 So good evening, everybody, what's going on with your contents? Does that generally say a few words, often we should have taken lessons. Very good. Good evening. I'm sorry to disturb your Friday evening before the beginning of the weekend. We've just landed, actually, I don't know, three or four minutes ago, after what has been a very important week, I believe, for Ukraine and for nuclear safety. Before I take your questions, I want to give you a very quick overview of how we see the situation at the plant and to do that, you know, I like to be graphic and clear so that you can have our best assessment, our best technical assessment of how we see things in a way which is clearly understandable for all. So as you know, we went there with our team, we were all in all 14 from the agency, including myself and experts from the Department of Safeguards and Nuclear Safety and Security and I was accompanied, of course, by the deputies and the team that came with me. You see some of them here and six of them stayed there. As you know, what I conducted there was an initial visit which lasted a few hours, we went on for a few hours, I was able to do many, many things there and I'm sure you will have questions about it, so I will not say everything now at this point. Also, after that, as you know, six of our experts remain there. They are going to continue the work that we started yesterday and after that, as I also indicated in Kiev and after the visit and the inspection in Zaporizhia when I came back and at the plant itself, we are establishing a permanent presence on site, this time with two of our experts which will be continuing the work. You know that I have, from the beginning of this situation, I have been trying to describe what is going on and its impact on the safety and the security of the plant through a number of pillars that try to address the things that in any nuclear power plant, in any nuclear installation in the world should be taken care of. So what I am trying to describe here with a very simple traffic light type, red, yellow or green, with all the arbitrariness about this kind of color-based description, but what is behind here and sustaining here is a very thorough technical analysis of course of how we see the situation at the plant. So I will not be spending a lot of time here just to describe to you how we see it now, so then I can take your direct questions about them. So first is the physical integrity of the facilities. What you see here is a red and is a big red. Why is it a big red is because there is still, we have been seeing military activity around the plant and I was able to see myself and my team impact holes, markings on buildings of Shelley, so it means that the physical integrity of the facility has been violated not once but several times. This is something irrespective of the kinetic power of whatever you are throwing at the plant is unacceptable in any way under any safety and security criteria. When it comes to the second pillar, the second pillar refers to the safety and security system being fully functional, we assess it with a yellow because some of them or most of them are working and are working relatively well but there have been interruptions, some of them related to the physical break in cables or in some connections and still also in some systems that are not fully back in place so we cannot get the full information. But it's not a red, it means that the activity is continuing. When it comes to, I hope that I'm not, yeah, you didn't lose, sorry for that. When it comes to the operating conditions for staff, this as you know has been one of the main points and continues to be one of the main points of concern because this situation in sub-Princia, we have this unique unprecedented situation where you have a Ukrainian nuclear power plant which is controlled by the Russian occupying forces, creating a situation whereby you have a cohabitation of the operators, people, the Ukrainian people, employees and professional experts that have been working there and there are also presence from Russian nuclear experts and also military forces. We don't put it fully red for one reason and it is that the plant continues to operate and there is a professional modest, they bend it if I can put it like that. They work together and the plant as it is obvious because it has been operating two units as of today are still operating including unit number five which was scrammed a couple of days ago and now is back in operation. So all the physical conditions are there and the plant continues to operate. The same code we are applying to off-site power supply. This has also been a matter of enormous concern and interest around the world because as you know if you don't have off-site power supply the cooling systems for the reactors cannot work and if they cannot work this can lead to a major accident. We have seen on several occasions that there have been blackouts or interruptions or one or two or three of the lines feeding the plant from outside. At the moment there are two operational and what we know also is that when there was one situation of a total complete blackout the diesel generators operated normally. We visited them, I saw them, I was talking to those in charge of that part of the operation of the plant. Logistical aspect and supply chain. This is important in terms of the replacement. You have to think about Zaporizia which is the biggest nuclear power plant in Europe also as a big industrial facility and any industrial facility you need spare parts, there are things that need to be replaced and so on and so forth. Given the anomalous situation of a war it is obvious that logistical chains are interrupted. We were quite probing about this, we were discussing with people on site and the impression that they gave us is that here there are no major problems, there are some interruptions hence the qualification we are putting here. In the case of the radiation monitoring and emergency response we have had some complete interruptions hence the half red situation but also some systems are working well so we do see a mixed back. In terms of reliable communications with the regulator it is also an operating function with some difficulties. So this gives you a bird's eye view of a situation which we are of course not wanting to banalize in any way. We believe and I continue to believe that the situation is extremely complex, extremely challenging and it will continue to require the permanent support and the monitoring that we are trying to provide now that we are there. So now that I gave you this general overview I am open to your questions. Thank you very much. A couple of questions, first of all what do you know now that you didn't know just before going to Zapparizia and secondly you mentioned specifically on the IAEA presence at the plant, you mentioned six people who are there now, I think if I heard you correctly you said something about two people staying in the longer term. So when does that presence get drawn down and these two people who will stay on are they just supposed to stay there till the end of the war or are they going to get rotated out, what's the plan for the long-term presence there? I started with the easiest part so those who are there will continue to be there. The end of the war we all wish for that, we hope it happens soon, we don't know. We believe that it was important, it was important for the agency to be there permanently. And this is a good segue for the first part of the question. You were saying what do you know now that you didn't know before? We knew a lot but of course our trade is inspecting. The difference between being there and not being there is like day and night. So many things we had information including remote data transmission etc but when it comes to many other things that are important it's very different to go. Now I saw as DG but also my technical experts things that were being said and we were able to assess the seriousness of them and what other questions. You can compare it with the inspections in the safe culture. You see something then you ask something else so we know much more and we are learning even more as we speak. What I was getting at is the fact that you said you're going to report to the Board of Governors next week and so I'm trying to get a sense of how much information you expect to have by then, at what point you will obtain this information? We are getting this information all the time. We have been getting it from the very beginning and now we are trying to have an in-depth assessment of how things stand at the moment. I expect to produce a report early next week as soon as we have the full picture of the situation by the end of the weekend more or less. Hi DG, how are you doing? I hope you're fine. We are fine. I'm happy to be back home. OK, so DG, my main question to you, what is it that you are, what is your biggest concern in terms of the safety of the plant? I mean we can see the red spot here on the physical integrity. What is it that could happen? What is it that you are mostly worried about? I mean we all know about the cooling necessity, about the radioactive waste storage that is there. What is it that you are mostly concerned about? I also have another question. You mentioned that there is a cohabitation between the Ukrainian staff and the Russian occupiers. Could you give us a bit of a sense of the atmosphere, of what is it like to be there at the plant? Well, yeah, yours is a very deep question, Stephanie. It's a very deep question that has human and psychological factors that I should be very prudent in answering. What I can tell you is that the plant is operating. There is a professional relationship between these experts. They are all nuclear experts. So they know what they are doing. They know what they are talking about. But they are human beings. And they have sides on a wall. That is affecting them and their families. So the situation is one of, I would say it's admirable for the Ukrainian experts to continue to work in these conditions in the way they are doing. They care for the facility. They work very, very well. But of course, there is a tension. There is a latent tension there because of the obvious reasons of the war. So I would say this is something that needs to be, must be dealt with enormous caution. And again, our presence there has a very big added value, I believe, because we can interact with people constantly, frequently throughout days. They know that the IAEA people are there. So I think it is very important that we have this presence there. I missed something of your question. That was the second question. My first question was in terms of the risks, the nuclear risks. What is your biggest concern? I think we have to be looking at the main points. And when it comes to the main points, first of all, is the physical integrity. Why? And here I will not get into that, but I will simply mention that it is obvious that there is a lot of fighting in the region in general, in this part of Ukraine. So the military activity and operations are increasing in that part of the country. And this worries me a lot. This worries me a lot. There are references to offensives, counteroffensives. I don't want to get into that because it's not my domain, but it is obvious and we all know it. And everybody acknowledges it on site. So it is obvious that the statistical possibility of more physical damage is present. Let me give you an example. The physical damage to the plant with the exception of the event on the night of the 3rd to the 4th of March with this fire, the shelling actually started in August. So it is quite clearly a more recent trend, if I can call it like that. So what we see with this increase of military activity is that the physical integrity is more compromised. And with that, I take you to fall, I take you to the power supply because it is clear that those who have these aims, these military aims, know very well that the way to cripple or to do more damage is not to look into the reactors which are enormously sturdy and robust, but to hit where it hurts so the plant becomes very, very problematic. So my concern would be the physical integrity would be the power supply and of course the staff. So these are the areas. The rest are things that we can work on, radiation systems, supply change, all very, very important, all very important, but of course they have a lesser degree if you want of dramatism when it comes to what, if I have to address your question directly. Thank you, next. Mathias Röder, German Press Agency. You call the mission now a permanent mission and how sure are you that the agreement with both sides will be a stable one and will there be a moment when you describe the danger which might be increased in the next weeks or month when you will withdraw your own staff? Well, how sure I am, you know, we can never be sure what we need to do is to always try and to improve. If you look at what we have now, it is far, far better than what we used to have. Now I have my people, I was there. We have a big team there. We have people who are going to stay there. This has tremendous value. This is a huge difference. And of course if something happens or if any limitation comes, they are going to be reporting it, they are reporting it to us. It is no longer a matter of A, set this and B, set the country. Now the IAEA is there. And this is, like I said, from night to day. In terms of the people being there, naturally for me the safety of my people is the first thing. You remember that I said I will never send somebody to a place where I don't go myself first. And this is what I have been doing. Now that we know that we have a certain degree, a system that is working, we have our people there. And it has been very challenging. Of course, we are looking at this. They are in constant communication with us. If something happens, of course, we will take the necessary measures. Thank you. Jordi from Agencia Efe. So just to be clear, the two who stay are in the group of the six who are there now. Yes. And the four are coming back the next few days and with whom did you negotiate? Is it both sides agreed that these two people will stay there? Yes. Yes? Yes. And the four will come back the way you came back or is this going to be a different way? Well, there are logistic aspects related to that, but they are going to continue to count. And thank you for the question because I want to recognize the support that we received from the United Nations Department of Safety and Security. We have incredibly good people there that are coming from the most, you know, difficult hotspots in the world. And that they were accompanying us and guiding us through what they themselves recognized was a very challenging thing. So they are going, of course, to continue to have the support. But that's regular updates you were sending in which you said the Ukrainian side told us this and this. It will change now. It will be always your own information. Of course. Yes, Jordi. There are information that you don't have the access to the inner circle of the facility. Can you confirm this? What do you mean, sorry, by the inner circle? In the circle, the crisis center. Ah, no, yeah. Okay. The crisis center. Let me. Thank you. And it's a problem to control the situation there. No. If you can't go there in this inner circle or in this crisis circle. Let me explain. Every nuclear power plant has a crisis center where certain operations can be handled in every circumstance. This place is being used for other things, but there has been another center set up for the facility to continue working. So there is no, I would say, influence in the operation of the plant because of the non-availability of this place that has been chosen, of course, by the military occupiers to have a place. I cannot get into that because I don't know, frankly. I'm not hiding anything from you. But it is obvious, and we will be recommending that the plant should have its normal operational centers and rooms for that. I want to emphasize this because this idea I have seen in some of the comments and reactions that we were not shown that we were paraded, we have seen what I requested to see, everything I requested to see. Even as we were going alone, when something we thought should be seen, I said I want to go here and there and we saw everything. I want to emphasize this because I think it's very important when we go somewhere we do what we need to do. And if we are prevented from doing it, we just come back and say we were not able to do it. So thank you for the question. Hi. Welcome back, Diji, and for everybody from the group. You mentioned that the presence of the IAE is very necessary to stabilize the situation. Now, apart from getting the hands-on information from the group who are going to be there, what else do you expect this presence would help? What is your expectation of having them there in terms of stabilization? That's number question number one. Could I just do the second one? Yes, yes, yes. Everybody has two questions in one. Yeah. OK. Very efficiently. So there are expertise of three major areas, the security, safety, and safeguards. And now you're leaving two people. Are they the safety people or are they the safeguards? Because safeguards was one of the top agenda, actually, although it wasn't really reported much. But it was a huge, huge agenda for you. So what would be the constellation? And would that hinder your presence in assessing if one of the three is missing among the two? Well, what we try, when we put together our teams with the support of my deputies here, we try to have the best combination of knowledge as necessary for what we believe we are going to be doing at the plant. We chose a very experienced team. And I can assure you that we will at all times have the necessary knowledge on site, on safety and security and on safeguards. It could be two, could be three, but at all times we are going to be able to have that. And the first question was? Well, this question of yours, of course, has a subjective factor to it. But I would say that the fact that the IEA is there, that we have our people there informing 24 hours a day assessing what is going on. And for those who may have intentions on the plant, knowing that international inspectors are there, witnessing and informing immediately what is happening, has, I think, an inherent, very important stabilizing effect. I don't want to aggrandize or pretend that what we are doing is going to either settle this terrible war or give back the plant to Ukraine. This is beyond our capacities. What we are doing there is stabilizing, looking at the safety, at the security, at the safeguards aspects of the plant, in the conviction that if we get this right, this will have some bearing influence in what happens overall. Hello, Paula from ZDF. Ukraine criticizes that the IEA does not speak out clearly in favor of demilitarizing the zone around the nuclear power plant, while Russia on the other side welcomes your presence there, while also protecting the side military. Doesn't that make the IEA a political play ball that it not should be? Listen, your question, which is very interesting, one, can apply to everything we do. If you look at other situations with other countries that I'm not going to mention now, because they are not part of the discussion today, you will find the same thing. When people tend to like what we say, they will praise us. When they don't like it, they will say that the IEA is a puppet of whomever, or that we are being manipulated, or that we are never manipulated. We never lose our north. We know what we need to do, and we listen, of course, respectfully to all this noise. But our ability is to keep focus on what we need to do. We are aware of the comments. And, of course, it is very legitimate for member states to expect that the agency or myself will say exactly what they would like the DG to say. Of course, I have to be very clear in what I do. I have to be prudent in what I say. My responsibility is 360 degree one. So I have to be looking at all the factors involved, and how everything I say will be affecting other important pieces of the operation that we are having. So frankly speaking, there are enough political players in this game, and there are enough people saying what they feel or condemning one or the other. The nuclear watchdog has to remain what it is. The nuclear security, safety, and non-proliferation watchdog, and it has to do its job to have its credibility. We respect and we understand that people have these expectations, that we will demand these things. But what we believe is that the IEA adds value is in its technical work. Not if I am one more of those saying A or B against A or B. Since we can ask two questions, the second question. Yes, you're right. Do you think the IEA can now stay constantly there to watch the side and give us information about what happens there? I hope we are not going to be constantly there. I hope that normalcy will return. I hope that there will be a day not in any distant future where the plant is going to be operating again normally and with its normal owners and operators. And we are going to be visiting periodically as we did. I think in all its drama and in all its tragedy, this proves why you need organizations like the IEA. That can go there, try to provide a degree of stability, a degree of certainty about what is going on. Now, when you will hear that there is an allegation that something has happened at the plant, you will be able to turn to us. Because you are doing it now, but now we have people there. People who are going to be telling this is the situation, this is what happened. We are talking to A, B, and C, or the engineers, and this is what we see. Or we are not being allowed. We are locked in a room, DG. What's going on? And then we will know we are in trouble. So I think that's the difference. My question is, you said you're technical experts, but for sure you met the heavy armed soldiers. You spoke to them. How was the connection with them? Was it terrifying with them? Were they friendly? And did you maybe try to speak about demilitarized area with them? Or was it clear, no speaking about this? Can you tell us about the atmosphere with the Russian soldiers? I would say that the military present, those there, did not approach us in any way, were not available. For I asked on a couple of occasions to talk to one of them, but they were not available. Precisely on this issue of the control center, of the crisis center, because I wanted to ask why they were there and if this room could be returned to its normal functions. But it was evident that this group was very withdrawn throughout our presence there. But what we got from our Ukrainian counterparts is that in general, this is the case, they are working with their Russian technical counterparts. And I described this situation before. It's not an easy situation. It's a tense situation. It's not an ideal situation. It's a situation everybody is coping with. I have a question. So you said they are still operating, two plans. How is it a situation that there are occupants there and people, Ukraine, and people working? How is this possible when there is a war going on? It is possible. It is happening. It has been happening since the plant was occupied. There is a military force that has taken over not only the plant, that part of Ukraine, and they are in control. The plant continues. Some decided to leave the plant and are not working there anymore. Some decided to be there and to continue in their work. This is why I have been saying that this is a situation that we cannot envisage this to continue for a very long time until there is clarity about what is going to happen. These people basically are very fundamentally uncertain about the future. As we all are, do you know what's going to happen with the war? I don't. You don't. We hope for peace, but we don't have it yet. And second question, very short. Which impact could be, especially on Austria-Vienna, for example, if you compare 86 Chernobyl, but it was far smaller plant, right? Well, I would say I've heard comparisons, and they make sense in terms of the public interest, because people, of course, relate to Chernobyl. I think the situations are quite incomparable. These are operating nuclear power plants. They have degrees of safety that are immensely higher than what happened there. There are, however, risks in terms, for example, of the spent fuel storage, which is there in case it was attacked or there was an impact there. It would, of course, not be comparable to what happened at that time. But it could have transpondering, perhaps, effects, or regional. It would depend. I don't like to avoid the question, but I don't like to speculate too much, because it could be a big thing or a small thing, depending on the damage. OK. Thank you. I have a few more questions for you. Yes. Did anything surprise you at Zaporizhia? There's a lot of things you've described or things that pretty much what you'd expect or what we'd known before, but were you surprised by anything there? Not surprised. Not surprised. I haven't a couple of questions. My colleague, but I have one question in French. Monsieur Raphael, avant de partir, vous avez dit que vous avez peur de la situation. Est-ce qu'après votre visite, il y a toujours le danger? Parce qu'il ne s'agit pas qu'une, disons, centrale en Ukraine, mais centrale qui risque d'être dangereuse pour tout le continent. Je crois que c'est un peu la question de notre collègue ici. C'est une question, dès que vous avez un accident nucléaire, si c'est un accident grave, majeur, évidemment, les effets peuvent théoriquement aller au-delà des frontières, de la zone, de la région où l'accident s'est passé. Dans ces cas-ci, je crois que la question, c'est d'éviter un tel accident. C'est pour ça qu'on fait cette évaluation pour vous donner une idée claire de où l'on est dans chacun de ces catégories-là. Je suis toujours inquiet. J'ai dit aussi là-bas, quelqu'un m'a dit, vous m'avez posé la question, vous étiez inquiet. Non, j'étais inquiet, je suis inquiet et je serai inquiet pour autant qu'on n'aura pas une situation stabilisée de manière permanente. So, one more question. I got the impression that you will be there as long as the military forces are present, so that the red dot in number one will not go away unless they move away. So, may I understand that the IAEA intends to stay until the military forces? I said yesterday you are right. The IAEA is there to stay for as long as it is needed. Yes, we are not leaving, we are not going anywhere. Yes, but my question was that, is that means that until the military forces move away either by force or peacefully either way? Well, we would evaluate at that time. We had a similar situation with Chernobyl, you remember? Chernobyl was occupied as well and on the 31st of March, there was an evacuation. Interestingly, that didn't mean that the IAEA left. It meant that we came even in bigger numbers with more help to assist them to reconstruct the safety structures and we have a big programme of assistance which, by the way, we are also planning to have for Zaporizia. When? As soon as we can, of course, as soon as we can. As I said, we have to be realistic, we are dealing with realities. Let me thank you all for your interest. We are going, as I said, to continue our work at the plant there and hopefully have a deeper degree of information, hoping that this is going to help stabilise the whole thing. On Tuesday, I am going to be briefing the United Nations Security Council about our findings and what happened. I thank you again and I wish you a nice weekend to you all. Thank you very much for having come. Thank you.