaking or acting, for, these either do not endeavor to revenge the injury they have received, or they become reconciled, or they finally affect nothing. Also those who derive no advantage in waiting for judgment and recompense, such as foreigners and handicraft tradesmen, for, these are satisfied with a small recompense for the injuries they may have received, and such men easily cease from prosecution. Men likewise injure those who have already done many injuries to others, or who have done such injuries as they now suffer, for it seems to be something near to the not doing an injury when anyone suffers an injury, as he is accustomed to do to others. I say for instance, as if a man should chastise him who acted insolently towards others. They also injure those who have acted ill, or who have wished to do so, or have this wish at present, or intend to do an injury hereafter, for it is attended both with the pleasant and the beautiful, and this appears to be near to not acting unjustly. Men likewise injure those in injuring whom they gratify their friends, or those whom they admire, or love, or their masters, or in short, those with whom they live, and from whom they expect to obtain some good, and also those whom they have falsely accused, and their friendship with whom is dissolved. For things of this kind appear to be near to the doing no injury, as was the case between Calypus and Dion. They likewise injure those who, unless they were injured by them, would be oppressed by others, as if with these there was no longer any place for consultation. As Anisodemus is reported to have written to Galo, when Calabria would have been depopulated by him, that he anticipated him as if he intended to have done the same thing himself. Also those to whom, if they have injured them, they may do many things justly by way of satisfaction. As Jason of Thessaly said, it is necessary to act unjustly in some things in order that we may be able to do many just things. Men likewise act unjustly in those things in which all or many persons are accustomed to act injuriously, for they fancy they shall obtain pardon for thus acting, also in those things which can easily be concealed. But things of this kind are such as are easily consumed, such as escalant substances, or which are easily changed, either in their figure, or color, or temperament, or which may easily be concealed in many places. But things of this kind are such as are portable, and which may be concealed in small places, and which also resemble many things, which he that did the injury possessed before. Men likewise commit injuries in those things which those who are injured are ashamed to disclose, such as insolent and indecent behavior towards the wife of a man, or towards himself, or his children. They also injure others in those things which show the prosecutor to be a contentious person. But things of this kind are such as are of small consequence, and for which pardon is granted. And thus we have nearly shown how men are capacitated when they do an injury, in what things they act unjustly, what kind of men they injure, and on what account. Chapter 14 Let us now distinguish between all unjust and just deeds, first beginning from hints. Just and unjust deeds, therefore, are divided with reference to two laws, and with reference to the persons to whom they relate in two ways. But I call law either proper or common, and the proper indeed is not which the several cities and nations have established among themselves. And of this law, one part is not written, but the other part is written. But common law is that which is according to nature, for there is something which is just, and something which is unjust in common naturally, and which all men prophetically pronounce to be so, though they have no communion nor compact with each other. And this, the antigony of Sophocles appears to imitate when she asserts that it is just to bury Polynesus, though forbidden to do so by Creon the king, because this is naturally just. Quote, nor could I ever think a mortal's law of power or strength sufficient to abrogate the unwritten law divine, immutable, eternal, not like these of yesterday, but made ere time began. Close quote. And as empedically says, with respect to not slaying that which is animated, for this is not indeed just to some persons, but not just to others. Quote, but a fixed law in all men's breasts, where air, heaven's light, immense shines through, wide ruling air. Close quote. And this is also confirmed by Alcidamus in his Messeniac oration. The persons, however, to whom the just and the unjust are referred, are distinguished in a twofold respect. For what ought, and what ought not to be done, is either referred to the community or to one individual of the community. Hence also, with respect to unjust and just deeds, it is possible to act justly and unjustly in two ways. Viz, towards one definite person, or towards the community. For he who commits adultery, or strikes a man, injures some definite person, but he who does not fight for his country, injures the community. Since, therefore, all unjust deeds receive a twofold division, and some have a reference to the community, but others to different private persons, after repeating what it is to be injured, we shall explain the rest. To be injured, therefore, is to suffer unjustly, by those who act voluntarily, for we have before defined the injuring another person to be a voluntary deed. Since, however, he who is injured is necessarily hurt, and is hurt unwillingly. What hurts are, indeed, is evident from what has been before said. For good and evil have been already essentially distinguished, and voluntary deeds are such as men perform knowingly. Hence it is necessary that all crimes should either be committed against the community or against an individual, and this either by one who is ignorant or by one who is unwillingly, or by one who acts willingly and knowingly. And of these crimes, some are the result of deliberate choice, but others are the effect of passion. Concerning the crimes, therefore, which are produced from anger, we shall speak when we discuss the passions, and we have already shown what are the objects of deliberate choice, and how men are disposed with respect to them. Since, however, frequently, men who confess that they have done a thing of which they are accused, either deny the name by which the accuser calls the deed, and inscribes the accusation, or deny the thing which is signified by the inscription, as, for instance, that the thing was taken, indeed, but not stolen, and that such a one gave the first blow, but did not act insolently, and associated with the woman, indeed, but did not commit adultery with her, or that he committed a theft, not sacrilege, bracket, for he took nothing consecrated to divinity, close bracket, or that he broke up land, but not belonging to the public, or that he discoursed with the enemy, but did not betray his country. On these accounts, it will be requisite to define what theft, insulin conduct, and adultery are, in order that, if we wish to show these offenses were committed or not, we may be able to declare what is just. Everything, however, of this kind pertains to the question whether the thing is unjust and wicked, or is not unjust, for depravity and acting unjustly consist in deliberate choice, but appellations of this kind pre-signify deliberate choice, as, for instance, insulin conduct and theft, for it does not follow that he who strikes another acts entirely insolently towards him, but then only if he strikes him for the sake of insulting him, as, for instance, with a view to disgrace him, or to please himself, nor does it entirely follow that if a man receives anything latently, that he has stolen it, but if he takes it away with a view to the detriment of him from whom he takes it, and of his own advantage. The like also takes place in other things, in the same manner as in these. Since, however, there are two species of just and unjust things, for some indeed are written, but others are not committed to writing, of those indeed which are proclaimed by the laws we have already spoken, but of those which are not committed to writing, these are two species. And of these, some indeed consist in the excess of virtue and vice, in which are disgrace and praise, ignominy and honor and gifts, such, for instance, as to be grateful to a benefactor to benefit him who benefits, and to be ready to give assistance to friends, and other things of the like kind. But others are a supplement to the proper and written law, for the equitable appears to be just, and the equitable is that which is just, besides what is enjoined in the written law. This, however, happens partly against the will, and partly with the will of the legislators. Against their will, indeed, when the crime is latent, but with their will, when they are unable to define the thing. And it is necessary, indeed, to assert universally that the thing does not thus subsist always, but for the most part. Legislators also omit certain things willingly, which it is not easy to determine on account of their infinity. As, for instance, when they ordain a punishment for striking a man with iron, they omit to determine the quantity and the quality of the iron. For life would not be sufficient to enumerate things of this kind. Therefore, anything is indefinite, but it is requisite to make a law concerning it. The legislator must necessarily promulgate the law simply. Hence, if a man having a ring on his finger lifts up his hand against, or strikes another person, according to the written law, indeed, he is guilty and acts unjustly. But in reality, he does not act unjustly by striking him with his ring. And this is the equitable. If, then, what we have said be equity, it is evident what kind of things are equitable and not equitable, and also what kind of men are not equitable. For those things are equitable in which it is necessary to grant pardon. It is likewise equitable not to estimate errors and injuries as deserving equal punishment, nor errors and misfortunes. But misfortunes are such things as happen contrary to expectation and not from depravity. Errors are such things as do not happen contrary to expectation and are not from depravity. But injuries are such things as are not affected contrary to expectation, but proceed from depravity. For what proceeds from desire emanates from depravity. It is likewise equitable to pardon human frailties. Also, not to direct our attention to the law but the legislator. And not to look to the action but to the deliberate intention of him who did it. Nor to a part of a thing but the whole. Nor to consider what kind of a person a man is now, but what he always was or for the most part. It is also the province of an equitable man rather to remember the good than the evil which he has received from another and to be more mindful of the good which he has received than of the good which he has done. Also to endure the being injured patiently and to be more willing that a controversy should be decided by words than by deeds. He is likewise more desirous that a thing should be decided by arbitration than by the suffrages of judges. For an arbitrator looks to the equitable but a judge looks to the law and recourse is had to an arbitrator for the sake of this viz that the equitable may prevail and thus much concerningly equitable. Chapter 15 Those injuries however are greater which proceed from greater injustice. Hence also sometimes the least injuries are attended with the greatest injustice. Thus for instance Calistratus accused Melanopus for having defrauded the builders of the temple of three sacred vessels of an inconsiderable value but the contrary takes place in justice. These however are the greatest injuries because they transcend in power for he who stole these three sacred vessels would have committed any other unjust act. Sometimes therefore the injury is thus greater but sometimes it is judged to be greater from the harm that ensues. That injury also is considered to be greater to which no punishment is equal but every punishment is less than it deserves and likewise that for which there is no remedy because it is difficult to apply such a remedy. Also that for which the sufferer can obtain no recompense for the evil is incurable since justice and punishments are the remedies of injuries. Likewise if the sufferer and he who is injured cannot endure the attendant ignominy for in this case he who did the injury deserves to be punished in a still greater degree. Thus Sophocles when pleading for Ectimon who had been used insolently slew himself said that he who had done the injury ought not to be punished in a less degree than he had punished himself who had been injured. The injury likewise is greater which a man does alone or the first of all men or with a few associates. The injury also is considered as greater which is often committed and also that for the prevention of which laws have been explored. Thus in Argos those are punished on whose account some new law is established or a prison is built. The injury likewise is greater which is more brutal and also that which is more premeditated. Likewise that which excites in the hearer of it terror rather than pity and rhetorical formula indeed are of this kind viz that a man has subverted from the faith and conjugal vows for this is an exuberance of many injuries and also that a man has committed an injury there where those that act unjustly are punished as is the case with false witnesses for where will not he do an injury who commits one in a court of justice. Likewise that a man has done an injury which is attended with the greatest shame and that he has injured him or has been benefited for such a one multiplies injuries because he acts ill and likewise does not act well. Also the injury is greater which a man does against the unwritten laws for it is the province of a better man to be just not from necessity but voluntarily. Written laws therefore are observed from necessity but this is not the case with unwritten laws but after another manner the injury is greater against the written laws for he who acts unjustly in those things in which he may be terrified by punishment will much more act unjustly in those things for which no punishment is ordained and thus much concerning a greater and a less injury. Chapter 16 It follows in the next place that we should discuss what are called inartificial credibility for these are peculiar to forensic rations in number vis the laws witnesses examinations and an oath in the first place therefore let us speak about laws how they are to be used both by him that exhorts and him who dissuades by him who accuses and him who defends for it is evident that if the written law indeed is contrary to the affair the common law must be used and equity as being more just and it is also evident that the best decision will be given when the written laws are not entirely used. The equitable likewise always remains and never changes and this too is the case with common law for it is according to nature but written laws are frequently changed hence also it is said in the Antigone of Sophocles bracket for Antigone says as an apology that she acted contrary to the law of Creon but not contrary to the unwritten law close bracket quote nor can I ever think a mortal's law of power or strength sufficient to abrogate the unwritten law divine immutable eternal not like these of yesterday but made airtime began shall man persuade me then to violate heaven's great commands and make the gods my foes close quote it is likewise evident that the just is something true advantageous but not that which seems to be so so that what is written is not law for it does not perform the work of law it may likewise be said that a judge is like an assayer of silver and gold for it is his province to distinguish what is truly just from what is adulterate and also that it is the business of a better man rather to use unwritten then written laws and to abide by their decision it must likewise be considered whether the law in force is contrary to a law which is approved or is itself contrary to itself and when the when law commands all contracts to be firmly observed and the other forbids any contracts to be made contrary to law it must also be considered whether the law is ambiguous so that it may be distorted and then it must be seen to what part the just is to be adapted or the advantageous and afterwards the law is to be used if also the things for which the law was established no longer remain but the law itself remains this we must endeavor to render manifest and thus the law must be opposed by showing that things being changed the law also is to be changed and abrogated but if the written law is adapted to the occasion or the fact then it must be said as the result of the best decision that the law was established not for the sake of contrary to law but in order that he may not be perjured who may happen to be ignorant what the law says it must likewise be asserted that no one chooses that which is simply good but that which is good to himself and that it makes no difference whether laws are not established or are not used likewise that in other acts it is of no advantage to dispute against the masters of them thus for instance it is not expedient for anyone who is sick to dispute against the prescriptions of the physician for the error of the physician is not so injurious as it is to be accustomed to disobey a ruler to endeavor likewise to become wiser than the laws is that which is forbidden in celebrated laws and thus much concerning laws with respect to witnesses however there are two kinds for some are ancient but others modern and of the latter are seekers of danger but others are exempt from it but I call ancient witnesses the poets and other illustrious persons whose judgments and opinions are manifest thus the Athenians made use of Homer as a witness about Salimus the Tenedians of Periander the Corinthian against the Sygeans and Cleopon made use of the elegies of Solon against Cridius in order that he might show that this was formally condemnatious for otherwise Solon would never have said quote bid Cridius with his yellow locks his father's will obey close quote such therefore are the witnesses about things that are past but with respect to future events those who interpret oracles are witnesses as for instance the Mysticles when he said that the wooden wall mentioned by the oracle signified that the Athenians must be take themselves to their ships Proverbs also are witnesses thus if someone should deliberate whether he should form a friendship with an old man the proverb testifies what he is to do which says never confer a benefit on an old man thus also for him who deliberates whether he shall slay the children whose parents he has likewise slain there is this proverb he is a fool who having slain the father leaves the children modern or recent witnesses however who have no share in the danger are such as being illustrious have given a decision in a court of justice for the judgments of these men are useful in the confirmation of what is doubtful thus Ubalus in a court of justice employed against Charis what Plato had said against Archibius that it was common in the city for men to acknowledge themselves to be depraved those also are recent witnesses who partake of the danger of being punished if they appear to have given false evidence persons therefore of this description are alone witnesses in things of this kind viz whether the thing has been done or not and whether it is or not but they are not witnesses concerning the quality of the thing as whether it is just or unjust advantageous or disadvantageous remote witnesses however are the most worthy of belief in things of this kind but the ancients are most worthy of belief for they cannot be corrupted the credibility however derived from witnesses is to be employed as follows when indeed there are no witnesses it is necessary to judge from probabilities and this it is to employ the best decision probabilities also cannot be corrupted by money and they are not condemned for giving a false testimony but he who has witnesses ought to say to him that has not that witnesses may be tried and punished but probabilities cannot it may also be added that there would be no occasion for witnesses if arguments from probabilities were sufficient testimonies however are either concerning ourselves or concerning our opponents and some indeed are concerning the thing itself but others concerning the manners of persons hence it is manifest that we can never be in want of useful testimony for if the testimony does not relate to the thing it will either be favorable to the defendant or adverse to the plaintiff but the testimony respecting manners will either evince our probity or the depravity of our opponent other particulars however respecting a witness whether he be a friend or an enemy or neither whether he be a man of reputation or an infamous character or neither and whatever other differences there may be of the like kind must be derived from the same places from which enthamemes are derived with respect to compacts an aeration is so far useful as it increases or diminishes their authority or so far as it renders them credible or unworthy of belief for it is favorable to the speaker to show that the compacts possess credibility and authority but the contrary is favorable to the opponent. The same arguments therefore are to be employed in showing the compacts are worthy or unworthy of belief as we have employed in the affair of witnesses for such as those persons are who have subscribed and signed the compacts with respect to being worthy or unworthy of belief such also are the compacts when however it is acknowledged by the litigants that compacts were made if this acknowledgement is appropriate and the authority of the compacts is to be increased for a compact is a private law and is of a partial nature and compacts indeed do not give authority to the law but the laws give authority to legal compacts and in short the law itself is a certain compact so that he who disbelieves in and subverts the contract subverts the laws further still many contracts and voluntary transactions so that if compacts lose their authority the intercourse of men with each other must be subverted other things also which are adapted to the conformation of compacts the orator will perceive by himself but if the compacts are adverse to the cause and favorable to the opponents in the first place those are adapted to the purpose which someone may urge to invalidate the force of the contrary law for it is absurd that we should think laws obeyed which have not been established rightly but by fraud and that we should not think it necessary to observe compacts which have been rightly made in the next place it must be said that a judge is a dispensator of what is just and therefore that his attention is not to be directed to the observance of the compacts but to that which is more just and the just indeed is not to be perverted either by fraud or by necessity or by natural subsistence but compacts are made both by persons who are deceived and those who are compelled in addition to these things also it is requisite to consider whether the compact is contrary to any written or common law and to things just or beautiful and besides this whether it is contrary to any posterior or prior contracts for either the posterior contracts are binding but the prior have no or the prior are right but the posterior fallacious and thus this contrariety of compacts may be employed with advantage again it will be expedient to see whether the compacts are in any way adverse to the judges and to direct the attention to other things of the like kind for these things may in a similar manner be easily perceived examinations also and torments are certain testimonies and they seem to possess credibility because a certain necessity is present with them there is no difficulty therefore in perceiving what relates to these things and in narrating what is contingent to them as also in discussing those particulars which if they are adapted to our purpose we may amplify by asserting that these alone are true testimonies but if they are against us and favorable to our opponent then the evidence may be invalidated by speaking against the whole genus of examinations and torments for men through compulsion no less assert what is false than what is true since they endure in order that they may not speak the truth and readily assert what is false in order that they may be more swiftly liberated from pain for collateral confirmation also it is requisite that examples should be adduced with which the judges are acquainted with respect to oaths however there is a four fold consideration for we either give and take an oath or we do neither or we do the one but not the other and of these either an oath is given but not taken or it is taken but not given again either we have sworn before and are accused by our opponent of perjury or the opponent swears and is accused of perjury he therefore who does not offer an oath to his opponent may say that men are easily perjured and that his opponent if he should take an oath would not restore the money but if he did not take an oath he should think the judges would condemn him he may also add that as the affair is dangerous it is better to commit it to the judges for he believes in them but not in his opponent he likewise who does not take the oath which is offered him may say that he does not take it because he is unwilling to swear for money and that if he was a bad man he would take an oath for it is better to be depraved for the sake of something than for the sake of nothing for by taking an oath he will obtain money but otherwise not he is not taking an oath therefore will be the effect of virtue and will not be the consequence of the fear of perjury the saying of Xenophonies likewise may be adapted to this affair that the challenge is not equal of an impious against a pious man but is just as if a strong man should call upon a weak man to fight with him he also who takes an oath may say that he takes it because he confides in himself but not in his opponent and by inverting the assertion of Xenophonies he may say that the challenge is equal if an impious man offers but a pious man takes an oath and that it is a dreadful thing he should not be willing to swear respecting those things for which he thinks and the judges should pass sentence on those that take an oath but if he offers an oath he may say that it is pious to be willing to commit the affair to the gods and that there is no occasion for his opponent to require any other judges since the judgment of the cause is committed to him through an oath he may likewise say that it is absurd that his opponent should not be willing to swear concerning those things about which he requires others i.e. the judges to swear since however the manner in which we ought to speak according to each of these four modes is evident it is likewise evident how we ought to speak according to these modes when combined as for instance if a man is willing indeed to take but not to give an oath or if he gives but is unwilling to take it or if he is willing both to give and take it or is willing to do neither for a combination must necessarily be made from the above mentioned modes so that arguments also must necessarily be composed from them if however anyone has before taken an oath and which is contrary to the present oath it must be said that there is no perjury for to do an injury is a voluntary thing but things which are done by violence and fraud are involuntary hence therefore it must be inferred that injury is committed in the mind and not in the mouth but if the opponent has before sworn and is now unwilling to abide by his oath it must be said that he subverts all things who does not adhere to what he has sworn for on this account also judges that have taken an oath use the laws and it may likewise be said in the way of amplification shall we rejoice indeed that you judges should abide in the decision which you have made after taking an oath and shall not we abide in the oaths which we have taken and such other things as may be said for the purpose of amplification and thus much concerning in artificial credibility End of Chapter 16 of Book 1 Recording in memory of Mitchell Edwards