 Question 63 of Summa Theologica Pars Prima, On the Angels and On the Six Days. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Tony Russell. Summa Theologica Pars Prima, On the Angels and On the Six Days by St. Thomas Aquinas. Translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Question 63, The Malice of the Angels with Regard to Sin, in nine articles. In the next place we must consider how angels became evil. First of all with regard to the evil of fault, and secondly as to the evil of punishment. Under the first heading there are nine points for consideration. One, can there be evil of fault in the angels? Two, what kind of sins can be in them? Three, what did the angels seek in sinning? Four, supposing that some became evil by a sin of their own choosing, are any of them naturally evil? Five, supposing that it is not so, could any one of them become evil in the first instant of his creation by an act of his own will? Six, supposing that he did not, was there any interval between his creation and fall? Seven, was the highest of them who fell, absolutely the highest among the angels? Eight, was the sin of the foremost angel the cause of the other sinning? Nine, did as many sin as remained steadfast? First article, one, question 63, article 1, whether the evil of fault can be in the angels? Objection 1, it would seem that there can be no evil of fault in the angels, for there can be no evil except in things which are in potentiality, as is said by the philosopher. Metaphysics 9, text 19. Because the subject of privation is a being in potentiality, but the angels have not been in potentiality since they are subsisting forms, therefore there can be no evil in them. Objection 2, further the angels are higher than the heavenly bodies, but philosophers say that there cannot be evil in the heavenly bodies, therefore neither can there be in the angels. Objection 3, further what is natural to a thing is always in it, but it is natural for the angels to be moved by the movement of love towards God, therefore such love cannot be withdrawn from them, but in loving God they do not sin, consequently the angels cannot sin. Objection 4, further desire is only of what is good or apparently good, now for the angels there can be no apparent good which is not a true good, because in them either there can be no error at all or at least not before guilt, therefore the angels can desire only what is truly good, but no one sins by desiring what is truly good, consequently the angel does not sin by desire. On the contrary, it is said, Job 4, 18, quote, in his angels he found wickedness, end quote. I answer that an angel or any other rational creature considered in his own nature can sin, and to whatever creature it belongs not to sin such creature has it as a gift of grace and not from the condition of nature. The reason of this is because sinning is nothing else than a deviation from that rectitude which an act ought to have, whether we speak of sin in nature, art, or morals. That act alone, the rule of which is the very virtue of the agent, can never fall short of rectitude. Were the craftsman's hand the rule itself engraving, he could not engrave the wood otherwise than rightly, but if the rightness of engraving be judged by another rule, then the engraving may be right or faulty. Now the divine will is the sole rule of God's act, because it is not referred to any higher end, but every created will has rectitude of act so far only as it is regulated according to the divine will, to which the last end is to be referred, as every desire of a subordinate ought to be regulated by the will of his superior. For instance, the soldier's will according to the will of his commanding officer. Thus only in the divine will can there be no sin, whereas there can be sin in the will of every creature considering the condition of its nature. Reply Objection 1. In the angels there is no potentiality to natural existence, yet there is potentiality in their in-elective part, as regards their being inclined to this or the other object. In this respect there can be evil in them. Reply Objection 2. The heavenly bodies have none but a natural operation. Therefore as there can be no evil of corruption in their nature, so neither can there be evil of disorder in their natural action. But besides their natural action there is the action of free will in the angels, by reason of which evil may be in them. Reply Objection 3. It is natural for the angel to turn to God by the movement of love, according as God is the principle of his natural being. But for him to turn to God as the object of supernatural beatitude comes of infused love, from which he could be turned away by sinning. Reply Objection 4. Mortal sin occurs in two ways in the act of free will. First, when something evil is chosen, as man sins by choosing adultery, which is evil of itself, such sin always comes of ignorance or error. Otherwise what is evil would never be chosen as good. The adulterer errs in the particular, choosing this delight of an inordinate act as something good to be performed now, from the inclination of passion or of habit. Even though he does not err in his universal judgment, but retains a right opinion in this respect. In this way there can be no sin in the angel, because there are no passions in the angels to fetter reason or intellect, as is manifest from what has been said above. Question 59, Article 4. Nor again could any habit inclining to sin precede their first sin. In another way, sin comes of free will by choosing something good in itself, but not according to proper measure or rule, so that the defect which induces sin is only on the part of the choice which is not properly regulated, but not on the part of the thing chosen, as if one were to pray without heeding the order established by the church. Such as sin does not presuppose ignorance, but merely absence of consideration of the things which ought to be considered. In this way the angel sinned by seeking his own good from his own free will insubordinately to the rule of the divine will. Second Article 1, Question 63, Article 2. Whether only the sin of pride and envy can exist in an angel. Objection 1. It would seem that there can be other sins in the angels besides those of pride and envy, because whosoever can delight in any kind of sin can fall into the sin itself. But the demons delight even in the obscenities of carnal sins, as Augustine says, the city of God 14.3. Therefore there can also be carnal sins in the demons. Objection 2. Further, as pride and envy are spiritual sins, so are sloth, avarice, and anger. But spiritual sins are concerned with the spirit, just as carnal sins are with the flesh. Therefore not only can there be pride and envy in the angels, but likewise sloth and avarice. Objection 3. Further, according to Gregory, Moral Poems 31, many vices spring from pride and in like manner from envy. But if the cause is granted, the effect follows. If therefore there can be pride and envy in the angels, for the same reason there can likewise be other vices in them. Augustine says, the city of God 14.3, that the devil, quote, is not a fornicator, nor a drunkard, nor anything of the like sort, yet he is proud and envious, end quote. I answer that sin can exist in a subject in two ways, first of all by actual guilt and secondly by affection. As to guilt, all sins are in the demons, since by leading men to sin they incur the guilt of all sins. But as to affection, only those sins can be in the demons which can belong to a spiritual nature. Now a spiritual nature cannot be affected by such pleasures as appertain to bodies, but only by such as are in keeping with spiritual things, because nothing is affected except with regard to something which is in some way suited to its nature. But there can be no sin when anyone is incited to good of the spiritual order, unless in such affection the rule of the superior be not kept, such is precisely the sin of pride, not to be subject to a superior when subjection is due. Consequently, the first sin of the angel can be none other than pride. Yet as a consequence it was possible for envy also to be in them, since for the appetite to tend to the desire of something involves on its part resistance to anything contrary. Now the envious man repines over the good possessed by another in as much as he deems his neighbor's good to be a hindrance to his own, but another's good could not be deemed a hindrance to the good coveted by the wicked angel, except in as much as he coveted a singular existence which would cease to be singular because of the excellence of some other. So after the sin of pride there followed the evil of envy in the sinning angel, whereby he grieved over man's good, and also over the divine excellence, according as against the devil's will God makes use of man for the divine glory. Reply Objection 1. The demons do not delight in the obscenities of the sins of the flesh as if they themselves were disposed to carnal pleasures. It is wholly through envy that they take pleasure in all sorts of human sins so far as these are hindrances to a man's good. Reply Objection 2. Avarice, considered as a special kind of sin, is the immoderate greed of temporal possessions which serve the use of human life and which can be estimated in value of money. To these demons are not at all inclined any more than they are to carnal pleasures. Consequently, avarice, properly so-called, cannot be in them. But if every immoderate greed of possessing any created good be termed avarice, in this way avarice is contained under the pride which is in the demons. Anger implies passion, and so does concupescence. Consequently, they can only exist metaphorically in the demons. Sloth is a kind of sadness whereby a man becomes sluggish in spiritual exercises because they weary the body which does not apply to the demons. So it is evident that pride and envy are the only spiritual sins which can be found in demons, yet so that envy is not to be taken for a passion, but for a will resisting the good of another. Reply Objection 3. Under envy and pride, as found in the demons, are comprised all other sins derived from them. 3rd Article 1. Question 63. Article 3. Whether the devil desired to be as God. Objection 1. It would seem that the devil did not desire to be as God. For what does not fall under apprehension does not fall under desire, because the good which is apprehended moves the appetite, whether sensible, rational, or intellectual. And sin consists only in such desire. But for any creature to be God's equal does not fall under apprehension, because it implies a contradiction. For if the finite equals the infinite, then it would itself be infinite, therefore an angel could not desire to be as God. Objection 2. Further, the natural end can always be desired without sin, but to be likened unto God is the end to which every creature naturally tends. If, therefore, the angel desired to be as God, not by equality, but by likeness, it would seem that he did not there by sin. Objection 3. Further, the angel was created with greater fullness of wisdom than man, but no man save a fool ever makes choice of being the equal of an angel, still less of God, because choice regards only things which are possible, regarding which one takes deliberation. Therefore much less did the angel sin by desiring to be as God. On the contrary, it is said in the person of the devil, Isaiah 14, 13, and 14, quote, I will ascend into heaven, I will be like the Most High, end quote. And Augustine, on eight questions from the Old Testament, 113, says that being, quote, inflated with pride, he wished to be called God, end quote. I answer that, without doubt the angel sinned by seeking to be as God, but this can be understood in two ways, first by equality, secondly by likeness. He could not seek to be as God in the first way, because by natural knowledge he knew that this was impossible, and there was no habit preceding his first sinful act, nor any passion fettering his mind, so as to lead him to choose what was impossible by failing in some particular, as sometimes happens in ourselves. And even supposing it were possible, it would be against the natural desire, because there exists in everything the natural desire of preserving its own nature, which would not be preserved were it to be changed into another nature. Consequently no creature of a lower order can ever covet the grade of a higher nature, just as an ass does not desire to be a horse. For were it to be so appraised, it would cease to be itself. But herein the imagination plays us false, for one is liable to think that, because a man seeks to occupy a higher grade as to accidentals, which can increase without the destruction of the subject, he can also seek a higher grade of nature, to which he could not attain without ceasing to exist. Now it is quite evident that God surpasses the angels, not merely in accidentals, but also in degree of nature, and one angel another. Consequently it is impossible for one angel of lower degree to desire equality with a higher, and still more to covet equality with God. To desire to be as God according to likeness can happen in two ways. In one way as to that likeness whereby everything is made to be likened unto God, and so if any one desire in this way to be Godlike, he commits no sin, provided that he desires such likeness in proper order, that is to say that he may obtain it of God. But he would sin were he to desire to be like unto God even in the right way, as of his own, and not of God's power. In another way one may desire to be like unto God in some respect which is not natural to one, as if one were to desire to create heaven and earth which is proper to God, in which desire there would be sin. It was in this way that the devil desired to be as God, not that he desired to resemble God by being subject to no one else absolutely, for so he would be desiring his own not being, since no creature can exist except by holding its existence under God. But he desired resemblance with God in this respect, by desiring as his last end of beatitude something which he could attain by the virtue of his own nature, turning his appetite away from supernatural beatitude which is attained by God's grace. Or if he desired as his last end that likeness of God which is bestowed by grace, he sought to have it by the power of his own nature, and not from divine assistance according to God's ordering. This harmonizes with Anselm's opinion, who says, on the fall of the devil four, that, quote, he sought that to which he would have come had he stood fast, end quote. These two views in a manner coincide, because according to both he sought to have final beatitude of his own power, whereas this is proper to God alone. Since then what exists of itself is the cause of what exists of another, it follows from this furthermore that he sought to have dominion over others wherein he also perversely wished to be like unto God. From this we have the answer to all the objections. Fourth article 1, question 63, article 4, whether any demons are naturally wicked. Objection 1, it would seem that some demons are naturally wicked, for Porphyry says, as quoted by Augustine, the city of God 10, 11, quote, There is a class of demons of crafty nature, pretending that they are gods and the souls of the dead, end quote. But to be deceitful is to be evil, therefore some demons are naturally wicked. Objection 2, further, as the angels are created by God, so are men, but some men are naturally wicked, of whom it is said, wisdom 12, 10, quote, their malice is natural, end quote. Therefore some angels may be naturally wicked. Objection 3, further, some irrational animals have wicked dispositions by nature, thus the fox is naturally sly, and the wolf naturally rapacious, yet they are God's creatures. Therefore, although the demons are God's creatures, they may be naturally wicked. On the contrary, Dionysius says, divine names four, that, quote, the demons are not naturally wicked, end quote. I answer that, everything which exists, so far as it exists and has a particular nature, tends naturally towards some good, since it comes from a good principle, because the effect always reverts to its principle. Now a particular good may happen to have some evil connected with it, thus fire has this evil connected with it, that it consumes other things. But with the universal good no evil can be connected. If then there be anything whose nature is inclined towards some particular good, it can tend naturally to some evil, not as evil but accidentally, as connected with some good. But if anything of its nature be inclined to good in general, then of its own nature it cannot be inclined to evil. Now it is manifest that every intellectual nature is inclined towards good in general, which it can apprehend in which is the object of the will. Hence, since the demons are intellectual substances, they can in no wise have a natural inclination towards any evil whatsoever. Consequently, they cannot be naturally evil. Reply Objection 1. Augustine rebukes Porphyry for saying that the demons are naturally deceitful, himself maintaining that they are not naturally so but of their own will. Now the reason why Porphyry held that they are naturally deceitful was that, as he contended, demons are animals with a sensitive nature. Now the sensitive nature is inclined towards some particular good, with which evil may be connected. In this way, then, it can have a natural inclination to evil, yet only accidentally, in as much as evil is connected with good. Reply Objection 2. The malice of some men can be called natural, either because of custom, which is a second nature, or on account of the natural proclivity on the part of the sensitive nature, to some inordinate passion, as some people are said to be naturally wrathful or lustful, but not on the part of the intellectual nature. Reply Objection 3. Brute beasts have a natural inclination in their sensitive nature towards certain particular goods, with which certain evils are connected. Thus the fox, in seeking its food, has a natural inclination to do so with a certain skill, coupled with deceit. Wherefore it is not evil in the fox to be sly, since it is natural to him, as it is not evil in the dog to be fierce, as Dionysius observes Divine Names 4. 5th Article 1, Question 63, Article 5. Whether the devil was wicked by the fault of his own will in the first instant of his creation? Objection 1. It would seem that the devil was wicked by the fault of his own will in the first instant of his creation, for it is said of the devil, John 8.44, He was a murderer from the beginning. Objection 2. Further, according to Augustine, the literal meaning of Genesis 1.15, the lack of form in the creature did not precede its formation in order of time, but merely in order of nature. Now according to him, the literal meaning of Genesis 2.8, the heaven, which is said to have been created in the beginning, signifies the angelic nature, while as yet not fully formed. And when it is said that God said, quote, be light made and light was made, end quote, we are to understand the full formation of the angel by turning to the word. Consequently the nature of the angel was created and light was made in the one instant. But at the same moment that light was made, it was made distinct from darkness, whereby the angels who sinned are denoted. Therefore in the first instant of their creation some of the angels were made blessed and some sinned. Objection 3. Further sin is opposed to merit, but some intellectual nature can merit in the first instant of its creation as the soul of Christ or also the good angels. Therefore the demons likewise could sin in the first instant of their creation. Objection 4. Further the angelic nature is more powerful than the corporeal nature, but a corporeal thing begins to have its operation in the first instant of its creation as fire begins to move upwards in the first instant it is produced. Therefore the angel could also have his operation in the first instant of his creation. Now this operation was either ordinate or inordinate. If ordinate, then since he had grace he thereby merited beatitude. But with the angels the reward follows immediately upon merit as was said above. Objection 5. Consequently they would have become blessed at once, and so would never have sinned, which is false. It remains then that they sinned by inordinate action in their first instant. On the contrary it is written, Genesis 1.31, God saw all the things that he had made, and they were very good. But among them were also the demons, therefore the demons were at some time good. I answer that. Some have maintained that the demons were wicked straight way in the first instant of their creation, not by their nature but by the sin of their own will, because as soon as he was made the devil refused righteousness. To this opinion, as Augustine says, the city of God, 11.13, if anyone subscribes he does not agree with those Manichaean heretics who say that the devil's nature is evil of itself. Since this opinion, however, is in contradiction with the authority of Scripture, for it is said of the devil under the figure of the Prince of Babylon, Isaiah 14.12, how art thou fallen, O Lucifer, who didst rise in the morning? And it is said to the devil in the person of the king of Tyre, Ezekiel 28.13, thou wasst in the pleasures of the paradise of God. Consequently, this opinion was reasonably rejected by the masters as erroneous. Since others have said that the angels in the first instant of their creation could have sinned but did not, yet this view also is repudiated by some, because when two operations follow one upon the other, it seems impossible for each operation to terminate in the one instant. Now it is clear that the angel's sin was an act subsequent to his creation, but the term of the creative act is the angel's very being, while the term of the sinful act is the being wicked. It seems then an impossibility for the angel to have been wicked in the first instant of his existence. This argument, however, does not satisfy, for it holds good only in such movements as are measured by time and take place successively. Thus if local movement allows a change, then the change and the local movement cannot be terminated in the same instant. But if the changes are instantaneous, then all at once and in the same instant, there can be a term to the first and the second change. Thus in the same instant in which the moon is lit up by the sun, the atmosphere is lit up by the moon. Now it is manifest that creation is instantaneous, so also is the movement of free will in the angels. For as has been already stated, they have no occasion for comparison or discursive reasoning. Question 58, Article 3. Consequently, there is nothing to hinder the term of creation and of free will from existing in the same instant. We must therefore reply that on the contrary it was impossible for the angel to sin in the first instant by an inordinate act of free will. For although a thing can begin to act in the first instant of its experience, nevertheless that operation which begins with the existence comes of the agent from which it drew its nature, just as upward movement in fire comes of its productive cause. Therefore, if there be anything which derives its nature from a defective cause, which can be the cause of a defective action, it can in the first instance of its existence have a defective operation, just as the leg, which is defective from birth through a defect in the principle of generation, begins at once to limp. But the agent which brought the angels into existence, namely God, cannot be the cause of sin. Consequently, it cannot be said that the devil was wicked in the first instant of his creation. Reply, Objection 1. As Augustine says, the city of God, 1115, when it is stated that, quote, the devil sins from the beginning, end quote, quote, he is not to be thought of as sinning from the beginning wherein he was created, but from the beginning of sin, end quote, that is to say, because he never went back from his sin. Reply, Objection 2. That distinction of light and darkness, whereby the sins of the demons are understood by the term darkness, must be taken as according to God's foreknowledge. Hence Augustine says, the city of God, 1115, that, quote, he alone could discern light and darkness, who also could foreknow before they fell those who would fall. Reply, Objection 3. All that is in merit is from God, and consequently an angel could merit in the first instant of his creation, the same reason does not hold good of sin, as has been said. Reply, Objection 4. God did not distinguish between the angels before the turning away of some of them, and the turning of others to himself, as Augustine says, the city of God, 1115. Therefore, as all were created in grace, all merited in their first instant, but some of them at once placed an impediment to their beatitude, thereby destroying their preceding merit, and consequently they were deprived of the beatitude which they had merited. 6th Article 1, Question 63, Article 6. Whether there was any interval between the creation and the fall of the angel. Objection 1. It would seem that there was some interval between the angel's creation and his fall, for it is said, Ezekiel 2815, quote, thou didst walk perfect. Vulget, quote, thou hast walked in the midst of the stones of fire, thou wast perfect, end quote. In thy ways from the day of thy creation until iniquity was found in thee, end quote. But since walking is continuous movement, it requires an interval. Therefore there was some interval between the devil's creation and his fall. Objection 2. Further, Origen says, first homily about Ezekiel, that, quote, the serpent of old did not from the first walk upon his breast and belly, end quote, which refers to his sin. Therefore the devil did not sin at once after the first instant of his creation. Objection 3. Further capability of sinning is common alike to man and angel, but there was some delay between man's formation and his sin. Therefore for the like reason there was some interval between the devil's formation and his sin. Objection 4. Further, the instant wherein the devil sinned was distinct from the instant wherein he was created, but there is a middle time between every two instance. Therefore there was an interval between his creation and his fall. On the contrary, it is said of the devil, John 844, quote, he stood not in the truth, end quote. As Augustine says, the city of God 1115, quote, we must understand this in the sense that he was in the truth, but did not remain in it, end quote. I answer that there is a twofold opinion on this point, but the more probable one, which is also more in harmony with the teachings of the saints, is that the devil sinned at once after the first instant of his creation. This must be maintained if it beheld that he elicited an act of free will in the first instant of his creation, and that he was created in grace, as we have said, question 62, article 3. For since the angels attained beatitude by one meritorious act, as was said above, question 62, article 5, if the devil created in grace, merited in the first instant, he would at once have received beatitude after that first instant, if he had not placed an impediment by sinning. If, however, it be contended that the angel was not created in grace, or that he could not elicit an act of free will in the first instant, then there is nothing to prevent some interval being interposed between his creation and fall. Reply Objection 1. Sometimes in Holy Scripture, spiritual instantaneous movements are represented by corporeal movements, which are measured by time. In this way, by walking, we are to understand the movement of free will tending towards good. Reply Objection 2. Origin says, quote, the serpent of old did not from the first walk upon his breast and belly, end quote, because of the first instant in which he was not wicked. Reply Objection 3. An angel has an inflexible free will after once choosing. Consequently, if after the first instant in which he had a natural movement to good, he had not at once placed a barrier to beatitude, he would have been confirmed in good. It is not so with man, and therefore the argument does not hold good. Reply Objection 4. It is true to say that there is a middle time between every two instants, so far as time is continuous, as it is proved, physics, six, text, two. Reply Objection 5. But in the angels who are not subject to the heavenly movement, which is primarily measured by continuous time, time is taken to mean the secession of their mental acts, or of their affections. Reply Objection 6. So the first instant in the angels is understood to respond to the operation of the angelic mind, whereby it introspects itself by its evening knowledge, because on the first day evening is mentioned, but not morning. This operation was good in them all. For such operations some of them were converted to the praise of the word by their morning knowledge, while others, absorbed in themselves, became night, quote, swelling up with pride, end quote, as Augustine says, the literal meaning of Genesis 4-24. Hence the first act was common to them all, but in their second they were separated. Consequently they were all of them good in the first instant, but in the second the good were set apart from the wicked. 7. 1. Question 63, Article 7. Whether the highest angel among those who sinned was the highest of all? Objection 1. It would seem that the highest among the angels who sinned was not the highest of all, for it is stated, Ezekiel 28-14, quote, thou wasst a cherub stretched out and protecting, and I set thee in the holy mountain of God, end quote. Now the order of the cherub is under the order of the seraphim, as Dionysius says, on the heavenly hierarchy 6-7. Therefore the highest angel among those who sinned was not the highest of all. Objection 2. Further God made intellectual nature, in order that it might attain to beatitude. If therefore the highest of the angels sinned, it follows that the divine ordinance was frustrated in the noblest creature which is unfitting. Objection 3. Further the more a subject is inclined towards anything, so much the less can it fall away from it, but the higher an angel is, so much the more is he inclined towards God. Therefore so much the less can he turn away from God by sinning, and so it seems that the angel who sinned was not the highest of all, but one of the lower angels. On the contrary, Gregory, homily 34, on the Gospels, says that the chief angel who sinned, quote, being set over all the hosts of angels, surpassed them in brightness, and was by comparison the most illustrious among them, end quote. I answer that two things have to be considered in sin, namely the proneness to sin and the motive for sinning. If then in the angels we consider the proneness to sin, it seems that the higher angels were less likely to sin than the lower. On this account Damocene says, on the Orthodox faith, too, that the highest of those who sinned was set over the terrestrial order. This opinion seems to agree with the view of the Platmists, which Augustine quotes, the city of God, seven, six and seven, ten, nine, ten and eleven. For they said that all the gods were good, whereas some of the demons were good and some bad, naming as gods the intellectual substances which are above the lunar sphere and calling by the name of demons the intellectual substances which are beneath it, yet higher than men in the order of nature. Nor is this opinion to be rejected as contrary to faith, because the whole corporeal creation is governed by God through the angels, as Augustine says, on the Trinity, three, four and five. Consequently there is nothing to prevent us from saying that the lower angels were divinely set aside for presiding over the lower bodies, the higher over the higher bodies, and the highest to stand before God. And in this sense Damocene says, on the Orthodox faith, too, that they who fell were of the lower grade of angels, yet in that order some of them remained good. But if the motive for sinning be considered, we find that it existed in the higher angels more than in the lower. For, as has been said, article two, the demon's sin was pride, and the motive of pride is excellence, which was greater in the higher spirits. Hence Gregory says that he who sinned was the very highest of all. This seems to be the more probable view, because the angels sinned did not come of any proneness, but of free choice alone. Consequently, that argument seems to have the more weight which is drawn from the motive in sinning. Yet this must not be prejudicial to the other view, because there might be some motive for sinning in him also who was the chief of the lower angels. Reply Objection One. Cherubim is interpreted, quote, fullness of knowledge, end quote, while Seraphim means, quote, those who are on fire, end quote, or, quote, who set on fire, end quote. Consequently Cherubim is derived from knowledge, which is compatible with mortal sin, but Seraphim is derived from the heat of charity, which is incompatible with mortal sin. Therefore the first angel who sinned is called not a Seraph, but a Cherub. Reply Objection Two. The divine intention is not frustrated either in those who sin or in those who are saved, for God knows beforehand the end of both, and He procures glory from both, saving these of His goodness and punishing those of His justice. But the intellectual creature, when it sins, falls away from its due end. Nor is this unfitting in any exalted creature, because the intellectual creature was so made by God that it lies within its own will to act for its end. Reply Objection Three. However great was the inclination towards good in the highest angel, there was no necessity imposed upon him. Consequently it was in his power not to follow it. 8. 1. 63. 8. Whether the sin of the highest angel was the cause of the other's sinning. Objection One. It would seem that the sin of the highest angel was not the cause of the other's sinning, for the cause precedes the effect, but as Damascene observes, on the Orthodox faith too, they all sinned at one time, therefore the sin of one was not the cause of the other's sinning. Objection Two. Further an angel's first sin can only be pride, as was shown above, Article Two, but pride seeks excellence. Now it is more contrary to excellence for anyone to be subject to an inferior than to a superior, and so it does not appear that the angel's sinned by desiring to be subject to a higher angel rather than to God. Yet the sin of one angel would have been the cause of the other's sinning if he had induced them to be his subjects, therefore it does not appear that the sin of the highest angel was the cause of the other's sinning. Objection Three. Further it is a greater sin to wish to be subject to another against God than to wish to be over another against God, because there is less motive for sinning. If therefore the sin of the foremost angel was the cause of the other's sinning, in that he induced them to subject themselves to him, then the lower angels would have sinned more deeply than the highest one, which is contrary to a gloss on Psalms 103, 26. Quote, this dragon which thou hast formed, he who was the more excellent than the rest in nature, became the greater in malice, end quote. Therefore the sin of the highest angel was not the cause of the other's sinning. On the contrary it is said, Revelation 12.4, that the dragon drew with him, quote, the third part of the stars of heaven, end quote. I answer that, the sin of the highest angel was the cause of the other's sinning, not as compelling them, but as inducing them by a kind of exhortation. A token thereof appears in this, that all the demons are subjects of that highest one, as is evident from our Lord's words. Quote, go, vulgate, quote, depart from me, end quote. You cursed into everlasting fire which was prepared for the devil and his angels, end quote, Matthew 2541. For the order of divine justice exacts that whosoever consents to another's evil suggestion shall be subjected to him in his punishment, according to 2 Peter 219, quote, by whom a man is overcome, of the same also is he the slave, end quote. Reply, Objection 1. Although the demons all sinned in the one instant, yet the sin of one could be the cause of the rest's sinning, for the angel needs no delay of time for choice, exhortation, or consent as man who requires deliberation in order to choose and consent, and vocal speech in order to exhort, both of which are the work of time. And it is evident that even man begins to speak in the very instant when he takes thought, and in the last instant of speech another who catches his meaning can ascent to what is said, as is especially evident with regard to primary concepts, quote, which everyone accepts directly they are heard, end quote, Boethius, on the heb demands. Taking away, then, the time for speech and deliberation which is required in us, in the same instant in which the highest angel expressed his affection by intelligible speech, it was possible for the others to consent there too. Reply, Objection 2. Other things being equal, the proud would rather be subject to a superior than to an inferior. Yet he chooses rather to be subject to an inferior than to a superior if he can procure an advantage under an inferior which he cannot under a superior. Consequently it was not against the demons' pride for them to wish to serve an inferior by yielding to his rule, for they wanted to have him as their prince and leader, so that they might attain their ultimate beatitude of their own natural powers, especially because in the order of nature they were even then subject to the highest angel. Reply, Objection 3. As was observed above, Question 62, Article 6, an angel has nothing in him to retard his action, and with his whole might he is moved to whatsoever he is moved, be it good or bad. Consequently, since the highest angel had greater natural energy than the lower angels, he fell into sin with intenser energy, and therefore he became the greater in malice. 9th Article 1, Question 63, Article 9. Whether those who sinned were as many as those who remained firm. Objection 1. It would seem that more angels sinned than stood firm. 4. As the philosopher says, Ethics 2. 6. Quote, Evil is in many, but good is in few. End quote. Objection 2. Further, justice and sin are to be found in the same way in men and in angels, but there are more wicked men to be found than good, according to Ecclesiastes 1.15. Quote, The number of fools is infinite. End quote. Therefore, for the same reason it is so with the angels. Objection 3. Further, the angels are distinguished according to persons and orders. Therefore, if more angelic persons stood firm, it would appear that those who sinned were not from all the orders. On the contrary, it is said, 4th Kings 6.16. Quote, There are more with us than with them. End quote. Which is expounded of the good angels who are with us to aid us, and the wicked spirits who are our foes. I answer that more angels stood firm than sinned, because sin is contrary to the natural inclination, while that which is against the natural order happens with less frequency, for nature procures its effect either always or more often than not. Reply Objection 1. The philosopher is speaking with regard to men, in whom evil comes to pass from seeking after sensible pleasures, which are known to most men, and from forsaking the good dictated by reason, which good is known to the few. In the angels, there is only an intellectual nature, hence the argument does not hold. And from this we have the answer to the second difficulty. Reply Objection 3. According to those who hold that the chief devil belonged to the lower order of the angels, who are set over earthly affairs, it is evident that some of every order did not fall but only those of the lowest order. According to those who maintain that the chief devil was of the highest order, it is probable that some fell of every order, just as men are taken up into every order to supply for the angelic ruin. In this view the liberty of free will is more established, which in every degree of creature can be turned to evil. In the sacred scripture, however, the names of some orders, as of seraphim and thrones, are not attributed to demons, since they are derived from the ardor of love and from God's indwelling, which are not consistent with mortal sin. Yet the names of cherubim, powers, and principalities are attributed to them, because these names are derived from knowledge and from power, which can be common to both good and bad. End of Question 63. Recording by Tony Russell. Question 64 of Summa Theologica, Pars Prima, On the Angels and on the Six Days. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Tony Russell. Summa Theologica, Pars Prima, On the Angels and on the Six Days by St. Thomas Aquinas. Translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Question 64. The Punishment of the Demons in Four Articles. It now remains as a sequel to deal with the punishment of the demons, under which heading there are four points of inquiry. 1. Of their darkness of intellect. 2. Of their obstinacy of will. 3. Of their grief. 4. Of their place of punishment. First Article 1. Question 64. Article 1. Whether the demon's intellect is darkened by privation of the knowledge of all truth. Objection 1. It would seem that the demon's intellect is darkened by being deprived of the knowledge of all truth. For if they knew any truth at all, they would most of all know themselves, which is to know separated substances. But this is not in keeping with their unhappiness, for this seems to belong to great happiness, in so much as that some writers have assigned a man's last happiness the knowledge of the separated substances. Therefore the demons are deprived of all knowledge of truth. Objection 2. Further, what is most manifest in its nature seems to be specially manifest in the Angels, whether good or bad, that the same is not manifest with regard to ourselves comes from the weakness of our intellect which draws its knowledge from phantasms, as it comes from the weakness of its eye that the owl cannot behold the light of the sun. But the demons cannot know God, who is most manifest of himself, because he is the sovereign truth, and this is because they are not clean of heart, whereby alone can God be seen. Therefore neither can they know other things. Objection 3. Further, according to Augustine, the literal meaning of Genesis 4.22, the proper knowledge of the Angels is twofold, namely morning and evening. But the demons have no morning knowledge because they do not see things in the Word, nor have they the evening knowledge because this evening knowledge refers the things known to the Creator's praise, hence after evening comes morning, Genesis 1. Therefore the demons can have no knowledge of things. Objection 4. Further, the Angels at their creation knew the mystery of the Kingdom of God, as Augustine says, the literal meaning of Genesis 5.19, the City of God 11. But the demons are deprived of such knowledge, quote, for if they had known it they would never have crucified the Lord of Glory, end quote, as is said 1 Corinthians 2.8. Therefore for the same reason they are deprived of all other knowledge of truth. Objection 5. Further, whatever truth anyone knows is known either naturally, as we know first principles, or by deriving it from someone else, as we know by learning, or by long experience as the things we learn by discovery. Now the demons cannot know the truth by their own nature because, as Augustine says, the City of God 11.33. The good Angels are separated from them as light is from darkness, and every manifestation is made through light, as is said Ephesians 5.13. In like manner they cannot learn by revelation, nor by learning from the good Angels, because, quote, there is no fellowship of light with darkness, vulgar what fellowship hath, end quote, 2 Corinthians 6.14. Nor can they learn by long experience, because experience comes of the senses, consequently there is no knowledge of truth in them. On the contrary Dionysius says, Divine Names 4, that, quote, certain gifts were bestowed upon the demons which, we say, have not been changed at all, but remain entire and most brilliant, end quote. Now the knowledge of truth stands among those natural gifts, consequently there is some knowledge of truth in them. I answer that, the knowledge of truth is twofold, one which comes of nature, and one which comes of grace. The knowledge which comes of grace is likewise twofold. The first is purely speculative, as when divine secrets are imparted to an individual, the other is effective, and produces love for God, which knowledge properly belongs to the gift of wisdom. Of these three kinds of knowledge the first was neither taken away, nor lessened in the demons, for it follows from the very nature of the Angel, who, according to his nature, is an intellect or mind. Since on account of the simplicity of his substance nothing can be withdrawn from his nature, so as to punish him by subtracting from his natural powers, as a man is punished by being deprived of a hand or a foot or of something else. Therefore Dionysius says, Divine Names 9, that the natural gifts remain entire in them, consequently their natural knowledge was not diminished. The second kind of knowledge, however, which comes of grace, and consists in speculation, has not been utterly taken away from them, but lessened, because of these divine secrets only so much is revealed to them as is necessary. And that is done either by means of the Angels, or, quote, through some temporal workings of divine power, end quote, as Augustine says, the City of God 9, 21. But not in the same degree as to the Holy Angels, to whom many more things are revealed and more fully in the word himself. But of the third knowledge, as likewise of charity, they are utterly deprived. Reply Objection 1 Happiness consists in self-application to something higher. The separated substances are above us in the order of nature. Hence man can have happiness of a kind by knowing the separated substances, although his perfect happiness consists in knowing the first substance, namely God. But it is quite natural for one separate substance to know another, as it is natural for us to know sensible natures. Hence a man's happiness does not consist in knowing sensible natures, so neither does the Angel's happiness consist in knowing separated substances. Reply Objection 2 What is most manifest in its nature is hidden from us by its surpassing the bounds of our intellect, and not merely because our intellect draws knowledge from phantasms. Now the divine substance surpasses the proportion not only of the human intellect, but even of the angelic. Consequently, not even an angel can of his own nature know God's substance. Yet on account of the perfection of his intellect, he can of his nature have a higher knowledge of God than man can have. Such knowledge of God remains also in the demons. Although they do not possess the purity which comes with grace, nevertheless they have purity of nature, and this suffices for the knowledge of God which belongs to them from their nature. Reply Objection 3 The creature is darkness in comparison with the excellence of the divine light, and therefore the creature's knowledge in its own nature is called evening knowledge. For the evening is akin to darkness, yet it possesses some light. But when the light fails utterly, then it is night. So then the knowledge of things in their own nature when referred to the praise of the creator, as it is in the good angels, has something of the divine light, and can be called evening knowledge. But if it be not referred to God, as is the case with the demons, it is not called evening, but nocturnal knowledge. Accordingly we read in Genesis 1.5 that the darkness which God separated from the light, quote, he called night, end quote. Reply Objection 4 All the angels had some knowledge from the very beginning respecting the mystery of God's kingdom, which found its completion in Christ, and most of all from the moment when they were beatified by the vision of the word, which vision the demons never had. Yet all the angels did not fully and equally apprehend it, hence the demons much less fully understood the mystery of the incarnation when Christ was in the world, for as Augustine observes the city of God 921, quote, it was not manifested to them as it was to the holy angels who enjoy a participated eternity of the word, but it was made known by some temporal effects so as to strike terror into them, end quote. For had they fully and certainly known that he was the Son of God and the effect of his passion, they would never have procured the crucifixion of the Lord of glory. Reply Objection 5 The demons know a truth in three ways, first of all by the subtlety of their nature, for although they are darkened by pervation of the light of grace, yet they are enlightened by the light of their intellectual nature. Secondly, by revelation from the holy angels, for while not agreeing with them in conformity of will, they do agree, nevertheless, by their likeness of intellectual nature, according to which they can accept what is manifested by others. Thirdly, they know by long experience not as deriving it from the senses, but when the similitude of their innate intelligible species is completed in individual things, they know some things as present which they previously did not know would come to pass, as we said when dealing with the knowledge of the angels. Second Article 1 Question 64 Article 2 Whether the will of the demons is obstinate in evil. Objection 1 It would seem that the will of the demons is not obstinate in evil, for liberty of will belongs to the nature of an intellectual being, which nature remains in the demons, as we said above. Article 1 But liberty of will is directly and firstly ordained to good rather than to evil, therefore the demon's will is not so obstinate in evil as not to be able to return to what is good. Objection 2 Further, since God's mercy is infinite, it is greater than the demon's malice, which is finite, but no one returns from the malice of sin to the goodness of justice, save through God's mercy. Therefore the demons can likewise return from their state of malice to the state of justice. Objection 3 Further, if the demons have a will obstinate in evil, then their will would be especially obstinate in the sin whereby they fell, but that sin, namely pride, is in them no longer, because the motive for the sin no longer endures, namely excellence, therefore the demon is not obstinate in malice. Objection 4 Further, Gregory says, moral poems, 4, that man can be reinstated by another, since he fell through another, but, as was observed already, Question 63, Article 8, the lower demons fell through the highest one, therefore their fall can be repaired by another, consequently they are not obstinate in malice. Objection 5 Further, whoever is obstinate in malice never performs any good work, but the demon performs some good works, for he confesses the truth, saying to Christ, quote, I know who thou art, the Holy One of God, end quote, Mark 1, 24, quote, the demons, end quote, also, quote, believe and tremble, end quote, James 2, 19, and Dionysius observes Divine Names 4, that, quote, they desire what is good and best, which is to be, to live, to understand, end quote, therefore they are not obstinate in malice. On the contrary, it is said, Psalms 73, 23, quote, the pride of them that hate thee, ascendeth continually, end quote, and this is understood of the demons, therefore they remain ever obstinate in their malice. I answer that, it was Origen's opinion, on 1st Principles 1, 6, that every will of the creature can, by reason of free will, be inclined to good and evil, with the exception of the soul of Christ on account of the union of the word. Such a statement deprives angels and saints of true beatitude, because everlasting stability is of the very nature of true beatitude, hence it is termed life everlasting. It is also contrary to the authority of sacred scripture, which declares that demons and wicked men shall be sent into everlasting punishment, and the good be brought into everlasting life. Consequently, such an opinion must be considered erroneous, while according to Catholic faith it must be held firmly both that the will of the good angels is confirmed in good and that the will of the demons is obstinate in evil. We must seek for the cause of this obstinacy, not in the gravity of the sin, but in the condition of their nature or state, for as Damascene says on the Orthodox faith, too, quote, death is to men what the fall is to angels, end quote. Now it is clear that all the mortal sins of men, grave or less grave, are pardonable before death, whereas after death they are without remission and endure forever. To find the cause then of this obstinacy, it must be borne in mind that the appetite of power is in all things proportions to the apprehensive whereby it is moved, as the movable by its mover. For the sensitive appetite seeks a particular good, while the will seeks the universal good, as was said above, question 59, article 1, as also the sense apprehends particular objects, while the intellect considers universals. Now the angel's apprehension differs from man's in this respect, that the angel by his intellect apprehends immovably, as we apprehend immovably first principles, are the object of the habit of intelligence, whereas man by his reason apprehends movably, passing from one consideration to another, and having the way open by which he may proceed to either of two opposites. Consequently, man's will adheres to a thing movably, and with the power of forsaking it and of clinging to the opposite, whereas the angel's will adheres fixedly and immovably. Therefore, if his will be considered before its adhesion, it can freely adhere either to this or to its opposite, namely in such things as he does not will naturally. But after he has once adhered, he clings immovably. So it is customary to say that man's free will is flexible to the opposite both before and after choice, but the angel's free will is flexible either opposite before the choice, but not after. Therefore the good angels who adhered to justice were confirmed therein, whereas the wicked ones sinning are obstinate in sin. Later on we shall treat of the obstinacy of men who are damned. Supplement Question 98, Articles 1 and 2. Reply Objection 1. The good and wicked angels have free will, but according to the manner and condition of their state, as has been said. Reply Objection 2. God's mercy delivers from sin those who repent, but such as are not capable of repenting, clinging immovably to sin, and are not delivered by the divine mercy. Reply 3. The devil's first sin still remains in him according to desire, although not as to his believing that he can obtain what he desired. Even so, if a man were to believe that he can commit murder and wills to commit it, and afterwards the power is taken from him, nevertheless the will to murder can stay with him, so that he would he had done it, or still would do it if he could. Reply Objection 4. The fact that man sinned from another's suggestion is not the whole cause of man's sin being pardonable, consequently the argument does not hold good. Reply Objection 5. A demon's act is twofold. One comes of deliberate will, and this is properly called his own act. Such an act on the demon's part is always wicked, because although at times he does something good, yet he does not do it well, as when he tells the truth in order to deceive, and when he believes and confesses, yet not willingly, but compelled by the evidence of things. Another kind of act is natural to the demon. This can be good, and bears witness to the goodness of nature. Yet he abuses such good acts to evil purpose. Third Article 1. Question 64. Article 3. Whether there is sorrow in the demons. Objection 1. It would seem that there is no sorrow in the demons, for since sorrow and joy are opposites, they cannot be together in the same subject. But there is joy in the demons, for Augustine, writing against the manatees, on Genesis, against the manatees, says, quote, the devil has power over them who despise God's commandments, and he rejoices over this sinister power, end quote. Therefore there is no sorrow in the demons. Objection 2. Further, sorrow is the cause of fear, for those things cause fear while they are future, which cause sorrow when they are present. There is no fear in the demons, according to Job 41-24, quote, who was made to fear no one, end quote. Therefore there is no grief in the demons. Objection 3. Further, it is a good thing to be sorry for evil. But the demons can do no good action, therefore they cannot be sorry, at least for the evil of sin, which applies to the worm of conscience. On the contrary, the demon's sin is greater than man's sin, but man is punished with sorrow on account of the pleasure taken in sin, according to Revelation 18-7, quote, as much as she had glorified herself and lived in delicacies, so much torment and sorrow give ye to her, end quote. Consequently, much more is the devil punished with the grief of sorrow because he especially glorified himself. I answer that fear, sorrow, joy, and the like, so far as they are passions, cannot exist in the demons, for thus they are proper to the sensitive appetite, which is a power in a corporeal organ. According, however, as they denote simple acts of the will, they can be in the demons, and it must be said that there is sorrow in them because sorrow, as denoting a simple act of the will, is nothing else than the resistance of the will to what is or to what is not. Now it is evident that the demons would wish many things not to be, which are, and others to be, which are not, for out of envy they would wish others to be damned, who are saved. Consequently, sorrow must be said to exist in them, and especially because it is of the very notion of punishment for it to be repugnant to the will. Moreover, they are deprived of happiness, which they desire naturally, and their wicked will is curbed in many respects. Reply Objection 1 Joy and sorrow about the same thing are opposites, but not about different things. Hence there is nothing to hinder a man from being sorry for one thing and joyful for another. Especially so far as sorrow and joy imply simple acts of the will, because not merely in different things, but even in one and the same thing, there can be something that we will and something that we will not. Reply Objection 2 As there is sorrow in the demons over present evil, so also there is fear of future evil. Now when it is said, he was made to fear no one. This is to be understood of the fear of God which restrains from sin, for it is written elsewhere that the devils believe and tremble. Reply Objection 3 To be sorry for the evil of sin on account of the sin bears witness to the goodness of the will to which the evil of sin is opposed. But to be sorry for the evil of punishment or for the evil of sin on account of the punishment bears witness to the goodness of nature to which the evil of punishment is opposed. Hence Augustine says, the city of God, 1913, that, quote, sorrow for good lost by punishment is the witness to a good nature, end quote. Consequently, since the demon has a perverse and obstinate will, he is not sorry for the evil of sin. Fourth Article 1 Question 64 Article 4 Whether our atmosphere is the demon's place of punishment. Objection 1 It would seem that this atmosphere is not the demon's place of punishment, for a demon is a spiritual nature. But a spiritual nature is not affected by place, for there is no place of punishment for demons. Objection 2 Further, man's sin is not graver than the demon's, but man's place of punishment is hell. Much more, therefore, is it the demon's place of punishment, and consequently not the darksome atmosphere. Objection 3 Further, the demons are punished with the pain of fire, but there is no fire in the darksome atmosphere. Therefore, the darksome atmosphere is not the place of punishment for the demons. On the contrary, Augustine says, the literal meaning of Genesis 3.10, that, quote, the darksome atmosphere is as a prison to the demons until the judgment day, end quote. I answer that the angels in their own nature stand midway between God and men. Now, the order of divine providence so disposes that it procures the welfare of the inferior orders through the superior. But man's welfare is disposed by divine providence in two ways. First of all, directly, when a man is brought unto good and withheld from evil, and this is fittingly done through the good angels. In another way, indirectly, as when anyone assailed is exercised by fighting against opposition. It was fitting for this procuring of man's welfare to be brought about through the wicked spirits, lest they should cease to be of service in the natural order. Consequently, a twofold place of punishment is due to the demons, one by reason of their sin, and this is hell, and another in order that they may tempt men, and thus the darksome atmosphere is their due place of punishment. Now the procuring of men's salvation is prolonged even to the judgment day. Consequently, the ministry of the angels in wrestling with demons endure until then. Hence, until then, the good angels are sent to us here, and the demons are in this dark atmosphere for our trial, although some of them are even now in hell to torment those whom they have led astray, just as some of the good angels are with the holy souls in heaven. But after the judgment day, all the wicked, both men and angels, will be in hell and the good in heaven. Reply Objection 1 A place is not penal to angel or soul as if affecting the nature by changing it, but as affecting the will by saddening it, because the angel or the soul apprehends that it is in a place not agreeable to its will. Reply Objection 2 One soul is not set over another in the order of nature as the demons are over men in the order of nature. Consequently, there is no parallel. Reply Objection 3 Some have maintained that the pain of sense for demons and souls is postponed until the judgment day, and that the beatitude of the saints is likewise postponed until the judgment day. But this is erroneous, in contrary to the teaching of the Apostle 2 Corinthians 5.1 Quote, If our earthly house of this habitation be dissolved, we have a house in heaven. Others again, while not admitting the same of souls, admit it as to demons. But it is better to say that the same judgment is passed upon wicked souls and wicked angels, even as on good souls and good angels. Consequently, it must be said that, although a heavenly place belongs to the glory of the angels, yet their glory is not lessened by their coming to us, for they consider that place to be their own, in the same way as we say that the bishop's honor is not lessened while he is not actually sitting on his throne. In like manner it must be said that although the demons are not actually bound within the fire of hell while they are in this dark atmosphere, nevertheless their punishment is none the less, because they know that such confinement is their due. Hence it is said in a gloss upon James 3.6, quote, They carry fire of hell with them wherever they go, end quote, nor is the contrary to what is said Luke 8.31, quote, They besought the Lord not to cast them into the abyss, end quote, for they asked for this, deeming it to be a punishment for them to be cast out of a place where they could injure men. Hence it is stated, quote, They, Vulget he, besought him that he would not expel them, Vulget him, out of the country, end quote, Mark 5.10. End of Question 64, Recording by Tony Russell. Question 65 of Summa Theologica Parse Prima on the Angels and on the Six Days. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Tony Russell. Summa Theologica Parse Prima on the Angels and on the Six Days by St. Thomas Aquinas. Translated by the fathers of the English Dominican province. Question 65, the work of creation of corporal creatures in four articles. From the consideration of spiritual creatures, we proceed to that of corporal creatures in the production of which, as Holy Scripture makes mention, three works are found. Namely, the work of creation, as given in the words, quote, In the beginning, God created heaven and earth, end quote. The work of distinction, as given in the words, quote, He divided the light from the darkness and the waters that are above the firmament from the waters that are under the firmament, end quote. And the work of adornment, expressed thus, quote, Let there be lights in the firmament, end quote. First, then we must consider the work of creation. Secondly, the work of distinction. And thirdly, the work of adornment. Under the first head, there are four points of inquiry. One, whether corporal creatures are from God. Two, whether they are created on account of God's goodness. Three, whether they were created by God through the medium of the angels. Four, whether the forms of bodies are from the angels or immediately from God. First article, one, question 65, article 1. Whether corporal creatures are from God. Objection one, it would seem that corporal creatures are not from God, for it is said, Ecclesiastes 3, 14, quote, I have learned that all the works that God hath made continue forever, end quote. But visible bodies do not continue forever, for it is said, 2 Corinthians 4, 18, quote, the things which are seen are temporal, but the things which are not seen are eternal, end quote. Therefore God did not make visible bodies. Objection two, further it is said, Genesis 1, 31, quote, God saw all things that he had made, and they were very good, end quote. But corporal creatures are evil, since we find them harmful in many ways, as may be seen in serpents, in the sun's heat, and other things. Now a thing is called evil in so far as it is harmful. Corporal creatures, therefore, are not from God. Objection three, further what is from God does not withdraw us from God, but leads us to him, but corporal creatures withdraw us from God. Hence the apostle, 2 Corinthians 4, 18, quote, while we look not at the things which are seen, end quote. Corporal creatures, therefore, are not from God. On the contrary, it is said, Psalms 145, 6, quote, who made heaven and earth, the sea, and all things that are in them, end quote. I answer that certain heretics maintain that visible things are not created by the good God, but by an evil principle, and a legend proof of their error, the words of the apostle, 2 Corinthians 4, 4, quote, the God of this world hath blinded the minds of unbelievers, end quote. But this position is altogether untenable, for if things that defer agree in some point, there must be some cause for that agreement, since things diverse in nature cannot be united of themselves. Hence whenever in different things, some one thing common to all is found. It must be that these different things receive that one thing from some one cause, as different bodies that are hot receive their heat from fire. But being is found to be common to all things, however otherwise different. There must, therefore, be one principle of being from which all things in whatever way existing have their being, whether they are invisible and spiritual, or visible and corporeal. But the devil is called the God of this world, not as having created it, but because worldlings serve him, of whom also the apostle says, speaking in the same sense, quote, whose God is their belly, end quote. Reply Objection 1 All the creatures of God in some respects continue forever, at least as to matter, since what is created will never be annihilated, even though it be corruptible. And the nearer a creature approaches God, who is immovable, the more it also is immovable. For corruptible creatures endure forever as regards their matter, though they change as regards their substantial form. But incorruptible creatures endure with respect to their substance, though they are mutable in other respects, such as place, for instance, the heavenly bodies, or the affections, as spiritual creatures. But the apostles' words, quote, the things which are seen are temporal, end quote. Though true, even as regards such things considered in themselves, insofar as every visible creature is subject to time, either as to being or as to movement, are intended to apply to visible things insofar as they are offered to man as rewards. For such rewards, as consist in these visible things, are temporal, while those that are invisible endure forever. Hence, he said before, 2 Corinthians 4, 17, quote, it worketh for us an eternal weight of glory, end quote. Reply Objection 2. Corporal creatures according to their nature are good, though this good is not universal, but partial and limited, the consequence of which is a certain opposition of contrary qualities, though each quality is good in itself. To those, however, who estimate things, not by the nature thereof, but by the good they themselves can derive therefrom, everything which is harmful to themselves seems simply evil. For they do not reflect that what is in some way injurious to one person to another is beneficial, and that even to themselves the same thing may be evil in some respects, but good in others. And this could not be if bodies were essentially evil and harmful. Reply Objection 3. Creatures of themselves do not withdraw us from God, but lead us to Him, for, quote, the invisible things of God are clearly seen being understood by the things that are made, end quote. Romans 1, 20. If then they withdraw men from God, it is the fault of those who use them foolishly. Thus it is said, wisdom, 14, 11, quote, creatures are turned into a snare to the feet of the unwise, end quote. And the very fact that they can thus withdraw us from God proves that they came from Him, for they cannot lead the foolish away from God except by the allurements of some good that they have from Him. Second Article 1, Question 65, Article 2. Whether corporal things were made on account of God's goodness. Objection 1. It would seem that corporal creatures were not made on account of God's goodness, for it is said, Wisdom, 1, 14, that God, quote, created all things that they might be, end quote. Therefore all things were created for their own being's sake and not on account of God's goodness. Objection 2. Further, good has the nature of an end. Therefore the greater good in things is the end of the lesser good. But spiritual creatures are related to corporal creatures, as the greater good to the lesser. Corporal creatures, therefore, are created for the sake of spiritual creatures and not on account of God's goodness. Objection 3. Further, justice does not give unequal things except to the unequal. Now God is just, therefore, inequality not created by God must precede all inequality created by Him. But an inequality not created by God can only arise from free will, and consequently, all inequality results from the different movements of free will. Now, corporal creatures are unequal to spiritual creatures. Therefore the former were made on account of movements of free will and not on account of God's goodness. On the contrary, it is said, Proverbs 16, 4, quote, the Lord hath made all things for Himself, end quote. I answer that. Origen laid down, on first principles, too, that corporal creatures were not made according to God's original purpose, but in punishment of the sin of spiritual creatures, for he maintained that God in the beginning made spiritual creatures only and all of equal nature, but that of these by the use of free will some turned to God, and according to the measure of their conversion were given a higher or a lower rank, retaining their simplicity, while others turned from God, and became bound to different kinds of bodies according to the degree of their turning away. But this position is erroneous in the first place because it is contrary to Scripture, and after narrating the production of each kind of corporal creatures, subjoins, quote, God saw that it was good, end quote. Genesis 1. As if to say that everything was brought into being for the reason that it was good for it to be, but according to Origen's opinion the corporal creature was made not because it was good that it should be, but that the evil in another might be punished. Secondly, because it would follow that the arrangement which now exists of the corporal world would arise from mere chance, for if the son's body was made what it is, that it might serve for a punishment suitable to some sin of a spiritual creature, it would follow if other spiritual creatures had sinned in the same way as the one to punish whom the son had been created, that many sons would exist in the world, and so of other things. But such a consequence is altogether inadmissible. Hence we must set aside this theory as false and consider that the entire universe is constituted by all creatures as a whole consists of its parts. Now if we wish to assign an end to any whole, and to the parts of that whole, we shall find first that each and every part exists for the sake of its proper act as the eye for the act of sin, secondly that less honorable parts exist for the more honorable, as the senses for the intellect, the lungs for the heart, and thirdly that all parts are for the perfection of the whole as the matter for the form since the parts are, as it were, the matter of the whole. Furthermore the whole man is on account of an extrinsic end, that end being the fruition of God, so therefore in the parts of the universe also every creature exists for its own proper act in perfection and the less noble for the nobler, as those creatures that are less noble than man exist for the sake of man, whilst each and every creature exists for the perfection of the entire universe. Furthermore the entire universe with all its parts is ordained towards God as its end in as much as it imitates as it were and shows forth the divine goodness to the glory of God. Reasonable creatures, however, have in some special and higher manner God as their end since they can attain to Him by their own operations, by knowing and loving Him. Thus it is plain that the divine goodness is the end of all corporeal things. Reply Objection 1. In the very fact of any creature possessing being it represents the divine being and its goodness and therefore that God created all things that they might have being does not exclude that He created them for His own goodness. Reply Objection 2. The proximate end does not exclude the ultimate end therefore that corporeal creatures were in a manner made for the sake of the spiritual does not prevent their being made on account of God's goodness. Reply Objection 3. Equality of justice has its place in retribution since equal rewards or punishments are due to equal merit or demerit. But this does not apply to things as at first instituted for just as an architect without injustice places stones of the same kind in different parts of a building not on account of any antecedent difference in the stones but with a view to securing that perfection of the entire building which could not be obtained except by the different positions of the stones even so God from the beginning to secure perfection in the universe has set therein creatures of various and unequal natures according to His wisdom and without injustice since no diversity of merit is presupposed. Third Article 1. Question 65. Article 3. Whether corporeal creatures were produced by God through the medium of the angels. Objection 1. It would seem that corporeal creatures were produced by God through the medium of the angels for as all things are governed by the divine wisdom so by it were all things made according to Psalms 103-24. Quote, Thou hast made all things in wisdom. But, quote, it belongs to wisdom to ordain, end quote, as stated in the beginning of the metaphysics. 1, 2. Hence in the government of things the lower is ruled by the higher in a certain fitting order as Augustine says on the Trinity 3, 4. Therefore in the production of things it was ordained that the corporeal should be produced by the spiritual as the lower by the higher. Objection 2. Further, diversity of effects shows diversity of causes since like always produces like. If then all creatures, both spiritual and corporeal, were produced immediately by God there would be no diversity in creatures for one would not be further removed from God than another. But this is clearly false for the philosopher says that some things are corruptible because they are far removed from God on generation and corruption 2, text 59. Objection 3. Further, infinite power is not required to produce a finite effect. But every corporeal thing is finite. Therefore it could be and was produced by the finite power of spiritual creatures for in such like beings there is no distinction between what is and what is possible especially as no dignity befitting a nature is denied to that nature unless it be in punishment of a fault. On the contrary, it is said Genesis 1.1 quote in the beginning God created heaven and earth end quote by which are understood corporeal creatures these therefore were produced immediately by God. I answer that some have maintained that creatures proceeded from God by degrees in such a way that the first creature proceeded from him immediately and in its turn produced another and so on until the production of corporeal creatures. But this position is untenable since the first production of corporeal creatures is by creation by which matter itself is produced for in the act of coming into being the imperfect must be made before the perfect and it is impossible that anything should be created saved by God alone. In proof whereof it must be born in mind that the higher the cause the more numerous the objects to which its causation extends. Now the underlying principle in things is always more universal than that which informs and restricts it. Thus being is more universal than living. Living than understanding matter than form. The more widely then one thing underlies others the more directly does that thing proceed from a higher cause. Thus the thing that underlies primarily all things belongs properly to the causality of the supreme cause. Therefore no secondary cause can produce anything unless there is presupposed in the thing produced something that is caused by a higher cause. But creation is the production of a thing in its entire substance nothing being presupposed either uncreated or created hence it remains that nothing can create except God alone who is the first cause. Therefore in order to show that all bodies were created immediately by God Moses said quote in the beginning God created heaven and earth end quote. Reply objection one in the production of things an order exists but not such that one creature is created by another for that is impossible but rather such that by the divine wisdom diverse grades are constituted in creatures. Reply objection two God himself though one has knowledge of many in different things without detriment to the simplicity of his nature as has been shown above question fifteen article two so that by his wisdom he is the cause of diverse things as known by him even as an artificer by apprehending diverse forms produces diverse works of art. Reply objection three the amount of the power of an agent is measured not only by the thing made but also by the manner of making it for one in the same thing is made in one way by a higher power in another by a lower but the production of finite things where nothing is presupposed as existing is the work of infinite power and as such can belong to no creature. Fourth article one question sixty five article four whether the forms of bodies are from the angels. Objection one it would seem that the forms of bodies come from the angels for Boethius says in the trinity one quote from forms that are without matter come the forms that are in matter end quote but forms that are without matter are spiritual substances and forms that are in matter are the forms of bodies therefore the forms of bodies are from spiritual substances. Objection two further all that is such by participation is reduced to that which is such by its essence but spiritual substances are forms essentially whereas corporeal creatures have forms by participation therefore the forms of corporeal things are derived from spiritual substances. Objection three further spiritual substances have more power of causation than the heavenly bodies but the heavenly bodies give form to things here below for which reason they are said to cause generation and corruption much more therefore are material forms derived from spiritual substances. On the contrary Augustine says on the trinity three eight quote we must not suppose that this corporeal matter serves the angels at their nod rather that it obeys God thus end quote but corporeal matter may be said thus to serve that from which it receives its form corporeal forms then are not from the angels but from God. I answer that it was the opinion of some that all corporeal forms are derived from spiritual substances which we call the angels and there are two ways in which for Plato held that the forms of corporeal matter are derived from and formed by forms immaterially subsisting by a kind of participation. Thus he held that there exists an immaterial man and an immaterial horse and so forth and that from such the individual sensible things that we see are constituted in so far as in corporeal matter provides the impression received from these separate forms by a kind of assimilation or as he calls it participation Phido 49 and according to the Platonists the order of forms corresponds to the order of those separate substances for example that there is a single separate substance which is horse and the cause of all horses whilst above this is separate life or per se life as they term it which is the cause of all life and that above this again is that which they call being itself which is the cause of all being Avicenna however and certain others have maintained that the forms of corporeal things do not subsist per se in matter but in the intellect only thus they say that from forms existing in the intellect of spiritual creatures called intelligences by them but angels by us precede all the forms of corporeal matter as the form of his handiwork precedes from the forms in the mind of the craftsman this theory seems to be the same as that of certain heretics of modern times who say that God indeed created all things but that the devil formed corporeal matter and differentiated it into species but all these opinions seem to have a common origin they all in fact sought for a cause of forms as though the form were of itself brought into being whereas as Aristotle metaphysics 7 text 26 27 28 proves what is properly speaking made is the composite now such are the forms of corruptible things that at one time they exist and at another exist not without being themselves generated or corrupted but by reason of the generation or corruption of the composite since even forms have not been but composites have been through forms for according to a things mode of being is the mode in which it is brought into being since then like is produced from like we must not look for the cause of corporeal forms in any immaterial form but in something that is composite as this fire is generated by that fire corporeal forms therefore are caused not as emanations from some immaterial form but by matter being brought from potentiality into act by some composite agent but since the composite agent which is a body is moved by a created spiritual substance as Augustine says on the Trinity 3 4 5 it follows further that even corporeal forms are derived from spiritual substances not emanating from them but as the term of their movement and further still the species of the angelic intellect which are as it were the seminal types of corporeal forms must be referred to God as the first cause but in the first production of corporeal creatures no transmutation from potentiality to act can have taken place and accordingly the corporeal forms that bodies had when first produced came immediately from God whose bidding alone matter has its own proper cause to signify this Moses prefaces each work with the words God said let this thing be or that to denote the formation of all things by the word of God from whom according to Augustine first tractate on the Gospel of John and the literal meaning of Genesis one four is quote all form and fitness and concord of parts reply objection one by immaterial forms Boethius understands the types of things in the mind of God thus the apostle says Hebrews 11 3 quote by faith we understand that the world was framed by the word of God that from invisible things might be made but if by immaterial forms he understands the angels we say that from them come material forms not by emanation but by motion reply objection two forms received into matter are to be referred not to self-subsisting forms of the same type as the Platonists held but either to intelligible forms of the angelic intellect from which they proceed by movement or still higher to the types in the divine intellect by which the seeds of forms are implanted in created things that they may be able to be brought by movement into act reply objection three the heavenly bodies inform earthly ones by movement not by emanation end of question 65 recording by Tony Russell