 It did make my life easier is that since we cannot possibly exceed the principle of full accommodation, which is we started 15 minutes late, we will end 15 minutes late, we cannot go above that, I think that we have now to open the floor to general debate. I will abuse my position by posing the first question to the panel, which does bring together, I believe, themes from three of the four presentations. Eleni takes Keynes from your presentation, that is, in the economic consequences of the peace, and Keynes is one of Vitor's favorite authors, the very first lines of that book, Keynes basically says that people take the international system for granted, and that in Europe, he's talking about Europe, the powers are free riding, I'm using my own language, on the system because they're taking it for granted. By doing so, Keynes forecast the collapse of the system, and one of his life missions was to rebuild it, which eventually he helped doing at Bretton Woods. So given that that is preceding your quote in the Keynes book, how do we see this problematic today given the transformation that is ongoing, the globalization trends, the great divide, the difference in the relative power across Europe, the United States, India, and China. I think this is not a bad question for the panel, but it will be dealt with together with your own questions. Who wants to intervene third row here at the middle? Mike is coming. I think I found very ironic that Richard Baldwin is talking about real convergence in the global economy, in the global space. At a time, we are so worried about fragmentation and fractures inside Europe, but also around the world. I think this is an irony, and I have a very hard time in rationalizing it. Secondly, I think in all the presentation was being lying behind, but not sufficiently explained, is there is a tremendous shift of power. It's not like we are thinking about a new Bretton Woods arrangements in a Western world's center. I mean, it's a global economy. It's an enormous shift of power. And this is why the Chinese and other are contemplating, I mean, it's an alternative to the international policy regime. And I think this is something we should worry us. And now to get back to your point, I mean, Richard, real convergence. Apply your logic to the Euro area, where we have a huge cleavage between the northern fringe and the southern fringe. Is it going to solve the problems in the Euro area? And then forget about redesigning the mechanism and the policy arrangements are. I don't buy it. Thank you. Can you pass the mic to John Willbauer? Oh, you have it. Super. A clarifying comment on Ben Friedman's excellent remarks. You might have thought there's a contradiction between my evidence yesterday that there is a stable Sagan Phillips curve and the flattening of the Phillips curve that Ben Friedman was talking about. There is a contradiction. Let me explain. The research that I pointed to yesterday suggested that in addition to via the unemployment rate, in other words, the output gap, the transmission mechanism also works through the housing market through the exchange rate. The exchange rate channel is fairly weak because there's a lot of pricing by foreign companies to the US. The housing market one, of course, is very complex. And credit factors are a very important part of the story apart from interest rates. That also applies to the output gap or the unemployment rate in terms of the transmission mechanism because the financial system, the credit system has been transformed. The role of credit and housing and asset prices in the linkage between monetary policy and unemployment is now very different from what it was before. So in that sense, in a policy sense, he's right, Ben Friedman is right, the transmission, the Phillips curve has flattened in the sense that the mechanism of interest rates to inflation is much more complicated now than it was before. Thank you. Could you pass the mic to Jean-Pizani please? This is a question to Richard. I wish you your book, very, very many readers, because it's a great book. Now assume that you reached the US median voter and the US median voter reads it. Would he or she conclude that Mr. Trump is right to try to slow down the transmission of technology and intellectual property to the US, to China, sorry. Thank you. So we're a bit in trouble in terms of time. I would suggest to come back to the panel now and assign Max two minutes to each in reverse order. So, André, you would be first. Well, I don't really have much to add to what I said in my remarks. I will just comment on your question. I mean, will we be able, will the world community be able to respond to the challenges? And I do agree with Daniel that those are huge challenges. It's a huge transformation. I call it the great transformation for a reason. I really believe that it is a great transformation. Now, will we be able to do that? It will require obviously huge amount of leadership. Where is the leadership at the moment to do that? Where is the Keynes, who was the person that indeed had the vision coming out of a very difficult period and was a great mind, but then really rolled his sleeves up and got himself involved in the nitty gritty of the policy with always sort of this political economy vision? Where are those people? Where is the cordial hello? We see the Nobel Prize, who was really the person behind what Roosevelt did in assembling the United Nations and the global institutions. So I think we're in a very, very difficult situation. Will it come from China? I think China has clearly a role to play. And China should have a great interest in doing this. So the difficulty is to have leadership in the countries in decline. I think this is really the problem. As long as the US stays on this view, you know, make America greater grand and tell a story to their citizens, which is a false story, we cannot roll back history. And obviously, America can remain rich, as Europe can remain rich, but we cannot be such a dominant share of the global economy. And therefore, I would think it's, in a sense, from China to show some wisdom here. Thank you. Richard? So let me, first, on the skepticism about the real conversion. So this is an arbitrage of where there's a very high know-how-to-labor ratio. And the arbitrage is proportional to the differences. Those aren't that different in Europe. If you want to see what is going on in Europe, it's a shift to manufacturing from, say, Germany to Central and Eastern Europe with the outsourcing and global value chains. So that's going on. But if you're not part of this high-tech, low-wage thing, you're hurt by it. So the fact that countries can now produce manufacturing with high-tech and low-wages, if you're still trying to do it, low-tech, low-wages, you can't compete. So that's led to this premature deindustrialization. So inside the rich countries, this is highly divisive. But my point is, if you look at the world as a whole, it's incredibly positive. 600 million people have come out of dire poverty during this time. And what you see is globalization is super popular in the emerging markets. If you look at the Pew, it's only in the rich countries. So I'm going to talk with yours to put up together. You can think about this as two football teams. And in the old globalization, they exchanged players. And if they actually did exchange players, everybody won. What's going on since 1990 until now is the trainer of the better team went to the pitch of the worst team and trained up the worst team, which was very good for the worst team. It made the whole league more competitive. But it's not at all sure it was good for the players and the best team who used to have a monopoly on the know-how of their coach. And that's essentially what's happened in the G7. The workers used to have a monopoly on G7 knowledge for technological reasons. Now they no longer do. You can look at Branko Malanovic's elephant diagram to see sort of things like that. The, for Jean, as I said, when I launched the book Seven Days After Trump Got Elected in Washington, DC, globalization is not something that the foreigners are doing to America. And so in my story, it's really this movement of knowledge. But I don't think that can be stopped. But the point is, it's not the median American. It's just the manufacturing workers who are really being hurt by this. I think the median America has done relatively well and there's all sorts of other problems. Also, a lot of the discussion that we've had about pro and anti-globalization, I'd like to make two distinctions. One, put in a Trump fix factor and look at the world again. And you'll be a lot calmer. The second is, if you distinguish between anti-immigration and anti-globalization, the world will look a lot clearer. In Europe, we have a lot of anti-immigration coming from particular shocks, Finland, Sweden, whatever. But very few people are against pre-trading goods in Europe and the basic principles. And the ones who sort of may be backed against it with Brexit, they're regretting it. And nobody's looking at Brexit and saying, wow, we need to do that too. So in my mind, a lot of the confusion is that people are conflating anti-immigration and anti-globalization. And they're really very separate things. If the immigration flow stopped tomorrow, the world economy would not collapse. If the trade flows stopped tomorrow, they would collapse. So even from an economic perspective, they're very, very different things. Thank you. Ellen? Two quick points. I was very happy about the exchange between John and Ben on the Phillips curve because I also think that introducing some more macro finance characteristics in the Phillips curve and the notion of risk somewhere has to be there. And that could be one of the way to improve the way we think about the transmission of monetary policy. On the more kind of big question on the structural change of the international economy, and that was also a code there, of a change in the international financial system, monetary system, with the rise of China, I think it's pretty much clear that the world is becoming more multipolar. Now this happens at different speeds in different domains. So in trade, it happens quite fast. In the financial markets, we do have all these measures that still point towards a very preeminent dollar. But we also know that the yuan potentially might make an inway. We had the coming in of the euro. So the world is becoming at a different speed multipolar. The effect that might have and the consequences on the institutional setup are probably going to be quite deep. But these are definitely a lot of different issues to think about. You can think about this issue from the supply of safe assets in the world, resupplying them in terms of nominal stability. That's a very deep issue. And the multipolar world may increase the supply of these nominally safe assets. That's one angle. Another angle is if you have different international currencies, they become more substitutable with one another. More substitution across currencies could lead to more portfolio shift if you have some shifts of credibility on one area or the other. So that might lead to more instability. So all these different effects may come through at the same time. And I think it's fair to say that for the moment, we haven't really put all of that together. Thank you. Ben, you have the last word before Peter. Let me say something quickly in response to John. I have no disagreement with the idea that the factors that many of us have discussed, and in fact, my discussion was really about the globalization of labor. But also you talked yesterday about unionization and increasing concentration. All of these are important for understanding why the Phillips curve has flattened. But there's a difference between understanding why it's flattened and recognizing for purposes of monetary policy the fact that it has flattened. And the issue is that even though we may understand it better, the fact that the Phillips curve is flatter has profound implications for monetary policy and all the more so under an inflation targeting regime. Ironically, as we know more and more about the transmission mechanism that links what central banks do to the real economy, I think we know less and less about the transmission mechanism that links what central banks do and the price and wage setting process. And again, if we're in an inflation targeting world, that lecuna is especially unfortunate. Let me conclude if I may by disagree. I loved Richard's presentation, but I have to disagree with something you said at the very end. And it's important. Median America is not doing well. And I think perhaps the greatest key to understanding the origins of the not just regrettable because they are and for an American embarrassing because they are developments in my country. But the genuinely worrisome developments not just for us but for the world at large in all sorts of ways that have deeply, deeply troubling historical resonances is precisely to realize that at the median, in the middle ranges of the distribution, America, my fellow citizens are not doing well. And I wish it were true that Median America was doing well. It isn't. Thanks, Ben. Please join me thanking the panel for a very enlightening presentation. And to Victor, please accept my apologies for the delay.