 And it's good to have you back. Please, by all means, fill in in the center here. I think some people have, some of our speakers from the earlier panels have left, so we took the reserve signed off of the front tables. Please fill in if you would, that would be great. Ernie Bauer here again, good to be back. I am now honored to introduce again the president and CEO of CSIS, Dr. John Hamry. We asked Dr. Hamry to talk a little bit about the politics and geopolitics of economic engagement in Asia, which is something we've touched on in our earlier panels and the earlier keynote. So please join me in welcoming Dr. Hamry, thank you. Well, I hope you all know why you have me. And that's because we had a much better speaker who was supposed to come, who canceled at the last minute. So, not better. No, no, clearly it would have been better to have had someone who was prepared and for a conference of this sophistication, it certainly is not me. And, but I did get about eight hours of advanced warning. So I have been thinking a bit about this and would like to offer a few thoughts and if it does stimulate some discussion, that'd be great. I think that, let me just step back to put some context to this because we're heading into, I think, a very, very formative period here in the next months. I think next week you will see the administration finally putting a trade promotion authority package on the table. It's been very long in coming. But let me give you, I think, the political backdrop that's larger, which is largely going to shape the debate in Washington, I think, over the next year and a half on Asia issues. And it really goes back to when the President Obama back in the winter of 2011, 2012 started talking about the pivot to Asia. Now, I need to, this has been widely misunderstood. So let me just take a second to provide the backdrop for this. Now, you will recall that in 2009, 2010, we had some scratchy relations with the Chinese, especially in the South China Sea. And so that was kind of a backdrop. Early on, President Obama was kind of confronted by this. I think managed it fairly well. And I think the President also managed very well keeping separate the politics of the recession from these scratchy relations in Asia. When we went into this great global or great American recession in 2008, 2009, it could very easily have been demonized. And we could have tried to demagogue it and blame it on other people. And it was certainly coming at a time when there was a great deal of debate here about China manipulating currencies, et cetera. And so it could very well have evolved into a nasty sort of foreign policy dimension blaming it on them. We didn't do that. President Obama deserves a lot of credit, I believe, for keeping the scratchy relations that we were having away from becoming an excuse or a dimension of the recession. And in the summer of 2011, it became clear that the budget problems were going to force a change on defense spending. And the President gave a direction to the department to undertake what was called a strategic review, a review of all of our priorities because the direction was we're going to have to cut out $500 billion out of the defense budget. So in January of 2012, then Secretary Panetta invited the Secretary over and the President over and they revealed the results of this strategic plan. And of course, politically it was an awkward situation. No president at the beginning of an election year wants to give a great announcement saying, citizens, I'm proud to tell you, we've just cut the defense budget $500 billion. You know, that's not something a president will do in an election year, especially a Democrat president. So instead, the spin-meisters thought about it and came up with a very different way to talk about it which is we're going to pivot to Asia. It gave a manly sound to what was really a budget exercise of trying to establish what are our priorities. It was an awkward expression. It worked politically. Defense was not an issue in the 2012 election. It worked quite brilliantly that way. But it did create a lot of confusion. It gave many people in China evidence in their minds that America was going to contain them. Finally, we have shifted and have announced that our policy were going to contain China. It was not what it was intended. It gave Europeans a frightening thought we were going to abandon them because we were gonna pivot away from Europe. So it just created a lot of confusion. But there was a very important core to this announcement, which was the federal government, the defense, especially the defense and foreign policy establishment. Had undertaken a very detailed review of our priorities. What are our priorities? And the outcome was very clear. Asia is going to be our first priority. Eastern Mediterranean, the Middle East would be priority number two and Europe would be priority number three, the lowest priority. Some of this may be changing now because of what's going on in Ukraine. It's not settled yet. We don't really know where that's going to go. It's unformed and I think will be a major debate in the Congress this summer. But I do think that there is a very firm consensus that our strategic interests are going to be centered in Asia for the next 30 years. That's the real meaning of the pivot speech. It wasn't, it was the wrong vocabulary. It was framed in the wrong way. It created a lot of confusion. But fundamentally, it was a national statement that resolved an uncertainty we'd had for many years. You know, what is the highest priority? And we decided it was Asia. Well, what does that mean? What it means is that the center of the international economic, the center of gravity of international economics has shifted to Asia. And we have to be present in a way as China rises to ensure that it's a region that's peaceful and stable and it's constructive. That's in essence. Now, this brought to a head the central question that we've been wrestling with. We in China have been wrestling with and that is how do we understand China's rise and America's continued presence? You know, it's an anomaly of history that the largest military force in Asia was not an Asian country. It was the United States byproduct of World War II and then the Cold War. But China's a rising power with legitimate aspirations for its power to be honored and recognized. How are we going to resolve that? That's been kind of a central issue. For us in this town for the last, well, 10 years, but really much of the Obama presidency. And I think after a period of four or five years with the Obama presidency, four years, certainly, there came to be a realization. The Chinese now know that they cannot organize Asia in a way that excludes the United States. It's not possible. The reason is nobody in the region wants that to happen. And I think the Chinese are making an enormous mistake by all this island building in the South China Sea because it sets off these antibodies of worry throughout the region and has everybody in the region want to draw us in even more closely. Oh, it's a colossal mistake on their part. But China I think now realize they cannot organize Asia in a way that excludes the United States. The United States knows very clearly that we can't organize Asia in a way that contains China. Nobody in the region wants that. Everybody in the region wants to have good relationship with China. But what's unresolved, we've both come to this realization. What's unresolved is what's the relationship we have with each other as it relates to everybody else in Asia. And about two years ago we had, this was after the Sunnylands visit, there was a real, there was a discussion. The Chinese put on the table the idea of a great power relationship. And I think that dialogue in that meeting and some subsequent meetings was a bit confused because it wasn't, it was an idea that it was taken out of the oven too quickly. It wasn't baked very, very thoroughly. But our friends in China immediately started going around Asia saying, see the Americans have agreed we're now running Asia. And of course we said no, we haven't agreed to that at all. And so we just backed up and stopped talking about great power relationship because it was being interpreted the wrong way in the theater. So the question on the table really is what is the organizing construct between us that accommodates everybody else in Asia? I mean that's the central question that we're wrestling with. We're not, we haven't defined it that bluntly but that's really what it is. And that's the context within which we have to look at TPP. TPP is, and it's not without controversy in the region. I mean, as Ernie was saying to me earlier, it cuts ASEAN in two. Half of them are in and half have made. But from our standpoint, TPP is this formulation for the long-term evolution of Asia that it's participatory, it's open to everyone and it's governed by rules of due process, rule of law, transparency, accountability. I mean that's in essence what TPP is all about. Now it has, you know, the vocabulary of our debate is going to be very different in this country over the next two months. But at its core, it is about this central question. How is Asia going to be organized? What's our role going to be in it? How does it accommodate a rising China? How does everybody feel safe in the environment? That's what this is about. I think that several years ago, I think the Chinese have started to realize this is the shifting dynamic. And so they've offered their own concept, you know, with RCEP. I think that's really what, in part, what's going on with the Asia Infrastructure Bank initiative. I think the administration here made a mistake to oppose the Asia Infrastructure Bank because it is in essence a statement by China that, you know, the West, you know, us, the Europeans have simply refused to amend the World Bank, the IMF, the international institutions. These were byproducts of World War II. The Global Center of Power Mass was in the Transatlantic Alliance and we cooked the institutions that were with our disproportionate weight, governing them at the time, and the world has changed. So why do you still keep the institutions that way? Well, we have refused to accommodate legitimate grievances to reform the institutions. So the Chinese are saying, fine, okay, we'll just create our own. And rather than view it as a geopolitical challenge, which I think some people in town have viewed it as, they should have viewed it as an opportunity to advance our central concept for how Asia gets organized over the next 30 years. It would be much better for us to be a part of the Asia Infrastructure Bank and to be on the inside, insisting on standards of transparency and accountability and due process. That would be far stronger, far better in our interests, strategic interests, than to be on the outside fighting it. But we're on the outside fighting it. Now, part of it is, I think, a byproduct of the politics of TPP. You know, and just to step back, I mean, this is complicated politics. Trade policy is always complicated, you know, in America. But this is especially complicated because at least the industrial unions in America are very, very strong in their influence over the Democratic Party. And they have decided that TPP is a great threat to them. I think they're wrong. I think they're very wrong. I mean, it's today about 150 million workers in Asia have collective bargaining rights. Under TPP, 550 million laborers will have collective bargaining rights. I mean, it's far in their interests, it seems to me, to embrace TPP. But they have decided not to. They've decided to oppose it. And about 150, 160 members, Democrats in the House of Representatives have formally signed a letter saying they will oppose TPP. Okay, well, what does this mean? It means that President Obama will win only if Republicans give him the victory. Now, that's pretty tough politics in this town. I mean, the way that the White House and Congressional Republicans have been basically skirmishing on every conceivable thing they can think of. They make up things to fight over. You know, it's just, it's factless and it's disappointing, but the idea now to come together on TPP, where Republicans have to give the victory and the President has to let them give him the victory. Okay, this is the politics that's right in the middle of it. Now, that's why I stepped back to say this is not a traditional trade bill. That's not what this is about. This is about how all of Asia is going to be organized in a constructive way going forward. Personally, I don't think it's helpful to have the President say publicly, either we organize Asia or China organizes Asia. That's what this is about. I think that's very counterproductive. I think TPP should be, the thing we should be saying right now is TPP's open for China. This is not an anti-China framework, far from it. We want everybody in Asia to be a part of this. But it is about how this region is going to be structured, how we're going to have a constructive role in it, how China will have a constructive role in it, and how we're going to do that jointly with everyone else in Asia. That's why it's so important. This TPP vote is far more important than people realize. It is, in my view, and it's what Secretary Ash Carter said, I guess it was earlier this week, that he considers TPP to be the, I don't know if he said it was the most important defense program he has. I've said that. I think it's more important to the next aircraft carrier, because it's going to shape the environment. That's going to be the context for security and safety and prosperity for the next 30 years. Everything that we want Asia to become is embedded in our aspirations for what TPP will be. So that's why it is a national security debate. Now, is it possible, I mean, given how fractious and difficult relations are between Republicans and Democrats, is it possible to get TPP? I think it is. It's going to be hard, but I think it is possible for TPP to get passed. We will see TPA go up next week. Frankly, Prime Minister Abe's visit is just essential. It's what's propelling this at this stage, because he needs TPP for his domestic reform agenda. But he's not going to expose himself politically until we're out with TPA. So the timing of this is all important. And that's what it's coming together, I think, next week. It will be a tough battle. I think that the administration is working very hard now. It hadn't for a while, but now it's working very hard to try to get momentum behind TPP. And I think when the day is done, I do believe this is going to be the one thing that a Republican Congress and a Democrat president are going to do together. Let me say one last thing and then I'll stop. And it's, again, goes, refers to what I mentioned earlier about this island building in the South Pacific. South, trying to see. I'm very worried about this. I'm not from a military standpoint. I mean, I don't think these are militarily meaningful developments, but they are geopolitically very significant. And they create antibodies that are going to run strong through the region for a long time. They could easily trigger a very negative dimension to our upcoming presidential campaign. We've had a history where our presidential campaigns have created very negative sentiments here about China that presidents then have to unpack and depressurize when they get into office. Fortunately, that hasn't happened these for the last, say, the last 10 years. I think President Bush had wise and thoughtful policies for Asia and for China. And I think President Obama, as I said, did a very good job of keeping the tension of our recession from infecting our foreign policy. He did a very good job at that. But this island building is a very visible sign that I think could run quite out of control. The old theme in American politics, Republicans are strong on defense, Democrats are weak on defense, is coming back. Again, I think this is unfair, but I think it is coming back. This could become a lightning rod for that. So there's a great deal of peril, I think, associated with this. And it's going to be hard to manage it. And I think that was in part why Secretary Carter was there this last week to make a statement about it. So that there is an appreciation for how much is at risk if this runs out of control. I think it would be a very bad thing for us to create artificial tensions with China that becomes the centerpiece of our presidential election a year from now. I think that could be a very, very unfortunate thing. But there's a significant chance for it because of what is going on. Let me stop, Ernie, see if this is, I know it's not probably at all in line with what you guys were talking about today, but I can't do anything else, that's all I know. So that's what you got. Thank you. Thank you, thank you, John. Will you take a couple questions? Okay, great. This is a good opportunity. Let me, if I could, let me start with the first question. You've been a member of the sub-cabinet as deputy secretary of defense. How would you be thinking about, you talked about the orchestration of steps. TPA is going, trade promotion authority would be going up to the hill next week, maybe. Prime Minister Abe is visiting in late April. President Xi Jinping is coming in September along with the Pope. Not sure that's relevant, but somebody was reminding me about that. And then the president of the United States is headed out to Asia for his annual trip in November to at least two Southeast Asian countries. How would you be thinking about this year based on what you just talked about? In terms of TPP, I think that it's almost essential they try to pass TPA before they leave for the August recess. I think they leave for the August recess and it's effectively we're into the election year. I mean, that's just the way it works here. And the fall will be dominated by appropriations bills and the politics that goes with all of that. The campaigns will be organizing, that's the unions get even larger control over the Democratic Party during campaigns. So I think there's just an imperative that this be dealt with in the June, July period. And I think it's possible. I think that the machinery is attuned to that. I think there's a fairly robust, quiet discussion going on between the White House and congressional Republicans and Democrats on TPA. So it's not, and there are some important fights that are still unresolved, but we all know where they are. They've been defined fairly well. And like all things, you get to the stage where compromises are struck and some compromises are internal to an issue and some we have to bring in exogenous factors, ways. Other things you can give people in exchange, that sort of a thing. I think that's fairly well developed. I personally think it's a June, July campaign. What if we don't get TPP? What would the scenario be if the President of the United States is going to Asia without TPA and without TPP? Well, I think there is a general backdrop in the world that America is a diminished power and it cannot achieve things any longer. It's too internally conflicted. It's lost its vision. It's no longer the respected leader of the international community. I hear this a lot when I travel and when I talk with when foreigners come and visit here. And I think it would certainly amplify that narrative. Now, I'm very unhappy with our politics right now. I mean, whether you do or do not like the framework agreement with Iran to have a very senior member of the Senate, a Republican member of the Senate say, you know, we just have to wait two years because we've got such a bad president we'll never get a good treaty with a bad president. I mean, it's inconceivable to me that a senior member of the opposite party would say something so rude, you know, because it's really demeaning to America's leadership at this time, I think. And I think failure to act on TPP, TPA, would add to that narrative of America diminishment. Let me open the floor for questions. I think the young woman in the back had her hand up. Could you use the microphone so I could hear you please? My name is Helen Ho and I have a question. Do you think that the recent rise in the US dollar is actually a vote by various people with money all over the globe in the United States? Well, I think America is still seen as being, I think for various reasons, a very attractive place to invest. I think the fact that we have a solid and predictable, legal and regulatory environment, it may be cumbersome, but it's predictable. That our capital markets are elaborate but fair, that there is a due process rule of law framework that eliminates much of the risk, you know, kind of governmental risk associated with investment. I think all of those are very strong. And I don't think they have been diminished. And you put that in a backdrop. There's a great questioning inside, for example, China now. I mean, every rich Chinese person I know is quietly trying to get all of his money out of China. I mean, because of this uncertainty they have about the current legal environment. It's, you know, it's the, there's a certain fear that an authoritarian mobilization model being used to restore the strength of the party is also makes their own personal well-being at risk. So it's very interesting to me that you see this. I think there's a feeling around the world that Europe is only a third of the way through the recession, that all of the problems that Europe's having were not halfway there yet. So I think it makes, you know, I think America is seen as a safe harbor, very strong safe harbor, is very strong. And then add to that the fracking revolution where, you know, we've got such abundant, reliable, inexpensive energy compared to others in the world. I think it's just, it's created a tremendous momentum. And I think that's really what's going on. It's, it isn't because of their confidence in our politics. We know that. The gentleman at the same table in the gray suit. Daniel Amoud. It's with all of the things that are happening with Putin, Ukraine, the Middle East, Iran, what makes you think that the American public will even give a hoot about the islands being built off of China? Thank you. Well, first of all, you're right. There are a lot of problems in the world right now. A lot of problems. I personally think that, you know, the situation in, with ISIS in Iraq, I think ISIS is at its apogee. I don't think it's not getting stronger, you know, and I think you're starting to see a galvanization of forces that are starting to manifest to defeat them. You know, I think the battle for Tikrit was very much a collaborative effort to defeat ISIS. I think the growing sentiment is that these apocalyptic radical fighters will, if they're defeated militarily, it takes away the narrative of the inevitability of the victory of Islam in the end of time. I mean, it's a very apocalyptic vision that they have. And so actually defeating them in the field is crucial. And I think, and you see that very widely felt by all the neighboring countries, you know, so I think ISIS is a, it's a province could be there for a while, but I think that it's, we do have a strategy. We don't talk about it very well. We do have a strategy. I think it is coming together. I think that's working. I think the issue, we do not know what President Putin is going to do in Ukraine. And the security community here is quite divided on the question. Is he simply waiting for the ground to harden after the spring melt before the armies roll on to Mariupol, or is the Minsk agreement sufficient, a sufficient victory for him to consolidate that and to let the European wounds that he opened up heal a bit. We don't know. Now, if he were to move, I think you would find that both Republican and Democrat parties would come together quite strongly on an agenda to confront Russia. Not sure what we'll do, but I think that there is, that's one, I mean, that would come back, I think quite quickly with a focus. The island thing is visible. It's hard to conceptualize intimidation. But when you can show a picture of islands being created out of nothing and military installations being built on them, I mean, that is so ripe for political exploitation. So I'm not predicting it would happen, but I think it's a high chance that it would become a focus, especially for a big field of Republican candidates who are looking to differentiate themselves, both from each other and from the president. So I think there is considerable risk that that could become a lightning rod issue. Front page of the New York Times. Yeah, yeah. Gentlemen, right here. Peng, I was in my new agency. You just mentioned that TPP should be open to war countries, including China. I'm wondering, what do you think of the timeline and the conditions if China really applies to join TPP? Thanks. Well, I think you should ask that to people that know what they're talking about, and I'm not one of them. I mean, I'm not an expert on TPP or trade policy, per se. There are legal conditions that we want to put inside TPP that will be, it'll be challenging for China to get there immediately or quickly. But I personally think that there's an inevitability to China's movement towards those very things anyway. I think it's such a dynamic, large, dynamic, complex country. I don't think that it's a country that can be governed with the old authoritarian mobilization model that exists now and they're trying to keep alive. It just isn't going to work. And you feel, you talk to Chinese citizens all the time. What are they, they're afraid of unsafe food. You know, they're afraid of pollution. They don't have safe places where they feel they can put their savings. You know, I mean, just fundamental issues that really, to their core, goes down to creating a predictable, transparent legal environment. So I think it's inevitable that China will eventually embrace that. And I think TPP is the pathway for it. But I think it may take some time. But you ask that question of somebody that knows what he's talking about. Woman here in that way. Thank you. I'm Paula Stern. And I think we're very lucky that we didn't have the originally planned speaker. So thank you very much for a really... Well, thank you, thank you. Really superb intersection of domestic politics and geo-strategic matters with an historic perspective. Thank you. And the point that you made about Obama having made a mistake to say in the TPP context that look, it's either gonna be the United States with TPP kind of setting the rules or China will do that. It seems to me the perfect kind of argument even though you may have think it's a mistake maybe long-term it is from a geo-strategic point of view but from a domestic political point of view and trying to win over this contentious both Republicans and Democrats particularly the Republicans which as you said are gonna fall all over themselves during the presidential campaign to respond to the island construction. So I happen to think that we ought to give the president a break on that one and I guess my point is that we have never succeeded no president in going to the Congress for authority to negotiate a trade agreement without making the geo-strategic arguments. Those have always been the arguments that have trumped all the other trade and commercial considerations. And so I guess my question is if my proposition is correct that geo-strategic argument the president has to make for his domestic argument how would you soften it or shape it differently? Well, it is a debate that is being shaped domestically by the passions that we feel and frankly, playing on people's fear of China is kind of a rather familiar theme in American politics. I think it's a mistake. I don't think we have to be afraid of China and I think we could make a lot of mistakes if we are. I think this, but I think if, so I can understand why it's happening but I just personally think it's a self-defeating approach. This really is about how we structure the next wave of global wealth development. I mean these last 40 years which were about lowering the barriers of international commerce was the foundation for the largest expansion of global wellbeing in recorded history. It was unbelievable how good this was. Now it helped having the Chinese change their strategy and to embrace development to lift people out of poverty. You have to give them a great deal of credit for that. But globally, the world became so much better off over the last 25, 30 years with the way we knocked down governmental barriers and took advantage of comparative opportunities for wellbeing. It just was a huge success. That's what this is about. This is the foundation for that, going forward to build on it. I mean there still are 1.4 billion people in the world that live on less than a dollar a day. I mean there isn't. But instead of thinking about that as a problem, let's think about that as the largest pool of untapped energy in the world. People that want to work and trying to find opportunities to bring them into the competitive workforce would be a very good thing. This is how we have to change our approach over here. I personally think the unions, look the unions have a very valid point about how hard it's been on labor over the last 25 years. They're absolutely right. It isn't because rich people got richer that they're poor. It isn't, that isn't the issue. What happened was 25 years ago, the leadership of China, the leadership of India decided to, well actually all of Southeast Asia decided to drop the barriers so that their workers would compete on the international marketplace. So with such a vast increase in the number of workers that were competitive on the global market and we lowered the barriers to transportation and communication so it became so much easier for them to compete, the relative returns to labor diminished and the relative returns to capital increased. It wasn't because we made a social choice to have rich people get rich at the expense of poor people. It's this global environment shifted profoundly. And American labor suffered in that, they did. But the solution isn't going to be to try to cocoon them and to prevent that, those dynamics from moving forward. It's to change how we, it's to change our framework in this country so that we go over time to try to help labor retool itself to be competitive in this global market. But that's not how the debate is being framed unfortunately. Asuki Shastri from Standard Chartered. Puzzle for the administration in the context of AIIB must be that all the countries in Southeast Asia who are most worried about island building by China are the ones who have enthusiastically signed up for the AIIB. And is this because they feel the TPP does not deliver all their needs and was this a gap that America missed? I suspect that the dynamic is a bit more complicated than just that simple trade off. I think that they all sensed that this was, there was enormous momentum within Beijing to do this and people didn't want to be on the wrong side of it. I think they'd be part of it. I think many of them shared Beijing's disappointment with the international financial institutions that we wouldn't change and legitimately felt that there was, it was the international systems are dominated by the English-speaking white guys and that time has passed and the institutions ought to be adapted. And I think so I think there was a legitimate agreement with some of the aspirations. I think there was a desire that many of them had, they'd rather be on the inside shaping the rules rather than the outside and being victimized by them. So they wanted to be on the inside to shape it, something I think we should have done. I think there were probably a lot of reasons for that. I think the, I don't think that it's, I don't think it was done as a direct reflection for the current structure of TPP so much. I mean, TPP evolved politically. The big change was when Japan decided to join TPP. I mean, that was fundamentally when it's momentum shifted. But it was so far down the road at that stage, some people just decided not to be in the front wave and it would just, it caught them. I think making it very clear that TPP is a very open framework that, and we invite an expansion and an extension of it, I think most will accept that. I don't think it is, I don't think the response to the Asian Infrastructure Bank was really reflects that dynamic so much. I think there's a pretty savvy appreciation for where this sits in the region. I think we should be trying to say right now that we envision TPP too. But it's hard to say we want to do TPP too when the unions are right now saying that's exactly where they're going. And they're, you know, this is going to hurt us even more so we're going to fight even harder. So I think that that debate is probably, we're not going to see that debate very, very open in the next couple of months. Time for a couple more questions. Andre. There's a microbe behind you. Oh thanks, thanks. I'm Andre Silverzone, I'm the partner and director for Interstate Fabric Company. It's a high speed rail company in Michigan. And the question is this, I want to build on that idea you had that, you know, it's not anti-China and we, you know, they're welcome should be. And we want to, so in building on your idea, my question is this, since the tensions actually do emanate from Chinese aggression, nobody else. I mean they violate the, you know, agreement, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea that they ratified in 1996, but they just do it. So to ease this tension, do you think it could be helpful? And I must confess this is not 100% original idea with me, I have some positive feedback on it. At senior levels of the Vietnamese government party. And but for some of the ASEAN countries, ideally all 10, but it wouldn't be, but you know, start with say the Philippines and Vietnam and hopefully Indonesia as a hub and then to form a coalition to negotiate with China, the things that are outstanding. And a precondition to this would be that they would have to resolve all internal disputes themselves. Now the Vietnamese tell me they don't have any disputes with other claimants in the South China Sea. Anyway, but resolve them all, then form a coalition to dialogue with China, since is, you know, China doesn't wanna do multilateral, only bilateral. So form this coalition and then invite friends like the United States and Australia and Japan and then invite China. Oh, and invite China. And then should Beijing refuse for reasons that you sort of imply they might, leave them an empty chair, always welcome. That's the formula, do you think it has merit? You know, first of all, let me just say in fairness to the Chinese, I mean, they don't think they started this, but they do plan to finish it. And, you know, they feel that they had an agreement with Vietnam over joint development of offshore mineral rights and that the Vietnamese violated that. But I think this has developed a momentum inside the Chinese system that is now getting out of control. You know, sadly, it started when the people, the secretariat for the Law of the Sea Convention, they sent out a notice to all the signatories saying you have until the 1st of January, I think it was 2011, to document your sovereignty claims and if you don't do it by then, you know, you lose your rights. Well, everybody in the world started putting flags down. You know, I mean, what the hell were they gonna do? You know, and it was just a colossal mistake, I think, for them to have done that. But then I think it created a dynamic that's now getting out of control in China. You know, there is, look, I'm not anti-China at all. I mean, I think one of the great successes of the last 30 years has been how China has lifted 500 million people out of poverty. No other country can claim to that. I mean, that's marvelous what they've done. But there is a propensity inside China to celebrate their victimhood in history. And they were victimized. There's no question about it. I mean, when the British, you know, got everybody hooked on opium just so that they wouldn't have empty ships, you know, you know, going over for tea. That was the most cynical thing in the world. That was, they were victimized. There's no question about that. But there is too much a willingness just to opt for this victimization narrative to mobilize public support. And I think that's getting married up here in a dangerous way, you know, in the South China Sea. It is not in China's strategic interest to alienate everybody in the neighborhood. But they are doing that by this. So finding a formula where it can gradually be taken down would be a good thing. It's very hard to do that when it means dismantling, you know, an island you built. I mean, this is the problem that Israel has about settlements that they built. How do they reach an agreement, a two-state agreement, when it means dismantling things that you spent so much time creating? Well, I think it's a little bit the same dynamic that's starting to grow in the South China Sea. It's a worry for us. So, but basically the rough outline of your idea is right. Well, ladies and gentlemen, I hope you'll join me in thanking John Hamry for spending some time with us over lunch. Thank you, John. Thank you. We'll reconvene with our next panel in about five minutes.