 Ozzy, as you know, we've been looking at Al-Qaeda in 2011 and now with this current report looking out to 2025, can you tell us a little bit about the threat or the manifestation that Al-Qaeda and associated movements may present? Absolutely, Tom. Now, obviously, you know, when you're predicting the future, we know that it's impossible to determine what it's going to look like and any attempt to do so would be futile. We also know that past performance, as many of the stock market commercials say, is no indicator of future performance as well. So we, when doing this threat, though, this project, we still had to determine a model for going forward. So what we decided to do is put forward five potential futures where we could highlight some key themes that no matter how Al-Qaeda might manifest itself in the future, those are things that the U.S. government and its international partners could focus on. And those five models that we use going forward, the first is what we call a resurgent Al-Qaeda core, whereas you described that Al-Qaeda core is, many argue in its waning days, and it's just diminished capability. But there is a scenario that we put forward that says it could come back and be even stronger than it currently is today. The second scenario is the one that you also addressed is the rise of the affiliates. We obviously, as you stated, seen the rise of the affiliates, but we're talking about a much more stronger grouping of affiliates that are not tied to the core as closely as they arguably are now. The third one is what we call the rise of the individual jihadists. Again, it's where you talked about this uncomfortable increase in the number of domestic extremists or self-inspired individuals who are adherents of Al-Qaeda's ideology, and that scenario is a rise of those individuals. And then the last two are kind of a little bit more interesting, a little bit different take. Number four is a scenario where Al-Qaeda actually takes over a nation state where their ideology, they have a presence inside a country where their ideology is actually dictating what style that nation state operates. And the last is a little counterintuitive. The last scenario that we discussed in the report is Al-Qaeda going away. If what everyone's saying about Al-Qaeda that it is in its last days, how do we get there? What does it look like? And how do we make sure we don't get in our own way in seeing the end of Al-Qaeda? Certainly. And I think we can expect a lot of people asking us which one we think is going to be the most likely to happen, but of course it could be a combination of all these in the future. And so it's not so cut and dry or discreet. Yeah. As Juan Zirotti has pointed out, you know, he calls it a hydra, and what we'll probably see is Al-Qaeda over the years manifests itself in some mixture of those entities. Hopefully the last scenario will take place where Al-Qaeda wants it for all, and... Yep. I hope so. Now, Tom, I talked a little bit about, you know, our paradigms we have in there, and the paradigms or these individual scenarios are really only one part of the study. It's actually a much more comprehensive report that talks about a bunch of different factors we need to consider in discussing the future of Al-Qaeda. Sure. Could you touch on a few of those? Absolutely. As you know, as co-director with me, we've been working on this for a well over year with a tremendous team of people with us. You mentioned Juan Zirotti and honor of D'Borghraff as well. But what we've done is we've broken this up into component parts where we conducted first the Al-Qaeda baseline threat assessment, looking at where Al-Qaeda and its associated movements are in the year 2011. We then conducted a series of case studies looking at Al-Qaeda core, the homegrown threat, and then a number of the affiliates from AQAP in Yemen to Al-Shabaab in Somalia, to AQIM, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, located in Mali and in Algeria, Lashkar Taiba, in Pakistan, Jama'az-Lamea in Indonesia. So what we did was we looked at these and pulled out the most relevant factors that contributed to their rise, to their fall, to Stasis. And then we used those to help project into the future. It was very difficult to do that task, and we have to look historically in order to look forward. So we did that, generated those key factors from charismatic leadership to U.S. or Western forces on the ground to outside sponsorship to safe havens, and we looked through those and helped essentially characterize the future so that we could do that. Then as you well know, we engaged in a serious amount of field work to get on the ground in current and future potential terrorism hotspots. You and I went to Europe with Zack Feldman, then you and I covered Southeast Asia. Dave Gorn and I went to Africa for a month, and we took this field work, all the interviews that you and I did with government officials, counterterrorism practitioners, clerics, the leaders, academics, a really wide range of people to give us a sense of what they thought was going on the ground with al-Qaeda and associated movements and where they think problems might be in the future. So we did that. We also looked into strategic surprises, things that could completely disrupt our notion of the future in those five paradigms that you just laid out. And then we also generated you and you and one in particular led to creation of these recommendations and the conclusion to help government determine where they can go in countering this threat. And all those brought together, I think, generated a pretty solid report. Ozzie, I think the title of our report is very indicative of what we're facing. It is an uncertain threat. We've seen this multi-headed hydra emerge. I think we have a lot of challenges in the future. I think our report addresses a lot of them, and hopefully it'll be helpful to the policymakers that we address in those recommendations. Thanks, Tom. You're welcome. Thank you, Ozzie.