 We are on the same panel again. Good morning, everyone. Everyone could please take their seats. We'll get started in the second and final session this morning. Hi, Doug. Good morning. So we're visiting the middle. I was going to put you in the center, but OK. Well, good morning, everyone. Thank you for coming today. My name is Jim Schoef. I'm a senior fellow in the Asia program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. It's my pleasure to moderate the second session where we follow up on that first panel, which talked a lot about what the United States and other countries in the region want, what we feel that we need from North Korea in this process, in this discussion and dialogue that's starting. This session we'll talk a little bit more, not only about that from all the different regional perspectives, but also what are we prepared to give and how those different, how that tension between pace and scope and who gives what, it really comes to the fore, I think, not only in our alliance relationships, but then with other key countries in the region. And we have a great panel to help us sort through this. I'll try to do, I'll leave a little bit more time for questions than Toby did, because we'll get a chance to draw on talent from the audience as well. But we'll take a good, well, a good 45 minutes or so to sort through some of these issues. And very pleased to welcome all the way from Korea. Pleased to have Chekang here with us from Seoul. He is the Vice President for Research and a Principal Fellow at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies. Dr. Che is also a member of the Advisory Council for the Office of National Security in Korea. Previously he was worked in the Blue House under a previous administration there as well. So thank you for coming, Kong, with us. And to my right is Jung Park from not so far away from next door at Brookings. Jung is the Senior Fellow and SK Korea Foundation Chair in Korea Studies at the Brookings Institution Center for East Asia Policy Studies. She focuses on national security challenges, has spent much of her career focused on Korea, both North and South, held senior positions in the CIA at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence as well. And we're really pleased that you're here with us to share with us your expertise. And last but not least, my boss, Doug Paul. Doug is the Vice President for Studies at Carnegie here and Director of our Asia program. He's previously served as Vice Chairman of JPMorgan Chase International, was our unofficial US representative in Taiwan for several years, and had a long career in the State Department, NSC, and in the CIA, and focuses a great deal on China and knows the US quite well as well. So my opening question, which I let all of our panelists know about, is kind of a three-part question. And I'm going to start with Che Kong, because I think everyone is very curious to hear about what the mood is in Seoul following this historic meeting that took place last Friday. And so the reaction to the summit, what is the political atmosphere there? And then following on to that, viewed from South Korea's perspective, getting back to this question we touched on earlier this morning, what do Koreans think is driving North Korea and Kim Jong-un to this point now? Because I think this is critical in terms of how we approach the issue ahead of us. Is Kim Jong-un coming with a feeling that he's in a position of strength? Or is he being somehow forced into this and making the best of a bad situation? I think that's a fundamental question. And my final part of the third-part question, and we can take it in pieces if we want, is what are South Korea's President Moon's priorities and hopes for this diplomatic process? And I don't mean pie in the sky, maximum benefit, but kind of realistically hopeful targets of what Seoul is looking to get out of this. And I'll start with you. OK, all three tough questions. Actually, of course, this is my personal observation. So first, actually, I can think of two words to describe atmospheric Seoul. Excitement and hope. People are really excited to have these kinds of moments. And then they hope for peace, real peace, actually. And also, nowadays, in Seoul, it's very difficult to make any kinds of critical comments on the summit, really. If you look at, for example, National Assemblyperson Nagyungwon's web page, she was bombarded by the critics who has been supporting this Moon Jae-in's policy toward North Korea. She made some kinds of critical comment, and then she became a target of the criticism on her. And also, nowadays, for example, the opposition party leader, Hong Jun-pyo, has moderated his comments. It's great to bring the dictator to the negotiation table. So before he was saying that, actually, it's kind of another fake peace offense. We should not be misguided by this charm offense from North Korea, but actually he moderated it. Those instant actually proves the mood in Seoul, very much excited. And also, for example, all people are much more insugested about the intercurrent economic cooperation and was expecting something will take place between the two Koreas and social dimension. For example, the reunion of separate family and resumption of any kind of talks, she made an assistant. So actually, hope is very high in Seoul. But government has just started to actually cool down a little bit. But actually President Moon Jae-in just two days after the summit, he said, we just have started the peace process. Still, we have a long way to go, unlike people's expectations. So actually, he's taking very cautious approach. Because of course, he opened the door for peace on the Korean Peninsula. But that must be tested again at the upcoming summit between the President Trump and Chairman Kim Jong-un, probably in May or June. That could be the critical moment of truth, to verify North Korea's intention to come to the negotiation to denuclearize entire Korean Peninsula. So actually, people are much more insugistic about this and are very supportive toward the outcome of this summit. Actually, there are lots to do in the coming years, maybe days. By my hunch, at least for six months to a year, we will be in a mood of peace at least. For example, and people just one day after the summit, the Nengmyeon, the dish served during this summit, actually became very popular. I went to Nengmyeon restaurant, actually, it's actually a restaurant filled with people. So actually, is it possible to have Ongyuk and that's a restaurant in Pyongyang? Is it possible to have a branch in Seoul? It's kind of a mood. Very much excited. The expectation is too high. So the problem of the government right now is to control the expectation, the peace. But let me elaborate the outcome of the Panmunjom Declaration. Okay, and then we'll turn later. Okay, it's about, it has three pillars. It's the one is like an intercurrent relation, how we are going to improve or to make it better in the coming years. About by having more economic cooperation and social contact between the two Koreas. Two leaders agreed to resume the social exchanges. I was a sports dimension. I was on every important dates, like for example, June 15th or August 15th, we are going to have some kind of event to celebrate. June 15th, joint decoration, a 15th at August 15th, Independence Day. There will be lots of events going on. We'll be taking place. The second pillar is about tension reduction and arms control. So we started to dismantle the loudspeaker equipment deployed along the DMZ. As of yesterday, North Korea did the same thing. So we are in a process of stabilizing the situation along the demilitarized zone. That's the first beginning. So we will be discussing. Actually, it seems to me that in, I don't know exactly timing, but there will be a meal to meal talk between the two Koreas in May. And that, I think there will be discussing about the consistency building measures and tension reduction measures. If we are successful, we will go into the arms control phase, but it will take time to go into phase. There's second pillar. So the pillar is about peace regime and denuclearization. So of course, President Moon Jae-in, clear state like to have declaration to end war by the end of this year. And that could be the beginning of peace process. But it's very unclear when we like to have peace talks. Very unclear, but that could be discussed between the US and ROK in the coming months. And that's my observation. So three pillars. The problem I have with these three pillars, there is no clear connectivity between these pillars, which comes first. Where actually, also the other point I like to share with of course, for the first time, Kim Jong-un, the top leader of North Korea signed the document in which the denuclearization is included, completed denuclearization. And then the final objective is nuclear-free Korean peninsula. But actually for that, there's a lot of controversy about what you mean by the nuclear-free Korean peninsula. Whether we are going back to joint declaration of 1991 and which we banned reprocessing, enrichment, introduction of any kinds of nuclear weapons and story. If that actually means the joint declaration of 1991, that's really perfect. North Korea is going to give up almost everything. Not the future nuclear, but also past nuclear. But that would be tested in the coming, something between President Trump and President Chairman Kim Jong-un. So that's my interview. Great, no, no, that's terrific. Let me bring in some of our other panelists into some of these questions that I raised. Jong-un, let me ask you then kind of, primarily this question about motivation in terms of how you see and how you think some of the players see what has brought about this real summit diplomacy. Can we do some audience participation first? And that is, how many people stayed up late to watch the summit? Admit it, yes. So I stayed up late watching the summit and I tried to break away, but I couldn't. Because it was so suspenseful, right? Who didn't gasp when Kim Jong-un walked out of that building with his bodyguards around him? Who didn't gasp when he tried to tug President Moon onto the other side? I did. Who was anticipating when his first cigarette was going to be? I did. And what is his voice going to sound like without the filters of North Korean regime media? So that was interesting. So Scott Snyder from the Council on Foreign Relations saw him yesterday and he said he likened, he said that when Kim Jong-un crossed over to the MDL, that's when he became from God to man. So think about that. In North Korea, and I'm unpacking this in his absence. So in North Korea, he is God. The Kim family is this God-like figure that is the father of the country and the only protector of the regime and the people. But when he crosses over and without the filters of regime media, he's huffing. Did anybody notice that? He's puffing. He could barely catch his breath walking that way. And he was waddling a little bit. You could tell that his girth was potentially bothering him a little bit. The leg issues that he's had, perhaps, you could see some elements of that. But that was what you can, when the two leaders are together, you can see the height differentials and just, and what is the purpose of film and what is the purpose of cameras? And that's to create intimacy, right, between the viewer and the object. And we couldn't turn away because this was such a, this was a character who's been built up to be this caricature, but he becomes man, human. And I think that's what, and that's what his intention was. North Korea, if they're good at anything, is theater. Their entire regime was built on theater, optics, controlling what you see, controlling what you hear, but to see that in a way that is highly orchestrated, some not, in the pulling of the MDL, pulling President Moon across the MDL. So they're masters at theater and optics. So what I see the meeting as doing is trying to cement North Korea's, or Kim Jong-un's status, as an international leader. He's human, he's normal, he can speak. He breathes, he walks. He eats and drinks and he does all of these things that normal people do. And he's not this monster who lives in Pyongyang, torturing his people and developing nuclear weapons. And threatening the United States and his neighbors. So what is driving Kim, and anything that theater and that optics and that this metamorphosis has a lot to do with why he's doing this now. I've often wondered last year why he was moving at such a quick pace in 2017. So we've been so desensitized to the smaller, the shorter range missiles and the medium range ballistic missiles and the threats and all of these things that I remember when the North Koreans subdued their military parade. And I remember the experts saying, oh, it was, they only showed a couple of missiles and it was a smaller parade. And I thought, they were showing ICBMs, right? A few years ago, we would have been all up in arms, but we were been so desensitized to North Korea's bad behavior that when they start breathing and talking like real people, it seems like something. So I think that he's trying to pivot toward engagement to try to show the world that he can be a responsible nuclear power. So that's what I was gonna ask. So is it your sense then that this is essentially part of a process or a plan to now that he's got this capability to protect it or enshrine it and grandfather it into his country's relationship and get people kind of accustomed to that while maybe tossing a few other things? Yeah, the regime has been pretty clear, especially under Kim Jong-un, that the nuclear weapons are not something that they're developing to bargain them away. It's written into their constitution. Kim owns this, he owns this program. His picture is on, you know, with the nuclear scientists, with the, he's at every missile test site. He is giving on-the-spot guidance to the scientist. He is elevating the scientist to a revered position. And the nuclear button is in his office. Let's not forget that, right? He was very clear that he owns the nuclear weapons program. So it's hard for me to see his comments about denuclearization as anything other than saying that I can be, this is me. I'm a nuclear weapons power and I'm going to be responsible and I want to talk to you as a nuclear weapons power. Doug, let me ask you about the U.S. perspective and also I'd also like to ask you about China's perspective and all this in terms of the mood, the reaction and some of these perceptions of what they think Kim is up to. Well, taking off from Jong's lead on this, the last five months have been amazing. Here in December, Kim was viewed as the arch-villain, you know, the master, the worst guy in any James Bond film ever with his missiles and smoking and threats and yet in a short order, he gave the January one speech, took advantage of the Pyeongchang Olympics to send family members and officials down and to break the ice and move in a holy, may not be a new direction, but certainly a whole new public relations world for them and people feel less threatened. I was in Seoul last week as a guest of J. Kong's institution with a lot of other foreign experts from around Asia and the U.S. And he's absolutely right, the atmosphere there of uncritical joy over the developments of reduced tensions with the North, coming so soon after the U.S. was talking about bloody nose against North Korea or a sneak attack or a preemptive attack on their capabilities. It's psychologically natural, people feel this sense of relief. Now, if you look at the tweets from, and talk about China, you look at the tweets from President Trump, he has been trying to reinforce his relationship with President Xi Jinping of China and try to keep the Chinese on the team that's providing the strongest sanctions ever on North Korea authorized by the U.N. Security Council. And for the most part, I mean, people find small gaps in the net that's been woven around North Korea where some Chinese stuff gets through, but by and large the Chinese have really tightened the net and cut down on imports and exports to sustain the regime. But that has been, I think, a very frustrating position for China. China's been not a player, but sort of a supporting role in helping the U.S. lead the international effort to isolate and sanction North Korea. By choices China made, they put themselves over the last couple of years in the position of having, neighboring strategically important peninsula, bad relations with both ends of the peninsula, with the North over the nuclear issue and with the South over the South's deployment of fad anti-missile defenses that China believes can weaken their own missile forces. There's debate about that, but Chinese took the action of enforcing an informal, undeclared set of sanctions on South Korea that have been biting into tourism trade, really feeling, some have said as much as 0.5% of GDP in South Korea may have been lost to the Chinese sanctioning of various Korean companies. And you can tunnel talking to Chinese experts and officials that they sort of feel like they're in neutral, they can't go forward, they can't go back, they're sort of stuck in this position. Now with this new diplomacy, China has a chance to deploy assets that it has and try to get in and play the game. And they're not gonna not play the game, it's their next door neighbor. It's a place that's had long thousands of years as you would expect intimate history of interrelationships between Beijing and the various groups on the peninsula. And China has always been, as it was in 1950 when it came to the defense, when North Korea's invasion of the South started to fail, China came to defend them from occupation by the United States and UN forces at that time. Now China has to decide which way to go. I have not yet detected how China wants to proceed. They have stuck to their twin shibboleths for a long time and even today of supporting denuclearization of the peninsula, not defined as in all these cases, and in maintaining stability on the peninsula. So that has, prior to the most recent phase of strengthening sanctions, China opposed going too far on sanctions because it felt denuclearization was the purpose, but you might destabilize the peninsula by really heavily sanctioning China. The North Korean behavior under Kim Jong-un of more and more missiles, more and more nuclear tests close to China's border with North Korea, exciting popular concerns about pollution, radiation, et cetera. China took a tougher and tougher position and got farther and farther from this balance they'd like to have between denuclearization and destabilization. They now have an opportunity, and we saw when Kim requested a meeting in Beijing with Xi Jinping, the Chinese were pretty quick to say yes. Interestingly, this very closely follows the playbook of Kim Jong-un's father. In 2000, he had been in office six years, having succeeded to Kim Il-sung in 1994, and he had not gone to China. Deng Xiaoping had set the pattern of wanting the Kims to come to China and learn about the things they could do to modernize while not yielding communist power authority over the peninsula. Learn from China's example, but he didn't do that for six years. But when he came to have an opportunity to deal with a progressive leader in South Korea and Kim Dae-jung, Kim was eager to deploy his sunshine policy toward the North. Kim Jong-il went to China first, met with Jiang Zemin to prepare his way to show he, the leader of North Korea, was not so isolated as not to have good relations with China and that he could go to his talks with Kim Dae-jung not as isolated and weak might have been otherwise perceived. This year, taking the same playbook, they asked us to go visit with Xi Jinping. The Chinese rolled out the red carpet as they had in the past, and they've clearly indicated that they want to go farther this time than the last time. We've had the Chinese foreign minister, it's now in Yongyang, it's pretty apparent that if his talks go well, that Xi Jinping will follow not long after, whether it's before the Trump-Kim summit or after, I don't know. But I'm not getting a clear indication of how the Chinese want to go, but the twin impulses that led them in the past to try to keep the regime healthy and stable is supported by a lot of opinion in China that goes back to the Korean War about Chinese blood has been heavily spilt on the peninsula and China has a relationship that cannot be sacrificed there. And on the other hand, recognizing that North Korea's direction under Kim Jong-un was putting China in a position that it was uncomfortable with in terms of destabilizing, bringing the US more actively in threats of bloody noses and strikes that could destabilize the situation. And that was not entirely the US fault that we were considering measures like that because North Korea was just pushing and pushing. Now they've stopped pushing for the moment, created this rosy light on the situation and give people hope. We have to watch very carefully to see of the various strands, especially the two major strands in Chinese policy, which one gets the nod from Xi Jinping? I don't know which one is gonna be watching it carefully. Thanks. I wanna come back to what South Korea wants in just a minute, but we should touch a little bit on the US side of things. And then, Jung or Doug, either one of you wanna try to characterize, as we've tried to characterize the view from Beijing and the view from Seoul, what's the view from Washington on this? Or are there multiple views? Go ahead. I think it's a work in progress. You know, as we're quickly approaching the late May, early June meeting, we're hearing different things. The new national security advisor, John Walton, said something about the Libya model recently, which does not sound good to North Korea ever. And President Trump has said something about, time will tell, right? We'll see. And the new Secretary of State Pompeo has said things about we're gonna test Kim Jong-un. So they're not contradictory statements, but it's a very amorphous set that seems to be continually being massaged and worked out. So I don't know that we have a strategy yet, but it's clear to me that what is concerning to me about some of the senior officials' comments and President Trump's comments is that they expect progress right away. And from my perspective, the North Koreans are not going to denuclearize within a six-month, one-year timeframe. And their definitions of denuclearization are still, there's a huge gap between our definition and the North Koreans' definition. So I think that's going to be something, hopefully that they can work something out before the meeting actually happens. Well, we have elections, and the North Koreans just have to worry about their leader's health. And there's probably something to worry about with his health, he is relatively young. Trump has an election that comes with a greater certainty, and one has to assume that the American consistent demand from all officials is for a comprehensive, verifiable, irreversible destruction of the nuclear capability, CVID. The question becomes, is it one possible, can you get an agreement? Two, even if you get an agreement, how soon do you get the steps leading toward it? If you have an election coming up, you want to get it done in two years. And if you don't have an election coming up, you'd rather see it go on and on, and then let the process get muddied down the road in the hopes of hanging onto as much of your capability as you can in the process. We've had, we have a kind of, as John mentioned, we've had talk about the Libyan example. To me, I think that is offered only as a poison pill. Yes, I'm cooperating with all of you, I want to have a solution. And my solution is you commit suicide. And I don't think that works as a sales pitch. But that's where that is right now. And then you have the North Koreans who seem, this is not my original observation, but the North Koreans seem to be looking at the example of India's kind of normalizing its nuclear status. Now India and North Korea, they're not even apples and oranges. But we've, in the course of the Bush administration, we kind of normalize their nuclear status. In the case of North Korea, I can't imagine anybody willing to do that. So the gap between what the North seems to want and what our advisors are publicly talking about is huge, which means there's a lot of discretion in the upcoming negotiations. Where do you go? One area where I think there's less discretion, and this is going to be critical all the way down, but not talked about as much up front as I think the political commitments and the optics. If Trump goes across the DMZ, like Panmunjom, the way Moon Jae-in did, all kinds of interesting sideshows will take place. But the core is this, what kind of agreement and can you verify it? Verification in North Korea has gotta be the world's biggest hurdle. And is there any agreement that's worth having that you can't verify? This thing, we may go a long way toward peace and maybe even a less than two year timeline and all of that. And then it'll all blow up on the first declaration by North Korea of its nuclear sites, which would be the ones you can see from commercial satellites, but tell you nothing about their underlying hidden structures of missile and nuclear capabilities. So this is a really a pregnant period with some opportunity but a lot of risks. Can I add to that? And what President Trump plans to ask for seems to be shifting or growing, right? Chemical and biological weapons seem to be on the table. Maybe cyber should be on the table, or human rights going to be on the table. So if all those things are piled onto the table, how is Kim Jong-un going to react? And the previous panel suggested that, as Doug mentioned, that verification is going to be a big deal. But also I think Kim, I agree with the earlier, the first panel in, I think it's Corey, who said that Kim in doing and saying these things about blowing up the nuclear test site, it's a way to bound the agenda of the Trump-Kim meeting. And as she said correctly, I think in my view, is that that's not a good thing for us, that he's trying to do this and trying to elicit Chinese support and South Korea support to have this particular agenda on the table. Okay, so we've got kind of excitement and hope in Korea, relief and possible opportunity viewed from Beijing, maybe some cautious optimism or healthy skepticism from the DC side. I'll add just quickly from kind of Tokyo's perspective, I think if there is a poison pill being prepared by John Bolton and others to raise expectations or demand a short timeline for denuclearization, I think Japan and Prime Minister Abe is kind of helping to mix the poison. I think they see real danger in a long extended process that gets a fuzzy denuclearization and leaves medium range missiles and possibly nuclear weapons in the hands of Kim Jong-un with possibly a weaker US South Korea alliance or some declared peace that isn't really peace. And so we've heard from Japanese friends, this idea of a package deal, it should include medium range missiles, it should include chemical and biological weapons, it should include resolving the abductee issue and some human rights issues. And so I think a lot of concern and if not outright fear in Tokyo and trying to link up closely with those allies in Washington who maybe feel a similar way. So we've heard a little bit about maybe what the US wants and what North Korea wants out of this. How about President Moon and South Korea in terms of what's the near term kind of game plan and peace treaty and declarations at the end of the war have been put on the table, but is that the most important thing? What are some of the priorities of the sequence that you see? Actually it seems to me that the Moon General Administration is pursuing to establish a kind of framework of a peaceful coexistence. So declaration to end war is the beginning of that process. But it would not precede the denuclearization process because actually denuclearization is kind of precondition for peace under any circumstances. So actually how we can start the peace process by having a kind of political declaration, not legally binding can assure the North Korea that we have a very benign intent to coexist with North Korea. So that actually help us go into the kinds of peace process and maybe help eliminate North Korea's demand for any kinds of peace guarantee or regime security guarantee kinds of things. We are going to give you a kind of top leaders political guarantee commitment to the North Korea. So that could be the beginning points. So of course we are preparing kinds of social events between the two Korea. That could be the first thing we will see in the coming months. Then we will see kinds of tension reduction talks between the two militaries. So it seems that we will begin kinds of process of talks on tension reduction and peaceful coexistence. What about the nuclear dimensions? Of course it's very unclear at this point of time. What could be the outcome of US DPRK deal in this month or next month? So that could be the critical points. So I hope that the outcome would be much satisfactory. Of course the deal must be where the agreement should be comprehensive not only focusing on the ICBM or elimination of the future nuclear nodes. Because we are the subject of current existing North Korea nuclear threat. Unless that component is not included in the agreement is very undesirable to accept. But anyhow we like to avoid any kinds of confronting at this point of time. So it's kinds of power pursuit on one dimension as conventional for we have to have some stability or mechanism to manage the situation on the ground on the other hand nuclear from maybe start and the continuation of dialogue with the US and DPRK. But my hunch on this US DPRK summit, I don't think they will agree on details. They will agree on some principles and directions. So it's kind of gateway to the next step of negotiation. That's why I said that the actually maybe from for six months to a year is kind of full of diplomatic activities and dialogue between all the concerned parties, bilateral or maybe three way. Of course that's my hunch. And also the other issue of course whether we will go for full fledged economic cooperation with North Korea, no I don't think so. Because actually it is clear state that the Moon Jae administration will honor the UN Security Council sanction resolutions. Not actually we don't want to regard as a weakest point international coalition of a sanction vis-a-vis North Korea. That's our leverage. That's why actually North Korea came to the negotiation. That's one of the reasons why North Korea came. Of course sanction has have not bite the North Korea economy substantially yet. But Kim Jong-un as it was expecting that their economy would be harmed by UN sanctions. That was clearly stated in the New Year's speech. Yeah actually maybe this is the beginning of another August march they had in 1994 and until the 1997 or 2000. During that period of time, minimum half a million, maximum two million people died because of starvation. So I don't want to let my people starve again to death. That's this design. So he is expected maybe the current international sanction regime continues. He's going to face a very serious problem. His popularity, his power background would be undermined by this kind. As for second maybe last year we stayed so various military exercise and bring in the stricter assets. So military dimension should be underscored at this point of time. Kim Jong-un disappeared before I see the exact date I forgot maybe more than 46 days. He still disappeared from the scene. So we brought in stricter assets from the United States and also B-50 flew over this DMZ line unlike the previous cases. Maybe there's a military dimension. Third dimension, actually there was no one in the world supported the North Korea. Maybe sometime Russia supported partially not for wholeheartedly but even China did not support North Korea. Actually rhetoric exchange between the two Beijing, Pyongyang, unprecedented. Actually he reminded all the North Korean relations is like the death of 1968. They're one of the worst period of bilateral diplomatic relations actually. Three dimension work today. So North Korean people actually nowadays enjoy a better life than six years ago. So he want to continue to provide that kinds of lifestyle to these people to consolidate his power base. So actually the four reasons. Domestic political reason, external pressure, military threat and international action. I think those are the main four reasons why North Korea came to the negotiating table. About the future, very unpredictable at this point of time. Maybe because actually they have not clearly said they are going to give up nuclear weapons. Two conditions. Yesterday Kim Jong-un actually according to news media Kim Jong-un actually said two conditions. One, the declaration to end the war between the North Korea and the United States. Second, actually agreement on the non-aggression between the US and the PRK. If those conditions are met, there's no reason for North Korea to keep nuclear weapons. That's what his statement. So actually he like to keep the nuclear weapons until the threat are clearly eliminated from the eyes of North Korea. Not from the eyes of South Korea. Not from the eyes of the United States. So how we are going to match, connect these two competing demands. But actually from our side, actually North Korea should do something upfront to outside the world that we can trust North Korea. That is, this is the real change in North Korea's calculation and North Korea's behavior. So we'll see. We'll see what happens. Well, we're getting to the crux of the problem a little bit as I see it. And one of the notes I wrote to myself watching the first panel is you think about how detailed and extended and comprehensive some kind of verification or nuclear dismantlement process would be. We've talked a lot about, or I've heard talk a lot about how peace and denuclearization move in parallel. And I think President Moon is trying to reassure the Americans that I'm not gonna get too far ahead of you, don't worry. And we're only going to start relieving sanctions when there's concrete steps towards denuclearization. So there's two mismatches that I see and I wonder if anyone on the panel can respond to this. First is if we're gonna wait until we see all these concrete steps that we wanna see to really provide sanctions relief, then we're not meeting North Korea's expectations. They're probably coming in with, well, I'll give this, this and this and I will expect something in return for that on the economic side. So how do you manage that gap? But then the second is the peace and denuclearization parallel idea. It makes sense to me and I get it, but I almost wondered, is it really that important? Couldn't you let peace move ahead of denuclearization in the sense that clearly North Korea's kind of view is, well, when everything's totally peaceful, then I'll be willing to get rid of nuclear weapons. And if you're fostering inter-Korean projects, better inter-Korean relations, if Kim Jong-un is actually sincere about that and that's not just playing to Moon's desires, then maybe you could create little exemptions in the international sanctions regime that are not so full-scale taking off UN sanctions but creating exemptions for inter-Korean economic projects that drive inter-Korean economic activity that satisfies some of the economic needs that North Korea needs without full-scale. So this idea that maybe could we let peace, could the Americans and the Japanese kind of let peace go ahead of denuclearization or those two kind of mismatches. I wonder what our panelists think, either their personal views or their views, what they think from how North Korea sees it or how China sees it. Or you can pick one of those conundrums. On the peace and DU parallel, what's different about sanctions now since 2016 is that is the assumption that any money that the North Koreans make can be directed to the weapons program. And that's how the UN has also seen its human rights violations is that the regime is depriving the people of their basic human dignity to funnel those scarce resources into this program. So, and I think for me, I would have to do some mental gymnastics to think that there can be peace while North Korea still has these nuclear weapons in which they've threatened to proliferate, they have proliferated in the past and that they've threatened to hit Guam, they've threatened to hit the US, they've threatened to hit South Korea and Japan. So, I think measures that President Moon and Kim have come up with in terms of greater military communication and establishing a hotline between the Blue House and the State Affairs Commission, I think those are good steps and I think that's part of the peace. On the economic front, I'm more skeptical about what that might do and the extent to which North Korea would actually agree to those economic agreements because North Korea does not want people coming in and infecting their people with ideas about market reforms, political democracy and all of these things. They just want people to pour money in and the regime will take care of your money. So, I'm very skeptical about the econ part of the puzzle but I'm very supportive of the communication channels and anything to reduce tension in that way. You know, it's, right now we're in the afterglow of last Friday's summit and people are picking out the positives and the images that looked so different from previous months. But when we get to the Trump-Kim summit, it'll be in the afterglow of the outcome of the American decision on the Iran agreement. And the Iran agreement is every signal, I mean, we don't know the final result but every signal so far is it's not good enough because it doesn't deal with human rights, missiles, Hezbollah, Syrian support, and other things that were never part of the JCPOA originally. And then you go to deal with North Korea and you start to peel back on things. I mean, the expectations are gonna be for maximal outcomes, not minimal outcomes. We're gonna condition our own atmosphere to further tighten negotiating space for people to try to find accommodations that meet, you know, two very different sides requirements. In almost every area, they're antithetical, finding a common agreed position that is totally acceptable to the other is gonna be tough on almost every issue before the parties. And so I think we have to be really humble in the face of what this kind of Mount Everest climb is gonna be and the way it's being prepared for, I'm very pleased Mr. Pompeo was able to go over and take advantage of the longstanding CIA ability to talk to the North discreetly and confidentially. But that's far from enough, I think, to prepare. President Trump's decision to front-load the meeting with the head of state rather than back-load it, you know, puts a huge burden on the negotiators and the administration is frankly underpopulated with experts to work these things through because of inattention time, resignations, retirements and a narrower bandwidth within the administration as a whole. Yeah, because actually, because I agree with John's points about actually, it seems to me that we will start with the political realm having a kind of declaration and kinds of whatever it is. Then we go into the institutionalization of dialogue between the two parties, like a meal to meal talk, then we will be discussing confidence-building measures. Then it could be paralleled by social or people-to-people exchange between the two Koreas, having more meetings. But I'm very skeptical of the economic cooperation between the two Koreas, because South Korean government knows very well we cannot violate the U.S. sanctions, because actually, once we violate, actually, that could actually benefit for North Korea, not for South Korea. So actually, I'm a little bit cautious about predicting about booming of economic cooperation between the two parties. So we will be discussing these issues in principle, but actually implementation of actually, of course, in the parliament-jump declaration, we agreed to resume the inter-Korean economic cooperation, but actually within the boundary, some certain boundary, not over the boundary. So I'm very skeptical, I'm a little bit cautious about the economy, but we will be discussing some political issue. Maybe there could be a political dialogue, high-level, senior-level political dialogue, a meal to meal. So I'm expecting lots of dialogue going on between the two parties. And also the other one, we are very cautious. So we don't want to be, we don't want to talk about our U.S. alliance with North Korea, actually. It's totally separate issue. So actually, we don't want to bring in any additional issues to inter-Korean dialogue when you have, for instance, meal to meal dialogue, actually. USFK issue was mentioned by Secretary Mattress. I was really shocked, actually. So of course, Professor Moon Jong-in's article before the office, I was really also shocked, actually. We have no intention at this point of time to talk of the USFK, our U.S. alliance issue at this point of time, because actually our U.S. alliance has been the backbone and will be the backbone of South Korea's security and stability. Well, let me ask one more question before we open it up to the audience and kind of pivoting off of some of this. Let me take the cynical, skeptical view. What if failure actually comes a little bit more quickly than we think? I mean, right now, the tweets coming out of Trump are all, it really looks like he wants to have a big success and there was some consideration of, well, maybe having it in Pamun Jong, the meeting there would allow a celebratory mood and there'd be confetti in the streets. But let's say we come more quickly to this head of the poison pill kind of works. The expectations are really high. We get very little back from the North Koreans in terms of commitments. We really slow walk the US North Korea piece, but meanwhile you've got two summits between Kim and Xi Jinping possibly within a short period of time. The integrity of the sanctions regime is, I mean, in some ways, maybe China just holds the throttle and can ease back and if it feels that the US is asking for too much and the mood in Seoul certainly seems to suggest that there'd be a price to pay in the alliance atmosphere if the US really pulls back. So what are the implications of a quick reversal by Trump and a kind of a victory of the skeptics in Washington? Does everything stop when we go right back to where we were before or has the situation fundamentally changed now because of the North China dialogue and because of the political mood in South Korea? Well, I think one observation, which is the talk of bloody nose or preemptive attack has really been undermined by these developments in the last couple of months. And a president who orders such an attack would have been viewed as unreasonable by a broad range of people. That range will be even broader now, especially in South Korea where the euphoria is palpable. Some people feel that they're past that point and they're onto something better. And if we suddenly go back to a confrontational and perhaps provocative posture, it's gonna be more costly to us. I hate, you know, Mr. Trump got elected because he tried to simplify things and problem his reality isn't quite so simple. We also have a negotiation going on at the end of this week with China on trade. And we've connected it to China's cooperation on the nuclear issue. And the trade posture we've got with China has three major demands of it, all of which have been jumbled together and the path forward on each of the demands has not been made clear. What criteria you could meet to resolve these issues is not clear. So we may be handed simultaneously towards rejection on your hypothesis, rejection of the terms that we can try to reach in the early phase of discussions at the summit level and then the follow on special envoy level and a simultaneous souring of US-China relations further incentivizing China not to cooperate and to pursue its own interests more strongly. I think failures in the eye of the beholder. I think we would all define failure differently. I think if Kim were to say, come up with, say that he's going to dismantle the ICBM program, that's not failure for President Trump who's very concerned about the threats to the actual threats to the homeland and potentially less so about what's going on in the region. So if there is a peace agreement then it's good for Kim. It might be good for President Trump who wants to peace and where Kim successfully taps into America first national security inclinations and we start have a dismantling of the US alliance structure in the region. Is that a failure for President Trump necessarily? I'm not sure. And is that a failure for some in South Korea? I don't know about that either. So I think, or for China for that matter. Or Japan. Or Japan. Well, Japan would be very concerned about that. Japan would be very concerned. I don't know that China would be very concerned about the dismantling of the US alliance structure. So I think they're all sorts of ranges of failure and that it's on the spectrum. So for people who are very concerned about US credibility and US standing in the region then we cannot just be talking about ICBMs or about US troops leaving the Korean peninsula or from Japan. But right now all of those issues are very plastic than ever before. So I think, so failure has different meanings for everybody in addition to denuclearization having different meanings for the various actors. Okay, my take on that actually is actually who's going to be responsible for the failure? Kim Jong-un or Trump? Actually, I agree with Chung-un. In the eyes of the beholder. So actually if Kim Jong-un is responsible for the failure for not agreeing to the comprehensive deal, I don't know. So that is going to be a critical issue. Maybe if Kim Jong-un is responsible for AB, that's the case in these eyes of international community. Actually the Moon Jae-in government will be in a very difficult position. Maybe criticized for being naive to believe what Kim Jong-un said. Of course, if that's the case, AB Moon Jae-in's dimension will go back to the policy pre-summit, tougher on North Korea, no engagement, but actually keep the door open for dialogue. That could be the scenario. But if Trump seems to be the response for the failure, maybe we will be in a big trouble in managing bilateral relations with the United States. So, but the second issue I get, how we can define the success? What kinds of maximum or minimum deal we can expect, outcome we can expect out of this upcoming summit? So I think this upcoming Trump-Kim Jong-un summit could be a very important, very critical issue in setting the tone and path after stage. I hope we can have very, very, actually that's what South Korea government actually put forward, comprehensive agreement, not only including the ICBM, but the future nuclear issue, but also the old existing nuclear programs and material. Well, that could be packed here and also we'd clear timeframe within a certain period of time. We'll do this in six months and do that in a year and then by the end of, let's say, 2020, the nuclear free current is achieved. That kind of timeframe is very necessary to make it sure that we will be able to accomplish the denuclearization of Korean Peninsula. Yeah, and in that sense then, the meeting could be a success, but relatively soon thereafter, if you fall short of such an ambitious timeline, that's the problem. Okay, we're gonna open it up to the audience. I had a couple hands here, these two gentlemen right next to each other. Hands went up first and then. I'm Peter Humphrey, intel analyst and a former diplomat. There are two things I am absolutely certain of. There will be no inspectors allowed into those prison camps. And that means any nuclear or anything can be moved into those prison camps and never be seen. Second, North Korea will try and soak us for billions of dollars worth of cash. They'll sell us their 60 nuclear weapons at a billion a piece. Center fuses may go for a few hundred thousand. That means they are trading away weapons which have no utility whatsoever, simply cannot be used for a huge cash injection to maintain a regime whose most lethal weapon of destruction, the prison camps, are untouched. Prison camps which have killed a million people. That's about five atomic bombs worth of human beings. Are we insane? Well, we haven't agreed to anything yet, but let me take that question in terms of that level of, well, that aspect of the dialogue because I think it's a very valid point. We'll take one more question here and then. Mark Brodsky, retired engineer, physicist, CEO. I'm puzzled why you haven't brought up the most obvious reason for North Korea's change right now and their apparent willingness for diplomacy. They don't have a way of testing weapons. That has disappeared when their mountain caved in. So why not say we're not gonna test weapons? We're gonna denuclearize. Aside from testing weapons, there's no way we, for the most part, can test to see, verify what else they're doing. So it's an easy thing to say. We're giving up nuclear testing and expanded to denuclearization and back to 2000 in the early 90s. Just delayed again, so that will undermine the ability, as the speaker had just said, of giving them a bloody nose because if they're negotiating and saying they're gonna give us everything we want apparently without defining it, why not do that until they can rebuild their ability to test? I'm surprised, why hasn't either panel brought up that aspect? Sure, okay, so we have a couple questions, yeah. Well, on the second, on the Pyongyang re-testing site, there's a genuine dispute among observers about whether or not it is out of use, or not usable. The two Chinese think tanks, which did not apparently have direct access to it, claim that it's out of use. And 38 North, which is published here on the basis of commercial photography, made a strong case that it is still got two functioning tunnels. So we don't know whether or not they've given up nothing or they might have given up something. And this tends to take me back to how do the Chinese view this? The Chinese are really upset about that being close. That last bomb may have vented. They claim to have one ventilation sensed of the radioactive material. And I think if China made any major points, and we don't know what they all were, but one I can assume was strongly made during Kim Jong-un's visit to Beijing recently was stop testing there. Now the Chinese, I mean the North Koreans last fall when we were in our period of heightened rhetoric, the North Korean foreign minister in New York said that the next test could be a hydrogen bomb over the surface of the Pacific. So they themselves do not rule out doing atmospheric tests as opposed to underground tests. So you have to take that into account as well. And then we also have the question from this gentleman about essentially would the United States or would other countries be willing to really essentially pay, let's say North Korea is willing to, we're gonna give you all of these nuclear weapons. So here's what complete denuclearization means. They're almost meeting our definition in a sense. But the asking price is very high and is actually in the form of essentially cash as opposed to just simply letting sanctions go. Because we've already seen just unwinding sanctions by itself does not necessarily guarantee North Korea a great windfall. Actually it's quite interesting. This time North Korea has not demanded any kinds of compensation, economic compensation for giving up any kinds of capability at all. In previous case there's always economic compensation. We promised to build two light water reactors and also we promised to deliver half a million tons of heavy fuel over every year, economic assistance, all kinds of things. But this time we have not agreed to provide any kinds of economic assistance at this point of time. North Korea has not demanded that as well. Instead, North Korea demanded actually two things. One is an elimination of military threat. Second is a kind of guarantee or regime security. It's kind of security versus security, not a security versus the economic compensation. So it's quite different formula. But I don't know what kinds of demands. What kinds of more concrete conditions they like to have. It's a strong clear. Actually, as I said before, they actually demanded the US DPRK joined the declaration to end the war. Kind of political symbolic meaning. And then three of non-aggression, the one they actually demanded. Not actually asking the cash. So South Korea has no intention to give any cash. That's a violation of UN Security Council Declaration. Bulk cash. That's why actually we have not studied any kinds of economic cooperation. Of course, we are just a few days away from the summit, actually past the summit, so I have no idea what's going on. Of course, they will be thinking about some kinds of small scale of economic assistance. North Korea on the humanitarian front, but not huge scale. Yeah. Okay. I want to go to the back a little bit. There's a woman there with her hand up. I'll turn to her first. Thank you. Diane Perlman, George Mason School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution. So most of what we're talking about is dealing with the symptom. And I want to talk about addressing the underlying causes. And it was mentioned about trauma and tension reduction. So there's obviously a huge history in trauma and there's a body of work on the need to deal with the past in order to move forward. So I'm wondering about something like some form of a truth and reconciliation process and also recognition of the trauma and also analyzing what's the underlying conflict about, what are legitimate goals, what do the parties want. And the other part is that I don't hear anything at all about the fact that we're spending a trillion dollars on modernizing our nuclear weapons as all the nuclear weapons states are and we haven't complied with article six of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and they're totally understandable feeling that they need to deter, that they need a deterrent, that it's logical and rational and people are more dangerous than they're afraid and just they're, you know, and the Libya example, all of that. So just what are your thoughts about that? Thank you and then gentlemen here. Hi, this is Sangmin, I'm a reporter from the Radio Free Asia. I have a question about the possibility of the withdrawal of U.S. troops in South Korea. As you mentioned that as a North Korea report the demand that security guarantee from the United States. So it may be possible that the United States use the possibility of the withdrawing U.S. troops in South Korea as a negotiation deal to North Korea. So I want to know how to see that. Okay, let's take those two and if I put a little addendum to that question about reconciliation I must say I myself am a little perplexed about the idea of moving quickly toward a peace treaty because I would assume a peace treaty and I'm curious, Kong, what you think the view and soul is would involve a lot of questions about compensation, property rights, all the leftover nitty gritty details from the war. Are the South Koreans prepared to just say, all right, clean slate, you keep the North, we'll keep the South and then we'll work together on that basis or would there be a strong desire once you open that up to get back into, my family has lived on this land for X number of generations and et cetera but so that's another dimension to that reconciliation question and then we have a question on the USFK or the future of US forces in Korea. Who would like to? About the reconciliation, of course, we'll go for the, we try to reconcile with North Korea and various dimension about the, I don't know when South Korea can sign a peace treaty with North Korea. Quite difficult, actually, peace treaty actually is going to be really comprehensive, first we have to come up with clear demarcation line of the territorial justification, whose territory and then of course coming to the, all the issues, we know compensation, all this, very difficult, actually we drafted a peace treaty when I was in the government as kind of a researcher. But it's a really complicated issue, actually it touches upon, for example, the most sensitive issue, not only the line issue, but there is a jurisdiction line or just kind of military line really drawn by the US command at that point of time. Really difficult to go into that direction. But that's why actually South Korean government is pursuing the declaration to end war as a starting point, not actually concluding the peace treaty. Maybe peace treaty come later. Actually, North Korea wants peace declaration with South Korea, but the peace treaty could be signed between the US and the DPRK, that's a design. Each one has different idea about the peace treaty. Who should be the signatory to the peace treaty? Of course, China wants its own share, four party talks, four way peace treaty. Because actually they actually go back to the Amnesty's treaty. And then they say claim, China is a signatory to the Amnesty's treaty. So that's why China should be involved as a signatory to the upcoming new peace treaty among all the directly concerned parties. But this time South Korea has actually changed a little bit initially as like a three way peace declaration or the declaration to end war. US, North Korea, and South Korea, three way. Actually, I think that provoked China. And China actually four way history. So in the Parment of Declaration we include either three way peace treaty or four way. So leaving the door for China to be part of it. About the USFK, we draw, it's actually, we like to keep the USFK as far as we can. So in our mutual defense treaty, there's anything, I don't think there's any word on North Korea. It says any external threat. And until the completion of a collective defense mechanism in the Asia Pacific, we will maintain our US alliance. So even after solving the North Korean nuclear problems, still we will be able to have the USFK under current peninsula. But there could be some modification. If tension really gone down and they have substantial, real, real substantial progress into the peace, real peace. I think there's possibility for modifying the configuration of US forces in Korea and reducing the size. Actually, it was President Kim Jong-un actually US forces in Korea is an issue to be discussed only between the US and ROK. But if there's a substantial reduction of tensions and progress made in the peace regime, it is possible to open the issue for dialogue. But actually he alluded to the possibility, but not actually specified that as a kind of given fact. I appreciate that question about conflict resolution. It makes sense to me, but only if you assume that North Korea wants peace. And I don't see that unless, I mean, they built from its regime bounding, they built an ideological, economic, political infrastructure that's based on a hostile United States and a puppet regime in South Korea. So for that, you know, that has to go away or dismantled before I would start to believe that North Korea actually wants a peace treaty and that everybody can exist in a peaceful way. So I have yet to see signs of that, unfortunately. Just an addendum on that. I think that the concept of reconciliation commissions and the like is something that would follow a decision to reunify as opposed to a decision to stand still and have two different systems. And right now it doesn't look like reunifications anywhere in the cards. Of course, in 1989, reunification of Germany didn't look like it was in the cards either. So I'm not ruling out anything, but I think that my frame of reference would be is if we start moving towards reunification because of a collapse in the North for some other hypothetical outcome, then I would think very strongly about how we deal with these unsettled claims on each other. It's difficult to go back to hold. Actually, my family has a property right in Shinonju in some part of North Korea, but actually I have no intention to claim my rights over there. But do you want compensation? Some compensation, please. I'm sorry, we have time for just one more question and I'm just gonna ask this gentleman here. I wanted to take somebody from this side. My apologies, not to be able to get to everyone. Can you elaborate more on what Japan seeks from these negotiations and whether they have a different position from the US? S-T-U. I'm glad you asked that, I'm glad I called on this gentleman. Right, we haven't talked too much about Japan and as I alluded to before, I think there's a lot of concern in Japan about how kind of quickly we fell into this dynamic. Great suspicion about what Kim Jong-un's motivations are, concern that the Moon administration is bending too far potentially to try to achieve its great goal of peace with the North and at the same time avoid some kind of military strike that they feared was potentially in the cards. So that, and wariness about Trump's potential eagerness to claim great victory or improve chances for the election later in the fall. So they're very much trying to join themselves at the hip with the United States, push the line of don't give in too quickly, don't forget about the things that matter to us, the medium range missiles, all of the nuclear weapons capability and then they're in addition adding the abductee issue. As a matter of fact, family members of people that North Korea had abducted from Japan are here in Washington this week meeting with officials to make sure this kind of stays on the agenda. I think they'd be very pleased that John Bolton mentioned it on Sunday talk shows and that it remains a talking point, I think right now in the United States. So this is in a way, they also see an opportunity. So it's an opportunity potentially to get some, if things are going to move, then they wanna see the abductee issue resolved and a couple of other big threats. I mean, anything that eliminates North Korea's nuclear weapons, even if the medium range missiles are still there, frankly, that's a huge gain for Japan compared to where they are right now. So I think they also see, they don't wanna miss an opportunity if an opportunity is actually there. And there is talk about trying to arrange a summit meeting between Abe and Kim if they're the last ones left behind in terms of the region because we could have a Putin-Kim summit as part of this. All of this makes me think in some way, six-party talks was a better venue for the Japanese because they had a guaranteed seat at the table and you had that trilateral solidarity as kind of a caucus within the six-party talks, keeping themselves lashed together. So they may push for some kind of collective dialogue on some of these issues. I think they certainly wanna stay close to moon and keep the US, Japan, South Korea trilateral dynamic going and there'll be very active bilateral diplomacy. I gotta believe Abe will leverage every ounce of his relationship he has with Putin. He's met him plenty of times and we have the South Korea, China, Japan trilateral meeting coming up in a week or so in Japan, I don't know if it's in Tokyo or not, but it's in Japan. And that Japan will be a little bit isolated. They're the only one who hasn't, Abe will be the only one who hasn't met with Kim in the last couple of weeks. But I think Japan still has a lot to offer the United States in the context of maximum pressure if indeed we have to get back to that point. And there still is the potential on the optimistic scenario normalization between Japan and North Korea that could provide great benefit to North Korea if they're able to satisfy Japan's demands on some of these things. So still a player, but fighting to get its voice heard in all of these different avenues. Actually at least the South Korea tried to keep Japan informed about this intercontinental. That's why actually director of NIS National Intangible Service went to Japan actually who attended the summit and then explained what discussed in the summit. So to assure that Japan is on the same page with us and on the same boat to solve this North Korean problem. But actually about the abductation will be discussed bilateral between Japan and DPRK in coming months or so. No and I think that's really important. Keeping the Moon-Abe relationship together is critical. It's not just keeping it together. It's the first meeting where a Korean leader has gone to Japan in over six and a half years. Exactly. So it's got a lot of significance. Well thank you all for participating with us. Please join me in thanking our panel. And thank you for joining us today for this discussion.