 So, Francis, Guruji, we're hoping on you to bring back something a little positive to that. I mean, I don't want to, you know, fly away scared out of my mind. Can we make, I mean, we definitely understand there are a lot of risks, there's a question of trust. Is it possible to, we definitely need to find new forms of governance. The idea of putting networked intelligence together is kind of, I mean, it gives me a little hope. What do you make of it, Mr. Guruji? Well, thank you very much, Virginie and ladies and gentlemen, colleagues. Thank you also to Thierry de Montbrillard for this invitation. Look, I'm not going to be such an optimist. I'm afraid. Oh, well. But nor a pessimist, necessarily. But I'll focus more on the problem than the solution because I think we can't design the solution until such time as we have a thorough understanding of the problem and we're getting there, I think, but I'm not sure we're completely there. Now, I would say as far as the impact of the connected world on global governance is concerned, well, the greater the connection, the greater the dependence that is created and the greater the dependence, the greater the vulnerability and risk. And so I think we've seen that and it's been described on the panel this morning by many persons. We see it the risk to privacy, which is playing out in the policy discussions and the governance discussions on the protection of personal data. The risk to business assets, it's playing out in terms of how we deal with espionage, cyber espionage, the risk to the integrity of data, which is playing out in the fake news area, the risk to security, which is playing out in the cyber warfare area. So I think that something we can say about these risks is that they are qualitatively different from the risks of the past. And they're qualitatively different for several reasons. First of all, because they are international in character. And that's just an obvious thing, of course. But it's not the case with risk frameworks of the past necessarily. So the second is that they are occurring at an accelerated speed. And that has been mentioned again by others. And the third is, I think, that they're very radical. And that's, I think, a product of the accumulation of knowledge. I mean, Sherlock Holmes says in one of his books, knowledge begets knowledge as money bears interest. And that's what's happening, of course, with the degree of knowledge in the world. Now, our institutions, I think, were designed for a completely different risk framework than from these risk frameworks. And if you think in terms, since we've been speaking about cities, if you think in terms of the walls of a city, a walled city, is one governance response to the sort of risks that were out there. Now, we have a completely qualitatively different sort of risks that we are confronting. And that is causing, I think, radical disruption in the efficiency and the efficacy of our governance institutions, because they were designed for something else, frankly. And we can see that in many different ways. I'll give you one example, which comes out of the nature. I mentioned three things which differentiate risks these days in the connected world. One of them is speed. And coming out of that, of course, we find ourselves confronted with a series of situations which our institutions have not had the time to reflect upon and consider. So for as long as we live in a world in which you can do anything except that which is expressly prohibited, as opposed to a world in which you can only do that which is permitted and I'm not advocating a change, but for as long as we live in that sort of a context, then science and technology, particularly with the speed and with the accumulation, are going to be way out in front of our institutions that were designed for dealing with different nature, different risks, different risk frameworks. And there are many examples, but I think the effect of it is that governance is reverting increasingly to the market and technology or if you like in order, it's reverting increasingly to technology, which is actually determining social directions or the direction of society and business models built by the market upon that basis. Nothing to do with governments. And you can see this in anything from relatively trivial examples to major, major examples. It's just I can give you one from my field very, very briefly, which is music. So in the last 20 years, there has been a revolution, of course, in the production, the distribution, and the consumption of music. Everything has changed. Now, we have reached a situation in which in the last two years, for the first time in 20 years, the size of the music industry worldwide has grown as opposed to reduced. And digital sizes, digital market sales, rather, are increasing. That situation was produced by the market, not by governments. And I'm saying that as someone whose job is to suppose to get international cooperation around solutions for this sort of a situation. It's been produced by different and accessible, more accessible business models. So we have a situation in which a lot of governance and a lot of social direction is being set by the market and technology, regardless of ideologies, just as a consequence of the speed and the radical nature of technologies. And when you come to the international solution to that, since one of the features of the new risk framework is that these risks are international, of course, it's much worse than at the national level. It's much slower than at the national level. But we have, of course, international problems or risks if you like. And in addition, at the international level, I think one of the things, and this comes back to a bit towards one of the things that points at Toby was making where I'm not sure I'm in total agreement with him. What we see at the international level is that these areas of risk are also the areas of competition. So let me give you the example of Ebola and the World Health Organization. Now, it's relatively easy in the World Health Organization, relatively easy to get a unity of purpose about the suppression of Ebola because everyone's interests are the same. We all want to suppress it for different reasons. That's not the case in science and technology because it's the center of competition between countries. And this is a newer feature because it wasn't always so much the center, although I'd argue it's often been near the center. So that's one thing. And secondly, it's also the center of difference. It's the center of disparities. The great disparities in the world are produced by technological differences in technological capacity. So we face a situation which is a perfect storm in many respects. New risks, different nature, they're stressing and disrupting our governance institutions that we've known because they were designed for walled cities or just taking an extreme example, different situations. And difficult to move forward because this is also the area where we have huge differences and the area of competition. So I would say if I may just make one or two small points, other points. These two factors, that is that science and technology are really the basis of competition and they're also the basis of the hugest, the biggest disparities. This is producing a situation in which I think it's a contribution to the movements that we see towards unilateralism as a policy posture rather than multilateralism. Because if you're going to be competing, you go to your national basis to compete. So they're contributing also to these movements we're seeing towards national approaches, unilateral approaches as opposed to multilateral approaches. But on the other hand, it's also the case that because of interconnection that the first mover provided it has scale is going to be determining the global rule. And I think that we see from, I think it was Patrick who mentioned the GDPR, the General Data Protection Regulation. So the European Union has moved first and the scale of the European Union is such that the whole world has to comply with it. Now it might be different if some small country in Ireland state introduces the regulation, but when it's the European Union. And furthermore, there is a growing pressure which we've seen over the last couple of days with Tim Cook, for example, from Apple, speaking out and saying, well, the United States needs to develop a regulatory framework also for the protection of personal data, plus the social movements on the internet all produce a situation in which influence is being exercised in a different way and is being exercised by the first mover. And I'm not saying that the EU deliberately chose to do that, but that's the impact these days of an absence of multilateral, a reversion for lots of reasons to unilateral approaches. But we will also see that first moves are made by China and first moves, of course, are made by the United States of America despite its non-regulatory culture. So this produces a situation which I don't think is very optimistic for risk management in where we have a completely new set of risks to deal with. So in conclusion, I would say we really have to rethink our governance models, really radically rethink our governance models to deal with new forms of risk. Thank you very much, Frances. I'd like to try something here. First, I'm going to try to summarize quickly what I think is the three solutions of governance you're proposing. And I'd like you to vote on it and see what is the one that appeals best to you. So if I go to you, Frances, you're really the liberal one. That's the guys doing the new technology. They're going to find the way, the scale to put out the good answers. I'm not sure why, but because at least they'll have the power to implement at some point. You say the risks are super important. We need some kind of a new government body. You're much more confident in multilateralism is a hard word for me to say. Multilateralism than Frances Gehry is. And you, I think, have a very different approach because it's none of those two. Let's take the intelligence where it is on the network. Let's try something really different. It's provide governance within the network with the intelligence we have here. So we have something very spread out with taking the best of what we can provide eventually. Let's say it's A, it's you, Toby. B, Mr. Nicolet, which is let's try to put some sense, organize it the way we know how to do it. And basically it's a super body with new laws and try to stop the risks. And C would be you, Frances. Well, I described more than endorsed. OK, so it's not yours. But the description of Mr. Gehry's, which would be coming out from the actors. So let's say, what do you think is the most likely to happen if you don't mind helping me out here? But do you think Toby is on the right path? Do you think Mr. Nicolet, and I'll let's start with Toby, do people believe that there's intelligence in the network and we can use it for governance? Does anybody think that here? There's one, two, three, four, five. OK, so let's say 10 to be generous. Now let's go to Mr. Nicolet. So rather more classical solution, probably better organized, easier for us to apprehend. A new super governing butt. So I see one here. OK, we're a little more comfortable with your solution. 20. Well, you can have somebody here. If I apply the same rule, it's 20. OK, yeah, apparently it's the good one. And last, what Francis just described, who agrees with his description of the world? And the analogy was music was interesting, how this whole business changed and evolved and set its new rules.