 Individualism, a Reader, edited by George H. Smith and Marilyn Moore, narrated by James Foster. 15. From Voluntary Socialism, Francis Dashwood Tandy Voluntary Socialism, Denver, Francis D. Tandy Publisher, 1896 This selection is from Francis Tandy's provocative, self-published book titled Voluntary Socialism. Like Benjamin Tucker and other individualist anarchists of his day, Tandy sometimes used the word socialism to mean a system of voluntary social cooperation or voluntarism, in contrast to state socialism. One of the few modern writers to mention Tandy was Robert Nozick in Anarchy, State and Utopia. Nozick included Tandy's name in a list of individualist anarchists who advocated competing protection and justice agencies instead of a sovereign monopolistic government. Economist and historian Murray Rothbard subsequently became the best-known proponent of this type of free market anarchism, a position that remains popular among some modern libertarians. In this selection from Voluntary Socialism, Tandy presents a theory of egoism that was based on the ideas of Max Stirner. Contrary to many negative interpretations of survival of the fittest, Tandy maintains that this process requires a high degree of individual freedom and social diversity, that it recognizes the welfare of the individual to be of paramount importance, and that it will result in the general welfare. It should also be noted that Tandy was a social determinist, as were many of his anarchist contemporaries. The term survival of the fittest, first used by Spencer and afterwards endorsed by Darwin, is in many respects more exact, but even it is not proof against the carelessness of the untrained mind. A large number of people think that the fittest are those individuals who best conform to their standard of ethics. The word is only used to signify those who can best adapt themselves to their environment. It is easy to see that in a country where food is scarce, those individuals who had religious objections to killing and eating their aged parents would stand a poorer chance of surviving than their less punctilious brethren. In this case the cannibals would be the fittest to survive, while judged from our ethical standpoint the others would probably be considered more moral. The survival of the fittest must of necessity remain inoperative until a certain amount of variation exists. If all individuals were alike there could be no fittest to survive. The smaller the amount of this variation the slower must the change be. Thus the species which manifests the greatest variety among its individuals is most likely to adapt itself quickly to changed conditions. Any species in which variation is unknown and which has become a fixed type must suffer total extinction if its environments change. The only reason the lowest forms of life have continued to exist in spite of almost universal change is that the changed conditions do not affect their limited environments and so the species remains constant. Selection presupposes variation and operates only through the most relentless competition. By the extinction of those individuals which are least able to adapt themselves to their environment the species develops those characteristics which have proved beneficial to the surviving individuals. Applying these conclusions to social reform we see that permanent improvement in human society can only be found under conditions which are favorable to the development of different characteristics among its members which recognize the welfare of the individual to be of paramount importance and which foster the freest competition in order that welfare may become general. The foolish philanthropy so prevalent today which would prevent the procreation of the unfit and which seeks to lessen competition must be unqualifiedly condemned. To limit the number of births even of criminals is to limit the variation of the species. Any such action makes the perfect adaptation of us to our environments less speedy and less sure. The wider the variation the greater chance there is for the production of favorable types. Then competition is absolutely essential in order to weed out the unfit and to make the variation beneficial to the race. It is impossible for a few self conceded lady novelists to tell what individuals will prove the fittest or what combination is necessary to produce such individuals. If the teachings of evolution are true all external force which limits the procreation of any individuals whether good or bad or restricts competition must result disastrously to the human race. From this standpoint the present social system is condemned on every hand. It places a special premium upon one characteristic the ability to get money at the expense of every other. It fosters a spirit of self-sacrificing patriotism and so places the welfare of the country above that of the individual. It denies the first essential of free competition, the right of every individual to the free use of the earth and hedges us around with restrictions of all kinds. Unfortunately most of the proposed reforms seek to intensify these evils instead of to remove them. The habits of the lower animals the growth and development of plants and the motion of the heavenly bodies may all be generalized and the laws in accordance with which they act may be stated. May not the motives of human action be also subject to generalization. This is a question to which the old school of philosophers gives a negative, the modern school, an affirmative answer. The fact that a person reads or writes a book devoted to social science presupposes an agreement with the modern idea. It is only when human action is generalized that a science of society can be found possible. Such a science must consist of generalizations of human action and deductions from those generalizations. If men are free moral agents, that is, if they can act of their own volition regardless of the rest of the universe, any generalization of their actions is impossible. Even if under such conditions any general statement of their past actions could be made, it would be valueless, for there would be no guarantee that they would again act in a similar manner under similar circumstances. Anyone that admits the possibility of a social science is thereby committed to the doctrine of necessity, that is, that a certain individual placed in certain environments of necessity acts in a certain manner. This being assumed it becomes of the very first importance to discover the fundamental law of human action, for on this law all sound theories of social reform must depend. The Theist declares that we should always act in accordance with the commands of God. Admitting for the sake of argument the existence of God, why should we obey him? Immediately the answer suggests itself. God, being the supreme ruler of the universe, it is the height of folly to antagonize him. He can heap disasters from which there is no escape on those who disobey him and is capable of rewarding with eternal joy those who uphold his honor and glory. We must obey the commands of God and deny ourselves in this life in order that we may reap joy's eternal. Lay not up for yourselves treasures upon the earth where rust and moth do corrupt and where thieves break through and steal, but lay up for yourselves treasures in heaven where neither rust nor moth do corrupt and where thieves do not break through and steal. This is the essence of the Christian religion. The altruist maintains that we should love our fellow man and act for his good. If we love our fellow man the sight of pain in him will make us unhappy and his happiness will cause us pleasure. So we proceed to ameliorate his pain and increase his happiness in order that we ourselves may be happy. But why should I love my fellow man? If I don't love him or feel badly when he suffers I certainly will not put myself to the trouble of helping him unless I know that he will help me in turn when I shall need it. You should act for the greatest good of the community, says another. Why should you, except in so far as the good of the community is liable to result in good to you? Even if you owe the community anything, why should you pay? Still the same answer. If you don't it will be the worse for you. But now up comes another and says you must act from a sense of duty. Duty to whom? To God? I owe him only such obedience as he gains through my fear of punishment or hope of reward. To my neighbor? What do I owe him? Only that consideration which we agree to accord each other for our mutual good. To society? To my family? To the state? The same answer applies. Turn which way you will, the idea of duty entirely disappears. John Stuart Mill says, the internal sanction of duty, whatever our standard of duty may be, is a feeling in our own mind. A pain more or less intense, attendant on violations of duty which in properly cultivated moral natures rises in the most serious cases into shrinking from it as an impossibility. Its binding force, however, consists in the existence of a mass of feelings which must be broken through in order to do what violates our standard of right and which, if we do nevertheless violate that standard, will probably have to be encountered afterwards in the form of remorse. Thus there are two forces which cause us to pursue a right course of action, the external force or fear of retaliation and the internal force or fear of our conscience. The conscience has been considered by many as the distinctive attribute of man, the spark divine in the human breast. Darwin, however, found many evidences of it in the lower animals. Really there is nothing mysterious about it. At the moment of action man will no doubt be apt to follow the stronger impulse and though this may occasionally prompt him to the noblest deeds it will more commonly lead him to gratify his own desires at the expense of other men. But after their gratification, when past and weaker impressions are judged by the ever-enduring social instinct and by his deep regard for the good opinion of his fellows, retribution will surely come. He will then feel remorse, repentance, regret or shame. This latter feeling, however, relates almost exclusively to the judgment of others. He will consequently resolve more or less firmly to act differently for the future and this is conscience. For the conscience looks backward and serves as a guide for the future. We must by no means underestimate the important part which this internal force plays in deciding the happiness or unhappiness of most men. But both the internal and the external forces which deter us from a wrong course of action operate upon our knowledge that such a course will ultimately result in unhappiness. This is the only ultimate motive of action. If every individual always attempts to attain the greatest amount of happiness, the doctrine of necessity follows as a logical deduction. Given a complete knowledge of all the environments in which an individual is placed and a complete knowledge of that individual's conception of happiness, this latter includes an exact idea of his intelligence and we could determine with mathematical certainty what course of action he would pursue. That this exactness is never reached is due to the practical impossibility of obtaining all the necessary data, but it is surprising how accurate the keen observer of human nature often is in foreseeing the actions of another. This accuracy will be found to increase or diminish in proportion to more or less correct estimates of the actor's character and environments are formed. Conan Doyle gives us a glimpse of the possibilities in this line in his famous Sherlock Holmes stories. If, on the other hand, men do not always act from motives of self-interest but sometimes from selfish and sometimes from unselfish motives, it is impossible to generalize their conduct in the slightest. In which case, as above stated, a science of society is absolutely unthinkable. The absurdity of such a position need hardly be pointed out in spite of the voluminous works which have been written in its defense. So we are justified in maintaining that all action resolves itself into an attempt on the part of an organism to place itself in harmony with its environments, that is, to increase its happiness, or what is the same thing, to decrease its pain. Such is the philosophy of egoism. This is the only theory of psychology which is in harmony with the doctrine of evolution for it is a sine qua non of that competition which is so essential to natural and sexual selection. In accordance with this principle all our actions may be divided into two classes, those from which we expect to derive pleasure directly, and those from which, though often unpleasant in themselves, we hope ultimately to gain more happiness than pain. When a man goes for a walk on a pleasant afternoon, he expects to derive pleasure from the walk. But when, on a cold, wintry night, he walks several miles through the snow to go to a dance, the walk becomes only a means to attain happiness. In other words, he sacrifices his immediate pleasure for one which is greater, though more remote. The two possible courses of action are perpetually conflicting with one another. We pursue one course or the other according as our experience and intelligence may prompt us. So many of our actions are the result of sacrificing the immediate to the remote or pleasure that people begin to look upon that sacrifice as something noble, forgetful of the fact that it is only a means to attain greater happiness in the end. Experience teaches us that it is often advisable to sacrifice minor points for the benefit of others in order that we may either escape the pain of self-reproach or that we may reasonably expect others to help us when we shall need it. This is a purely egoistic course of action. We can often perform great services for others at the cost of very little trouble to ourselves and we often need assistance which others can give us without much inconvenience but which is invaluable to us. These exchanges are for mutual benefit. When people lose sight of that mutual benefit and say we must sacrifice ourselves without any hope of reward, they get altogether beyond the pale of reason. If self-sacrifice is good, the more we have of it the better and the man who gives away all that he has except just enough to keep him alive is the finest member of society, but now a paradox is manifest. If the self-sacrificer is the noblest member of society, the one who accepts that sacrifice is the meanest. So to manifest due humility we should debase ourselves by permitting others to sacrifice themselves for our good. This nice little piece of jugglery may be kept up ad infinitum. A can sacrifice himself by permitting B to sacrifice himself by condescending to allow A to sacrifice himself and so on as long as you like. If self-sacrifice is good, to sacrifice oneself for the benefit of the lower animals from whom no return of the kindness can be reasonably expected is still better. Since we cannot even breathe much less eat, drink or be clothed without destroying life, suicide becomes the only moral course. Now the same old paradox confronts us again. The fulfillment of duty is a source of happiness from which the self-sacrificer should flee. Instead of committing suicide as in duty bound, he should live to kill others. Mental gymnastics of this nature may be highly amusing, but they are hardly satisfactory when offered as a substitute for a philosophical system. Yet this is all the self-sacrifice theory or altruism as it is called has to offer. It is absurd whichever way it is approached. It requires but little imagination to trace the effect of the spirit of utilitarianism operating upon this useless self-immolation and transforming it into the modern idea of self-sacrifice. People often find it necessary to submit to temporary pain in order to gain more permanent happiness. Gradually the cake of custom hardens, the means are mistaken for the end and the whole trend of human thought is perverted in consequence. Egoism as such does not teach us how to act, it simply states why we act as we do. It is merely an analysis of the motives of action, but on the result of this analysis all true ethics must rest. In declaring that all action is the result of an attempt on the part of the individual to secure the greatest possible happiness, the egoist merely asserts a fact. Having discovered this fact he will base a theory of conduct upon it with the end in view of obtaining the greatest amount of happiness. He will sacrifice an immediate pleasure for one more remote when it seems good to him and not when it appears otherwise. Thus he says to himself, I will countenance the killing of animals for my food because the good to be derived from so doing is greater than the disadvantages. But I will discountenance unnecessary cruelty first because cruelty to animals makes a man brutal in his nature and such a man is liable to injure me or someone I love, secondly because the sight or even the thought of unnecessary pain is unpleasant to me, and thirdly because I derive no benefit from it. So with regard to all his actions with other men, after taking into consideration the feelings of satisfaction or remorse he will experience from a certain act, the chances of the action exciting the resentment or commendation of the rest of the community and the effect of setting an example which is liable to be followed by someone else tomorrow and cause a similar course of action to be applied to him, after taking all these and similar factors into consideration he will, if he be a wise man, be governed by the highest expediency. If all our acts are attempts to gain greater happiness, it behooves us to exert all our energies to the attainment of that end. This gives us a direct rational basis of ethics. The idea of duty is absolutely lost. Actions appear to be good only insofar as they minister to our happiness and bad insofar as they cause us pain. The term right is synonymous with wise and wrong with foolish. The highest morality is to devote all our efforts to attainment of happiness, leaving others free to do the same. The golden rule must be stated negatively and made to read Mind Your Own Business. As egoists we are bound to assume that others are seeking their own greatest happiness and as long as they do this it is impertinent to interfere with them and foolish to set an example which will probably be followed and result in interference with our own affairs. If others attempt to meddle with us we are justified in acting towards them in such a manner that they will find the pain resulting from such a course far outweighs the pleasure and consequently will not be tempted to repeat the experiment. The egoist should abstain from all interference with others and resent any similar liberties they may take with him. He is not even justified in meddling with another's business for his good. He is bound to assume that everyone is wise enough to know what constitutes his own happiness. If he isn't he will suffer the consequences and know better next time. Every individual should be brought to understand that he is responsible for his actions and will suffer the consequences of all his mistakes. This is really inevitable. The attempt to evade the law of individual responsibility invariably results disasterously. It leads people to suppose that they can act foolishly and not suffer the consequences and when their folly finds them out there is no one to help them. The doctrine of individual responsibility is a corollary of egoism. It is self-reliance instead of self-sacrifice, dependence upon self instead of upon others. To develop this feeling it is only necessary to give people a chance to practice it. To say that I am my brother's keeper is to admit that he is also mine. Devote yourself to being happy and I will do the same. If we all succeed the social question will be solved. If we fail let us try again with our intelligence improved by past experience. Enlightenment makes selfishness useful and this usefulness popular. This has been Individualism a Reader, edited by George H. Smith and Marilyn Moore, narrated by James Foster. Copyright 2015 by the Cato Institute. Production copyright 2015 by the Cato Institute.