 Question 164 of Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde, triates on the cardinal virtues, the virtue of temperance. This is the LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde, triates on the cardinal virtues, the virtue of temperance. By St. Thomas Aquinas. Translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Question 164 of The Punishments of the First Man's Sin, in two articles. We must now consider the punishments of the first sin, and under this head there are two points of inquiry. First, death, which is the common punishment. Second, the other particular punishments mentioned in Genesis. First article, whether death is the punishment of our first parent's sin. Objection one, it would seem that death is not the punishment of our first parent's sin. For that which is natural to man cannot be called a punishment of sin, because sin does not perfect nature, but vitiates it. Now death is natural to man, and this is evident both from the fact that his body is composed of contraries, and because mortal is included in the definition of man. Therefore death is not a punishment of our first parent's sin. Objection two, further, death and other bodily defects are similarly found in man as well as in other animals, according to Ecclesiasticus 319. The death of man and beasts is one, and the condition of them both equal. But in dumb animals death is not a punishment of sin, therefore neither is it so in men. Objection three, further, the sin of our first parent's was the sin of particular individuals, whereas death affects the entire human nature. Therefore it would seem that it is not a punishment of our first parent's sin. Objection four, further, all are equally descended from our first parent's. Therefore if death were the punishment of our first parent's sin, it would follow that all men would suffer death in equal measure. But this is clearly untrue, since some die sooner and some more painfully than others. Therefore death is not the punishment of the first sin. Objection five, further, the evil of punishment is from God, as stated above in the Pars Prima, Question 48, Article 6 and Question 49, Article 2. But death apparently is not from God, for it is written in Wisdom 113, God made not death. Therefore death is not the punishment of the first sin. Objection six, further, seemingly punishments are not meritorious, since merit is comprised under good and punishment under evil. Now death is sometimes meritorious, as in the case of a martyr's death. Therefore it would seem that death is not a punishment. Objection seven, further, punishment would seem to be painful. But death apparently cannot be painful, since man does not feel it when he is dead, and he cannot feel it when he is not dying. Therefore death is not a punishment of sin. Objection eight, further, if death were a punishment of sin, it would have followed sin immediately. But this is not true, for our first parents lived a long time after their sin, according to Genesis 5.5. Therefore, seemingly, death is not a punishment of sin. On the contrary, the apostle says in Romans 5.12, By one man sin entered into this world, and by sin death. I answer that, if anyone, on account of his fault, be deprived of a favour bestowed on him, the privation of that favour is a punishment of that fault. Now as we stated in the first part, question 95 article 1, as well as in question 97 article 1, God bestowed this favour on man in his primitive state, that as long as his mind was subject to God, the lower powers of his soul would be subject to his rational mind and his body to his soul. But inasmuch as through man's mind withdrew from the subjection to God, the result was that neither were his lower powers wholly subject to his reason, whence there followed so great a rebellion of the carnal appetite against the reason, nor was the body wholly subject to the soul, whence arose death and other bodily defects. For life and soundness of body depend on the body being subject to the soul, as the perfectible is subject to its perfection. Consequently, on the other hand, death, sickness, and all defects of the body are due to the lack of the body's subjection to the soul. It is therefore evident that as the rebellion of the carnal appetite against the spirit is a punishment of our first-parent sin, so also are death and all defects of the body. Reply to Objection 1. A thing is said to be natural if it proceeds from the principles of nature. Now the essential principles of nature are form and matter. The form of man is his rational soul, which is, of itself, immortal, wherefor death is not natural to man on the part of his form. The matter of man is a body such as is composed of contraries, of which corruptibility is a necessary consequence, and in this respect death is natural to man. Now this condition attached to the nature of the human body results from a natural necessity, since it was necessary for the human body to be the organ of touch and consequently a mean between objects of touch. And this was impossible were it not composed of contraries, as the philosopher states in On the Soul to 11. On the other hand, this condition is not attached to the adaptability of matter to form, because if it were possible, since the form is incorruptible, its matter should rather be incorruptible. In the same way, a saw needs to be of iron, this being suitable to its form and action, so that its hardness may make it fit for cutting. But that it be liable to rust is a necessary result of such a matter and is not according to the agent's choice, for if the craftsmen were able, of the iron he would make a saw that would not rust. Now God who is author of man is all-powerful, wherefore when he first made man, he conferred on him the favour of being exempt from the necessity resulting from such a matter, which favour, however, was withdrawn through the sin of our first parents. Accordingly, death is both natural on account of a condition attaching to matter and penal on account of the loss of the divine favour preserving man from death. Reply to Objection 2. This likeness of man to other animals regards a condition attaching to matter, namely the body being composed of contraries. But it does not regard the form, for man's soul is immortal, whereas the souls of dumb animals are mortal. Reply to Objection 3. Our first parents were made by God not only as particular individuals, but also as principles of the whole human nature to be transmitted by them to their posterity, together with the divine favour preserving them from death. Hence through their sin, the entire human nature being deprived of that favour in their posterity incurred death. Reply to Objection 4. A twofold defect arises from sin. One is by way of a punishment appointed by a judge, and such a defect should be equal in those to whom the sin pertains equally. The other defect is that which results accidentally from this punishment. For instance, that one who has been deprived of his sight for a sin he has committed should fall down in the road. Such a defect is not proportionate to the sin, nor does a human judge take it into account, since he cannot foresee chance happenings. Accordingly, the punishment appointed for the first sin and proportionately corresponding thereto was the withdrawal of the divine favour whereby the rectitude and integrity of human nature was maintained. But the defects resulting from this withdrawal are death and other penalties of the present life, wherefore these punishments need not be equal in those to whom the first sin equally apportains. Nevertheless, since God foreknows all future events, divine providence has so disposed that these penalties are appointed in different ways to various people. This is not on account of any merits or demerits previous to this life as origin held. For this is contrary to the words of Romans 9-11, when they had not done any good or evil. And also contrary to statements made in the first part, Question 90 Article 4 as well as Question 118 Article 3, namely that the soul is not created before the body, but either in punishment of their parents' sins in as much as the child is something belonging to the father, wherefore parents are often punished in their children, or again it is for a remedy intended for the spiritual welfare of the person who suffers these penalties to wit that he may thus be turned away from his sins or lest he take pride in his virtues that he may be crowned for his patience. Reply to Objection 5. Death may be considered in two ways. First, as an evil of human nature, and thus it is not of God, but is a defect of a falling man through his faults. Secondly, as having an aspect of good, namely as being a just punishment, and thus it is from God, wherefore Augustine says in his retractions 121 that God is not the author of death, except insofar as it is a punishment. Reply to Objection 6. As Augustine says in On the City of God 13.5, Just as the wicked abuse not only evil, but also good things, so do the righteous make good use not only of good, but also of evil things. Hence it is that both evil men make evil use of the law, though the law is good, while good men die well, although death is an evil. Wherefore, inasmuch as holy men make good use of death, their death is to them meritorious. Reply to Objection 7. Death may be considered in two ways. First, as the privation of life, and thus death cannot be felt since it is the privation of sense and life. In this way it involves not pain of sense, but pain of loss. Secondly, it may be considered as denoting the corruption which ends in the aforesaid privation. Now we may speak of corruption even as of generation in two ways, in one way as being the term of alteration, and thus in the first instant in which life departs, death is said to be present. In this way also death has no pain of sense. In another way, corruption may be taken as including the previous alteration. Thus a person is said to die when he is in motion towards death, just as a thing is said to be engendered while in motion towards the state of having been engendered. And thus death may be painful. Reply to Objection 8. According to Augustine, although our first parents lived there after many years, they began to die on the day when they heard the death decree, condemning them to the decline to old age. Second article, whether the particular punishments of our first parents are suitably appointed in Scripture. Objection 1. You would seem that the particular punishments of our first parents are unsuitably appointed in Scripture. For that which would have occurred even without sin should not be described as a punishment for sin. Now seemingly there would have been pain in childbearing, even had there been no sin. For the disposition of the female sex is such that offspring cannot be born without pain to the bearer. Likewise the subjection of woman to man results from the perfection of the male and the imperfection of the female sex. Again it belongs to the nature of the earth to bring forth thorns and thistles. And this would have occurred even had there been no sin. Therefore these are unsuitable punishments of the first sin. Objection 2. Further that which pertains to a person's dignity does not seemingly pertain to his punishment. But the multiplying of conceptions pertains to a woman's dignity. Therefore it should not be described as the woman's punishment. Objection 3. Further the punishment of our first parents sin is transmitted to all as we have stated with regard to death in Article I. But all women's conceptions are not multiplied nor does every man eat in the sweat of his face. Therefore these are not suitable punishments of the first sin. Objection 4. Further the place of paradise was made for man. Now nothing in the order of things should be without purpose. Therefore it would seem that the exclusion of man from paradise was not a suitable punishment of man. Objection 5. Further this place of the earthly paradise is said to be naturally inaccessible. Therefore it was useless to put other obstacles in the way lest man should return thither, to it the cherubin and the flaming sword turning every way. Objection 6. Further immediately after his sin man was subject to the necessity of dying so that he could not be restored to immortality by the beneficial tree of life. Therefore it was useless to forbid him to eat of the tree of life as instanced by the words of Genesis 3.22. See lest perhaps he take of the tree of life and live for ever. Objection 7. Further to mock the unhappy seems inconsistent with mercy and clemency which are most of all ascribed to God in Scripture according to Psalm 144 verse 9 his tender mercies are over all his works. Therefore God is unbecomingly described as mocking our first parents already reduced sin to unhappy straits in the words of Genesis 3.22 behold Adam is become as one of us knowing good and evil. Objection 8. Further clothes are necessary to man like food according to 1 Timothy 6.8 having food and werewith to be covered with these we are content. Therefore just as food was appointed to our first parents before their sin so also should clothing have been ascribed to them. Therefore after their sin it was unsuitable to say that God made for them garments of skin. Objection 9. Further the punishment inflicted for a sin should outweigh in evil the gain realized through the sin else the punishment would not deter one from sinning. Now through sin our first parents gained in this that their eyes were opened according to Genesis 3.7 but this outweighs and good all the penal sins which are stated to have resulted from sin. Therefore the punishments resulting from our first parents sin are unsuitably described. On the contrary these punishments were appointed by God who does all things in number, weight and measure according to wisdom 11.21 I answer that as stated in the foregoing article on account of their sin our first parents were deprived of the divine favor whereby the integrity of human nature was maintained in them and by the withdrawal of this favor human nature incurred penal defects. Hence they were punished in two ways. In the first place by being deprived of that which was befitting the state of integrity namely the place of the earthly paradise and this is indicated in Genesis 3.23 where it is stated that God sent him out of the paradise of pleasure and since he was unable of himself to return to that state of original innocence it was fitting that obstacles should be placed against his recovering those things that were befitting his original state namely food, less he should take of the tree of life and place. For God placed before paradise cherubim and a flaming sword. Secondly they were punished by having appointed to them things befitting a nature bereft of the aforesaid favor and this is regards both the body and the soul. With regard to the body to which pertains the distinction of sex one punishment was appointed to the woman and another to the man. To the woman punishment was appointed in respect of two things on account of which she is united to the man and these are the begetting of children and community of works pertaining to family life. As regards the begetting of children she was punished in two ways first in the weariness to which she is subject while carrying the child after conception and this is indicated in the words of Genesis 316 I will multiply thy sorrows and thy conceptions. Secondly in the pain which she suffers in giving birth and this is indicated by the words of Genesis 316 in sorrow shall thou bring forth. And as regards family life she was punished by being subjected to her husband's authority and this is conveyed in the words of Genesis 316 thou shalt be under thy husband's power. Now just as it belongs to the woman to be subject to her husband in matters relating to the family life so it belongs to the husband to provide the necessities of that life. In this respect he was punished in three ways. First by the barrenness of the earth in the words of Genesis 317 First is the earth in thy work. Secondly by the cares of his toil without which he does not win the fruits of the earth hence the words of 317 with labour and toil shall thou eat thereof all the days of thy life. Thirdly by the obstacles encountered by the tillers of the soil wherefore it is written in Genesis 318 thorns and thistles shall it bring forth to thee. Likewise a triple punishment is ascribed to them on the part of the soul. First by reason of the confusion they experienced at the rebellion of the flesh against the spirit hence it is written in Genesis 317 the eyes of them both were opened and they perceived themselves to be naked. Secondly by the reproach for their sin indicated by the words of Genesis 322 Behold Adam is become as one of us. Thirdly by the reminder of their coming death when it was said to him in Genesis 319 dust thou art and into dust thou shalt return. To this also pertains that God made them garments of skin as a sign of their mortality. Reply to Objection 1 In the state of innocence childbearing would have been painless for Augustine says in On the City of God 1426 just as in giving birth the mother would then be relieved not by groans of pain but by the instigations of maturity so in bearing and conceiving the union of both sexes would not be one of lustful desire but of deliberate action. The subjection of the woman to her husband is to be understood as inflected in punishment of the woman not as to his headship since even before sin the man was the head and governor of the woman but as to her having now to obey her husband's will even against her own. If man had not sinned the earth would have brought forth thorns and thistles to be food of animals but not to punish man her growth would bring no labor or punishment for the tiller of the soil as Augustine says in his commentary on Genesis. Alcuin however holds that before sin the earth brought forth noorthorns and thistles whatever but the former opinion is the better. Reply to Objection 2 The multiplying of her conceptions was appointed as a punishment to the woman not on account of the begetting of children this would have been the same even before sin but on account of the numerous sufferings to which the woman is subject through carrying her offspring after conception hence it is expressly stated I will multiply thy sorrows and thy conceptions Reply to Objection 3 These punishments affect all somewhat for any woman who conceives must needs suffer sorrows bring forth her child with pain except the Blessed Virgin who conceived without corruption and bore without pain according to Saint Bernard in his homily on the assumption of the Blessed Virgin Mary because her conceiving was not according to the law of nature transmitted from her first parents and if a woman neither conceives nor bears she suffers from the defect of barrenness which outweighs the aforesaid punishments likewise whoever tills the soil must needs eat his bread in the sweat of his brow while those who do not themselves work on the land are busy with other labours for man is born to labour according to Job 5.7 and thus they eat the bread for which others have laboured in the sweat of their brow Reply to Objection 4 Although the place of the earthly paradise avails not man for his use it avails him for a lesson because he knows himself deprived of that place on account of sin and because by the things that have a bodily existence in that paradise he is instructed in things pertaining to the heavenly paradise the way to which is prepared for man by Christ Reply to Objection 5 Apart from the mysteries of the spiritual interpretation this place would seem to be inaccessible briefly on account of the extreme heat in the middle zone by reason of the nighness of the sun this is denoted by the flaming sword which is described as turning every way as being appropriate to the circular movement that causes this heat and since the movements of corporal creatures are set in order through the ministry of the angels according to Augustine in On the Trinity 3.4 it was fitting that besides the sword turning every way there should be cherubim to keep the way of the tree of life Hence Augustine says in his commentary on Genesis its literal meaning 1140 It is to be believed that even in the visible paradise this was done by heavenly powers indeed so that there was a fiery guard set there by the ministry of angels Reply to Objection 6 After sin, if man had eaten of the tree of life he would not thereby have recovered immortality but by means of that beneficial food he might have prolonged his life Hence in the words and live forever forever signifies for a long time for it was not expedient for man to remain longer in the unhappiness of this life Reply to Objection 7 According to Augustine in his commentary on the literal meaning of Genesis 1139 these words of God are not so much a mockery of our first parents as a deterrent to others for whose benefit these things are written lest they be proud likewise as Adam not only failed to become that which he covered it to be but did not keep that to which he was made Reply to Objection 8 Clothing is necessary to man in his present state of unhappiness for two reasons First, to supply edificiency in respect of external harm caused by, for instance extreme heat or cold Secondly, to hide his and to cover the shame of those members wherein the rebellion of the flesh against the spirit is most manifest Now these two motives do not apply to the primitive state because then man's body could not be hurt by any outward thing as stated in the first part question 97 article 2 nor was there in man's body anything shameful that would bring confusion on him Hence it is written in Genesis 2 23 and they were both naked to wit, Adam and his wife and were not ashamed The same cannot be said of food which is necessary to entertain the natural heat and to sustain the body Reply to Objection 9 As Augustine says in the same commentary We must not imagine that our first parents were created with their eyes closed especially since it is stated that the woman saw that the tree was fair and good to eat Accordingly, the eyes of both were opened so that they saw and thought on things which had not occurred to their minds before and this was a mutual concupiscence such as they had not either to End of question 164 Read by Michael Shane Craig Lambert, LC Question 165 of Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde Triates on the Cardinal of Virtues The Virtue of Temperance This is a LibriVox recording All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain For more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde Triates on the Cardinal of Virtues The Virtue of Temperance by St. Thomas Aquinas Translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province Question 165 Of our first parents' temptation in two articles We must now consider our first parents' temptation concerning which there are two points of inquiry First, whether it was fitting for man to be tempted by the devil Second, of the manner and order of that temptation First article Whether it was fitting for man to be tempted by the devil Objection one It would seem that it was not fitting for man to be tempted by the devil For the same final punishment is appointed to the angel's sin and to man's According to Matthew 2541 Go you cursed into everlasting fire which was prepared for the devil and his angels Now the angel's first sin did not follow a temptation from without Therefore, neither should man's first sin have resulted from an outward temptation Objection two Further, God, who foreknows the future Who that through the demon's temptation man would fall into sin And thus he knew full well that it was not expedient for man to be tempted Therefore, it would seem unfitting for God to allow him to be tempted Objection three, further It seems to savor of punishment that anyone should have an assailant Just as on the other hand the cessation of an assault is akin to reward No punishment should not precede fault Therefore, it was unfitting for man to be tempted before he sinned On the contrary, it is written in Ecclesiasticus 3411 He that hath not been tempted, what manner of things doth he know I answer that God's wisdom orders all things sweetly according to wisdom 8.1 Inasmuch as his providence appoints to each one that which is befitting it according to its nature For as Dionysius says in On the Divine Names 4 It belongs to providence not to destroy but to maintain nature Now it is a condition attaching to human nature that one creature can be helped or impeded by another Therefore it was fitting that God should both allow man in the state of innocence to be tempted by evil angels and should cause him to be helped by good angels And by a special favor of grace it was granted him that no creature outside himself could harm him against his own will whereby he was able even to resist the temptation of the demon Reply to Objection one Above the human nature there is another that admits of the possibility of the evil of fault but there is not above the angelic nature Now only one that has already become evil through sin contempt by leading another into evil Hence it was fitting that by an evil angel man should be tempted to sin Even as according to the order of nature he is moved forward to perfection by means of a good angel An angel could be perfected in good by something above him namely by God but he could not thus be led into sin because according to James 1.13 God is not a tempter of evils Reply to Objection two Just as God knew that man through being tempted would fall into sin so too he knew that man was able by his free will to resist the tempter Now the condition attaching to man's nature required that he should be left to his own will according to Ecclesiastic as 1514 God left man in the hand of his own counsel hence Augustine says in on the literal meaning of Genesis 11.4 It seems to me that man would have had no prospect of any special praise if he were able to lead a good life simply because there was none to persuade him to lead an evil life Since both by nature he had the power and in his power he had the will not to consent to the persuader Reply to Objection three An assault is penal if it be difficult to resist it but in the state of innocence man was able without any difficulty to resist temptation Consequently the tempter's assault was not a punishment to man Second article Whether the manner and order of the first temptation was fitting Objection one It would seem that the manner and order of the first temptation was not fitting For just as in the order of nature the angel was above man so was the man above the woman Now sin came upon man through an angel therefore in like manner it should have come upon the woman through the man In other words the woman should have been tempted by the man and not the other way about Objection two further the temptation of our first parents was by suggestion Now the devil is able to make suggestions to man without making use of an outward sensible creature Since then our first parents were endowed with a spiritual mind and adhered less to sensible than to intelligible things It would have been more fitting to man be tempted with a merely spiritual instead of an outward temptation Objection three further one cannot fittingly suggest an evil except through some apparent good But many other animals have a greater appearance of good than the serpent has Therefore man was unfittingly tempted by the devil through a serpent Objection four further the serpent is an irrational animal Now wisdom speech and punishment are not befitting an irrational animal Therefore the serpent is unfittingly described in Genesis three one as More subtle than any of the beasts of the earth or as the most prudent of all beasts according to another version And likewise is unfittingly stated to have spoken to the woman and to have been punished by God On the contrary that which is first in any genus should be proportionate to all that follows it in that genus Now in every kind of sin we find the same order as in the first temptation For according to Augustine in on the Trinity twelve twelve it begins with the Coupes sense of sin in the sensuality signified by the serpent Extends to the lower reason by pleasure signified by the woman And reaches to the higher reason by consent in the sin signified by the man Therefore the order of the first temptation was fitting I answer that man is composed of a two-fold nature Intellective and sensitive hence the devil in tempting man made use of a two-fold incentive to sin One on the part of the intellect by promising the divine likeness through the acquisition of knowledge Which man naturally desires to have the other on the part of the sense This he did by having recourse to those sensible things which are most akin to man Partly by tempting the man through the woman who was akin to him in the same species Partly by tempting the woman through the serpent who is akin to them in the same genus Partly by suggesting to them to eat of the forbidden fruit which was akin to them in the proximate genus Reply to Objection One In the act of tempting the devil was by way of principal agent Whereas the woman was employed as an instrument of temptation in bringing about the downfall of the man Both because the woman was weaker than the man and consequently more liable to be deceived And because on account of her union with the man the devil was able to deceive the man especially through her Now there is no parity between principal agent and instrument Because the principal agent must exceed in power which is not requisite in the instrumental agent Reply to Objection Two A suggestion whereby the devil suggests something to man spiritually Shows the devil to have more power against man than outward suggestion has Since by an inward suggestion at least Man's imagination is changed by the devil Whereas by an outward suggestion the change is wrought merely on an outward creature Now the devil had a minimum of power against man before sin Wherefore he was unable to tempt him by inward suggestion but only by outward suggestion Reply to Objection Three According to Augustine in On the Literal Meaning of Genesis 11.3 We are not to suppose that the devil chose the serpent as his means of temptation But as he was possessed of the last of deceit he could only do so by the animal he was allowed to use for that purpose Reply to Objection Four According to Augustine again in On the Literal Meaning of Genesis 11.29 The serpent is described as most prudent or subtle on account of the cunning of the devil who wrought his wiles in it Thus we speak of a prudent or cunning tongue because it is the instrument of a prudent or cunning man in envising something prudently or cunningly Nor indeed did the serpent understand the sounds which were conveyed through it to the woman Nor again are we to believe that its soul was changed into a rational nature Since not even men who are rational by nature know what they say when a demon speaks in them Accordingly the serpent spoke to man even as the donkey on which Balaam sat spoke to him Except that the former was the work of a devil whereas the latter was the work of an angel Hence the serpent was not asked why it had done this because it had not done this in its own nature But the devil in it who was already condemned to everlasting fire on account of his sin And the words addressed to the serpent were directed to him who wrought through the serpent Moreover as again Augustine says His that is the devil's punishment mentioned here is that for which we must be on our guard against him Not that which is reserved to the last judgment For when it was said to him, Thou art cursed among all cattle and beasts of the earth The cattle are set above him not in power but in the preservation of their nature Since the cattle lost no heavenly bliss seeing that they never had it But they continue to live in the nature which they received It is also said to him, Upon thy breast and belly thou shalt creep According to another version Here the breast signifies pride because it is there that the impulse of the soul dominates While the belly denotes carnal desire because this part of the body is softest to the touch And on these he creeps to those whom he wishes to deceive The words earth shalt thou eat all the days of thy life may be understood in two ways Either those shall belong to thee whom thou shalt deceive by earthly lust Namely sinners who are signified under the name of earth For a third kind of temptation namely curiosity is signified by these words For to eat earth is to look into things deep and dark The putting of amenities between him and the woman Means that we cannot be tempted by the devil Except through that part of the soul which bears or reflects the likeness of a woman The seed of the devil is the temptation to evil The seed of the woman is the fruit of good works Whereby the temptation to evil is resisted Wherefore the serpent lies and waits for the woman's heel That if at any time she fall away towards what is unlawful Pleasure may seize hold of her And she watches his head that she may shut him out at the very outset of the evil temptation End of question 165 Read by Michael Shane Craig Lambert, LC Question 166 of Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde Triaties on the Cardinal Virtues The Virtue of Temperance This is a LibriVox recording All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde Triaties on the Cardinal Virtues The Virtue of Temperance by St. Thomas Aquinas Translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province Question 166 of Studiousness in two articles We must next consider studiousness and its opposite, curiosity Concerning studiousness, there are two points of inquiry First, what is the matter of studiousness? Second, whether it is a part of temperance? First article, whether the proper matter of studiousness is knowledge Objection one, it would seem that knowledge is not the proper matter of studiousness For a person is said to be studious because he applies study to certain things Now a man ought to apply study to every matter in order to do or write what has to be done Therefore, seemingly knowledge is not the special matter of studiousness Objection two, further, studiousness is opposed to curiosity Now curiosity, which is derived from cura, care, may also refer to elegance of apparel and other such things which regard the body Wherefore the Apostle says in Romans 13-14 Make not provision, curam, for the flesh in its concupiscences Objection three, further, it is written in Jeremiah 6-13 From the least of them, even to the greatest, all study, covetousness Now covetousness is not properly about knowledge, but rather about the possession of wealth as stated above in Question 118, Article 2 Therefore studiousness, which is derived from study, is not properly about knowledge On the contrary, it is written in Proverbs 27 verse 11 Study wisdom, my son, and make my heart joyful, that thou mayest give an answer to him that reproacheth Now study, which is commended as a virtue, is the same as that to which the law urges Therefore studiousness is properly about knowledge I answer that, properly speaking, study denotes keen application of the mind to something Now the mind is not applied to a thing except by knowing that thing Wherefore the mind's application to knowledge precedes its application to those things to which man is directed by his knowledge Hence study regards knowledge in the first place, and as a result it regards any other things the working of which requires to be directed by knowledge Now the virtues lay claim to that matter about which they are first and foremost Thus fortitude is concerned about dangers of death and temperance about pleasures of touch Therefore studiousness is properly ascribed to knowledge Reply to Objection 1 Nothing can be done a right as regards other matters except insofar as is previously directed by the knowing reason Hence studiousness, to whatever matter it be applied, has a prior regard for knowledge Reply to Objection 2 Man's mind is drawn on account of his affections towards the things for which he has an affection According to Matthew 621 Where thy treasure is there is thy heart also And since man has special affection for those things which foster the flesh It follows that man's thoughts are concerned about things that foster his flesh So that man seeks to know how he may best sustain his body Accordingly curiosity is accounted to be about things pertaining to the body by reason of things pertaining to knowledge Reply to Objection 3 Covetiousness craves the acquisition of gain and for this it is very necessary to be skilled in earthly things Accordingly studiousness is ascribed to things pertaining to covetousness Second article Whether studiousness is a part of temperance Objection 1 It would seem that studiousness is not a part of temperance For a man is said to be studious by reason of his studiousness Now all virtuous persons, without exception, are called studious according to the philosopher Who frequently employs the term studious Spudios In this sense in Ethics 9, 4, 8 and 9 Every vicious person is ignorant of what he ought to do Therefore studiousness is a general virtue and not a part of temperance Objection 2 further Studiousness, as stated in article 1, pertains to knowledge But knowledge has no connection with the moral virtues which are in the appetitive part of the soul And pertains rather to the intellectual virtues which are in the cognitive part Therefore solicitude is an act of prudence, as stated above, in question 47, article 9 Therefore studiousness is not a part of temperance Objection 3 further A virtue that is ascribed as a part of a principal virtue resembles the latter as to mode Now studiousness does not resemble temperance as to mode Because temperance takes its name from being a kind of restraint Therefore it is more opposed to the vice that is in excess Whereas studiousness is denominated from being the application of the mind to something So that it would seem to be opposed to the vice that is in default Namely, neglect of study Rather than to the vice which is in excess, namely curiosity Therefore, on account of its resemblance to the latter, Isidore says in his etymologies 10 that A studious man is one who is curious to study Therefore studiousness is not a part of temperance On the contrary, Augustine says, in On the Morals of the Catholic Church and the Morals of the Manicheans We are forbidden to be curious, and this is a great gift that temperance bestows Now curiosity is prevented by moderate studiousness Therefore studiousness is a part of temperance I answer that, as stated above in question 141, articles 3, 4 and 5 Belongs to temperance to moderate the movement of the appetite, lest it extend excessively to that which is desired naturally Now just as in respect of his corporeal nature, man naturally desires the pleasures of food and sex So in respect of his soul, he naturally desires to know something Thus the philosopher observes, at the beginning of his metaphysics, 11 All men have a natural desire for knowledge The moderation of this desire pertains to the virtue of studiousness Therefore it follows that studiousness is a potential part of temperance, as a subordinate virtue annexed to a principal virtue Moreover, it is comprised under modesty for the reason given above in question 160, article 2 Reply to Objection 1 Prudence is the complement of all the moral virtues, as stated in Ethics 613 Consequently, insofar as the knowledge of prudence pertains to all the virtues, the term studiousness, which properly regards knowledge, is applied to all the virtues Reply to Objection 2 The act of a cognitive power is commanded by the appetitive power, which moves all the powers as stated above in the Parsprima Secunde, question 9, article 1 Wherefore knowledge regards a twofold good One is connected with the act of knowledge itself, and this good pertains to the intellectual virtues and consists in man having a true estimate about each thing The other good pertains to the act of the appetitive power, and consists in man's appetite being directed a right in applying the cognitive power in this or that way to this or that thing And this belongs to the virtue of seriousness, wherefore it is reckoned among the moral virtues Reply to Objection 3 As the philosopher says in Ethics 293 In order to be virtuous, we must avoid those things to which we are most naturally inclined Hence it is that, since nature inclines us chiefly to fear dangers of death and to seek pleasures of the flesh Fortitude is chiefly commended for a certain steadfast perseverance against such dangers and temperance for a certain restraint from pleasures of the flesh But as regards knowledge, man has contrary inclinations For on the part of the soul he is inclined to desire knowledge of things, and so it behooves him to exercise a praiseworthy restraint on this desire lest he seek knowledge immoderately Whereas on the part of his bodily nature, man is inclined to avoid the trouble of seeking knowledge Accordingly, as regards the first inclination, studiousness is a kind of restraint, and it is in this sense that it is reckoned a part of temperance But as to the second inclination, this virtue derives its praise from a certain keenness of interest in seeking knowledge of things, and from this it takes its name The former is more essential to this virtue than the latter, since the desire to know directly regards knowledge to which studiousness is directed Whereas the trouble of learning is an obstacle to knowledge, wherefore it is regarded by this virtue indirectly as by that which removes an obstacle of Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde Triates on the Cardinal Virtues The Virtue of Temperance This is the LibriVox recording. 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For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde Triates on the Cardinal Virtues The Virtue of Temperance By St. Thomas Aquinas Translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province Question 167 Of Curiosity In two articles We must next consider curiosity, under which head there are two points of inquiry First, whether the vice of curiosity can regard intellect of knowledge Second, whether it is about sensitive knowledge First article Whether curiosity can be about intellect of knowledge Objection 1 It would seem that curiosity cannot be about intellect of knowledge Because according to the philosopher in Ethics 2.6 There can be no mean and extremes and things which are essentially good Now intellect of knowledge is essentially good Because man's perfection would seem to consist in his intellect being reduced From potentiality to act And this is done by the knowledge of truth For Dionysius says in On the Divine Names 4 That the good of the human soul is to be in accordance with reason Whose perfection consists in knowing the truth Therefore the vice of curiosity cannot be about intellect of knowledge Objection 2 further That which makes man like to God in which he receives from God cannot be an evil Now all abundance of knowledge is from God according to Ecclesiasticist 1.1 All wisdom is from the Lord God And wisdom 7.17 He hath given me the true knowledge of things that are To know the disposition of the whole world and the virtues of the elements Again by knowing the truth man is likened to God since All things are naked and open to his eyes according to Hebrews 4.13 And the Lord is a God of all knowledge according to 1 Kings 2.3 Therefore however abundant knowledge of truth may be it is not evil but good Now the desire of good is not sinful Therefore the vice of curiosity cannot be about the intellect of knowledge of truth Objection 3 further If the vice of curiosity can be about any kind of intellect of knowledge It would be chiefly about the philosophical sciences But seemingly there is no sin in being intent on them For Jerome says in his commentary on Daniel 1.8 Those who refused to partake of the king's meat and wine lest they should be defiled If they had considered the wisdom and teaching of the Babylonians to be sinful Would never have consented to learn that which was unlawful And Augustine says in on Christian doctrine 2.40 that If the philosophers made any true statements we must claim them for our own use As from unjust possessors Therefore curiosity about intellect of knowledge cannot be sinful On the contrary Jerome in his commentary on the letter to the Ephesians 4.17 says Is it not evident that a man who day and night wrestles with the dialectic art The student of natural science whose gaze pierces the heavens Walks in vanity of understanding and darkness of mind Now vanity of understanding and darkness of mind are sinful Therefore curiosity about intellect of sciences may be sinful I answer that as stated above in question 166 article 2 second reply Studiousness is directly not about knowledge itself But about the desire and study in the pursuit of knowledge Now we must judge differently of the knowledge itself of truth And of the desire and study in the pursuit of the knowledge of truth For the knowledge of truth strictly speaking is good But it may be evil accidentally by reason of some results Either because one takes pride in knowing the truth According to 1 Corinthians 8.1 knowledge potheth up Or because one uses the knowledge of truth in order to sin On the other hand the desire or study in pursuing the knowledge of truth May be right or wrong First when one tends by his study to the knowledge of truth As having evil accidentally annexed to it For instance those who study to know the truth That they may take pride in their knowledge Hence Augustine says in his On the Morals of the Catholic Church And on the Morals of the Manichaeans 21 Some there are who forsaking virtue and ignorant of what God is And of the majesty of that nature which ever remains the same Imagine they are doing something great If with surpassing curiosity and keenness They explore the whole mass of this body which we call the world So great a pride is thus begotten That one would think they dwelt in the very heavens about which they argue In like manner those who study to learn something in order to sin Are engaged in a sinful study according to the saying of Jeremiah 9.5 They have taught their tongue to speak lies They have laboured to commit iniquity Secondly there may be sin by reason of the appetite or study Directed to the learning of truth being itself inordinate And this in four ways First when a man is withdrawn by a less profitable study From a study that is an obligation incumbent on him Hence Jerome says in his Letter to Damas We see priests forsaking the gospels and the prophets Reading stage plays and singing the love songs of pastoral idols Secondly when a man studies to learn of one by whom it is unlawful to be taught As is the case of those who seek to know the future through the demons This is superstitious curiosity of which Augustine says in On true religion number four Maybe the philosophers were debarred from the faith by their sinful curiosity In seeking knowledge from the demons Thirdly when a man desires to know the truth about creatures Without referring his knowledge to its due end namely the knowledge of God Hence Augustine says again in On true religion number 29 that In studying creatures we must not be moved by empty and perishable curiosity But we should ever mount towards immortal and abiding things Fourthly when a man studies to know the truth above the capacity of his own intelligence Since by so doing men easily fall into error Wherefore it is written in Ecclesiasticus 322 Seek not the things that are too high for thee And search not into things above thy ability And in many of his works be not curious And further on in Ecclesiasticus 326 For the suspicion of them hath deceived many And hath detained their minds in vanity Reply to Objection 1 Man's good consists in the knowledge of truth Yet man's sovereign good consists not in the knowledge of any truth But in the perfect knowledge of the sovereign truth as the philosopher states in Ethics 10, 7 and 8 Hence there may be sin in the knowledge of certain truths And so far as the desire of such knowledge is not directed in due manner to the knowledge of the sovereign truth Wherein supreme happiness consists Reply to Objection 2 Although this argument shows that the knowledge of truth is good in itself This does not prevent a man from misusing the knowledge of truth for an evil purpose Or from desiring the knowledge of truth inordinately Since even the desire for good should be regulated in due manner Reply to Objection 3 The study of philosophy is in itself lawful and commendable On account of the truth which the philosophers acquired through God revealing it to them as stated in Romans 119 Since, however, certain philosophers misuse the truth in order to assail the faith The apostle says in Colossians 2, 8 Beware lest any man cheat you by philosophy and vain deceit according to the traditions of men and not according to Christ And Dionysius says in his seventh letter to Polycarp of certain philosophers that They make an unholy use of divine things against that which is divine and by divine wisdom strive to destroy the worship of God Second Article Whether the vice of curiosity is about sensitive knowledge Objection 1 It would seem that the vice of curiosity is not about sensitive knowledge For just as some things are known by the sense of sight, so too are some things known by the senses of touch and taste Now the vice concerned about objects of touch and taste is not curiosity but lust or gluttony Therefore, seemingly neither is the vice of curiosity about things known by the sight Objection 2 further Curiosity would seem to refer to watching games Wherefore Augustine says in Confession 6, 8 That when a fall occurred in the fight, a mighty cry of the whole people struck him strongly and overcome by curiosity Alpius opened his eyes But it does not seem to be sinful to watch games because it gives pleasure on account of the representation Where a man takes a natural delight as the philosopher states in his Poetics, Number 6 Therefore, the vice of curiosity is not about the knowledge of sensible objects Objection 3 further It would seem to pertain to curiosity to inquire into our neighbor's actions as Beat observes in his commentary on the first letter of John 216 Now seemingly it is not a sin to inquire into the actions of others because according to Ecclesiasticus 1712 God gave to every one of them commandment concerning his neighbor Therefore, the vice of curiosity does not regard the knowledge of such like particular sensible objects On the contrary, Augustine says in On True Religion 38 that Concupiscence of the eyes makes men curious Now according to Bede in his commentary on the first letter of John chapter 2 verse 16 Concupiscence of the eyes refers not only to the learning of magic arts But also to sightseeing and to the discovery and dispraise of our neighbor's faults And all these are particular objects of sense Therefore, since concupiscence of the eyes is a sin Even as concupiscence of the flesh and pride of life, which are members of the same division It seems that the vice of curiosity is about the knowledge of sensible things I answer that The knowledge of sensible things is directed to two things In the first place, both in man and in other animals It is directed to the upkeep of the body Because by knowledge of this kind, man and other animals Avoid what is harmful to them and seek those things that are necessary for the body's sustenance In the second place, it is directed in a manner special to man To intellective knowledge, whether speculative or practical Accordingly, to employ study for the purpose of knowing sensible things May be sinful in two ways First, when the sensitive knowledge is not directed to something useful But turns man away from some useful consideration Hence Augustine says in Confessions 1035 I go no more to see a dog coursing a hair in the circus But in the open country, if I happen to be passing Coursing happily will distract me from some weighty thought And draw me after it And unless thou, having made me see my weakness Didst speedily admonish me, I become foolishly dull Secondly, when the knowledge of sensible things is directed to something harmful As looking on a woman is directed to lust Even so, the busy inquiry into other people's actions Is directed to detraction On the other hand, if one be ordinarily intent On the knowledge of sensible things by reason of the necessity of sustaining nature Or for the sake of the study of intelligible truth This studiousness about the knowledge of sensible things is virtuous Reply to Objection 1 Lust and gluttony are about pleasures arising from the use of objects of touch Whereas curiosity is about pleasures arising from the knowledge acquired through the senses According to Augustine in his Confessions 1035 It is called concupiscence of the eyes Because the sight is the sense chiefly used for obtaining knowledge So that all sensible things are said to be seen And as he says further on By this it may be more evidently to be discerned Wherein pleasure and wherein curiosity is the object of the senses For pleasure seeketh objects beautiful, melodious, fragrant, savoury, soft But curiosity, for trial's sake, seeketh even the contraries of these Not for the sake of suffering annoyance, but out of the lust of experiment and knowledge Reply to Objection 2 This seeing becomes sinful when it renders a man prone to the vices of lust and cruelty On account of things he sees represented Hence Chrysostom says that such sights make men adulterers and shameless Reply to Objection 3 One may watch other people's actions or inquire into them with a good intent Either for one's own good, that is, in order to be encouraged to better deeds by the deeds of our neighbour Or for our neighbour's good, that is, in order to correct him if he do anything wrong According to the rule of charity and the duty of one's position This is praiseworthy according to Hebrews 1024 Consider one another to provoke unto charity and to good works But to observe our neighbour's faults with the intention of looking down upon them Or of detracting them, or even with no further purpose than that of disturbing them Is sinful Hence it is written in Proverbs 24 15 Lie not in wait, nor seek after wickedness in the house of the just, nor spoil his rest End of question 167 Read by Michael Shane Craig Lambert, LC Question 168 of Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde Triaties on the Cardinal of Virtues The Virtue of Temperance This is a LibriVox recording. 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For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde Triaties on the Cardinal of Virtues The Virtue of Temperance By St. Thomas Aquinas Translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province Question 168 Of modesty as consisting in the outward movements of the body In four articles We must next consider modesty as consisting in the outward movements of the body And under this head there are four points of inquiry First, whether there can be virtue and vice in the outward movements of the body that are done seriously Second, whether there can be a virtue about playful actions Third, of the sin consisting in excess of play Fourth, of the sin consisting in lack of play First article Whether any virtue regards the outward movements of the body Objection one It would seem that no virtue regards the outward movements of the body For every virtue pertains to the spiritual beauty of the soul according to Psalm 44 verse 14 All the glory of the King's daughter is within And a gloss adds, namely in the conscience Now the movements of the body are not within but without Therefore there can be no virtue about them Objection two further Virtues are not in us by nature as the philosopher states in Ethics 2 1 But outward bodily movements are in man by nature Since it is by nature that some are quick and some slow of movement And the same applies to other differences of outward movements Therefore there is no virtue about movements of this kind Objection three further Every moral virtue is either about actions directed to another person, as justice Or about passions, as temperance and fortitude Now outward bodily movements are not directed to another person, nor are they passions Therefore no virtue is connected with them Objection four further Study should be applied to all works of virtue as stated above in question 166 article one Objection one and in article two first reply Now it is centrable to apply study to the ordering of one's outward movements For Ambrose says in On the duties of the clergy, 118 A becoming gate is one that reflects the carriage of authority, has the tread of gravity, and the footprint of tranquility Yet so that there be neither study nor affectation, but natural and artless movement Therefore, seemingly, there is no virtue about the style of outward movements In the contrary, the beauty of honesty pertains to virtue Now the style of outward movements pertains to the beauty of honesty For Ambrose says in On the duties of the clergy, 118 The sound of the voice and the gesture of the body are distasteful to me Whether they be unduly soft and nervous or coarse and boorish Let nature be our model Her reflection is gracefulness of conduct and beauty of honesty Therefore, there is a virtue about the style of outward movement I answer that moral virtue consists in the things pertaining to man being directed by his reason Now it is manifest that the outward movements of man are dirigible by reason Since the outward members are set in motion at the command of reason Hence it is evident that there is a moral virtue concerned with the direction of these movements Now the direction of these movements may be considered from a twofold span point First, in respect of fittingness to the person Secondly, in respect of fittingness to the externals, whether persons, business or place Hence Ambrose says in On the duties of the clergy, 118 Beauty of conduct consists in becoming behavior towards others according to their sex and person And this regards the first As to the second, he adds, This is the best way to order our behavior This is the polish becoming to every action Hence Andronicus in his On the affections ascribes two things to these outward movements Namely, taste or natus, which regards what is becoming to the person Wherefore he says that it is the knowledge of what is becoming in movement and behavior And methodicalness, bona ordinazio, which regards what is becoming to the business in hand And to one's surroundings, wherefore he calls it the practical knowledge of separation That is, of the distinction of acts Reply to Objection 1 Outward movements are signs of the inward disposition according to Ecclesiastic as 1927 The attire of the body and the laughter of the teeth and the gate of the man show what he is And Ambrose says that the habit of mind is seen in the gesture of the body And that the body's movement is an index of the soul Reply to Objection 2 Although it is from natural disposition that a man is inclined to this or that style of outward movement Nevertheless, what is lacking to nature can be supplied by the efforts of reason Hence Ambrose says, let nature guide the movement And if nature fail in any respect, surely effort will supply the defect Reply to Objection 3 As stated in the first reply Outward movements are indications of the inward disposition And this regards chiefly the passions of the soul Wherefore Ambrose says again that from these things, that is the outward movements The man that lies hidden in our hearts is esteemed to be either frivolous or boastful or impure Or on the other hand sedate, steady, pure and free from blemish It is moreover from our outward movements that other men form their judgment about us According to Ecclesiastic as 1926 A man is known by his look, and a wise man, when thou meetest him, is known by his continence Hence moderation of outward movements is directed somewhat to other persons According to the saying of Augustine in his Rule, as stated in his letter 211 In all your movements let nothing be done to offend the eye of another But only that which is becoming to the holiness of your state Wherefore the moderation of outward movements may be reduced to two virtues Which the philosopher mentions in Ethics 4, 6 and 7 For in so far as by outward movements we are directed to other persons The moderation of our outward movements belongs to friendliness or affability This regards pleasure or pain which may arise from words or deeds in reference to others With whom a man comes in contact And in so far as outward movements are signs of our inward disposition Their moderation belongs to the virtue of truthfulness By a man, by word and deed, shows himself to be such as he is inwardly Reply to Objection 4 It is centrable to study the style of one's outward movements by having recourse to pretense in them So that they do not agree with one's inward disposition Nevertheless, it behoves one to study them so that if they be in any way inordinate This may be corrected Hence Ambrose says, Let them be without artifice, but not without correction Second article Whether there can be a virtue about games Objection 1 It would seem that there cannot be a virtue about games For Ambrose says, and on the duties of the clergy, 123 Our Lord said, Woe to you who laugh, for you shall weep Wherefore I consider that all and not only excessive games should be avoided Now that which can be done virtuously is not to be avoided altogether Therefore there cannot be a virtue about games Objection 2 further Virtue is that which God forms in us, without us As stated above in the Bar's Prima Secunde, question 55, article 4 Now Chrysostom says, It is not God, but the devil, that is the author of fun Listen to what happened to those who played The people sat down to eat and drink, and they rose up to play Therefore there can be no virtue about games Objection 3 further The philosopher says in Ethics 10.6 that Playful actions are not directed to something else But it is requisite of virtue that the agent and choosing should direct his action to something else As the philosopher states in Ethics 2.4 Therefore there can be no virtue about games On the contrary, Augustine says in His triities on music, 2.15 I pray thee, spare thyself at times, for it becomes a wise man sometimes to relax the high pressure of his intention to work Now this relaxation of the mind from work consists in playful words or deeds Therefore it becomes a wise and virtuous man to have recourse to such things at times Moreover the philosopher in Ethics 2.7 and 4.8 Assigns to games the virtue of eutropalia, which we may call pleasantness I answer that, just as man needs bodily rest for the body's refreshment Because he cannot always be at work, since his power is finite and equal to a certain fixed amount of labour So true is it with his soul, whose power is also finite and equal to a fixed amount of work Consequently, when he goes beyond his measure in a certain work, he is oppressed and becomes weary And all the more, since when the soul works, the body is at work likewise Insofar as the intellect of soul employs forces that operate through bodily organs Now sensible goods are conatural to man, and therefore when the soul arises above sensibles Through being intent on the operations of reason, the results in consequence a certain weariness of soul Whether the operations with which it is occupied be those of the practical or of the speculative reason Yet this weariness is greater if the soul be occupied with the work of contemplation Since thereby it is raised higher above sensible things Although perhaps certain outward works of the practical reason entail a greater bodily labour In either case however, one man is more soul wearied than another According as he is more intensely occupied with works of reason Now just as weariness of the body is dispelled by resting the body So weariness of the soul must needs be remedied by resting the soul And the soul's rest is pleasure as stated above In the Parse Prima Secunde question 25 article 2 as well as in question 31 article 1 Second reply Consequently the remedy for weariness of soul must needs consist in the application of some pleasure By slackening the tension of the reason study Thus in the conferences of the Fathers 2421 it is related of blessed John the Evangelist That when some people were scandalised on finding him playing together with his disciples He is said to have told one of them who carried a bow to shoot an arrow And when the latter had done this several times he asked whether he could do it indefinitely And the man answered that if he continued doing it the bow would break Whence the blessed John drew the inference that in like manner man's mind would break if its tension were never relaxed Now such like words or deeds wherein nothing further is sought than the soul's delight are called playful or humorous Hence it is necessary at times to make use of them in order to give rest as it were to the soul This is in agreement with the statement of the philosopher in Ethics 48 that In the intercourse of this life there is a kind of rest that is associated with games And consequently it is sometimes necessary to make use of such things Nevertheless it would seem that in this matter there are three points which require special caution The first and chief is that the pleasure in question should not be sought in indecent or injurious deeds or words Wherefore Tully says in On the Duties of the Clergy 129 that One kind of joke is discourteous, insolent, scandalous, obscene Another thing to be observed is that one lose not the balance of one's mind altogether Hence Ambrose says We should beware lest when we seek relaxation of mind we destroy all that harmony which is the concord of good works And Tully says that just as we do not allow children to enjoy absolute freedom in their games But only that which is consistent with good behavior so our very fun should reflect something of an upright mind Thirdly we must be careful as in all other human actions to conform ourselves to persons time and place And take due account of other circumstances so that our fun befit the hour and the man as Tully says Now these things are directed according to the rule of reason and a habit that operates according to reason is virtue Therefore there can be a virtue about games The philosopher gives it the name of Wittiness Eutrapalia And a man is said to be pleasant through having a happy turn of mind whereby he gives his words and deeds a cheerful turn And in as much as this virtue restrains a man from immoderate fun it is comprised under modesty Translators note Eutrapalia is derived from Trapane to turn Reply to Objection 1 As stated above fun should fit with business and persons Wherefore Tully says that when the audience is weary it will be useful for the speaker to try something novel or amusing Provided that joking be not incompatible with the gravity of the subject Now the sacred doctrine is concerned with things of the greatest moment according to Proverbs 8.6 Here for I will speak of great things Wherefore Ambrose does not altogether exclude fun from human speech but from the sacred doctrine Hence he begins by saying Although jokes are at times fitting and pleasant Nevertheless they are incompatible with the ecclesiastical rule Since how can we have recourse to things which are not to be found in holy writ Reply to Objection 2 This saying of Chrysostom refers to the inordinate use of fun Especially by those who make the pleasure of games their end Of whom it is written in Wisdom 1512 They have accounted our life a pastime Against these Tully says Reply to Objection 3 Playful actions themselves considered in their species are not directed to an end But the pleasure derived from such actions is directed to the recreation and rest of the soul And accordingly if this be done with moderation it is lawful to make use of fun Hence Tully says In Grave and Serious Matters Objection 1 Now play is sometimes an excuse for sin For many things would be grave sins if they were done seriously Whereas if they be done in fun are either no sin or but slightly sinful Therefore it seems that there is no sin in excessive play Objection 2 further Therefore it would not seem to be a sin Objection 3 Further comedians especially would seem to exceed in play Since they direct their whole life to playing Therefore if excessive play were a sin all actors would be in a state of sin Moreover all those who employ them as well as those who make them any payment Would sin as accomplices of their sin But this would seem untrue For is is related in the lives of the fathers That this was revealed to blessed Panthenutsius That a certain jester would be with him in the life to come On the contrary A gloss on Proverbs 14-13 Laughter shall be mingled with sorrow And mourning taketh hold of the end of joy A mourning that will last forever Now there is inordinate laughter and inordinate joy in excessive play Therefore there is mortal sin therein Since mortal sin alone is deserving of everlasting mourning I answer that In all things dirigible according to reason The excessive is that which goes beyond And the deficient is that which falls short of the rule of reason Now it has been stated in article 2 That playful or jesting words or deeds are dirigible according to reason Wherefore excessive play is that which goes beyond the rule of reason And this happens in two ways First on account of the very species of the acts employed for the purpose of fun And this kind of jesting, according to Tully, is stated to be Discurtious, insolent, scandalous, and obscene When to wit a man for the purpose of jesting Employs indecent words or deeds Or such as are injurious to his neighbor These being of themselves mortal sins And thus it is evident that excessive play is mortal sin Secondly, there may be excess in play through lack of due circumstances For instance when people make use of fun at undue times or places Or out of keeping with the matter in hand or persons This may be sometimes a mortal sin on account of the strong attachment to play When a man prefers the pleasure he derives therefrom to the love of God So as to be willing to disobey a commandment of God or of the church Rather than forgo such like amusements Sometimes, however, it is a venial sin For instance where a man is not so attached to amusement As to be willing for its sake to do anything in a disobedience to God Reply to Objection 1 Certain things are sinful on account of the intention alone Because they are done in order to injure someone Such an intention is excluded by their being done in fun The intention of which is to please not to injure In these cases, fun excuses from sin or diminishes it Other things, however, are sins according to their species Such as murder, fornication and the like And fun is no excuse for these In fact, they make fun, scandalous and obscene Reply to Objection 2 Excessive play pertains to senseless mirth Which Gregory, in his commentary on Job 3117 Calls a daughter of gluttony Wherefore it is written in Exodus 32 verse 6 The people sat down to eat and drink and they rose up to play Reply to Objection 3 Play is necessary for the intercourse of human life Whatever is useful to human intercourse May have a lawful employment ascribed to it Wherefore the occupation of play actors The object of which is to cheer the heart of man Is not unlawful in itself Nor are they in a state of sin provided that their playing be moderated Namely, that they use no unlawful words or deeds in order to amuse And that they do not introduce play into undue matters and seasons And although in human affairs they have no other occupation In reference to other men, nevertheless in reference to themselves And to God, they perform other actions both serious and virtuous Such as prayer and the moderation of their own passions and operations While sometimes they give alms to the poor Wherefore those who maintain them in moderation Do not sin but act justly by rewarding them for their services On the other hand, if a man spends too much on such persons Or maintains those comedians who practice unlawful mirth He sins as encouraging them in their sin Hence Augustine says that To give one's property to comedians is a great sin, not a virtue Unless by chance some play actor were in extreme need In which case one would have to assist him For Ampro says Feed him that dies of hunger For whenever thou canst save a man by feeding him If thou hast not fed him, thou hast slain him Fourth article Whether there is a sin in lack of mirth Objection one You would seem that there is no sin in lack of mirth For no sin is prescribed to a penitent But Augustine, speaking of a penitent, says Let him refrain from games in the sights of the world If he wishes to obtain the grace of a full pardon Therefore there is no sin in lack of mirth Objection two Further no sin is included in the praise given to holy men But some persons are praised for having refrained from mirth For it is written in Jeremiah 1517 I sat not in the assembly of gestures And in Tobias 317 Never have I joined myself with them that play Neither have I made myself partaker with them that walk in lightness Therefore there can be no sin in the lack of mirth Objection three Further Andronicus counts austerity to be one of the virtues And he describes it as a habit whereby a man neither gives nor receives the pleasures of conversation Now this pertains to the lack of mirth Therefore the lack of mirth is virtuous rather than sinful On the contrary, the philosopher in Ethics 2.7 and Ethics 4.8 Reckons the lack of mirth to be a vice I answer that in human affairs whatever is against reason is a sin Now it is against reason for a man to be burdensome to others By offering no pleasure to others and by hindering their enjoyment Wherefore Seneca says Let your conduct be guided by wisdom so that no one will think you rude or despise you as a cad Now a man who is without mirth is not only lacking in playful speech But is also burdensome to others since he is deaf to the moderate mirth of others Consequently they are vicious and are said to be boorish or rude As the philosopher states in Ethics 4.8 Since however mirth is useful for the sake of the rest and pleasure it affords And since in human life pleasure and rest are not in quest for their own sake But for the sake of operation as stated in Ethics 10.6 It follows that lack of mirth is less sinful than excess thereof Hence the philosopher says in Ethics 9.10 We should make few friends for the sake of pleasure Since but little sweetness suffices to season life Just as little salt suffices for our meat Reply to Objection 1 Mirth is forbidden the penitent because he is called upon to mourn for his sins Nor does this imply a vice in default Because this very diminishment of mirth in them is in accordance with reason Reply to Objection 2 Jeremiah speaks there in accordance with the times The state of which required that man should mourn, wherefore he adds I sat alone because thou hast filled me with threats The words of Tobias 3 refer to excessive mirth And this is evident from his adding Neither have I made myself partaker with them that walk in lightness Reply to Objection 3 A sterity as a virtue does not exclude all pleasures But only such as are excessive and inordinate Wherefore it would seem to pertain to affability which the philosopher In Ethics 4-6 calls friendliness or eutrapelia Otherwise wittiness Nevertheless he names and defines it thus in respect of its agreement with temperance To which it belongs to restrained pleasure End of question 168 Read by Michael Shane Craig Lambert, LC