 We're going to move very swiftly. I'd like to invite our panelists to our first panel forward and being very mindful of the time. Swabaki, you mentioned about having wise men, wise women, this expertise. If I were to develop a dream panel of thinking my way about this issue from a Western European context, I would construct this panel. So we're in for a great treat. Let me introduce some very quickly that I want to jump right into substance here. I'm barely going to let them have a seat as I'm going to introduce you. Is that okay? Can I be that? Can I rush you that much? Beginning immediately to my left, Angela Stent is the Director of the Center for Eurasia, Russia and East European Studies at Georgetown University. She also serves as a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. From 2004 to 2006, Angela was the National Intelligence Officer for Russia and Eurasia at the National Intelligence Council. And prior to this, she had served in the Office of Policy Planning at the Department of State. She is one of the foremost experts on that triangular political relationship between the United States, Russia and Europe, as Minister Rothfeld had mentioned, and has a book coming out. But maybe you'd like to talk a little bit about that. Here, Angela concludes her remarks. We're going to shoot right down to James Scher, Associate Fellow in the Russia and Eurasia Program at Chatham House in London, an extremely distinguished service as Chatham House, formerly the Director of the Russia and Eurasia Program. He has served as a recent member of the Social Studies faculty at Oxford University. Also has a book coming out and has spent an enormous amount of time focusing on Ukraine, Russia, particularly on the defense and the security sector. And then we move on to Cornelius Ackman of the Bertelsmann Stiftung in Germany. Cornelius, really one of the leading European experts on the EU policy towards Russia and what we call the Eastern Partnership countries, has spent an enormous amount of time focusing on understanding the institutional relationship there. And we look forward to his comments, and last but not least, playing clean up, batter clean up here. Use of baseball analogy, Ambassador Kurt Volcker, Executive Director of the McCain Institute for International Leadership, prior to his service, served as the U.S. Ambassador to NATO in 2008-2009. It would take me a long time to work through Kurt's resume of distinguished service on many think tanks and boards and a great colleague. And I thank all four of you for being with us today. And Minister Rotfeld's a tough act to follow, Angela, but I'm going to give you the baton to see if you can do it. Thank you all for being with us. Stay here. We will stand up there. Whatever you prefer to do. Would you like to stand? Perfect. Thank you very much for that generous introduction. Thank you for inviting me to speak here. Minister Rotfeld is indeed a very difficult act to follow, and I really enjoyed listening to your conceptual talk. I would just add that a couple of years ago, I organized a conference at Georgetown where we compared Polish-German reconciliation with Polish-Russian reconciliation, many of the themes you've already heard, but one thing, of course, came through loud and clear. Germany was willing, when it started this process, to undergo and to engage in what the Germans call Vergangenheitsbewältigung, which is confronting and overcoming your past and admitting your guilt. And that was a very important part in admitting responsibility for what Germany did to Poland. Obviously, in the process of Russian-Polish reconciliation, the Russians also need to confront what they did, admit responsibility and move on. And this is obviously a much more complicated process, as you've heard. And the education, I think, is key to that. And I would just say, I'm very glad that your whole project is focusing so much on education because my experience of teaching at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations, albeit before this process really got underway, was that those students needed to understand much more about the realities of what the Soviet Union really did before, during and after World War II to deal with this. I would also like to recognize that there clearly has been progress in Polish-Russian relations, all of the excellent things that Professor Rotfeldt and academician Tarkunov's commission is doing. I'm going to present you with a somewhat more sober view today because what I'm going to do is to situate what's happening currently within the kind of trajectory of the US-Russian relationship and Russian-EU relations. And then I'm going to come back briefly to the Polish-Russian relationship because we do have European colleagues here and obviously we're going to get to more of the specifics here. And so I would just start with the US-Russian relationship again where I would place the context of what Russia is doing at the moment is likely to do maybe for the next couple of years. So this is a very limited partnership, it's an ad hoc partnership. I've just finished a book on US-Russian relations which you kindly mentioned and I've counted at least four resets in the last 20 years. You have different administrations, irrespective Republican-Democratic doesn't really matter. Coming into power, raising expectations, really hoping to have a qualitative improvement in relations with Russia and most of them have ended in disappointment. It's I'm not going to judge the longer-term trajectory of the Obama administration yet because there have been some successes, the new start agreement cooperation on Afghanistan, on Iran, Russia joining the WTO. Of course the two major remaining issues, one of them is missile defense and I will come back to that briefly because clearly Poland is very important here and the other one of course is Syria where there seems to be an impossibility really of coming to any agreement on that. But so that has been really the US-Russian trajectory. Now the other thing is that the US certainly under the Obama administration pursued a policy if you like a pragmatic, interest-based policy, specifically saying we're not going to link our foreign relations, our agreements to what's happening domestically inside Russia. We're going to separate this. We're not going to talk about values. And that worked pretty well till the fall of 2011 and until the demonstrators went out on the Balotnaya and they protested the Duma elections and then after Mr. Putin was re-elected the presidential elections. And that's when Mr. Putin himself tied the US-Russian relationship to what was happening domestically in Russia, blaming the United States, you know, Hillary Clinton for paying the demonstrators and he has continued to appeal to this kind of anti-American sentiment domestically. That appeals certainly to his supporters who are the working-class provincial voters in Russia. And so on the other hand he said that he's quite willing to engage in more pragmatic partnership with the US. He would like to have more US investment in Russia. And so where we are now, if you like, in the US-Russian relationship is we're sort of at a plateau. I mean maybe things might improve this year. We've got two presidential meetings envisaged. But where I think the Russians would still like vis-a-vis the US to have what one of my Russian colleagues has called an equal partnership of unequals. And that's what they're still trying to sort of push towards. And certainly to, if you're talking about overcoming the past, to definitively reject the legacy of the 1990s where Russia, in their view, was treated unfairly by the United States, was not given enough respect to show that they're over that. So this is a relationship I would say at the moment of modest expectations. And I think the other point is that Putin and those around him, I think, believe that the United States is a power in decline. They believe that they don't really need very much from the United States. And I think the US has minimum leverage with Russia. And so again, that is in the context in which we see these relations developing. And I would remind you that the Obama administration has twice changed, modified its missile defense plans, specifically vis-a-vis Poland, deployments in Poland to which, or potential deployments to which the Russians objected. And the last one, which was the announcement that the phase four now isn't going to be implemented because of North Korea, has elicited extremely modest reactions from the Russians and really not very encouraging at all. Let me just say a word now about the Russian-EU relationship. A few weeks ago, I participated in a conference with a number of EU colleagues, including Poles, to talk about this. And what was quite interesting was there was very little difference of views between Europeans, both West, Central Europeans, whatever, and Americans on what was happening in Russia, on the state of relations with Russia. We were really very much in agreement. Now, of course, we recognize in the US that Europe is fated to continually engage in a dialogue with Russia to try and improve it for history, for geography, because of energy and economics for all the reasons that we all know. But I think there was certainly a feeling that this partnership for modernization, which a number of EU countries really thought would, again, bring qualitative change to the relationship that that didn't produce very much, that, again, a pragmatic interest-based policy, which the EU also was pursuing, also didn't produce that much. And that there's a kind of plateau now, obviously, in relations between the European Union in general and Russia, and that, of course, Russia has been affected by the euro crisis. We know what happened in Cyprus. But again, I think the Russian government seems to look at the European Union in general as a declining block, that the Europe is in general in decline, as is the United States. So the Russian response to that, of course, has been to tell the Russian pivot to Asia. I remain a little skeptical about that, but that's certainly what the rhetoric is at the moment. And then the other, of course, major delight motif, if you like, of Putin's third term is the creation of this Eurasian Union. And I know that we will be coming back to that in subsequent panels vis-a-vis Poland and Russia. If that project were to succeed completely, and that's a big if, then that clearly could have a major impact on Russian-Polish relations, because it would really leave Poland as the easternmost border of democracy, rule of law, and of free markets. So let me come finally just say a few words about the Russian-Polish relationship, putting it in the context of this much more, I would say, difficult relationship between Russia and the Euro-Atlantic community. And I would say, first of all, when I was thinking back to what motivated Putin, I would agree that with what Foreign Minister Shikorski said that from the Polish side, this began earlier. But when we're thinking about the 2009 Putin visit to Poland and his speech, at that point, I think he appeared to believe that it was more beneficial for Russia to agree to open, to discuss these blank spots, these disputed areas in history of Polish-Russian relations, including, obviously, Katyn and other issues. And that would be a net benefit for Russia. I think Russia saw Poland obviously recognize its growing role as a very important leading power within the European Union. And so for all those reasons, he was willing to do it, to open the door to this dialogue. It also occurred to me this was the time at the height of the financial crisis when Russia had been very adversely affected by what was going on. So maybe that had something to do with it. My question really for my Polish colleagues and others is, you have now a new Russian drive to reassert the uniqueness of Russian slash Eurasian, the civilizational model, the rejection that the Euro-Atlantic model is a universal model. Also, we've heard about the Russian Orthodox Church very much using the Russian Orthodox Church today to convey sort of conservative traditional values and criticize, again, Europe and the United States for not respecting these kind of values. So I wonder how this drive, again, to reassert the uniqueness and importance of Russia, of the Russian civilizational model, how that will impact the discussion of historical issues going forward, including the discussion of Stalin. Again, I don't want to get into that now, but that in itself would be the subject of a whole other conference. And I'm not sure today, and again, I look forward to listening to my colleagues' views on this. I'm not sure today that the factors that induced Mr. Putin in 2009 to engage in this reset, if you like, of Polish-Russian relations, that those factors really are still as relevant for Russia today. And I think we see that maybe people will talk about in the way the difficulties that Russia and Poland have had, obviously, in dealing with the tragic plane crash in Smolensk in 2010 and sort of coming to a joint agreement about how to portray this. Now, there's a new economic dimension here, dare I mention Polish shale gas. I mean, and that's in the context of Europe's declining dependence on Russia, on Russian imported gas, particularly on Russian energy in general. I've talked to people who are knowledgeable about the Polish situation. Obviously, there's some discussion about exactly how much shale gas Poland has, how long it will take to produce it, to bring it online, and whether the European Union itself will maybe place restrictions on fracking. Let me just tell you that James Scher and I were at a dinner with Mr. Putin a couple of years ago, where he expressed great concern about the impact of hydraulic fracturing on the water supplies for Polish children. And I would say that, whereas these environmental sentiments were very admirable, I think the reality is that Poland will become less dependent on Russian energy imports going forward. It's just a question of how long that will take, and I don't know how that will impact the relationship. And the final point I want to make about the Polish-Russian relationship is just to raise the issue of Ukraine. I know we're going to talk much more about Ukraine. Obviously, Poland has been the leading country in terms of the Eastern partnership and in terms of encouraging Ukraine to make a choice for Europe. We have a critical issue by the end of the year. The European Union will have to decide whether it will offer an association agreement to Ukraine and whether Ukraine will sign that agreement. And clearly, some of that involves the question of the continuing, the fact that Yulia Tomoshenko is still in jail and what happens with that. So on the other side, obviously, you have Russia that has never liked the Eastern partnership and that wants Ukraine to become a member of the Eurasian Union because without Ukraine, what's the Eurasian Union? And let me just say again that if Ukraine were to join, were to sign this association agreement with the European Union, I mean again, this will be a long process, but that is potentially also a game changer in terms of the Polish-Russian relationship. That would certainly create different dimensions and structures there. So I would just conclude by saying, coming back to what's happening inside Russia today because so much of Russian foreign policy is driven by the domestic situation. This clampdown on civil society that continues, that is, and now we have prominent people leaving because it's people who had quite good relations with the Kremlin, as long as this continues, I would think there's a limit to how much any of these reconciliation processes can go forward. I understand that you can have discussions within one group that aren't necessarily affected by what's happening in the broader society, but I think in the long run, again, if you come back to the education and the way that this is presented within Russia, I think that will, as long as we have this clampdown that's continuing now, that will also act as a break on any more breakthroughs in the Polish-Russian relationship. Thank you. Wonderful kickoff. James, over to you. In order to keep my eye on the time, I will stay seated. I'd first like to thank Heather and her colleagues of having the foresight and courage to shine a light on an issue which not only risks being misunderstood in the United States, but in many quarters simply ignored. And I'd like also to thank all of you for having the taste to invite me to Washington when it's merely warm and not boiling. It's much appreciated. In the UK, we think 28 is warm and meaning 80 degrees is warm and 28 degrees Fahrenheit is cold. Right. The Polish-Russia relationship which has emerged is not a reset. It is more than that, but it is less than what Russians call a swig. It is not a geophysical change. What it is, what it represents is a conscious repositioning but for highly asymmetrical reasons and motives. I will start with the counterintuitive point. The principle aim of Poland's Russia policy today is not focused on Russia. Poland's principle aim is to establish its position as a mature and influential state in Europe and at the same time as a pivotal state in the EU's Eastern policy. It has an overriding interest in countering tendencies in the EU that diverted its attention from the countries to the east of it. And these other tendencies are very strong. The Mediterranean Dialogue and its expansion and this whole vector of EU outreach. Globalization and the preoccupation with Jihadism which is not simply an American preoccupation, it's a European preoccupation and what is worse, what is most ominous and disturbing and pervasive in today's Europe of course is introversion brought about by the Eurozone crisis. By the same token, Poland particularly after the Kaczynski experience and episode is determined to establish itself as an instrumental ally of the one European state that has both global and regional significance namely Germany. Poland is not the first state to use a relationship with Russia as a means of strengthening its relationship with Germany. This was central to the strategy and tactics of Gaulist France. These goals that I mentioned cannot be advanced on the basis of an anti-Russian policy let alone on a policy that appears to be anti-Russian. And I think the present government came to power very conscious of this and determined to change the interest of the image of Poland as a scaremonger in Europe and as the country with regard to Russia that always says no. To these ends Warsaw requires a relationship with Moscow which is balanced, multifaceted and constructive. So those are the principle, the first aims but there are others. There is a recognition and this is my second point that towards Russia a mixture of firmness and cooperation will be a far more effective way of advancing Polish national interests and protecting oneself than simply firmness on its own let alone confrontation. It is not possible to have a satisfactory relationship with Russia unless one has a relationship and that means many of the factors that Professor Rothfeld spoke about. Not just personal ties but institutionalized forums, structured mechanisms of consultation on a standing basis but most important the ability to communicate and be understood clearly on difficult questions. To disagree where it's necessary to disagree and not disagree because one simply misunderstands one's interlocutor. Thirdly there is a recognition that this policy can only succeed if it is both complimented and counterbalanced by a broader eastern policy that seeks to strengthen the confidence and security of Russia's neighbors and in the fullness of time bring about their full integration with Europe. Ukraine's future in this regard is for Poles of transcendental importance and one of the most interesting dimensions of the entire Ukraine issue which I suspect one of our participants will explore in greater depth is that Ukraine is a factor in the identity not only of Russia and Russians but of Poland and Poles. And therefore Ukraine's future is it plays a material role in Poland's own psychological and political balance. Fourth, there are all the particular issues of the kind that any Polish minister and official will speak about which are important in their own right particularly the management of relations with Kaliningrad and the attempt to soften this relationship and open it up and expand its potential without at the same time creating a perception in Moscow that Poland seeks to dilute Russia's sovereignty and encroach upon its territory and expand its own domain. And finally the issue that Professor Rothfeld understands better than anyone else to address the serious historical issues. Russia today has, Russia today over a period of years has devoted enormous effort into politicizing history and using history as a political tool and has wielded this tool often very, very effectively in societies whose understanding of history is more fragmented and less cohesive than the version that Russia puts forward. But apart from that there is also apart from this politicization there are some very serious historical issues to be overcome and to underscore a point that Professor Rothfeld made which is the key point. The Federal Republic of Germany from the time of Adenauer built its entire legitimacy on influence on the basis of a repudiation of the state that preceded it. The Russian Federation long before Putin came to power attempted to build its legitimacy and influence both on the basis of repudiation and continuity with the state that preceded it and that has caused anxiety throughout the region and it is essential that this contradiction be addressed and be explored and I think our Polish colleagues are doing that. Now finally and proceeding very quickly Russian interests. For the Russian Federation as well Poland is a pivotal state but in a very different way. If this state can be detached from the League of Anti-Russian States in Europe as seen by Moscow which in the main are Northern tier states and be made to link its diplomatic identity and influence to states that that incorporate successful partnership with Russia and place this in the very center of the policy notably France and Germany then a major sea change in European relations as a whole is possible. Doing this requires persuading as many elites in Poland as possible that the smaller states to Poland's east what Dimitri Rogozin called the new sickly democracies of Europe are immature, reckless and factors of instability and if this narrative and this perception gains ground in central Europe then the overall eastern policy of the EU and the West itself falls apart. With respect to Ukraine this Russian hope is fantastically misconceived but it is not misconceived across the board and Norma Seffert has been put into getting Polish politicians for example to accept the Russian narrative of how the Russia-Georgia war started and accept that Georgia would be an extremely that the admission of Georgia into NATO would be a dangerous and reckless decision. The second key Russian objective is to keep Poland in a privileged but dependent position in Russia's own energy market and to strengthen influence inside the country by maintaining and strengthening groups of influence who still exist in Poland and throughout central Europe who are very comfortable with Russia's business and political model. In short, by building up very close relations with Poland in the context of a German and Western European policy to transform Poland into a state which is more Western European in its psyche and objectively reinforce that line, that civilizational line that is now so central to Russian policy between its historic domain of influence and the EU. One final comment. The Polish-Russian relationship today does, I believe, demonstrate that a cooperative approach to Russia can be mutually beneficial but only if it is based on the other side on objective knowledge about those one is dealing with, about their purposes, about their strategy and about their thinking. It needs to be carried out by people who have a strategic mindset and a sense of purposefulness and who focus on this policy at the highest level in a sustained, coordinated and multifaceted way. If these conditions are not in place, as the example of the US and Russia has shown many times, such a policy will produce surprises, disappointment, frustration and disillusionment. Thank you. Thank you, James Cornelius, please. Thank you very much. Thank you very much for the invitation and interesting conversation here. So let me start with a personal remark. In addition was what Professor Rothfeld said about the German-Polish reconciliation. A few years ago, I think it was 2007, I have been invited to New York, the Columbia University to participate in the conference under the title, a German-Polish reconciliation and never-ending story. So the German participants agreed to participate. The former minister, Markus Meckl and few other persons agreed to participate at the conference under the conditions that there will be a question mark after a never-ending story. So seven years later, we are here in Washington discussing the Polish-Russian dialogue and reconciliation process. So from my point of view, it's a long-term process and the process is still going on, not only in the German-Polish relations and the Polish-Russian relations. Maybe in the future, in few years, there will be a Russian-German dialogue and reconciliation process. So we are part of the worldwide ongoing processes. Coming back to the German view of the Polish-Russian reconciliation and dialogue. So the German government, but not only a government, experts and the society is really interested in the progress in the Polish-Russian dialogue and reconciliation. As Angela Stent mentioned, the German-Polish relations are currently really good. I would say they are excellent and from this point of view, Germany is supported and is still supporting this process independently, independent from political construction from the party who is in government. I can't see any difference between the social democrats and the Christian democrats in this context. And I think that we should look at this process in the context of the Trialogue, which is developing a Trialogue between Germany, Poland and Russia. This Trialogue was initiated by Minister Westerwelle few years ago and the last meeting of the ministers took place in Poland few weeks ago. Looking on the positive Polish-Russian dialogue we are interested not only in overcoming historical disputes and misunderstandings. We in Berlin are really interested in practical results. For example, visa-free border crossing experience on the Kaliningrad region border. Could be very useful for the German internal discussion about the visa-free regime with Eastern European countries. I think it could be a good example for US visa-free traveling regulations for other Eastern European countries too. And from my point of view, the economic cooperation, the economic development of the relations in Poland, Russia are really important to us. It's important for Berlin with the trade above 80 billion euro with Poland and the German-Polish trade. Poland and Germany are from economic point of view for Germany more important economic relations, Germany, US. So the development in the last 20 years is going in this direction, economy first. The most important player in the German Eastern policy is currently the Ostauschus of the Committee of Eastern Economy and the growing influence of economy is visible in relations with Eastern European countries. So Russia and Poland are the most important partners for Germany in Eastern Europe. But there is a difference because Poland is a member of the European Union and Germany is really interesting in a cooperation with Poland in a creation of the Eastern policy of the European Union. And ladies and gentlemen, today the EU-Russia summit will start or is currently has started in Yekaterinienburg and Polish-German cooperation in this context is really useful for the creation of the Eastern policy of the European Union and the Polish-Russian dialogue has been seen in the past and currently as a very important progress, not only for the Polish-Russian relations, not only for Germany, but for the whole Europe. Thank you very much. Thank you, Cornelius. Kurt, you have been an enviable task of putting this all into context. All right, thanks, Heather. And thank you for inviting me. I know when Heather invites me to something, my job is to shake it up a little bit. So I will try to do that. The first, before I do, advertising, learned advertising is very important. McCainInstitute.org, we're doing a discussion on leadership in the Middle East tomorrow with former Israeli Prime Minister Olmert in the afternoon at our institute. And we're also doing a formal structured debate about the defense budget. Are the cuts a gift to our enemies or an opportunity for us? So that's June 19th. So tomorrow, Olmert, June 19th, debate. Done with the advertising. Look, the key thing here is that, and a topic that has not really been brought out, Poland and Russia are not equals. And what do I mean by that? Poland is a democracy. It believes in human rights, the rule of law, market economy, doing business the right way. It's a member of the EU. It's all in all a modern, normal country. None of that can be said about Russia. Russia is a country run by a small group for their own benefit that focuses on power and money and influence. And they do it at the expense of their own people and at the expense of those neighbors they can get away with doing it at. So the idea of a Polish, Russia reconciliation and dialogue, I would say good thing, be careful. And the good thing part is clear and this is what has come out. It is important for Polish security, especially given Polish history to have the relationship with Russia as well as with the European Union and many others as well in order to create as much stability and benefit to Poland for Poland's security as possible. Second, this kind of relationship can have, can have, doesn't necessarily have, but can have a direct relationship between Polish people and Russian people. And that's a good thing. Because helping Russia to modernize and helping Russian citizens have more say in their own society would be a good thing. And then the third is, and this was mentioned by Jim and it's a very good point so I included, is that it also helps the EU because Poland having a relationship with Russia as part of the EU can be very beneficial to the European Union. Now, if some, and that, those are all very real politic reasons. The watch out for or to be careful is be careful that this relationship and dialogue with Russia do not come at the expense of the Russian people or of the neighbors between Poland and Russia. And that is certainly the way Russia intends it. So it requires a lot of vigilance on Poland's part to make sure that it's getting the balance right. When people like Adam Daniel Rotfeld are in charge of this, I'm quite comfortable. When a policy of reconciliation is articulated without people like that in charge, I would be worried. It is difficult for Poland, as Jim also pointed out, because Germany and France and the US and even to some degree the UK are all doing the same thing. So it wouldn't make sense for Poland to be a one-note scaremonger out there waving a flag about Russia when everybody else is doing their own reset. At the same time, it wouldn't make sense to view simplistically the idea of the ability to have a reconciliation with Russia when Russia is not so much a country as it is a group that is running things for their own interest. And finally, I think the one element that I would add to the exposition of Polish policy which I thought was put out very well by Minister Rotfeld. There needs to be an element of educating and encouraging the United States and others in Western Europe to step up to the plate a little bit more on both sides of the equation. I think in many ways the reset policy here or with Germany is a way of keeping problems at bay rather than solving problems. And I think that puts at risk well-being of people in Russia. We've seen the crackdown on civil society. We've seen the trends there over several years especially since Medvedev has been reduced to prime minister again. And we've also seen that Russia has had no stake in the reset policy itself, I would say. They have articulated that they viewed the reset as a natural recognition of the United States of its failures and coming back to the table which means that we have to have very low expectations about what it should produce. So doing these things, maintaining the relationship, keeping dialogue and trying to address problems where possible is important and necessary and I think it should continue but I would just urge a high dose of caution in doing it. Well if you can find some questions in this discussion I can't help you. No, we have about 15 minutes for some questions. I'll take the moderator's prerogative and throw the first pitch out. But what I'd like to do is gather a few questions. We have colleagues with some microphones. Just raise your hand and if you could please identify yourself as well as your affiliation and then panelists you can decide what you'd like to answer and what you don't wish to answer. We'll leave it at that. That's right, exactly. I was struck through the conversation beginning with Professor Rotfeld and through this role of the civil society element, the public, the education against, as I said, the challenge of Russia's future narrative and the use of nationalism and I think in some ways Professor Rotfeld you mentioned repeatedly the helpfulness of the role of the churches in that yet we are seeing an increasing use of the orthodox church as again sort of a larger vehicle of nationalism and identity and I'm wondering in the future how those two, the positive which is the civil society, the public discussion, the historical fact and the truth seeking versus the future narrative of the government. So if I can just for whomever would like to do that answer that question and then we'll open up the floor for discussion but thank you all four of you really a very interesting and stimulating conversation who wants to take it, Jane. Very briefly, a Lithuanian colleague of mine in the MFA in the foreign ministry was very surprised two years ago and he walked into what he thought would be a routine meeting with his Russian colleagues and was subjected by three of them to two hour lecture on history with berating recriminations. This is how intense this whole approach on Russia's part now is. In this one respect, Gurt, with regard to Poland Russia is dealing with an equal because Poland is a country as conscious of its own history as Russia is without all these distortions. The impressive thing about the Polish museum of the uprising in Warsaw is that it was put together by historians objectively. It shows what is favorable, what is flattering, what is not. The Russians cannot do this. The experts who try to do this in Russia find themselves pressurized and hounded. Therefore, having this channel with Poland is extremely important, providing in a constructive way all sorts of pushback to what I think is a much underestimated vector of Russian policy. Thanks. Let me just add something to that. I mean, I think it's as clear from the discussion in Professor Rodfeld's speech, you have several simultaneous processes going on. So on the one hand, you can certainly have a dialogue between the Russian Orthodox Church and the Polish Catholic Church and it can make progress and you can have all those things. But then on the other level, you have propaganda emanating both from the Kremlin and then again, the heightened role of the Russian Orthodox Church in attacking Western values. So I mean, there's nothing new about that, but the question is, can this kind of the Polish-Russian dialogue between the churches that is progressing, can that remain insulated from that? A, and B, can that ultimately have a beneficial effect in the long run, even if you have all these other things going on, the popularization of certain views of history that run against this? And I think that it all comes back to what's happening inside Russia and how that's gonna evolve in the next few years. Right, I've given you some time to gather your questions. I see Janusz is going to be the first one out of the gate and then we have another colleague there. Yes. Okay, thanks, Heather. Janusz Pogacic, CSS. I'm still looking for a good definition of the word pragmatic. I keep hearing this constantly as a throwaway in Russian-Western relations. Does it mean flexible? Does it mean strategy or tactics? Does it mean focusing on one policy, ignoring another? I mean, if you look at history, you could say that Lenin was a pragmatist, Brest-Litovsk, Stalin was a pragmatist, socialism in one country, Rubentroff-Molotov. These are all temporary compromises, but they ignore the goals, the ambitions, the long-term strategies, the objectives of a particular power. Is there a danger that we could miss a lot on what's happening under the table, behind the scenes in Russian policy by focusing on the evident pragmatism? I wrote an article a couple of years ago called Russia's Pragmatic Reimperialization, which it sort of, it sounds like a contradiction, but it means you're flexible and you can adopt different tactics, different strategies. So if you could answer that, or sort of let me know what you think. While you're formulating that answer, we had a question right there. Yes, thank you. And then we'll take the third question, Steve Lehrer, be there, and then we'll let you take a pause and answer them. Elizabeth Pond, World Policy Journal, based in Berlin. I would like to ask both Mr. Scher and Mr., sorry, Kurt Volker, yeah, of course. If you could clarify, you've both alluded to a distinction between Polish-Russian reconciliation or relations as conducted by Professor Rotfeld and German-Russian relations. And I'd just like to ask if you could tease out a little bit with an implicit criticism of the German-Russian relations. I wonder if you could tease out a little bit of what the distinction is. Yes, and I just added two-finger to that for Cornelius with the recent Putin-Miracle visits, the Petersburg Dialogue. I think German public opinion is changing a bit because of the internal dynamic and I'd welcome your thoughts on that. And last question for this first tranche, Steve Larby. There's the microphone, Steve. Steve Larby ran. Actually, I'd like to ask Daniel if I can address the question to him. From your experience, what do you attribute the improvement in Polish-Russian relations to? Is it deep-seated or is it quote-unquote simply pragmatic? Do you think it'll continue? Okay, Professor Rotfeld, we'll take that. You can handle that one blast. Let me throw this open to the panel to hit pragmatism and German-Russian dynamics. Well, I'll take a first stab at that. Pragmatism depends on who is being pragmatic. Because if you know ruthlessly what your goals are and you're prepared to pursue them by whatever means, so that's one definition. I would argue that in the West, we actually don't know very much what our goals are at the moment and pragmatism is in many ways putting interests ahead of values where we'll just do whatever we have to do and not fuss too much over it rather than trying to keep them linked together at all times. On Germany and Poland, what I said in commenting on the Polish-Russia reset is it's essentially a good thing, but there's a watch out for, which is that it comes at the expense of the Russian people or the neighbors between Poland and Russia. And that, I think, points to where the German-Russia reset has gone off the rails a little bit because I think that it was so wide-open and uncritical that it did, in some respects, come at the expense of Russian people and people in the borders in between. And you think in particular about the German-Russian relationship on energy and how that was sustained by both sides at the expense of some of the interconnectors being built and some of the release of the near monopoly that Russia had on energy supplies in Eastern Europe. As Heather said, that has been changing. That's where it went off and I think it started with Schroeder and then I think under Merkel it continued and then now with the incontrovertible decline in democracy and human rights in Russia that the German public is concerned and is wanting to see Germany pull back into better balance now. Yes, thank you. Thank you, Heather, for this comment. I think that the picture of a German view towards Russia existing in US and in Poland is a little bit different from the reality because German politicians and German public opinion have been critical towards Russia not since half a year, but it is a process. And from my point of view, the German view towards Russia changed during the first Putin presidency. Maybe a rest of Hodor Kowski was the turning point, but it was a long process and the decision of the German Bundestag to criticize internal development in Russia in November last year has been a result of the long-term processes in Germany. Of course, we have a different interest group. The German economy is still really interested in a good relations with Russia, but political tensions in German-Russian relations didn't influence the trade. So regarding the trade, Poland is still more important for German economy than the trade with Russia because there is a difference between the German-Polish economy relations and the German-Russian. More than 90% of the Russian export to Germany or German import from Russia, it's energy resources, it's gas and oil. And German's economy is really oriented on interdependence and the economic relations between Germany and Poland are independent relations inside the European Union. But speaking about German-Russian relations, we should make a step back to the reunification of Germany. This process was influenced by the positive position of Mr. Gorbachev. And this positive view is still existing in Germany about Russia changed in the last 20 years. The Brettersman Foundation just finished a study. We will present it at the end of June about German view towards Russia and Poland. And the German society is much more critical towards Russia than towards Poland. And it's the real picture about the East. Of course, there are still existing, I would say the old pictures that media are still using the term Eastern Europe for the whole region of former Eastern bloc or something else. But the society realized that there is a different development and could Volker mention the difference between Poland and Russia. And I think that 25 years after the changes or dissolution of the Soviet bloc, there is a different approach towards Germany and towards Poland in Germany. Yes, Janusz in my book, which Brookings is launching tomorrow. Okay, with the paid advertisements. I've had quite a discussion with myself about pragmatism. In the Russian case, there's nothing to discuss. Russia defines pragmatism as, quote unquote, the strict promotion of Russian national interests, i.e. irrespective of how they affect the interest sensibilities and sensibilities of others and irrespective of whether people like us or don't like us for doing these things. The lazy Western approach to pragmatism, well represented in certain quarters of the British government, is the search for mutually acceptable outcomes that please everyone. Now, I think on our part we need, I'm glad for your question, I think we need to have a sober discussion as to what we mean and arrive at something, somewhere equidistant between these two points. Elizabeth Pond's question, I think it boils down to this. Who do the Germans talk to when they're dealing with Russia and other Eastern issues? Who inside Germany is going to have the most influence in policy? Those people who are still very strong in certain institutions, who are addicted, who have a psychological dependency on maintaining the cliches that have existed for 20 years, certainly throughout the Schroeder area and who cannot conceive of life unless they keep taking these tablets, or those people who are growing in number in Germany, not only in other political structures, but in business and in the energy business who are willing at certain points to say enough is enough and distinguish German interests from Russian interests. And the other side of that is which countries to Germany talk to? Do they talk to countries? Britain occasionally behaves like one of these countries. Italy always behaves like one of these countries who seem unable to distinguish the business interests from the national interest, or do they talk to countries that have a strategic view of Central and Eastern Europe and how it all fits together? And this is the prize and this is what is so important about strengthening that relationship in my view. But in order to do that, as I said, Poland can no longer appear to be toxic in the German polity as an anti-Russian. All right, two co-packs worth on pragmatism, but I have to tell you, listening to you, James, Elizabeth, I remember a number of years ago at a conference at CSIS when General Klaus Naumann accused the Americans of empathy deficit disorder in dealing with Russia. And I think there is still a lot of that. I mean, Germany, given its own history, its own past, also what happened in unification, I think things that the United States doesn't spend enough time trying to understand and be sympathetic towards Russia's unique concerns. All right, pragmatism. Every Soviet leader, of course, was pragmatics, Stalin, Lenin, all of them. I think the specific definition, right, that it's come to mean, at least if you look at, let's say, Russian-U.S. relations is that we just focus on the interests, on can we achieve something in Syria, whatever, and we back off from talking about what's happening inside Russia. And certainly, I think, from the Kremlin's point of view, pragmatism means not only doing what we want to do in Russia's national interests, but ensuring that neither the Europeans nor the U.S., well, isn't anyone else that does it, upraids us for what we're doing domestically or somehow policies influenced by that. So I think it means very, it lies in the eye of the beholden. It means very different things to whoever's using the word. Thank you so much. And I know, Kurt, you may have to sneak out a little bit now, but I thank you so much. And Professor Rotfeld, if you can do it in, if you can answer Steve Larrabi's question in two minutes. Thank you, Kurt. He's coming, this is serious. He's coming up to the podium. However, Steve's question is very important and I will, I'm in a position to say in two minutes, but it seems to me that there were some other questions which I would like to touch, especially Janusz Bogajski when he raised the question of pragmatism. I would like to say that, in fact, we should not see Russia as something totally different, a kind of the animal which does not exist in all the other parts of the world. Yesterday in Washington Post, I have seen the quotations by Senator Rohrbacher who said a lot of, I would suggest you to read it. Because it is, because in my view, I don't know how to interpret, but one can say that it is a kind of the pragmatism or hypocrisy or cynicism. All that is combined, in other words, Russia is not unique in that. Many politicians are full of hypocrisy. They are offering you a lot of promises, nice words, but nothing behind. And I would like to say the following, that one should also try to understand that Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union is in totally different situation than it happened before. It is in the process of fundamental change of circumstances. They do not have a response what to do. The main problem for them is how to keep the country to prevent the fate of the Soviet Union. In other words, this integration of Russia is the priority number one. Second element is what is very difficult to understand for Americans especially, that Russians are full of the complex of inferiority. Americans, they do not have such a complexes. And this is, I would say, fundamental difference. The problem between Poland and Russia is that Poles have also complexes of inferiority. But Poland is much smaller and in Russia complex is much bigger, much bigger. And when you have a need to find something in common between those who are with complexes, it is the problem of psychology. It is, well, I would like not to continue my intentions to say the following, since Steve Larraby raised the question, what was achieved? I would like to say that there were three fundamental issues which we were able to achieve much quicker than I expected. I would say the first one was that we were able to discuss because our discussions were without press, without media in very open way. I did not ask them to prepare something in common because in my view, it is impossible at the very beginning to start to write something because idea was that we should offer for the leadership in both in Russia and Poland a kind of the history written in common. I said it is impossible. We can make the common catalog of problems and then to present for each chapter, there were 15 chapters, 15 blocks in 100 years, recent 100 years, to present the most painful, the most sensitive issues. And then to present by the Polish perspective and the Russian perspective, it happened. And I would like to tell you that my great astonishment at the end of the day was as an editor that I noticed that one can remove the names of authors from Poland and Russia. Nobody would be able to say who has written what. In other words, it was very honest approach on both sides with a lot of, sometimes it is possible of course to say that it is written by Russian because of terminology, Russian, Soviet mentality. But the most difficult issues, for example, massacre of the Polish officers in Katyn or Molotow-Ribbentrop Act or the question of the words of uprising, behavior of Russians, it is written in very honest way. I would like to say Russia is diversified. One cannot say that all the Russians they have this view. This group is not typical. They are the people with a good intention. How long they will be able to continue? It is an open question, not all of them, most of them. Second, I would like to say that our achievement was that we were able to institutionalize dialogue. Not to make this as a kind of one conference, 10 conferences, but this center of dialogue and understanding is very important because for the first time, Russians accepted that such a center will be also in Moscow, not only Warsaw. The third element, the patriarch and hierarchy of the Polish Catholic Church. Andrzej Stend was right in that sense that patriarch should not be identified with the believers. Believers in Russia are not comparable to the Polish believers. For simple reason, they are only 2% of Russians who recognize themselves as being believers. In Poland, there are about 90%, let's say 60% definitely are believers. And it is a kind of the disproportion. Nevertheless, they introduce the element of morality because reconciliation is very much connected with the problem of recognition, of being guilty, of being responsible, it is connected with forgiveness. All that is not the political language. It is addressed to the people, not to the nation. Altogether, I would like to say that in my view, it has to be continued. I will stop it because you offered me only two minutes and I'm thinking 20 minutes, so thank you very much. No, thank you, Professor. You were the perfect finishing point and now I'm going to be brutal. We have five minutes where I allow you to refresh your coffee, but then please be back here. I'm going to invite the next panel to come up here, but let's pause for a moment before you race to the restrooms and thank our panelists. Thank you so much.