 Well, thank you. It's very nice to be back. And I wanted to thank Karen Schneider and Jamie Penn in particular for inviting me back. I feel like I've had the honor to do this every year or so, or every other year or so, so it's been a good run. I thought they were going to give me the topic of talking about ag policy under a Trump presidency. But just a joke, small joke. But instead, I'm going to talk about agricultural trade and developing countries, which is something both of the previous speakers have alluded to. And I know there was a lot yesterday on the program about that. I also want to talk, I'll talk at the end, about what's going on in those countries and many of those countries in terms of agricultural support, which I think also is very, very interesting. First, let me start with a slide on just global trade. And I put the launch of the Doha round on here not to make any causality there. It's almost in spite of the fact that there was no major agreement in Doha or that the major things that people were looking for, things like market access and domestic support. Despite that, we've seen a tripling of world trade since 2001. And obviously, a lot of that are nominal effects with things like ethanol expansion and what's been going on in energy markets and other macro factors. But if you look at most volumes for most major grains and oil seeds, you see very robust annual growth, particularly for things like soybeans, but also maize, also wheat and rice as well. But I'm going to focus on what's been going on in South-South trade. And I think there, too, you see this amazing growth. And here is essentially trade to developing countries. And you can see that while North-South trade has increased a lot, and Mary alluded to how important things like soybeans are to the US market, soybean imports from China. But the other striking thing is just the growth of South-South trade. Now, a lot of that, obviously, are the big ag juggernauts like Brazil. But again, big increases in South-South trade. Here shows the exports from developing countries, so South exports to both developed markets. And you can see there, again, that the growth there has been somewhat flatter. I mean, it's still been an increase, but somewhat flatter. That reflects or is very, very similar to what you might see on Australia's export profile or the US export profile. That is, exports to other developed countries has been fairly flat with a little bit of growth. But most of that has, the growth has come in developing countries. And again, the exports, you can see that the share of South exports to other South countries have increased substantially. Now here is, again, using 2013, which is, as a basis, it shows the largest developing country to exporters. And you can see, again, Brazil not a big surprise. China, a bit of a surprise, at least it was to me when I first saw these numbers or looked into these numbers. Just because I, again, in my previous life, coming from as chief economist at USDA, of course, the big focus was on how much we were sending to China. But they too are also a very, very big exporter, mainly things like fruits and vegetables and other things. And mainly a lot of regional exports in Southeast Asia. But again, very big exporter. And then you can see, again, other countries, Mary or Jamie, I forget, which mentioned the fact that India is such a large exporter of things like beef. They have a lot of water buffalo that they sell. And then Argentina, which, frankly, has been penalizing itself over the last several years with macro policies and with very unfavorable exchange rates. And then on top of that, export taxes, even with that, still have shown some increases in exports. And I think that looking at projections forward over the next 10 years, I think both Jamie and Mary mentioned the fact that Argentina is going to be a potential force to be reckoned with as well. And then let me turn now to domestic support. And here is just the OECD measures for OECD countries. The producer, a subsidy equivalent, which I'm sure many of you are aware of, where this measures the amount of domestic support going to agriculture and measures it as a share of, as a percent of farm production. And that has been declining. And I think this has been fairly well documented and talked about, but declining across the board largely because of reforms in some of the key developing countries. And two, the other major trend among that support has been a move away from highly coupled forms of support. And this shows, again, support tied to output, and then as compared to support tied to input use. And while we have seen a little bit of uptick in that going to input inputs, I think the other key point here is that decoupled support largely because of reforms like in the EU, which I think Tossos will probably talk about. But again, very, I think in terms of two positive trends in terms of domestic support, one declining support levels generally as a percent of overall ag production and then a move towards more decoupled forms of support. Well, here just shows by country essentially the PSE, and then also shows as a percent of whether it's coupled or not. And again, as I mentioned, reforms in the EU to a degree the US, and this is decoupled from production, which could include being coupled to price. So Mary mentioned the ARC program and the PLC program, which are very large subsidy programs, but they're not tied to actual production. They're tied to historical production. So that's why the US still shows decoupling here. But what I want to focus on are some of the developing countries. And again, the OECD doesn't cover a lot of developing countries. They are trying to increase their study. And in recent years have included Brazil and some very large countries like Brazil and China. They are hoping that they can bring India and start creating similar measures for India. But you can see that in looking at their composition and the support is a very different picture. That is, for the most part, it remains highly coupled, either to input use or directly tied to output, with very little trends in actually decoupled support. And I get this. This shouldn't be surprising. In one sense, decoupled support tends to be very expensive because it tends to be cash and other types of direct payments. Developing countries have chosen to go more the route of where, say, the US and EU were many years ago in terms of with direct price support by either purchasing or other sorts of methods. The other big thing has been the growth of insurance programs. And this has been phenomenal. I mean, Mary mentioned the US program, which of course is quite large. And I have on the chart on the right, you can see how the US program has increased. But just in a paper, I was looking at this issue where earlier last year, and we're looking at premium levels well over $30 billion now. I mean, just phenomenal growth over the last 10 years. And you look at a country like China where there was almost no crop insurance programs or agricultural insurance because in China, at least, it does include a lot of livestock as well. But no insurance programs to speak of prior to 2007 and now with a premium volume of over $5 billion US. Also very high subsidies. Well, the concern has been generally about things like with countries like China how, what sort of support levels they have and how those are influential on world markets. Here I show the, I take a study done by Fred Gale, who's at the Economic Research Service, has looked at a lot of different Chinese policies. And what you've seen is since 2007, price supports have increased in China. You can see how the Chinese market price has been bolstered by these prices. And particularly at a time when world prices here measured by the US price have declined. It's not surprising that's had an impact on one harvested area in China where that's gone up dramatically over the last 10 years or so. And because those prices are maintained so high relative to a world market price quite low, that's meant that China has accumulated a lot of stocks which is what's shown on the right hand side there. Similarly, Mary mentioned cotton. There too we've had very, very high support prices for cotton relative to world market prices and as a consequence, ending stocks have increased dramatically. What I don't show here is that cotton consumption mill use in China has also fallen. Why? Because of an increased domestic mill use in India where India has become an increasingly larger producer of yarn and fibers. China now imports a lot of their needs from India and the combination of those two things has meant the import of raw cotton has declined and of course that's affected both US and Australia. I mentioned India. India of course has been a focus in the WTO or the debate over public stock holding and India has a very extensive food security system that buys grain, holds grain and then distributes that grain to poor population but again essentially an in-kind transfer. The concern has been well what happens if those stocks build up to such a point and then end up on world markets and we did see some problems back in 2007, 2008 certainly where those policies on top of that there were things like export restrictions and so stock levels increased substantially and then here I think I have a chart of that where you can see the stock levels increasing up to about 2012 or so and then gradually those have come down and so a lot of concern about public stock holding and whether or not and I think from many developed exporting countries like the US and Australia we voice concern in the WTO at least that we wanna make sure that whatever policies are maintained that we understand safety net policies and certainly as Mary mentioned the US has enormous food nutrition type programs that spend a lot of money on poor population but the issue here is do these things affect world markets and I think one of the outcomes of Nairobi was to continue that discussion and as sort of agreed to under the Bali agreements of two years ago to try to get some agreement on the public stock holding. Well there are disciplines under the WTO I mentioned the of course things that affect Australia and the US and the EU are things like the AMS bondings the aggregate measurement of support that affects some 32 odd countries who have agreed to bindings and agreed to both bind their levels of support and then it reduced them under the agreement of agriculture under the Uruguay around of that about 15 developed countries and about 17 developing countries and many of these you'll see in the chart that I'm showing just as the next chart shows that many of these are newly acceded members or some of these are newly acceded members to the WTO like Russia and China. Also of course there's de minimis rules for developing countries so if your support levels are less than 10% of the current value of production that means you don't report them to the WTO so many countries who don't necessarily have AMS bindings for example they're fine as long as their level of support it doesn't become a violation unless that level of support exceeds the 10% now for China one of the agreements on their accession agreement is that instead of the 10% of de minimis they have agreed to they agreed to an eight and a half percent and then the other thing that affects our developing countries is under the Uruguay round agreement on agriculture article 6.2 allows a whole variety of support that are things like infrastructure improvements and other sorts of things that developing countries can engage in and those are not subject to reduction commitments. And then lastly of course is the green box which again lays out very specific rules for developed and developing countries in terms of allowable supports that have minimal or negligible trade or production distorting measures. Well here is just again I mentioned a balanced total AMS the 17 some odd countries that developing countries that have agreed to bind their levels of support and this gives you some notion of what those are. Again it you know the countries like Russia quite large but I think the bigger concern perhaps is the de minimis rule itself which is some 10% of the value of ag production and as we've seen in some of the previous some of the previous presentations where the value of ag production has increased phenomenally over the last 10 years and so that gives potential policy space as it were for developing countries but I think that generally the one thing that I would note is that countries like China have realized that are in the process of putting in place reforms that would lower supports and bring some of those distorting measures down because they too realized just like it took very long time for the US and the EU to realize these policies were not sustainable over the long run that is having large inventories and other things and India too is in their most recent economic report have talked about instituting policy reforms on the food security side. So let me conclude here with just saying that I think there has been a lot of concern voiced about the increasing domestic use of domestic use, domestic support measures by developing countries and as I mentioned many people talk about the policy space that's implied by a 10% de minimis but I think that a bigger concern for me in these negotiations has been frankly not a lot of this is notified to the WTO that in many cases for developing countries they are very slow in reporting and then just some policies go either unreported or I think often times misreported. It's interesting to me because following Nairobi I think it's very unclear what happens in the WTO in terms of multilateral trade negotiations in areas like domestic support. You know you look at I think a very good outcome again is elimination of export subsidies. I think many people would have liked to see more reforms on things like export credits and food aid but I think that there are at least one pillar where you've seen some major progress. On the other hand market access well not much done there frankly and under the WTO then we look to things like TPP and TTIP and in the case of the US and certainly all the free trade agreements that Australia's initiated is that obviously gives a lot of market access but one thing that I think clearly drops off the table is domestic support and I think an interesting question is you certainly see it in the US with concern over increased domestic support in developing countries whether or not that may be some impetus to bring countries back to the WTO and I certainly hope that we continue to see an active environment in Geneva or we see a renewal of a commitment to sort of look at some of these larger issues like domestic support disciplines as we move forward and with that let me conclude.