 We're looking today at the issue of oil abundance, the theory that we're headed into a new age, a new global age, in which we're not going to have scarcity, but a big oil and gas surplus. So first, we're going to look at the bull case. And so John, what's changing? What's happening over the next few years that's different from what we've had over the last decade or two? If we remember the 50s, 60s, and 70s in the United States of America, it was the land of prosperity, the land of plenty. We lost our way in the 80s, 90s, and the last decade in terms of how energy plays a role in the prosperity of the nation. Fortunately for the United States of America and North America in general, the natural resource base for oil and gas is huge. It's almost unbelievable how much oil and natural gas exists in North America that's available at these prices to produce for society. And if we enable the companies, the industry, to produce it, it's job creating, it's revenue generating, it's value creating, a lot more taxes will be paid, a lot more consumers will have good jobs to be able to buy the things they want in life. We could start a multi-decade era of new prosperity for North America. Okay. And we are talking about an age not only of greater oil production in North America, but this is something in South America, in Africa, and other places in the world. Mike, what could stunt all this? What's the wrench in the fan? Let's start by affirming that this is a good news story. But we need to be careful about not taking it too far, at least not taking it too far with a high degree of certainty. The first piece that you need to keep in mind is that when you add large volumes in South America, large volumes in North America, large volumes in the Middle East, large volumes in other places, someone needs to consume those. And if there isn't the appetite to consume them, prices go down, wiping out the economic case for a lot of that oil that you were expecting in the first place. So there's a balance to be struck here. You can't just have endless, expensive oil coming on the market. That's the first piece. The second piece is we're in the early stages of a lot of this development. There's a lot of uncertainty about the costs, about the production levels, and about how far everything can go. And the third piece of the equation that we still need to get our hands around in understanding this development is how local communities and broader environmental concerns will receive it. We focus a lot on the national level environmental lobbying, but a lot of the concern comes at the local level. These developments make a lot of people rich, and they make a lot of other people who haven't gotten rich quite upset. And so there's a lot of tension. I spent time in rural Ohio a couple of weeks ago talking to people, and this splits communities apart. And if you can't find the right way to make this work for whole communities, there's a good chance they won't let it work for anyone. Is there, is what you're arguing that there's a chance that the whole scenario does not happen? There's certainly a chance that the whole scenario does not happen. I think there's a decent chance that the whole scenario, if the scenario is the United States produces as much oil as it consumes, absolutely, there are a lot of variables in place, some of which are within the countries that might be producing, like local concerns, like regulatory policy, some of which are from well outside of it. If Iraq delivers massive volumes of oil, the kinds of ones that its government is aspiring to, not the ones that analysts actually believe will come online, that could bring down prices to a level that gets in the way of some of this development here. That could still be on net good news, but there are a lot of pieces that have to fall into place to make all these developments happen. Okay. John, one scenario that we all see every day, every month is the long decline of the United States, its influence in the world, its relative economy, and the rise of China. What does this scenario do to that? Well, I would argue that with the investment in oil and gas and the rest of our power electrical generation system, which is getting old and needs to be refurbished and in some places replaced, I think we could put about a trillion dollars a year of new capital into energy full stop for the next 10 to 20 years, so that's 10 to 20 trillion dollars of investment in the United States, Canada, and Mexico with respect to energy investment broadly writ. I think when you start looking at that kind of impact on GDP, you're looking at the world's largest economy growing at a rate of 7 plus percent per year over the next several decades. China can grow too. Nobody says China should stop growing, but the United States has ceased its growth, but we expect another 100 million people in this country by 2040. That's a big increase on where we are today, and so that kind of demographic on top of a 7% growth rate will be the world's largest economy for a very long time to come. Okay, let's close out by just asking, just give us a projection, the biggest winner, the biggest loser. The biggest winner, Middle America, meaning middle class Americans, where jobs are plentiful, because it's not just oil rigs or gas rigs where people will be working, it's all the supply chain, and it's all that supply chain which are the machinists, it's the assemblers, it's all the people who would have manufacturing jobs, real estate jobs, construction jobs, because this multiplier effect of this much spending would cut across the entire economy, and we'd be back to where we were 30, 40 years ago when we knew prosperity and we knew that when you grew up, you got a job. Loser? The loser will probably be OPEC. I think OPEC is gonna descend into chaos, and it will finally ultimately break up. Mike, same question. I think the United States is the big winner, but nowhere close to the level that John is suggesting. The most bullish, careful analysis out there which comes from Citigroup talks about a cumulative impact on GDP of two to 3% over the next decade. That's 0.2 to 0.3% each year, and that's more consistent with the kinds of investment numbers people look at. GDP isn't boosted by the same amount that investment is boosted when you look at basic macroeconomics. I think the main losers are the countries that depend on oil revenues and have no flexibility to go to anything else, and the ones that depend on captive customers for natural gas. If you apply those conditions, you're looking at Russia in particular and some other OPEC countries with high cost oil down the line. Thank you very much. Thanks.