 tudi, da jste pripravljali nekaj definitivni reskel in financijne stabilitve, ki se vse predstavili v komunitivnih političnih komunitih in akademijnih. Problima je, da vidim, da je tudi definitiva, is that it's difficult to... they don't boil down to a majorable, easy to communicate objective. At the moment we want to do macroprudential policy, i think it's necessary to come up somehow to a majorable objective. I understand it's much more difficult than in monetary policy polizi, ker inflatiočne, ja, kot, kot, nakel, so imelno opset triple, različne, tudi in začarno odstatчne odstapovne rizke možno bez vznečenčne in možno odstravo. Tya, ki ne500 neko naše, da imamo eveno in začarnomodne rečem, sem pravno s dedačak za dve ob allowed. Mešanjem tudi, ker v tega gl知道 svoji, Jer je pri.� zelo se borila, kako jaz se bilo, da ima inšten postupnje, kako jaz ima inšten postupnje, po kam je tko. Prišel je jaz inštena. To občatno so prišlo, da se bilo v poček, na korhe, barอ pa. Zelo se, da ja se budem, da se bilo, finančnjih zelo. Svetljamo včasno. Zelo, tega je izgleda k spetu, da je tudi taj vsakršel, S.J.G. F.S.R. In je to zelo, da je to vse priprvedal nečutnik na finančne stabilite, zato G.D.P. v zelo. Gdp. Srečaj, da vse predstavljajo, kaj je vse predstavljajo, gdp. 1, 2, 3, vse predstavljajo. Tako, na IMF, vse predstavljamo 0,4 vse predstavljamo vse predstavljamo. Vse predstavljamo finančne stabilite, finančne stabilite je fundacija for cyclical macro-medantial policy is to measure gdp at risk as a function of financial vulnerability. In the report we're proposing, we're showing two ways of doing it. One is a statistical way to basically model how the conditional density of gdp growth is moving and we can do that at different forecasting horizons and you can also use DSG models to generate conditional distribution or something we don't do in the report, but which central banks are doing is you can use a purely judgmental approach and say there are five scenarios and you put some probability weights in those scenarios. So I completely agree with you that I think we're to make cyclical macro-medantial policy a workable something workable you want to have some measurable objective that you can track and so my proposal would be to track gdp at risk. Thank you very much for a really interesting and so representation, I'm Francesco Matzafero and the head of the secretariat here at DSRB. Macro-medantial policy started 10 years ago being very strongly cyclical. Now there was then there was a phase in which people basically thought that's not function. It should be about accumulating resilience for several reasons we are not able to foresee the financial cycle and if I won't understand today you have been bringing us a very strong cyclical message which I find extremely interesting. Now I have three questions concerning the counter cyclical capital buffer which you have been mentioned. The first one do you think in terms of size? The size of capital which would be accumulated or could be released is sufficient to make the trick. The second question is sometimes people think banks would simply conserve capital because it's costly even if they get the policy information that you can release it. And the third point is we are in a world which is less and less bankocentric and we do not have cyclical instruments beyond banking. So what do you think about this? Yes. So all three questions are very relevant and interesting. So of course the world has changed in the past 10 years. Bank capital globally has increased tremendously. In the typical GSEP common some proxy for common tier one equity was somewhere between 4 and 5 percent 10 years ago in this today perhaps 9 or 10 percent so capital is substantially higher than it was 10 years ago. So that's the first order difference and it shifts so like the tail risk out quite a bit further. On top of that of course there are all kinds of additional buffers depending on the jurisdiction and the counter-signal capital buffer 2.5 percent on top of it. Now would that protect you against any kind of shock know 2.5 percent is a finite number but I think that say in the US case having 2.5 percent more would have made a tremendous difference in the fall of 2008 or the beginning of 2009 it would probably not have prevented this order leveraging but it would certainly have made it less necessary to recapitalize the banking system using tarp money in 2009. The other example is of course in Spain where there was the dynamic provisioning which was of the order of depending on the banks of a similar order as a counter-signal capital buffer and it was not sufficient to counteract the housing crisis as a whole but still differentially across the banks those that did accumulate the counter-signal capital provisioning buffer were cutting their credit provision less aggressively once the crisis hit so I do think it does make a difference but yes the calibration I think is a very important question. Now of course there are trade-offs bank capital is costly to some extent and they are both inter-temporal trade-offs and trade-offs across institutions so even counter-signal capital buffer might generate regulatory arbitrage into the shadow banking system or it might shift the temporal allocation of credit so I do believe even though we are now in a system with much higher equity in the core banks and with stress tests but much better regulatory and supervisor framework I still believe that variations in financial conditions are going to continue and those are going to have first order impacts on credit supply on credit availability and hands on market economic activity and so that's particularly important in the European context because of course monetary policy is set centrally and we might well be again in the case like Spain in the run up to the crisis where relative to the euro area monetary policy was set correctly but relative to one particular country it might have been much too easy or much too tight so that having these extra tools might be extremely extremely useful and powerful so thank you very much again I think it's time for lunch now