 Well, ladies and gentlemen, we're back and thank you very much. We're here for our last panel, which is a very important panel We are going to now look at policy recommendations to boost cooperation in the South China Sea For anybody who's new either here or online, I'm Ernie Bauer I'm the Sumitra chair for Southeast Asian Studies here at CSIS and it's an honor to to chair this Eminent panel. I'd like to introduce our panelists. They will each take about 10 minutes Each of them is going to focus on somewhat different areas of Recommendations, there may be some overlap. It wouldn't be a South China Sea conference without some overlapping Sorry about that Anyway, let me start by introducing my colleague here at CSIS Bonnie Glazer She is the senior advisor for Asia in the Freeman chair in China Studies where she works on issues related to Chinese foreign security policy Bonnie is Has just returned from the Shangri-La dialogue. She spends about half her time out in the hustings in Asia Talking with colleagues from from all the different Asian countries about these issues. So I'm really looking forward to Bonnie's perspective Next we have Leo Bernard or Leonardo Bernard. He's a research fellow with the Center for International Law or CIL at the National University of Singapore and focuses on Law of the Sea especially the South China Sea maritime boundaries disputes as well as ASEAN International dispute resolution and public law. So he is Leo is has an excellent background to share some views here, and I suppose Leo you were also at the At Shangri-La. Is that right? You actually you actually got to avoid that. It's very well done Christian LaMaire is our third panelist. He's working with the Defense and Military Analysis program at IIS He's responsible and for ensuring the quality of the Institute's maritime analysis and information on maritime capabilities He's written extensively on these issues, and I think he were you there too at Shangri-La? Yes, okay So two of three where we're at the Shangri-La dialogue all three have come from recently from Singapore So we have they have that in common Bonnie. Let me ask you to kick off and and lead our discussion Thank You Ernie and thanks to the Sumitra chair for Organizing this this conference for the the third annual And I attend many conferences on the South China Sea and Southeast Asia issues This is really one of the one of the best and it's been a terrific two days of discussions So I will try to add my perspective and a few policy recommendations and some of the issues that we have been talking about over the last couple of days There was some discussion yesterday about the need for ASEAN unity and centrality And so I want to start by endorsing this There was reference of course to the fact that there were some Fishers that emerged in ASEAN last year that made it more difficult to manage the South China Sea As Carl Thayer noted yesterday cooperation within ASEAN is proceeding more smoothly this year There obviously has been some progress toward negotiations on a code of conduct And I understand that the Chinese have said that sometime this month they may Begin negotiations So I would start by saying that a code of conduct that is robust Is is it is important and it should not take Many many years to negotiate as the DOC did I think that it is Probably correct that this simple undertaking of negotiations may tamp down tensions to some extent The process is important. Nevertheless, it is the product that is important as well And just as our acting assistant secretary Jo Yun said yesterday I think it's critically important that this code be legally binding and that it contains a dispute settlement mechanism It must be more effective than the DOC I would also say that there is a need to really define Concepts like the status quo and again Jo Yun talked yesterday about what is a U.S. Position that I agree with that there should be no unilateral change in the status quo But sometimes I think it's not too clear as to what that means when The Philippines which is currently now trying to reinforce an existing position that it has had I think since 1999 on second Thomas Shull China claims that that is now a Provocation and a unilateral change in the status quo. I'm not taking a position on this either way I'm just pointing out that it is unclear Whether it is the Philippines in this case that is changing the status quo or China depending on what On how you interpret that concept and you could say the same thing about the Scarborough Shoal last year I would personally argue again just my opinion and gosh I'm not a lawyer and my head is still spinning from the last panel But it seems to me that when the Philippines brought in a Cutter to arrest the Chinese fishermen that were poaching in the Scarborough Shoal It seemed to me that they had the the intent to Investigate what the Chinese fishermen were doing and then had the intention to withdraw They were not seeking to unilaterally change the status quo of that the The Scarborough Shoal, so I think that there's a it would be helpful To define these terms if we don't I wonder whether Having a new document as the code of conduct is indeed to going to solve the problems that we're all facing I Think it's also important. I'm just to add a last point on the ASEAN issue that ASEAN should not allow China to isolate Members that are pursuing policies that it doesn't favor. I personally felt that it was Disappointing that ASEAN remains silent about the Scarborough Shoal incident last year because that in fact led to led China to make conclusions and has led to many more problems and indeed Perhaps has contributed to the way that China is handling Not only the second Thomas Shoal, but also the situation in East China Sea with the Senkakus Diuyu I said yesterday in a question that I asked Joe Yun that I Very much endorse the decision by the Philippines to submit these Maritime disputes for arbitration. I also think that international law should be applied in any possible way To manage this issue. I had recommended I think last year at this conference that countries take their disputes To international courts for for for settlement. So I think this is a positive step and as I said yesterday Only the US, Japan and Vietnam as far as I have Based on my research have backed this move Again, I think that other countries should offer their support if if other countries Back this effort indeed is noted by one of our speakers in the last panel This could motivate claimants to resolve the dispute possibly before the judgment is made And so I think if you have a lot of countries that step up and endorse not the outcome not a final ruling But just the decision by the Philippines to take this for arbitration. Perhaps that could influence How China approaches this this case? I think other claimants should consider filing similar cases Perhaps Vietnam would be a good candidate, but it would likely first have to revise its baselines I think the China should consider preempting a ruling on the court by defining its nine-dash line in accordance With international law and I think that we that all the countries in the region would face a very negative outcome if the ruling In whether it's on the nine-dash line or some of the other issues that are raised that are handed down against China And then China ignores the ruling I think that that would have very negative consequences for the region as Anxieties grow about whether a more powerful China will act in accordance with international law Other panelists I think we're going to talk about resource issues So I think that I will skip over that and I will just talk a little bit about the need for more Confidence-building measures and conflict avoidance measures And I think I've probably made some of these points last year when I was on this panel, but good ideas are worth repeating The DOC includes confidence-building measures a notification of other parties in advance of Military exercises for example of exchanging information China continues to call for implementation of the DOC And negotiation of the COC of course could take some time although I hope it doesn't so Implementation of the DOC is really not a bad idea in the meantime And there really are some some good provisions the DOC Includes potential cooperative activities such as safety of navigation and communication at sea and those haven't been adequately Implemented either so I think that those should be there. We should create opportunities For those to be discussed between China and and ASEAN. There are other areas of cooperation such as Sea environment protection, which I think was raised by Dr. Sung from Taiwan yesterday scientific research at sea, search and rescue activities and Humanitarian assistance disaster relief activities There's also been I think some reference today as well as last year to ways to promote operational safety among navies one of those is the West Pacific Naval Symposium Code for unalerted encounters at sea, which is known as cues that was established in 2000 and includes Specific safety measures and procedures to be followed when ships and aircraft come into contact compliance with that is now voluntary But could be made compulsory Another recommendation that I would put forward is the establishment of a South China Sea Coast Guard Forum that could promote cooperation on a multitude of maritime security and legal issues such a Coast Guard Forum could share information and best practices Finally, I would recommend the establishment of something like a South China Sea information Sharing Center that would provide a platform to improve awareness knowledge and Communication among parties and could also serve as an accountability mechanism If states are required to document any incidents that take place and those could then be Presented to the center. So these are models that in some ways have been applied elsewhere other parts of the world but could be applied to the Specific situation in the South China Sea and I'll stop there Bonnie. Thank you very much I want I want to thank you for nailing it at ten minutes perfectly Obviously a seasoned conference speaker Leo not to put any pressure on you You're next Hi, good morning everyone. Thank you. Mr. Chairman. Thank you CSIS for having me here The next ten minutes I'm going to talk about the possibility of joint development entering the joint development arrangement in the South China Sea and I know this has been alluded yesterday and in the previous panel as well Henry mentioned that in the joint development is one of the options when we have a Where we can have a temporary solution in the South China Sea I'm going to start with just giving you a Brief background of what is joint development and the legal basis of joint development in the United Nations Convention of the law of the sea or own clause before I'm And after that I will go to the three elements that I want to discuss from the joint development the first is the setting aside the dispute to enter into joint development and then the elements of without prejudice to the final agreement and identifying area for joint development Now joint development arrangement is a form of provisional arrangement that own cause Actually laid down Specifically saying that if there's a dispute on maritime boundaries Pending the final agreement of that Dispute then all parties should enter to enter into should give all efforts to enter into a provisional arrangement of a practical nature and This is the legal basis of joint development if you want to see if you want to look for the legal basis on own clause and Join development has a lot of form and I think Bonnie also mentioned earlier just just now that it can be a form in the form of cooperation and preservation of marine environment it can be a cooperation of Exploiting hydrocarbon resources in the disputed area or in the form of fisheries management in the disputed area Now I want to go to the first Thing that we need to think about if we want to consider joint development, which is setting aside dispute It seems easy there's like to set aside a dispute and agree to join development But it's actually probably one of the hardest part because it takes a lot of political will to actually to agree to do that and The problem in the South China Sea context is the rhetoric within the each claimants that claimant state is Has made makes it difficult for the claimants to set aside the dispute What when when you when we have rhetoric such as undisputed sovereignty we have full sovereignty and There's no dispute. It's all ours. This makes it difficult for the state to actually Turn back and try to agree on a joint development some kind of joint development development arrangement I suggest that Each claimants actually and you know not not only all claimants actually guilty for this But by stroking the fire of nationalism in their domestic political environment in around such an issue But rather I think they have to think of Coming out with a better rhetoric rather than undisputed sovereignty Undisputed claim maybe just say look we have sovereignty in this future We recognize other state might have claims, but we have the we have the strongest legal claim and the others Doesn't have any legal strong legal claim on on the on the on the features now if if you have that if you start with that rhetoric that actually Recognizing the the claim the possible claim of other claimants without actually giving out your Sovereignty of the future as well and that actually opens the door to possible a lot of Possibility for a cooperation in the disputed area, but it takes a lot of political will Right and you have to educate your domestic citizens about That entering or agreeing or recognizing that Maybe another state has a claim over that territory over your territory Doesn't mean that you're giving up sovereignty of that territory. I think that's very important Which leads to my second element of joint development, which is without prejudice This is a very important element and I think Unless you're a lawyer you don't really grasp Like the delay man lay person don't really grasp the notion of without prejudice Which means that you're setting aside the dispute, but you're still maintain your basic position You're not giving up your sovereignty. You're not giving up your claim your basic position is maintained. What you do is You just setting aside the dispute look We I have so I have complete sovereignty and you said you have complete sovereignty Let's Take that aside and agree to cooperation Right. It's not that you're giving up your sovereignty. It's not that you're giving up your basic position so this is something that all States in the South China Sea Need to do before they agree to enter into any kind of joint development And of course when you agree to enter into joint development Then you have to have restraints and this is also actually mentioned in article 74 and 83 of Unclass that you shouldn't do anything to jeopardize the reaching of the final agreement, which means You have to maintain the status quo Which means you're not allowed to have unilateral action that made change that might change the nature of the disputed area So that's another important element in the Before entering into the joint development The last element that I want to discuss is how to define the area for joint development we have a really good discussion yesterday about How you need to clarify the claims before you even want to think about joint development and as a lawyer I totally agree with that. It's it's great if you can clarify the claims because if you have a Clear area of dispute it is easier to define or to identify Areas that's a possible for joint development However, I want to challenge actually the parties To identify areas that possible for joint development anyway without clarifying the claims It seems Impossible, but actually it's not because if you see the map there are We're not talking about joint development of the whole South China Sea That's just doesn't make sense, right? And you have to remember that joint development is actually a second option compared to the maritime final maritime boundary agreement So this is only a temporary solution, which I when a lot of case I hope it can be a permanent temporary solution But let's start with a temporary solution so you have to remember you want to narrow down the area as small as possible for joint development and Without clarifying the claims, I would argue that it is still possible To have a certain area for a model for joint development in South China Sea Take the Scarborough show for examples. I don't have a laser pointer, but the Scarborough show is located Quite in the north side of the north right of the map and it's only claimed by China and the Philippines Oh, thank you very much I'm not a geographer, so I'm not really good. So Greg Maybe can correct, but I think it's around here somewhere the Scarborough show like Nong Hong and Professor the Castro yesterday actually mentioned that Back in the days the fishermen from China and Philippines actually fished there peacefully along each alongside each other and Dr. The Castro yesterday bring out like why can't we go back to that status quo? Indeed, why can't we go back to that status quo? We don't need to for China to clarify What is the nine dash line? We don't need to for the Philippines to clarify. What is their utter limit of their? 200 nautical miles both agrees that they've been Traditionally have fish in the Scarborough show Why can't you just set aside a dispute don't bother with what do you mean with the nan dash line? What do you mean with your claim? What do you mean with the KIG? Just set aside the dispute sit down and talk about some kind of a fisheries corporation that you can enter into in the Scarborough show Right. It is possible to enter into this without Without sacrificing your claim and without clarifying your claim at the same time if you want to talk about Vietnam It is a bit more tricky because of the dispute and Paracel is highly sensitive China I don't want to talk about it Vietnam is very sensitive about it as well but historically China and Philippines has managed to agree on maritime boundaries in the Gulf of Tonkin, which is a good a good sign that they can actually agree on a Very sensitive area of dispute like I would I would recommend like maybe because Paracel is somewhere over here if I'm not mistaken Maybe it's areas over here See this treadling between the boundaries of EZ between of the middle Medium line of possible EZ between Vietnam and China over here just above the Sprat least Islands but below the Paracel so this may be a possible area where Vietnam and China can do some can explore the possibility of hydrocarbon exploration possibilities over there it's it's less controversial in a sense and it's doesn't involve Philippines So it's just bilateral between China and Vietnam If you want to be more controversial, I guess you can look at the spread is over here And like the some of the larger islands of the Spratley that might generate easy I think it's located somewhere over here in the northern part of the Spratley if you want to have a Multilateral joint development, maybe you can agree on area somewhere over here Just north of the Spratleys between well, maybe let's say the three main claimants China, Philippines and Vietnam then you can agree on the area of to join develop This area see the hydrocarbon possibilities or maybe Turn it into a marine preservation area. It's it's possible All right, so we can't we can't really be stuck in you have to clarify the claim you have to clarify the area of dispute because You know as much as I want to have that Clarified it's because it will make life easier for sure But again, it doesn't guarantee that it will settle the dispute we heard yesterday it might actually sharpen the dispute and Going from our colleagues from China It's very unlikely that China will clarify what What the nine-design means so we can't be hung up on clarifying the claims But sometimes we just have to agree to set aside the dispute Identify a specific area where we can agree that you have claimed I have claimed My claim might be stronger than yours, but let's set it aside and agree on joint development And I think that's still a possibility Whatever the result of the arbitration tribunal is and with that note and my presentation. Thank you very much question Thank you any and I just like to breakfast my comments by saying That I'm delighted to be here at the invitation of the CSIS and I'm particularly happy to be involved on this the most gender balanced of all panels of the conference so far Now there's a there's a danger of being a last speaker that anything of import and interest has already been said And I think that's certainly the case with the previous speakers. We've had over the last day and a half So I could just stop here, but I'm going to continue and hopefully fool you all collectively into thinking I'm saying something of interest to you And I'm going to focus on particular a very practical policy recommendations within the South China Sea that are specific to the regional states And therefore the US is largely excluded from this although it could act as an advisor and even an ancillary involvement in these various recommendations and I would place the various policy areas That these recommendations sit under into four separate categories, which we could rather pithily called the four C's and Appropriately called the four C's The first of which and it's been discussed Significantly over the last day or so is clarification And I would say that clarification of claims does not lie entirely with just China as well The various other disputants should also look towards clarifying their claims For instance when Vietnam claims the entirety of the Spratly Islands does it include James Shull in that which China clearly does And also clarification as has already been discussed of the maritime features in the South China Sea What are they what they can note and what are their maritime entitlements? The second policy area will be a collaboration and this follows on quite closely from the first One could imagine in the clarification of the maritime features and their their entitlements a form of collaborative Series of working groups between the various disputants This would also help in segregating out the various disputes because there's not just one dispute in the South China Sea There are really four maybe more So for instance you could have the disputants to the Paracel Islands China Vietnam Taiwan Involving the working group in trying to outline exactly what features there are in the Paracels and what they're entitled to Similarly all six disciplines to the Spratly Islands, but only three disputants to the Scarborough Shull Obviously you run up across the very difficult issue of what to do with Taiwan And that points to the fact that many of these recommendations are very realizable Some of them may be very unfeasible, but they could also act as ideals to which you could Gradually try and pursue some policies to work towards Now Leo is just talking extensively about joint development, which is very laudable. I wonder whether there might also be some Utility in looking at joint prohibition as a collaborative policy area as well The unilateral Chinese fishing ban for instance if we were to turn that into a multilateral fishing ban with the proviso that it's to To keep safe for future generations fishing stocks and make sure they're not entirely depleted that would undermine and undercut the concept this is a Chinese policy in its own sovereign waters and it's more an actual regional collaborative policy instead I would definitely recommend Bonnie's point on the South China Sea Coast Guard Forum Which could mirror the North Pacific Coast Guard Forum already exists and involves Coast Guards from Often very contentious or rival nations such as Russia China the US And following on from that if we are looking at areas of joint prohibition or joint development Could we in the future conceive of joint or coordinated patrols in these areas by either law enforcement Agencies or even military agencies China already has coordinated patrols on the Mekong River That it's been pursuing for the last two years. I think Could it look towards a similar development in the South China Sea? Military operations other than war by the military themselves are also very useful and Bonnie pointed out search and rescue in HADR Search and rescue has been a key area for the Arctic Council and was in fact the first legally binding Arctic Council resolution Two years ago HADR will be the focus of ASEAN exercises involving China this year as well so there's obviously areas that The various militaries can coordinate there to slowly build confidence Avoiding incidents at sea is also a very collaborative measure one could pursue Now this wouldn't necessarily involve mirroring the INCSE agreement from 72 between the US and Soviet Union But it could incorporate elements of it And I think one of the key aspects of the 72 INCSE was that it involves an annual meeting between the US and Soviet Union to Discuss various incidents at sea Which we have to some extent between China and the US in MMCA, but we could think of another on a regional basis in the South China Sea the third policy area and I would call contextualization and the theory behind that is to try and move the Narrative of the South China Sea away from the developing narrative of a Sino US bilateral military competition What was so eloquently? Stated yesterday as elephants either fighting or making love in the South China Sea and more towards one of a regional dispute involving ASEAN as a key actor in furthering or limiting tensions within the region as well and incorporating China And this would try and move the narrative away from one of conflict and one towards collaboration And the fourth of the four C's I would call civilianization This isn't just in terms of demilitarization of the disputes But also in terms of prioritizing the role of ministries of foreign affairs rather than ministries of national defense or even the military themselves in the Discussions and rhetoric around these particular disputes if we were to for instance institute an annual MFA meeting of the various disputants That would suggest to all the disputants and the wider international community That it is the civilian foreign ministries that are taking the lead on these policies rather than being driven by the often more Bellicose and zero some thinking of the militaries themselves And The DSC's we mentioned several times and an aspect of that is a freeze on new occupations But could we in the CSE work towards perhaps a freeze on continued construction on current occupations or any further development of fortifications that already exist with a final goal being to demilitarize or civilianize the the islands themselves now we have a We have a an example there in 2000 when Taiwan removed its military and replaced it with the Coast Guard administration To move all the militaries towards Coast Guard administrations in the South China Sea could be an excellent example of demilitarization and a step towards Complete demilitarization in the future Now these four areas are obviously just confidence building measures and all they do is manage tensions in the South China Sea in a short to medium term They don't work towards any kind of final resolution. I'm trying to avoid using the phrase final solution They don't work towards any kind of comprehensive resolution in the end to do so I think we need to look at treaty in law And I would highlight two particular historical examples of treaties that might have some bearing on Where we go with the South China Sea the first of which is a Svalbard treaty and which is drawn up in the early 1920s By a variety of nations to deal with the what was then called the Spitsburg and archipelago But it's now the Svalbard archipelago And the treaty essentially stated that Norway would have complete and indisputable sovereignty over the archipelago But the all nations that were signatories to the treaty would have the right to economic exploitation within the islands themselves and also within the territorial waters And there would be a variety of collaborative measures such as an international meteorological station It would also be entirely demilitarized. Norway would not allow any fortifications on the islands themselves The second would be the Antarctic Treaty and the various Various agreements that have occurred since the Antarctic Treaty was drawn up in the 1950s And this is very much the opposite end of the spectrum from the Svalbard Treaty So rather than looking for indisputable sovereignty and joint development the Antarctic Treaty looks towards no sovereignty and no development So it does not recognize any sovereign disputes or any sovereign claims within the Antarctic and does not allow any future claims to be made It also does not allow any exploit economic exploitation of the Antarctic But does encourage international scientific research to be undertaken in there Demilitarized the Arctic although it allows for temporary deployments of militaries in support of those international scientific research missions So I'm not suggesting either these treaties are the perfect examples for the South China Sea and there's a lot of Issues with the South China Sea that don't pertain to either Svalbard or the Antarctic But they do set a spectrum of where we can look towards historical treaty as an example of either Indisputable sovereignty and joint development or no sovereignty and no development and whether one of those two models might be Suitable for the South China Sea in the longer term Thank you very much, please join me in thanking the panel Let's open the floor to Two questions again, just please identify yourself and your institution when you get started Right here Thank you chair and actually it's a carry-on question for the last panel But I think it's still very relevant to this panel because we have no way I have policy and security experts here So the question is still relevant to the Philippine arbitration case Could you identify yourself? Oh, sorry a home loan from the China National Institute for South China Sea Studies So my question is that well Among the five arbitrators in this course apart from judge Wolfram Yanai I just really go wolf on which is nominated by the Philippine government The other four arbitrator was appointed by the president of it close and judge and I but as in he said Japanese nationality I was very partial because as a student international law I always believe a dress and fair and a tenacious litigation arbitration But I was very partial and disappointed to see the least because the president appointed by judge Yanai of this arbitration court of Chen tribunal happened to be a Sri Lanka Arbitrator who has a very strong Filipino background because he's married with a Philippine wife and a few days ago on the May 31 he was quit as a post of President of this arbitration court So I was wondering because although China decide in due to its commitment to its 2006 declaration it decides to not be a part of this process But you will watch very carefully how this possible go on. So with this specification Situation how do you evaluate whether we're seeing a fair and just process in this whole arbitration course? I would like to hear your comment from the law perspective and security and policy Okay, that sounds like it's yours Okay, I'll take a bite The the appointment of the four arbitrators it's it's a bit tricky because of the non-participation of China actually put the president of it plus in In a corner because the the rules of annex seven is if the parties couldn't agree on if they if the another party failed to appoint arbitrators on behalf of themselves and then Couldn't agree on the rest of the three arbitrators Then the president of it plus has to appoint the rest of the panel but The president is limited to appoint people that is on the list of arbitrators of the UN list arbitrators under annex seven So it if you see the list not all state parties of UN clause has nominate People there only a few states has nominate people so you have you have a list of People being nominated by state parties and not all of them actually have strong legal background as International arbitrators if most of them are very very capable in a very specific area or like maritime security or environment But not a lot of them actually a very qualified public international arbitrator, which is what they need for this case So if you if you narrow it down to that requirement, then you have a very very limited choice for the president right, I know It seems like there's no there's not enough Asian Representative in the panel, but if you see the other Asian names in the panel those who have names in you know renowned reputation of public international law in the world is limited to either Japanese which again, I can obviously China will Freeriously object if the Japanese judge appointed Japanese and another one that just appointed before As the case has been brought by the Philippine was Judge Pike from the from Korea, but it's a bit difficult as well To appoint a Korean judge probably I can't speak on behalf of judge Yanai But I can see why China would object if a Korean judge is appointed to the panel So it I I don't know for sure why He's like this for arbitrators the way he did, but I can understand his difficulties in selecting the people to be appointed on the panel and I It's it's a bit European heavy. Yes, but I think he did the best What with what he has in the sense? There's there's There's present from strong EU countries like judge Wolfram and I think judge court from from France as well, but then there's the judge from Polish judge Who's his appointed on behalf of China, which is not a big EU not another big Not not a not a top not a top five security counsel country You know like I think I think he tried to balance it out the best he can In appointing between like big big countries small countries and and Asia countries It's it's a difficult choice for him, but you know, it's it's the best he can do I guess I Just want to add something very briefly I have nowhere near the knowledge that Leo has on this subject, but I think his answer suggests that China has problems with many of its neighbors So it makes it really difficult to choose a judge that China's going to see objectively But I guess I'd also challenge your point that just because somebody's spouse is From the Philippines that well that maybe I misinterpreted your question But you did cite that as a region as a reason I guess I would just at least challenge that portion of your question. I think that it yet a Individual can carry out the mandate Take on the responsibility And offer a fair judgment Irrespective of where their spouse happens to be Christian Yeah, just briefly to echo that I would say I'm a big fan of English Cricut I'm also aware that the history of the British Empire may have created some slight resentments in a lot of different countries around the world So just a few Singaporean but so I'm aware that when I watch international cricket in England playing cricket some of the umpires may have Issues with with England generally But I allow them to make decisions that I often don't agree with because I have implicit trust within the system And I accept a jurisdiction as very experienced and independent Arbiters of this particular game now I think this has some reflection on what's happening with the orbital tribunal in that Leo pointed out there are very difficult decisions to be made with the those involved in the tribunal and Obviously care has been given to who has been involved And I think we have to have some trust in those that are being asked to be representatives here That they won't be swayed by the fact that for instance, they have a Filipina wife or they may have some issues with historical policy policies from China The gentleman in the blue shirt Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chair I'm Sun Jin from Chinese Embassy, but I will speak totally on my personal capacity as international lawyer So all the good things and bad things going to myself. I think I listen very Carefully on all the observations Previs session and also this session. I have two comments and one question the first comments is about the source and nature of international law when this Conference one to draw attention to what we're talking about the international law We only seems to emphasize on the law of the sea anchors We do not touch upon that international law not only includes treating or also include Customer international, which means in 1947 there's still international law Also at that time, there's no anchors. So when we emphasize on international law We should not only emphasize on anchors. Anchors is only one aspect of international law In pertinent when we try to resolve the problems in South China Sea We should put much more attention on historical of the development of international law because in 1947 China has already had a map there China has already has nine dash nine there and Then Chinese government also send their novel fleece to each and every islands and Features of the South China Sea to lend them to mark them. That's the historical facts That's also relating to the international law. So when we Mentioned I think some speaker in the last session the international cannot be divorced from the power. I Could not comment on that But I will say international cannot be divorced from the history the history facts this one comment The second comment is also relating to the international law because I'm a lawyer here Concerning the nature of international law when we said international International based on the consent of states, which means the state would also would only be obligated to those rules which he consent relating to the International law rules concerning the anchors It is clearly China has made Decorations in 2006 that he will not subject the South China Sea Disputes to the dispute resolution mechanics of the anchors So that's the willingness of the state party to a convention. You've argued that when you joined convention you have Agreed to all the provisions on the convention, but in this situation we have the declaration And I think the major state to this convention could say that this provision is a self Interpretation one such like I think in the future. Maybe some countries will join the convention also said some Military activities is totally belong to the interpretation of the country itself So this situation of self-interpretation is a common practice in international law That's not the only things that China want to do So China will not agree to arbitration not because he not respect international law Because he does not subject to these provisions to international according to his international intention and the consent this my second comment. I have the last point to make is that I Don't agree that Whether you agree to arbitration or going to ICJ is the solely Criteria for the country to say that you respect and promote international law or not because I think my friend from The government here is also he will say that when they join the Anklos is it's not a criteria for the respect of the international laws either because the state is not a part of the Anklos What's important here is you try to resolve all the disputes and problems in the South China Sea by a way, which is suitable for all the concerning relating claiming parties here. That's the way I think Forcing one party going to arbitration is not quite a way, especially this country's Firm objection to that. So that's what I would like to say. So I thank you when you join your Recommendations in protecting the front international law lawyer friend of mine to also put emphasis on this. Thank you very much Okay, let me ask the panel if they have any reaction Just okay. Just very quick. I do I do agree that The dispute in the South China Sea is not only about one clause, right? There is Other matter of international law that is involved in the dispute and I agree not a lot Not a lot of like focus has been given to that other aspect of the dispute Which is the sovereignty dispute, which is not a matter of Anklos and I think it's it's a good idea Maybe next year CSIS can focus on the the conference on the sovereignty dispute that will be interesting and probably That that's probably like that's the first in my mind because like you're right most of the these conferences focus on the maritime aspect of it I just want to Just a minor correction on China's declaration China's declaration is not that China agreed not to bring the dispute on South China Sea But it's specific on 298 that they they don't agree to bring any dispute in relation To maritime boundary delimitation delimitation as laid out in article 1574 and 83 and then of course also military activities and marine scientific research Is matters relating to military activities and marine scientific research is excluded for the dispute settlement Whether or not the questions brought by the Philippines can be considered as an extension to a Matter of boundary delimitation is a whole different argument and I think that's up to the tribunal to decide whether they can carve out the questions From maritime delimitation boundary issues and found jurisdiction or not. So I just want to highlight that to point Christian Just very briefly on this issue of the primacy of Anklos I mean if China doesn't want Anklos to be the primary legal instrument that is utilized in the South China Sea It shouldn't sign a declaration on conduct that specifically states Anklos as the primary legal instrument through which these disputes will be resolved and on On 1947 maps being customary international law. I'm not sure one could really claim the nine-dash line to be customary international law So customer international law is very useful and has its role But I'm not sure that has much relevance to the nine-dash line specifically A gentleman here Thank you, Mr. Barber and Yan Kui Song from Taiwan's academia Seneca This panel is about policy recommendations and I would like to comment on Miss Glacier's policy Recommendations and you mentioned a number of forums Coast Guard Forum For example, I would like to bring your attention to a number of existing forums For example the head of Coast Guard Administration in the Asia Pacific is Existing forum and track one level and there are other ASEAN Maritime Forum or expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum. There are also Maritime legal experts forum on meeting held in Philippine Thailand Indonesia So a number of them plus a packed ocean and fisheries working group So we can base upon those track one and because track two sometimes You need to go to the track one dialogue process and the second one is about that That's my personal opinion not not on this Creative thinking nobody talking about this but in this and inspired by our discussion here The 11 dash lines a gentleman say 1947 on the Republic of China and Then the two the two line were deleted right in 1953 And then the officials agreement signed between Vietnam and China again Confirmed the deletion with two lines. Now. Let's talk about the line 11 Anyone know the line 11? That's between Taiwan and Philippine side the Bosch that Barton Island Bosch Bosch channel or straight now and it comes to the question of practice island can practice island Generate 200 miles equalcy economy zone. I will say yes And there's no dispute now if that's the case is that possible to have a fisheries agreement between Taiwan and the Philippines and considering the possibility of Clarify that line and Following that president then we have other and then we take the step-by-step approach to clarify Different line in the South China Sea. That's the approach. I'm thinking I'm on my personal opinion I haven't know but anyway last one I Think it's very important for us to think about to put in a site that disputes and working on joint development or ecotourism and Join puts Preservation and conservation of the marine environment in the South China Sea The Philippine government has proposed the ecotourism of peace park in the South China Sea in a spreader Now China is doing the seesaw Tourism right tourism in in the sansa seaside and Taiwan also considering that to bring the build Marine peace park can we have used a concept of Antarctica and common heritage of mankind and Try to have a bigger vision that the South China Sea Can be shared by all the users Including freedom navigation in freedom conservation fish, whatever it's that easier and then when you go to court arbitration You turn ugly and there are so many different evidence historical evidence And you don't have control those lawyers and what are they thinking about and what are they going to do? So that's the risk so my stuff's my Not not for your personal purpose but for the national interest make money it's important But anyway, thank you very much for your thing. Thank you. Thank you. Mr. Tui and then we're back there Thank you. I'm to from Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam Thank you very much three panelists for very useful recommendations. I Appreciate very much a lot of the commendation for example join fishing in Paracels join fishing band in South China Sea join patrol for example but from our discussion yesterday and today we see just the main obstacle for any kind of cooperation and join development or so is clarification of claims and a lot of Speakers recommend China to clarify the claims but my concern is just not clarifying the claims but Clarifying according to international law If you are clarifying the claims not based on international law and uses claim as a basis for joint development is It's not suitable for other claimants also and second issue is how to convince China to accept your recommendation of join fishing in Paracels for example and Specific issue for miss Bonnie As as I remember Hillary Clinton declared just you ask win facilitated the cooperative process in the South China Sea My question is is that can you give More recommendation for us how to facilitate the cooperative process according to our recommendations here. Thank you Okay, let's go to the panel. Would anyone like to comment Bonnie? You've got a specific question there How to persuade China to for joint development By letting them not clarifying the claim Like like I said if it's it's very difficult to see in the near future that China will clarify what the nine dash line means I don't see that happening anytime soon to be honest and Of course if if they do clarify the claims we do want them to clarify their claims on the basis of international law right, but it's just the issue of It's not gonna happen not gonna happen Call me pessimistic, but I don't say it's happening But we we we can't let them we can't let that stop joint development if you do feel that there are a certain Aspect or a certain area in the South China Sea that you feel that you can persuade China to enter into joint development Then you shouldn't wait for China to clarify their claims like like I said I you know the the Scarborough show is a good example of Where a possibility that you can have joint development in the area without having either party clarifying the claims and Maybe there are some areas in the between the Philippines and China where both parties can agree to have joint development any form of joint development without having China clarifying the non-dash line or without having Philippines Sorry, we are having Vietnam Revising it on baseline as well Right, so we we want to avoid this technical difficult issues between the two claimant states and just agree on What can you do together to move forward in a certain area that you agree? I? Just want to I'm going to ask Bonnie to answer Tweez question, but I've talked with the CEO of forum energy after he came back from discussions with senior The CEO of the Chinese at oil company, and they actually he said we could joint develop Oil and natural gas resources easily On the business case no problem, but we have no we there's no foundation of international law That we can base our agreement on so that's where we're stuck You know we we could do this deal tomorrow, but they couldn't they didn't have a place to to to build the They can have the basis of on the agreement with them fear them and China Okay, I'll let your agreement that will be there will be enough. I guess okay I'll have to put you in touch with them Bonnie. Did you want to respond to me? I think there are several things that the United States is doing we can go back to Peter Dutton's Presentation certainly just trying to rule out any use of military force to discourage dissuade and deter other Countries or any country from using military force. I think is you know one set of things that we're doing statements such as Acting assistant secretary Jo Yoon made yesterday the August It was the August 4th 2012 statement that was made by the State Department Which also mentioned I think use of international law including arbitration Of course, we've had subsequent statements in support of that But then if you go to the level of actions, what can we really do? And that really I think is is is where the challenges are and as you know in the case of the Scarborough Shoal the United States did quietly Facilitate which by the way, it's not cooperative It's a collaborative process that Secretary Clinton said and so what I think we tried to do is facilitate defusing tensions and A return to the status quo ante, which was discussed earlier and we had One side one party that essentially the well first I would say there was as I understand it an agreement Maybe it was not written But there wasn't understanding that both sides would in a face-saving way Withdraw from the Shoal and of course the Philippines subsequently did and China did not and in that kind of a case Very very difficult the United States can't stand up and say but wait a minute. There was an agreement We know we tried to play a quiet positive role to facilitate a positive outcome But I would guess that there are some lessons learned on all sides for from that experience I think all countries will be very wary of having those kinds of Negotiations or discussions with China in the future without signing something and having the international community know what was agreed upon The gentleman in the back of the room And then we're here with Mike and time a good morning, I miss the Lloyd from the University of Maryland my question It's just very simple first it's about Geographical historical and number two is about economic When you say that you have the claim over the islands way back to as far as the first and second century That was that time before Christ. Why didn't you occupy the islands? Continuously and permanently since then and What is your reaction to the claim of the Spanish government? When they arrive in the Philippines in the time of Magellan that they have the map Claiming the islands in behalf of Spain and of course for the Philippines Why didn't you protest as early as the 15th century and now that you are an economic power? Why do you have the nerve to steer the waters in South China Z and bullying the smaller Neboros Philippines Vietnam and all the other claimants that you are no economic power Why didn't you steer the waters when the Russians are still in Cumberland Bay in Vietnam? And the Americans are still in Subic Bay in the Philippines. Why only now you should observe the waters way back Then the first century or in the 50s and the 60s. Why now? Please give us a very Comprehensive answer. Thank you Anyone want to respond Thanks for the impassioned question. I mean, I think There's lots to unpack there, but one thing we could talk about is The cultural aspects here. I mean, is it fair to criticize an East Asian state that has gone through a variety of different imperial and other Forms of governments over the last 2000 years for not adhering to current and modern Europeanized concepts of international law Why does Vietnam not occupy this the Paracels back in the 19th century when it sent a variety of different Flotillas out there and would regularly try and harvest a variety of different resources from the islands I mean, it's just not something that the states thought they had to do really if you think you have a claim to it And and you try and like later resurrect that claim It's a bit difficult to criticize very ancient Dynasties and governments for for not adhering to modern international law Okay, very good. Mike and then Dr. Tang Mike McDevitt from CNA a question for any of you at the panelists When we talk about clarification of claims and what have you it's always been or the past two days It's been about China It strikes me as I'd like your opinion about one the feasibility and to the long-term implications if for example Vietnam and the Philippines engaged in a negotiation to rectify their overlapping claims in the Spratlys would that Were they to reach some understanding of? On that basis would that help move the ball forward when you deal with China? I just comment briefly Mike I do think that there is a There have been some suggestions along the lines of what you're saying that if China is unwilling To try and solve these claims then the other parties that have claims that are in dispute should try to separately negotiate their claims and delimit the boundaries With and land features and maritime boundaries make whatever progress can be made Set some examples and then hope that China will later join that process Well, you could take for example. I understand that just I'll just give you a brief example I think that Brunei and Malaysia signed a boundary agreement in 2009 and then the following year They agreed to jointly develop two blocks They signed this 40-year production sharing agreement and started drilling in September 2011. So that would be one example Give a two-finger here Can I have the microphone here at this table? I can answer to just question You know as an claimant now the implicitly ratio of common understanding of Status quo Techno Activity just can affect other country interest and if you see my presentation yesterday owner seen incidents Happened between China on one side and on other sides of Vietnam, Philippines or Malaysia We did not see any incidents between ASEAN claimants and In reality Vietnam for example with Indonesia. We have a delimitation of continental shelf in 2003 We have joined submission with Malaysia on Outer limit of continental shelf in 2009. We have a lot of cooperative mechanism with Philippines So within ASEAN claimants, there's no problem Good point. Dr. Tang Back here Phoebe Thank you tongue on the Vietnam's lovers association. I have a questions by way of comments to Leo and Christian, but before I would like to share my view with the Chinese Participant spoke a little bit earlier about the link between international law history And when yeah, of course when we talk about international law, we have to talk about history too and And when you talk about the night I slide in 1947 I think you should also mention about the declaration the People's Republic China on the territorial seal in 1948 in that declaration China states very clearly that this Sea between the islands in the South China Sea a high sea So there's no historic rise no historic waters in the Saturday then Now go back to all the recommendations, which are fantastic by the finalists here For Leo I'm a little bit buzzed by your recommendation that we conduct joint development without clarifying the claim because If you look at the practice of joint development around the world and we see that most of the agreements are based on my time entitlement overlapping maritime entitlement and which are legitimate under law of the sea and if that list To an assumption that whenever you have a joint development agreement, you might have a some lezitim basis Lezitim basis or lawful basis for your claim so how we can conduct joint development without clarifying the claim and Then I think it is it is very very Wise and smart to Have a server spot of joint development in the South China Sea But I think it is only one way to avoid the Current situation where actually the whole South China Sea is disputed So if you have a joint development in one part a small part of the South China Sea then it doesn't work out How about the rest and if you look at the the situation in the East China Sea then You have a very small area for joint development China in Japan and in 2008 which hasn't we have nothing from then And I don't think that the agreement work really went in that case and now to Kristen Yeah, I think I think the idea of joy prohibition is quite interesting but it goes Contrary to the speed of the law of the second version because the law of the second version talks about legal order for economic exploitation, so if you Advise the the Countries in the South China Sea to in both joint development Joy prohibition and I think that it may go against their interest in advancing the claim in the South China Sea because what they want to have in the South China Sea by Raising or by making all those claims our for the resources in the South China Seas. It's not for the small Minute feature in the South China Sea It is the assumption that They have to have the so material the feature to have a resource in the South China Sea so I'm a little bit buzzer by your your Your Proposure that we have a joy prohibition on activities in the South China Sea. Thank you Gentlemen, would you like to respond please? Thank you for the question Yes, most joint development You is the basis of most of joint development practice in the world has a certain legal claim that each state put forward But we have to remember if we look at provision of own clause on maritime delimitation The first principle on maritime delimitation is actually agreement by states Unclos actually doesn't say clearly It doesn't say like How do you do it doesn't dictate how you do delimitation? The first way is actually agreement by states So that's the first principle, right? If it failed then there are certain guidance that Unclos and the presidents of international court and tribunals provide on how you delimit boundaries, right, but if we take the basic principle that Boundary delimitation is by agreement then we can adopt that into a model of joint development that even though Legally both parties may not have clarified their claims But if they agree if both agree, this is this is very important if both agrees that a specific area is Disputed between the two parties and feasible for joint development I don't see why both parties can't enter into a legal agreement to jointly develop that certain specific area Of course, we're not talking about China and Vietnam Agree to develop the Arctic or some part of the Pacific Ocean, right? Because we we we basically know like the areas, you know in dispute We can assume What are the areas in dispute and it's just a matter of whether or not? Vietnam in this case agree to a certain specific area that yes, that's in dispute. No, that's not that's not in dispute We can't join develop on that. So you you have to find You have to reach an agreement of which area that both of you agree that yes, this is a great area that yes We can develop and if you can agree on that Then I I think it's possible to have joint development. I don't see why On your question about why do we bother join developing only a small part when the dispute is actually the whole part like I said before it's impossible for for you for for the countries to come into an agreement to join me develop the whole of South China Sea I I Don't think Vietnam want that Because it you know, there are certain parts that Vietnam probably only have this bit with China and don't want to necessarily share it with Malaysia or Philippines or Brunei and You know, it's the case with the other claimants as well. So that's why I suggest a small Areas as a model as a model if it doesn't work at least there's a Confidence-building exercise that Bonnie actually refer to the process of negotiating Rocheting coming up with the model for joint development is a confidence-building Practice or exercise that can be useful in building the relationship between the claimants and building trust again Between the claimants if it failed it failed But it's it's better that you try to achieve something rather than it's not going to work. We can't You know, you have to change the mentality of and this is Again to all the claimants that you have to change the mentality that you can agree on something that some there is some agreement that then you can achieve and Join develop a certain area together. That's my Christian. Yeah, thanks for the question. I mean, I'm not sure joint prohibition is really qualitatively different from joint development in any way to be honest Perhaps it's framed incorrectly or use the wrong phrase the ology and perhaps we should call it joint conservation of resources or Or what have you but one could easily imagine a common fishery zone similar to the Gulf of Tonkin fishery zone that had certain quotas Had certain times a year when you weren't allowed to fish And we're just taking those elements of a joint development area and saying perhaps we should start with the joint conservation Rather than joint development because it's slightly less controversial and undermines the issues about The unilateral fishing ban that is currently being imposed and has been for the last 14 years by China Could have the gentleman in the pink shirt and then Henry CNA and also CSIS The Bonnie you sort of thought that maybe some of the other claimants could work something out And then we just heard, you know a sort of different point of view It's the same that I heard in Shangri-La depended who you spoke to this past weekend But my question is a follow-on really to you on this Brunei and Malaysia they have a very different relationship with China anyway and so one could say because of that it's kind of easier, but Would the United States in your view be in a position To really reconcile the others who have more Difficulties with China to maybe convince the Vietnamese that this is something to work out with the Philippines Is this something you know you talked a little earlier about now we we say a lot, but we don't do a lot Here's something we could really do perhaps. What do you think and maybe what are the other panelists think? It's a very difficult question. I mean ultimately are you Are you positing a role for the United States is mediating between some of these parties? I think that in any kind of mediation The first question is whether or not the parties want mediation and then whether they want That particular party in this case being the United States to be the mediator And then you have to ask the question as to whether that mediator the United States wants to take on that role I think in I would doubt that the answer would be yes to any of those questions I don't think the US wants to mediate. I don't think that there are any of these Countries involved that would choose the US to be the media nor do they necessarily want mediation So in cases where there is a potential solution I would guess that it the most likely outcome is that those two parties are going to get together and Find their own solutions. So for those reasons, I just think it's unlikely if I could just add I think the most useful thing the United States could do is really emphasize its and back up its policy statement that it wants to see a strong and integrated ASEAN and I think we have taken steps in that direction But we have to do much more and those should be recommendations that are included in this report Did anyone else want to comment Christian? Just very briefly. I mean, I agree hold off Lee with both What Bonnie and Ernie said, but I spoke into European diplomats who posited a mediation role for the EU And for similar reasons, I don't think it would be acceptable. It certainly wouldn't be acceptable to China It may not be acceptable to other ASEAN states as well I think even those slightly less controversial slightly less historically entangled states such as Norway or Switzerland who may be perceived as being independent would face similar barriers to any kind of involvement in the South China Sea So, you know, I think mediation external mediation would be a wonderful thing, but I don't think it's acceptable to the parties Okay, Henry and then Peter Thank you. Sorry for taking the floor again with all due respect to Leo I have to comment on the first the concept of joint development when you have the nine-dash line It makes a lot of sense Do you have your own pointer? Would that's a violation Henry Because because I have to do this because sometimes it's very easy to talk theoretically when you don't adapt it to the map to the map The technical is as important sometimes as the substance what I'm trying to say is would you allow joint development here? Or it's only on this part. So when you have 85 percent of practically all the easy it makes a lot of sense We're not against joint development But there are steps you have to do before you go into that when you talk about Antarctica Are you going to apply to the whole? Are you there for saying that? With Indonesia, we try to have a joint development on the overlap Indonesia. That's one Indonesia is correct Because the overlap of the easy does not mean that we have we can actually the limit in this in this case Therefore before you talk of joint development you have to take certain prior steps Then you can identify which area you don't go into this process. It's very hard. It creates more more problem My last point on yours carburetor It's a very dangerous proposition. I'll tell you why because it will encourage the mindset Oh in the end I can have joint development if I am able to occupy So what I will do is I will do this with a union then after a union It's Sabina show after Sabina show Iroquois reef after Iroquois reef Douglas reef Why because I am in control I can dictate That's a dangerous mindset Actually, and that's exactly is the mindset that will be encouraged with that proposition My last point on confidence building. I have nothing against confidence building But sometimes confidence building the concept of confidence building is to create the environment, right? but Sometimes it becomes the final solution Right and at the end of the day it assumes a double-edged sword. It becomes a double-edged sword I will amplify on the jmsu for example Sometimes maybe the problem is not the lack of confidence. Maybe the problem is abuse of confidence Maybe the problem is not lack of communication, but something more than that. Let me jmsu for example It's not true, and it's not correct to say that because we never had the implementing guidelines. There were no CBMs There were a lot in fact the jmsu was a confidence building measure. It was a marine scientific exactly But because of that jmsu because it included areas like the rebound there were no objections before we had a license to British form before 1997 But when jmsu was applied as a marine scientific research and as a joint confidence building measure China objected to that on what basis the contractual provision So therefore if it's a matter of contract with disregard now jmsu after that from a contractual provision No, we have indisputable sovereignty So in a sense if you're not very careful also with this confidence building they can be used as an affirmation that there exists a That that confidence building affirms the legitimacy of the existence of a dispute that can also I'm not saying not all the time, but you have to be very careful about it as well Does that mean that you cannot join go into joint joint cooperation? No part 9 actually of UNCLOS talks about Cooperation in the semi enclosed sea and that's not a problem. In fact, you can go into this conservation We are for it. That's a very good situation But in the light of the 9-9 it makes it difficult that is that has been our experience for the last What is the lesson learned from our perspective? It is important therefore now that you have to clarify the 9-9 Then on a step-by-step basis, you can go into joint cooperation, etc, etc That for us was the lesson. Thank you You want to respond? Yeah, thank you Henry I Agree with you in part in the sense that the ideal situation would be each part of to clarify their claims Before you can move on to either like joint development or any kind of cooperation agreement prior to a final delimitation agreement I'm not suggesting that you should join develop the whole of South China Sea. I think that's impossible right The the basis of why I would challenge the the parties to actually try to come into a joint development arrangement without having Clarifying the claim is with condition that both parties have to agree on A specific area that they feel that yes this specific area can be a model for joint development Now I only took Scarborough show as an example because of the exchange between Hong Nong and Dr. The Castro yesterday when they said Fishermen from the Philippines has fished there traditionally in peace alongside each other or the longest time So this practice shows that actually if you want to go back to that status quo It can be a form of cooperation a form of a form of cooperation within the two parties Setting aside the dispute and this is again another important point that I Respectfully disagree in the sense that The unclos also made it clear just because you agree to provisional arrangement doesn't mean that you recognize the legitimacy of the claim of their party and I think I I I Truly believe no court would actually use that against you if you join Agree to join development agreement because the joint development agreements under unclaw 74 paragraph 383 paragraph 3 Is without prejudice to the final agreement? Which means anything you agreed on on that provisional arrangement or joint development cannot be used against you in reaching the final agreement so I think that's something that you know each each party want to think about is it possible? I know it's difficult I know it's very sensitive, but if we wait if you want to wait until China clarify their claim it's gonna be a very very long wait and Yep, it's it's even even when arbitration come with a decision first It's gonna be difficult to have China comply. It's gonna be a challenge I'm I can't predict what's going to happen in how China will react but it's going to be a challenge for Philippines and Second it still doesn't settle the boundary issues, right? You still have to agree on a boundary and pending to that final boundary agreement You know you have to look on joint development as well And at that time you have the decision from the tribunal, but you still don't have the clarification from China So you're still stuck So it's it's a difficult situation and I'm just trying to suggest a solution maybe out of the box, but you know May it might work. It might not work, but it's it's a possibility Okay, thanks Peter Thank you very much. I actually want to respond to mr. Bernard and and to I guess sort of second something that Christians Been talking about which is why not jointly develop the whole South China Sea? I mean essentially The contention we've seen over the last couple of days Suggests that we really ought to just shift the discussion entirely I wrote about this in an article called three disputes and three objectives But but the bottom line is we haven't really considered here how international law is actually the problem Right because parties are pursuing international law, which is essentially a win-lose outcome, right? You know somebody wins somebody loses and what you end up with is structural instability Right because the loser is always unhappy with the outcome If we shifted entirely to a discussion about a regional answer You know not necessarily based directly on international law, but a regional answer that shifts the discussion It could be a better answer Especially when we're talking about a historical Asian system that was much more open than Opportunities that traditional international law today would would offer so We could in fact there are ways to replicate a shared resource zone Among this the South China Sea coastal states This is another answer and it's a win-win answer right where you're not building in structural tension or structural instability So I'd like to at least suggest talk about out of the box I mean it is a possibility that hasn't been directly considered And maybe in fact international law is the problem Yeah, I that's that's a really good argument actually Two points though, I guess the first point it depends on what kind of joint development are you talking about if you're talking about joint development Hardercover resources Do you think Vietnam want to share their blocks with Philippines and Malaysia over here if you're talking about the 9-dash line? That comes all the way here and do you think Philippines want to share their oil resources with Malaysia and Brunei and Vietnam over here? That's makes it difficult if we're talking about hydrocarbon resources Or they can give it all to China if you think they they they would agree to it That's fantastic or we can give it to the night of Malta which has traditional claim to the Spratly Islands that settles the issue as well Second point, I think if we're talking hydrocarbon resources joint development hydrocarbon resources very difficult higher joint development for marine preservation or fisheries agreement More possible, but still has its challenges if because if you thought talking about Marine preservation and fisheries management of the whole South China Sea You're talking more More than just the six claimants here We're talking about the 9-dash line come a bit with the Natuna Which is Indonesian waters or Indonesian ease at our continental shelf which you have means you have to involve Indonesia You can't you know Brunei and Malaysia has been on the sidelines so far But we can't forget that they do have claims Overlapping claims with the 9-dash line when if we're talking about the maritime zones and how do we handle Taiwan? We can't exclude Taiwan if we're talking about fisheries Taiwan is a big long-distance fishing entity Right if I don't want to say country But you know, but you know you can't ignore Taiwan Taiwan is a very very important fishing entity So and I don't know how China will react to it So that's the challenge if you're talking about the fisheries management in the South China Sea you have that that challenges That's why I'm all for joint development in the whole South China Sea And one article one two three actually when you talk about semi and policy also meant that the same Corporation but I do recognize the challenges and it's it's it's Small possibilities that all parties can agree to one model of joint development in any area So that's why I suggest like small areas Okay, ladies and gentlemen. We're at that hour. We've had four C's three D's Baking cricket and baseball analogies. We've got pointers in the audience at this point I think things are getting a little bit out of control No, I I want to thank I want to thank all of you for your incredible energy and And good thoughtful input. I want to ask you to join me in thanking this terrific panel for helping us with the All of the papers that were delivered will are up on the will be up on the CSIS South China Sea website. It's part of the CSIS website And if you'd like to comment or provide input to that, please send us an email and we'll make sure your comments are heard Thank you