 I think we still have a few more people coming in, but we're going to go ahead and get going. When we do something jointly with the military, we try to be punctual. So with that, I'd like to welcome you all to USIP. My name is Andrew Wilder. I'm the vice president of the Asia Center here at USIP. USIP was founded in 1984 by Congress as an independent national institute dedicated to the proposition that peace is possible. It's practical and essential for US and global stability. We pursue our vision of a world without violent conflict by working on the ground with local partners to help prevent, mitigate, and resolve violent conflict. USIP has been working in Afghanistan since 2002. We have an office in Kabul that's running a range of programs. We also support policy relevant research and hold both off the record events, but also on the record events like the one we have today to inform policy makers and practitioners and the public about the situation in Afghanistan. USIP's current top priority in Afghanistan is to support US government and Afghan efforts to achieve a politically negotiated end to the war in Afghanistan. This 17-year war is now the longest war in US history, but let's not forget it's been going on for 40 years for Afghans. I recently returned from Afghanistan, and I have to say for the first time in many, many years I came back with a glimmer of hope that there is a possibility to reach a peaceful settlement to the conflict in Afghanistan. The stars seem to be aligning, but also this is going to be extremely difficult. I often describe it as a long shot, but I think it's really the only shot that I see in terms of how to move forward in Afghanistan. And it's the only way, I think, to achieve our US objective of an Afghanistan that is at peace with itself, doesn't threaten to destabilize its neighbors, and doesn't once again become a safe haven for transnational terrorist groups that threaten the US and our allies. Again, this is going to be extremely difficult, and I've said this at previous gatherings like this, and many of you have heard me say this before. There's lots of ground for skepticism about whether this is going to be possible to achieve. But I worry that sometimes we get too skeptical that we view it's impossible and we might miss the opportunities. So that's my request of all of you today and all of us working on this issue, that let's not be so skeptical of opportunities that we maybe miss them. I think there is mutual recognition for most stakeholders that there's no plausible military victory in sight, either for the Afghan government backed by the US and our NATO allies or for the Taliban. As General Miller noted just a few weeks ago, this is not going to be one militarily. This is going to a political solution. I think there's also widespread consensus that a precipitous withdrawal of most US troops without a politically negotiated settlement would nearly inevitably lead to a collapse of the Afghan state and a return to the anarchic environment which we saw in the early 1990s that gave birth to the Taliban movement in the first place. I personally believe we are entering a pivotal time in Afghanistan's history, which may shape the course of the country for a long time to come. Supporting the Afghan peace process is therefore a top priority for USIP heading into this next year and we are boosting our capacity to support US and Afghan efforts to seize this crucial moment. This includes working with the State Department and Ambassador Zalmaa Kliuzad and his team in the office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation as well as with our other US interagency colleagues including US Central Command and the Resolute Support Mission in Kabul. Given this USIP priority, we are very pleased to be hosting this event today and to discuss some of the essential questions that CENTCOM has posed to our panel of experts today. USIP is pleased to be having a growing partnership with CENTCOM, including on today's topic of Afghan peace. We would also like to thank DOD's strategic multi-layer assessment program which has partnered with USIP to support the command. Finally, I'm very pleased to introduce Major General Michael Langley, CENTCOM's Director of Strategy, Plans and Policy or J5. General Langley could not be here in person, but if technology cooperates he will provide opening remarks via livestream. General Langley has a long and distinguished military career. Prior to his current assignment, he served as the Deputy Commanding General of the Second Marine Expeditionary Force and the Commanding General for the Second Marine Expeditionary Brigade at Camp Lejeune in North Carolina. After General Langley's remarks, my colleague Johnny Walsh will moderate a discussion with a very distinguished panel of Afghan experts, focusing again on the five questions that CENTCOM has asked us to address today. With that, I'll turn it over to General Langley. Thanks for joining us at USIP today. Over to you. Ladies and gentlemen, good morning. On behalf of the CENTCOM Commander General Will Tell, I'd like to say thank you for putting this event together. First of all, some acknowledgments. One first to the President of the US Institute of Peace, Ms. Nancy Lindborg. I also want to acknowledge Executive Vice President Ambassador Bill Taylor and the Vice President Andrew Wilder. An special acknowledgment to the Strategic Multilayer Assessment Office, the lead Dr. Kobanya. Good morning to all of you, and thank you for this opportunity to make opening remarks. I also understand that Johnny Walsh and Rusty Barber, a critical, critical pieces of your team have put together an impressive panel today, a panel of experts to discuss the peace process in Afghanistan. And I'd like to say, first and foremost, the timing couldn't be better. In Afghanistan, we watched the parliamentary election take place last month, and we witnessed also the Afghan forces take the lead in military operations to do what more than 100,000 NATO troops were doing just a few years ago. However, we know that the security situation in Afghanistan still remains very challenging, but it's good to know that the teams from the US Institute of Peace and the Strategic Multilayer Assessment Office are working to help us address these challenges. Back in July, Ambassador Taylor and his team briefed the Commander on the progress of their research to identify and understand the key components needed for the peace process. And also, in a related meeting with the Commander, on that same day, the team from the Strategic Multilayer Assessment Office presented their research on reconciliation and took away five key questions about the US strategy towards the peace process. Encapsulated with some of those questions were to address changing dynamics for a negotiated settlement. And the Commander also asked for the groups to identify buffers of instability that are essential to be addressed if we're going to embark upon a glide path to stability in Afghanistan. So today, I understand that the US Institute of Peace has put together a panel of experts with years of experience in Afghanistan. And the Commander's questions that are your tackling are key for us. And we're glad to have such experts helping us think through this process. You've generated a lot of interest here in SINCOM by the size of the audience there. It looks like you've generated a lot of interest in Washington as well. The interest is well warranted. As you know, the forefront, Syria has our attention. So does Iran. So does the formation of government and the progress in Iraq. And also, as an additive, a significant additive, the great powers competition of China and Russia have recently taken center stage within our central region. However, let me be clear, Afghanistan remains the center of our attention. We know victory will require a political reconciliation. We know that a conditions-based strategy is necessary. And we know that the Taliban must engage in talks with the Afghan government to reach a political settlement. However, for all the knowns, there are many unknowns. And that's why this forum here today is so important. SINCOM and its senior leadership consider Afghan peace process a top priority. Your expertise is greatly appreciated. And once again, thank you for the panelists to participate today to inform us on our way forward in the peace process within Afghanistan. Over. Thank you very much, General. And thank you to Andrew for the introductions. I'm Johnny Walsh. I'm a senior expert on Afghanistan here at USIP. In addition to everything that the General and Andrew said about the desirability of a peace process, as I would describe it as the plausible happy ending to this conflict and the only one that I can see, I would just note the urgency of trying to find one. And paradoxically, something that's often lost in the growing conversation about Afghanistan in Washington is the sheer human toll that this cost is exacting. And we just saw reporting the New York Times that as many as 25 Afghan security forces a day on average are dying. There have been reports that as many as 100 Afghans total are dying every day. And it is more difficult to measure the Taliban's casualty count, but they're also stratospheric. And that is to say that this isn't helping any side of the conflict. And it creates a special urgency to the thoroughly decent people on each of the sides here who have the courage to really explore a better way to end this. That in particular goes for scent common. I'll just say we at USIP, we exist for the cause of peace and we specifically exist to serve those as best we can who are directly charged with making it happen. And so with that, I'll introduce our really incredible panel. First, Orzalan Nima, who I believe is also joining us remotely via live stream from Kabul. She's the director of the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit. It's one of the most respected think tanks in Afghanistan. She's also a research associate at the School of Oriental and African Studies in London. She served as a subnational governance advisor to President Ghani. She's an extraordinary intellect and a member of the flourishing civil society that has really bloomed in Afghanistan. To my left is Laurel Miller, senior political scientist at the Rand Corporation. She was formerly a deputy special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan and an acting SRAP from 2013 to 17. She works the peace process as intimately and thoroughly as anyone in government. She has also been an associate professor at Georgetown. She's been a director for the Western Hemisphere at the National Security Council. It's an honor to have her. Vikram Singh also was a deputy SRAP, especially in the era of Richard Holbrook, who looms large over that process to this day. He's recently joined us at USIP as a senior expert on Afghanistan. He's been a vice president at the Center for American Progress and was a deputy assistant secretary of defense for all of South and Southeast Asia. So also someone who's worked the peace process very closely over many years. And Jason Campbell led that portfolio at the office of the Secretary of Defense until just a few months ago. He has returned to the Rand Corporation. I think we have the pleasure of one of his first public outings since that became acceptable for him again after leaving government. So four very deep experts. And so now what we will do is we've centered this panel around five specific questions that we received from the command at SENTCOM. We will tackle them as a group. I will then give the opportunity for our friends at SENTCOM to ask the first follow-up question if they choose to. And then after that, hopefully we can have some discussion with the audience. Good with everyone? So with that, the first question will go to Ursula and it's how have the ceasefire and the other remarkable events in 2018 changed the potential for a negotiated settlement in Afghanistan and specifically have prospects for a negotiated settlement improved? Thank you, Joni. Good morning, everyone. It's a great pleasure to be connected from Afghanistan where we are just about to end the day. And I'm grateful to USIP and SENTCOM to be part of this distinguished panel. To start, I hope you have my voices clearly being heard. We do. Excellent. So to start responding to your question, one point I would like to make before moving to a ceasefire in its results is an opportunity that Afghanistan delivers at this stage for lessons learned from our engagement in Afghanistan and particularly the engagement of the United States of America as one of the largest, most dedicated partners of Afghanistan over the past 16 years. We need to really draw lessons from how things have worked in order to be able to foresee and sort of envision our present and future. And for that, it's really some critical takeaways and lessons are needed to be learned from this past 16 years. For example, if I can say, I mean, in terms of interventions like the one of Afghanistan, if it ever happens again everywhere, there is a need for a specific exit strategy. Or if we are talking about, you know, interventions of that nature, there is an importance in terms of, you know, strengthening the formal institutions, investing more on systems rather than individuals and having a clear strategy for illegal armed and, for example, drug lards and war lards and so forth and have a clear strategy, for example, about or understanding of illicit economy. What are the illicit economy sources? And also, most importantly, that brings me to the senior prior question specifically is, while we are in war and while we are there to sort of try to end a conflict that was going on for too many years, when military engagement clearly needed and could be part of it, but also unless that needs to be political engagement and finding the most peaceful and nonviolent ways or non-aggressive ways of dealing with the conflict, whether it's at local, regional or at local level. So that's my sort of general points related to the experiences of war and how we dealt with it from Afghanistan. On the specific example of the ceasefire, the pains of ceasefire in the 14 years of Afghanistan. So for me, it's in my life which has almost suspended in conflict. I can say it was the first time in this era of war that we have experienced something very unique. If you can speak a little more personally about this, the uniqueness of those days during the Ramazan, in the Ramazan eat facility was that you could see the warring factions, the warring side. So the Taliban side and the government side shaking hands, praying together in the same mosque and sharing their eats. So the reflections about the ceasefire dates were more reflections of emotions rather than introducing a very clear approach or a clear strategy, if I may say, by government or the opposition or the armed opposition that we could call the Taliban. So both sides were in an experimental sort of phase in order to see whether it is working or not. The outcome and the messaging was very clear. To me, as an Afghan who is not part of the government or part of the organization, I could see the message very clear. As it was mentioned earlier here, the message was that people in Afghanistan, in the ground forces, whether these are the ASEF soldiers, are the ones who are fighting under that flag of what we call Taliban. They want peace. They want desperately this war to be over sooner than any time later. But the challenge that we are facing, and that brings me back to my lessons and points that I mentioned, is how we can really do it without having an in-depth and clear understanding of the different sort of dimensions and aspects of this conflict. And that I would end up by concluding this part by stating that peace is a demand and a call from every Afghan, whether in rural area or in urban area, peace is a demand of Afghans who have been in this war for over 40 years. At the same time, while having this demand for peace, clarity over what we mean by that is also critical. And that brings me to just finally say that I rushed up an agreement which will just be an event with some celebration is not going to satisfy us, nor is it going to really something that will last for too long. So for that, I will end and thank you again for your attention. Thank you, Ursula. I'll do this for each question. I'll give the other members of the panel a chance to weigh in after the initial response that we get. And I would just observe that in the question, it references the ceasefire but also the other events of 2018. And I understand that to refer for those who aren't blessed to follow this every single day, that at the beginning of the year, President Ghani made a quite forward-leaning offer of peace to the Taliban, sort of an unconditional offer of talks. In the weeks and months after that, there were a series of international conferences that really shored up a great deal of regional international support for this idea. And there were a series of spontaneous really peace demonstrations and a peace movement that broke out in virtually every part of Afghanistan that led to the ceasefire, incredibly emotional three days that Ursula was talking about. And since then, we've seen a real flurry of diplomatic activity, not everything that one would want to see, but more than one sees in an average few months. So anyway, I'd be interested if anyone else cares to weigh in on has this meaningfully changed the prospect for a negotiated settlement and how so? I think you're on. I don't personally think that these events markedly change the prospects for peace because I think the fundamental dynamics that have suggested that there is an opening for peace were there before these recent moves. I think it's just elevated the public awareness of those dynamics. But I wanted to just comment on one point related to the ceasefire. As an observer sitting here in Washington, what I found to be most policy relevant about the ceasefire was the way in which it demonstrated the capacity of the Taliban in particular to issue instructions and have those instructions followed by the rank and file. But I think more interesting than that is there are some indications that elements of the Taliban themselves recognize whether this was behind their originally part of their motivation and agreeing to the ceasefire, I doubt, but seeing the reactions and how it unfolded, there are some indications that elements of the Taliban recognize that this helpfully demonstrated proved in a limited way, I would say, their ability to issue instructions and have them followed and that therefore it can be used as as a talking point on their own behalf in demonstrating their ability to follow through on any commitments that they might enter into in a peace agreement. Whether it really demonstrates their ability to follow through in commitments is another question. I think it's much easier to issue instructions about a three-day ceasefire than it is to issue instructions and be sure they'll be followed about much more fundamental changes and decisions, but I do think that that's an interesting factor. Anyone else like to before we? I mean, look, I would just say this is indicative of what almost every peace process is. You're going to have in any given year and particularly as you make progress there are going to be things that frustratingly are setbacks. It's going to be incremental. This isn't a linear process where you just draw a line and say, okay, we're going to make our way here and at the end is peace. You're going to have instances where there are rays of sunlight and you've got a ceasefire that kind of brings people together in a way that they I would argue hadn't been in the post-Taliban Afghanistan and you're going to have setbacks and I think probably the biggest driver of that is the complexity here. You have numerous constituencies even within the Afghan pro-government camp. You have the Taliban organization and all its various moving pieces. You have a region that is much more involved than it was even five or 10 years ago and in many cases in very different ways than they have been traditionally. So when you start to grasp all of the moving pieces here, I think it just stands to reason that you're going to have this, again, sometimes very frustrating, very incremental process and you just try to at the end hope that it collectively gets us closer to some substantive talks. I wouldn't downplay the psychological impact that the ceasefire had on all parties and then the political impact that it had. So psychologically, Ursula mentioned in her personal reaction to it, it's the first time that many Afghans have experienced a few moments of calm and peace and a lack of fear and a sense that, oh, this is possible. So it demonstrated that peace is possible in a way that just we have not seen during the U.S. involvement in the war and to a large degree Afghans have only rarely seen in the last 40 years. That in turn had a political impact. So within the Afghan state, what you've seen is that all of Afghanistan's major political actors are essentially trying to articulate that they are the peacemakers. They can help bring peace. Everybody wants to be the one to bring peace. And for the Taliban, I think there was a, I think judging by their future reactions or reluctance to do any follow-on ceasefires, I think there was a nervousness about how much their own cadres probably want peace. And a desire to say, well, hold on. One, they probably got the ability to say to the Afghan government or other Afghan constituencies or the Americans or whoever, we can deliver on the ground. We showed that. And we're not going to unless we are comfortable with the direction this process is going. So I think there's, you can see that's also a political impact on the Taliban side that has been very significant. The danger is that in the aftermath, as Jason mentioned, the setbacks that we have, if that starts to erode confidence and starts to undermine the prospects for getting a process going. Fundamentally, though, I do think that is this moment changed dramatically because there was this window within the Afghan society of all groups coming together for just a brief moment. Thank you all. I'll go to the second question from Sankam. And I think I'll kick this one back to Laurel. And it's what should be the relationship between reintegration and reconciliation? And maybe you could define what those are commonly understood to mean in the Afghan context, which is always the same as around the world. Does one or the other have to come first? Does one drive the other? And what should be considered good enough on either? Finally, what is the implication if Sankam, for example, is focused on reintegration, but the rest of the US government is focused on reconciliation? Thanks. So I thought it might help at the outset if I clarify these concepts to some extent. Both of these terms, reintegration and reconciliation, have been used with respect to Afghanistan in ways that don't actually fit the common usage of the terms in connection with peace processes. And sometimes these terms have been used rather euphemistically in Afghanistan in ways that have created conceptual confusion. I think this is a problem that is more than semantic, because when different people use the same words in different ways and to mean different things, that can lead to some misapplication of the concepts in practice. So to begin with reintegration, over the last dozen years or so in Afghanistan, this has been used particularly by US government actors to mean peeling away Taliban fighters and figures. It has been used to mean a concept of essentially fracturing and degrading the Taliban, I mean, yes, to accommodate individuals and groups who have chosen to participate in reintegration, but essentially the motivation behind reintegration programs and initiatives in Afghanistan as supported by the United States and by NATO allies as well, has been to diminish the Taliban in a, as I said, sort of purposeful and degrading, in a way to degrade the organization. Not surprisingly, it's been seen as such by the Taliban. It's not a mystery that this initiative to peel away fighters has been an effort to fracture the organization. It has never worked to any meaningful degree that's had any genuine impact on the security dynamics in Afghanistan, and I personally see no realistic prospects looking ahead that it will work. I think Jason and his remarks might talk about that a little further, otherwise we could get into that in the question and answer if there's interest. Now if there is a negotiated settlement in Afghanistan, there will eventually be a need for something that is more like reintegration in the way that that term is more commonly used in with respect to peace processes, and that would be bringing together of fighters from both sides into unified and more coherent security institutions. But for Afghanistan, as compared to some other contexts around the world, I think it's better to think of this kind of initiative in terms of unification or amalgamation of security elements together with restructuring, not as reintegration per se, which suggests an absorption of the Taliban into existing government and security structures in a way that doesn't fit the circumstances in Afghanistan and I think would be rejected by those who you're seeking to integrate. In other words, I think it's more realistic in Afghanistan to think conceptually in terms of merger rather than acquisition, at least in how the concept can be framed and sold, the practical realities and its details may be something a little different than that. But if you approach this as part of a peace negotiation from an acquisition framework rather than a merger framework, I think it's going to be a non-starter. It's also important to add another layer of complexity to this to recognize that in areas where the Taliban exerts a significant amount of influence or control and the state is largely absent, the Taliban already are integrated into the local level political and security fabric and it's the government that isn't integrated. So again, it's the concept of reintegration suggesting a sort of dominant theme and minor theme isn't applicable in my view in the Afghanistan context. These contextual distinctions are important in part in terms of what experiences you might look to around the world for examples or lessons learned from other peace processes. The ways in which reintegration programs have been structured in many end of insurgency peace agreements may not directly apply in Afghanistan. It doesn't mean there's no lessons to be learned at the very practical level but I think caution is warranted in trying to find reintegration models that might directly apply to Afghanistan as opposed to developing something that is more sewer-generous. Now how this idea of unification of forces could be actually achieved over time in a post-settlement Afghanistan deserves some concerted planning as part of an overall consideration of what the security architecture for Afghanistan domestically could be and of what to do with fighters who either want to or will need to be pushed into being full-time civilians in the future. Again we could get into some of these specifics in the question and answer if there's interest. But turning to reconciliation, this is a term that has mostly been used in U.S. policy are got to mean peace process and as a synonym for peace process, some kind of process of negotiations that would lead to some kind of agreement. It's been used, the term reconciliation that has been used somewhat more flexibly or broadly within Afghanistan to also encompass accommodations that have been reached at the local level between opposing elements and also to reference understandings that have been reached between the government and Taliban figures, primarily political figures but not exclusively who have left the movement to suggest a sort of normalizing of their status. So you see references to Taliban figures who have reconciled or been reconciled with the Afghan government. For U.S. policy purposes I would suggest situating the concept of reconciliation where it belongs in terms of its more common usage with respect to peace processes and that would be a long-term process of stitching up the social fabric that occurs hopefully if at all in the aftermath of a negotiated peace agreement if we're fortunate enough to have that hopefully occur. Now that kind of long-term process of reconciliation can be encouraged and supported by outside actors to include the United States but overwhelmingly it has to be driven by internal actors if it's going to have any genuine effect and there is plenty of experience around the world with reconciliation processes to support that. It might be nice if reconciliation in a piecemeal or slow rolling form were a replacement for the hard work of negotiating a peace agreement if through the work of the Afghan High Peace Council or some other mechanism or a bottom-up peace movement violence could be reduced arms laid down and an Afghan social compact renegotiated that that would be a great thing but I don't see any evidence from the many years of experience in Afghanistan so far I don't mean my own experience I mean U.S. policy experience with Afghanistan and and what we have seen develop there I don't see any evidence to suggest that it's realistic to expect that kind of long-term reconciliation process to supplant the need for a negotiated peace agreement I think this is particularly so on a timeline that would fit U.S. political realities but even aside from that it's it's very difficult to see any evidence that those kind of dynamics are in place in Afghanistan. Among a variety of limiting factors in that regard mostly that that have to do with internal situation in Afghanistan I think the hopes for an Afghan reconciliation driven peace process ignore the role that the U.S. military presence and the NATO military presence in Afghanistan plays predominantly in motivating the Taliban to continue fighting but also to some extent in motivating some on the other side to keep the fight going as well because of vested interests in the in the conflict it is more prudent to plan for a conflict resolution in Afghanistan to follow the more usual if difficult course which is to slog through tough negotiations to make a deal that sufficiently satisfies the interests of the main actors and their constituencies that have the capability to inflict violence in Afghanistan and then to work on reintegration and reconciliation in the ways that that I have characterized them as part of the implementation of a peace deal. It's not just experience around the world but also experience in Afghanistan as I said over many years that shows that looking at reconciliation and reintegration as shortcuts around the challenges of a deal as they sometimes have been seen is not going to work and in fact it could be argued that reintegration as it has been conceived in the past in Afghanistan and the rhetoric of reconciliation probably have been among the factors that have undermined efforts toward a negotiated settlement because those approaches have looked more like an invitation to the Taliban to negotiate the terms of its surrender than a willingness to negotiate compromises among interests. Thank you very much Laurel. Would anyone in Washington or Kabul care to add to that? I trust we still have ours a little bit. I am here Johnny. Just yeah I think there are a lot more complexities in this whole optimism we have than ease up in terms of being simply optimistic about the possibility of a real peace negotiated settlement. One aspect again going back to the reintegration question when we just formed in the interim administration back in 2001 if you go back to that experience one of the most challenging experience was disarmament and demobilization of the armed groups the DDR or whatever we were calling it now I may forgive me if the the acronyms are not correct but DDR for us was basically the assignment of the armed groups and now again the larger question that we face here that's really important in this conversation to also cover is whether bringing a Taliban or a fraction of the Taliban back into the political settlement is going to really end the war the message the clear message from the Afghan population from north to south east to west central is to end this war it's not to bring x and y into the system and keep that out of it or like because now to be very frank with you I mean the concern that we have is that whether by bringing yet another fraction of this ongoing conflict for the last decades into the system we would still have someone else there to be to be fighting or is it going to end that story of insurgency and you know terrorism and that that that that France is completely over so definitely the aspect that our panelists was covering is needed to be concerned but at the same time that clarity and that's promise in this support of facilitating a negotiated settlement is really something which is like basic expectation problems thank you thank you for that maybe I'll move to the third question from cent com which will go to Jason for and it's very straightforward what catalysts could trigger fragmentation within the Taliban I got the easy one well thank you Johnny and thanks for everybody for coming it's it's great to see so many friendly faces here in the audience and as John Lee correctly pointed out at the outset the prospects of me oh pining on the Afghan peace process until very recently was a strictly behind closed doors situation so thanks for the opportunity I guess at the outset I just say you know first to temper expectations that you know given the current conditions in Afghanistan I don't foresee a situation where there is you know one or any combination of efforts that's going to trigger some sort of fragmentation within the Taliban I think as I stated earlier the much more likely scenario is that we're going to continue with this slow uneven process of trying to get to substantive talks and we'll have to withstand some setbacks along the way kind of enforcing that I think comparatively speaking the Taliban is is most likely the most cohesive entity in Afghanistan and that stands to reason I mean we see this in a lot of insurgencies it's much easier in many ways to sustain an insurgency than it is to develop weak government institutions among a polity that is so divided they have the they can be opportunistic in deciding where and when to attack vulnerabilities or become more involved in local politics as Laurel pointed out so that's that stands to reason in many ways that said I think there are within the Taliban organization broadly speaking sort of three camps when you talk about sort of the future of the organization in Afghanistan you know for one you've got the more pragmatic side that is willing to at least entertain discussions on a role for the Taliban in a stable political order in Afghanistan on the other side of the spectrum you have those that are more extremists in their views that are happy to continue the fight until all foreign forces are out of the country and even until perhaps the Taliban is once again the dominant political actor in Afghanistan now the third group I think are those that are if not more pragmatic than generally realistic in understanding that a stable Afghanistan is going to have to both include the Taliban but also many other players the issue with them is that they generally benefit from the current status quo of instability in terms of their either personal stature or the aid that they're receiving from from outside actors and are reluctant to take the risk to engage in some sort of political dialogue that will place these benefits at risk what is less known and still subject to I think a lot of speculation is you know where the various senior entities within the Taliban fall among these three camps and I think importantly what we the US or the coalition can do to either amplify those pragmatic voices and or tamp down the more extreme voices within the Taliban and I think that's sort of the the central issue here we're dealing with now I think fundamentally when we talk about fomenting fragmentation within the Taliban you've got sort of this divide between being proactive and reactive now I think being proactive certainly you know aligns well with with you know the US and coalition military and even government give tell me what to do I'll go execute and at the end we'll have the desired outcome what I would caution though in the afghan context is being proactive in fomenting fragmentation is extremely extremely delicate and I think that we have to be very careful about trying to socially engineer some level of fragmentation in an organization that is able to be so decentralized and draw so much of its really its legitimacy from issues that are in many cases very localized and it's also important to remember that you know identifying as pro government or even being neutral is no longer are no longer the only alternatives to being pro Taliban we have seen in a number of instances this this year in particular of disgruntled fighters either formally siding or identifying with ISIS and this is something that you know if you are not very careful in how you proceed it's not just about being pro government or pro Taliban there is now another alternative that disgruntled fighters can can opt for and we could unwittingly you know perhaps push them the other direction if we are are not careful and even among you know trying to amplify the the pragmatic voices in the Taliban you know being too overt in that effort risks alienating this cohort within their own organization you have to be very careful about how you go about trying to either on an individual or even sort of a a among a group make them artificially a more prominent voice within the organization because again within the Taliban leadership writ large there is this need to have a balance between increasing your stature internationally as we saw with their participation in Moscow a couple of weeks ago without spooking your low and mid-level fighters into thinking that you know your senior leadership who is comfortably ensconced in Pakistan or Qatar is going to cut some deal that leaves them out so you're you really have to be very deliberate in how you engage the Taliban and try to counter some of their messaging now from a reactive standpoint I think you know as Laurel alluded to a little bit with the top-down peace process and just with our train advice and assist mission the focus I think is is wisely on facilitating Afghan efforts and better enabling Afghans to address some of these problems now at more local levels there might be some opportunities to exploit disgruntled fighters and and some of their leaders and commanders but we need to be cognizant as Laurel said in great detail if our idea of enticing them to either defect from the Taliban or at least become neutral actors rests on a de facto surrender program whereby they're turning in weapons and in some instances posing for pictures as we've seen in the past I think we're going to be disappointed I think there needs to be a lot more flexibility and openness to engaging actors more discreetly allowing them to again either become neutral actors without having to formally defect and at least keep them from going the other way and siding with ISIS and I think fundamentally if you prioritize reduction in violence this becomes a concept that I think is easier to to accept that being said I think in terms of countering Taliban messaging there simply is no substitute for a unified message from the Afghan political elite regarding some broad platform on on what their negotiations might look like and what are some of the red lines that they that they would bring to a negotiation process tied to that I think would be even a rudimentary policy for dealing with opportunities where you have fighters who want to come in from from fighting with the Taliban and either become actors that are are neutralized or are neutral actors and just don't want to fight anymore because currently within the Afghan bureaucracy there is no policy for dealing with a group of fighters from some far off province who call the high peace council and say hey look we're interested in not fighting anymore what are our options there simply isn't anything in place and I think this brings me to my broader point is that it's very difficult to be proactive here if you don't yet have all of the ingredients in place to simply be reactive when opportunities present themselves and I think in Afghanistan right now we we're just not there yet and I think that needs to be more of greater priority in terms of the U.S. engaging with its Afghan partners um so the bottom line for CENTCOM I would suggest is one temper expectations um we are going into uh now what is going to be a very contentious presidential election season it's very difficult to sell uh those hardened fighters you're trying to either turn or become neutral actors on the viable alternative that the afghan government is going to be responsive and be there for you given that you're really nobody knows what's going to happen here in the next six to eight months so we have to be cognizant of that in Kabul I would say that the military has to continue to coordinate with the state department with the embassy to I think more concertedly and constructively press the afghan political elite to have some of the tough conversations that they haven't yet to build some sort of even broad consensus on on what they might be willing to live with or at least bring to initial negotiations with the Taliban because those conversations to my view have not have not occurred yet and need to now in the out in the field I think CENTCOM needs to articulate to the train advice and assist commands who are already carrying out several challenging missions with limited personnel need to articulate very carefully how they are will be expected to contribute to I think one a better understanding of the local atmospherics and what might be in the realm of the possible in terms of reaching out or engaging potentially disaffected commanders in the context of everything else they're having to do and I would also say that you know down at that level message afghan officials if this is the case that the US and coalition are willing to accept reduction in violence as a priority and there is flexibility there for them to reach out to local fighters and you know cut some of the deals quite frankly that have been going on for years in afghanistan I remember being in helmand in 2011 and it was common knowledge that a lot of the candaks out in the more sparsely populated areas had effectively cut non-aggression deals with some of the insurgent elements I think if we're more open and honest about the necessity again number one to reduce violence in afghanistan I think that opens up more opportunities to see some progress there and with that I'll stop thank you Jason I think maybe in the interest of time we're almost at noon so I'll go straight to the fourth question and turn it to vicram and it's the panelists will all have a chance to launch broadsides against each other on any of these issues they care to the question is the regional one and it specifically it's how can we increase the resolve and capability of regional actors to advance afghan reconciliation which I interpret in this context to mean the search for a political settlement in priority order please consider pakistan china russia iran india and ks and saudi arabia briefly and I think you want me to do that in three minutes right well thanks I have lots to say on all of these other issues but let's let's talk about the the region real quickly so you know in many ways afghanistan's uh political and military security woes stem from what extra afghan parties have done over the years over the centuries right so you have a country that's born of a of a pact between russia and and and the in the british empire um and you've had uh you know variations of the great game being played uh all along so most critically everyone will point out that you know what does pakistan what how much how much does uh a peace process matter if if pakistan isn't willing to to uh to actually be a part a party to the process and then a supporter of any political outcome and I think that's fundamental I mean I do think that of the regional powers uh pakistan and iran and to a degree russia if it were to choose to but certainly pakistan and iran have a pretty major capacity to be significant spoilers there's lots of entities that can be spoilers from political parties within the country to taliban to taliban factions to all sorts of folks can be spoilers uh you know I always with peace processes uh you know from the losers come the spoilers so those who perceive they may be losing will have an incentive to try to disrupt a peace process even if the aggregate outcome is better for everyone um so for with pakistan the question is do they uh do they want a political settlement or do they want to continue supporting the taliban and supporting proxies that uh provide them uh instability that is preferable to potentially bad bad stability from a pakistani standpoint i.e. uh lots of indian influence a limit of pakistani power uh reduction of pakistan's role in the region potential insecurity stemming from afghanistan that would threaten uh pakistan from its already insecure borderlands historically the sort of chaos of armed groups having sway that the pakistanis interface with through their intelligence and military apparatus and manage um it's not great I think a lot of pakistanis would say in the abstract we'd love to fix that but it's also what they know and it's a it's a it's a it's a system that um for all its flaws is is the only thing that really has any history or familiarity my feeling is the pakistan and I think the pakistanis have shown some interest my feeling is that um you know a political settlement that allows taliban that the pakistanis know to return to positions of influence in the most critical border provinces in the south and east of afghanistan in a way that reassures the pakistanis that they sustain some influence in those border regions I think that is certainly in the realm of something pakistan would support what it hasn't known is where are the other major players in this will the afghan government tolerate that or other afghan actors will the united states and the rest of the international community have fought so hard in afghanistan support something like that and so I think that I think pakistan's interests really haven't shifted in the entire time that this has been going on and pakistan has been relatively clear about what those interests are the the problem is that protecting those interests has meant that pakistan has been on the wrong side of a lot of bad actors in the region and has diminished the goodwill and the willingness to find a way to to a table that includes pakistan there have been a lot of attempts the you know pakistanis supported one attempted set of peace talks that others here know know well the pakistanis I think already they released a muliburada recently suggests um you know I think it is most likely a gesture of some sort so I don't know that I don't know details but it's uh it it seems to me that they're ready to do something iran similarly wants to maintain its traditional relationships into harat it has huge concerns around the drug trade um and it has large concerns around economics for china and russia I think you start looking you should also look to economics you know one of the things that I think makes it hard uh for americans to think about this region in a way that meshes up our interests with the interests of everyone there is right now we're bearing the costs for the instability what they're looking for is how they reap the benefits of future stability so they're looking at economic integration they're looking at do we improve our strategic position vis-a-vis our neighbors and are we the beneficiaries if this historic obstacle to trade and commerce and things opens up um and where the united states falls on that is largely I think unknown to a lot of the players in the region you know russia just held this Moscow uh conference uh and sort of indicated hey we want to get back in the game uh there's been some breathless speculation about russia's playing the great game again and things like that and of course hamid karzai has regularly said that we should throw ourselves our lot in with the russians rather than uh rather than these awful americans and so there's always drama around it but I think you have to look at the fundamental strategic interests if russia can sort of give the americans a hard time by poking her eye in afghanistan can enjoy us continuing to expend blood and treasure in afghanistan that's fine that's fine with them in the long term the russians also would probably benefit from a stable from stabilization in this region certainly russia stands to benefit from investments in infrastructure it increases in transit and trade that would come from more chinese investment going through central asia and the chinese very clearly made a big bet on the china pakistan economic corridor and on the belt and road initiative and for them to uh being able to take advantage of a different environment makes a lot of sense so what can we do I don't think um and we didn't do the Saudis I think with the Saudis and the and the Qataris I think it's much more a matter of influence so and I don't think you can take away the current developments with Saudi Arabia having that having an impact on whether the Saudis play more or less of a role right now I think it's a pretty good moment for Qatar um you know they're hosting the only official political recognized presence of the Taliban I think Basra Khalilzad was there for maybe three full days of discussions this week and if the Saudis were thinking we're going to get a piece of that we want to be the center for engaging with the Taliban and we want to use our historic relationship with Pakistan to be the people who broke or something here I think the space for the Saudis is actually is is pretty pretty quickly shrinking and things you know facts on the ground are going to outpace what they can achieve but what they would like um is to have a role in uh in in shaping where Pakistan and Afghanistan go in the future I mean that's that that relationship that Pakistan relationship is extremely important to the Saudis um but I think they're they're going to be really fixated on more near term concerns in the in the immediate future um the bottom line is we can't it's not it's not really about the United States being able to get other countries to be more supportive if there is a viable process there's a viable uh peace process underway every one of those regional players is going to want to have a position in that process have a role to play and be able to protect its interests as that process advances what's incumbent upon us is to try to understand those interests understand what things might motivate those countries to take more negative destructive paths in a in a future in a future settlement and try to mitigate against those and for the United States to try to do so while advancing U.S. interests which I think remain basically what they have been for all these years so I won't keep talking because I could go into you know 10 minutes on each country but but you know roughly speaking that's a that's that's a thumbnail thank you for that Vikram um we'll go to the fifth and final question from STCOM it's a big one so I want to give each panelist a chance to speak on this one though I think it's in all of our interests to despite the largeness of the question to try and track tackle it quickly and it's is our current approach referring to the United States's current approach undermining the path to stability in Afghanistan what are the drivers of instability and the buffers against it and what U.S. government actions could be counterproductive to stability in Afghanistan and maybe I'll go first to Ursula and Kabul well the current path to stability I think the approach to current path to stability to stability is so far at least there are some positive moves like getting finally after 16 years of you know being engaged in war on terror to come up with an idea of peace approach and contributing to peace and negotiations is positive and it's highly welcomed by Afghans in general I would say so there is a very positive sign that at least if not entirely fully optimistic but at least the positive sign were getting closer to peace however in this approach like I just ended my comments earlier rushing it up is a major concern so a high speed into coming up with something that will be more like an event than a process is worrying us so our hope and expectation from our partners in the United States is to to ensure there is a lasting sort of an approach that's that results into a lasting peace rather than some rush for current political demands of the global actors in terms of what actions could be counterproductive I think again that links back to rushing it up because for example not having a very clear definition of how this piece is going to be materialized are we going to implement the DER as I was saying or are we going to recognize state within the state for example as it is expected by some of the parties involved or are we what is the the sort of a settlement that we are looking at and these are kind of critical questions and most important questions lead the the largest question for half of the population of Afghanistan is the place of women in this whole talks and okay as a woman I would like to bring that up that so where are we are going to be standing in this negotiation and where is our place and I'm putting that up here of course this is a message more from my own government and people from Afghanistan being involved but also from from our partners and allies in the United States there is an expectation to to give a full recognition to the reality that women in Afghanistan has been they have managed to to develop in progress well despite of course challenges that we face but to just go back to a kind of a system just for the sake of regional interests of some countries and groups or particular interests of one faction into the fighting we should not compromise what has been achieved and of course in terms of learning lessons the same way we would like everyone else to learn lessons from the experiences of the past women in Afghanistan also will learn from our experiences of how we could approach things differently so to me in general I think the current approach is at least directing us towards a right direction however there are these really critical points to consider while moving ahead great thank you very much could I go to Laurel next sure just go down the line in terms of what might be counterproductive I think it's certainly good that the United States government now perceives a sense of urgency about negotiating a political settlement but it would be distinctly counterproductive in my view if that urgency were converted into expediency and if if US internal expectations are not properly managed to recognize that the process of negotiating a peace agreement that has some realistic prospect of being implemented and enduring is going to be very hard we can talk in the Q&A about why and what are some of the issues that will have to be negotiated but I do not think there is an expedient solution here that also has a prospect of being implemented there is a theoretically conceivable version of a peace agreement that might be negotiated relatively quickly and that would be a partial or what I would call a very thin agreement rather than a comprehensive agreement one that say puts in place an interim government makes some kind of commitment on the part of the US and NATO to draw down forces without which there will be no peace agreement and then just adopt some principles and sets in motion some processes for dealing with everything else later either through that transitional government or through some other mechanism I think that kind of approach would be a recipe for implementation failure in Afghanistan there is extremely high risk that the process that would then become stuck in a transitional phase with no exit other than a return to conflict transitional governments in many experiences around the world tend to be weak and dysfunctional I would expect that to be the case in Afghanistan and so if too much burden was put on transitional mechanisms to sort out all the very hard issues related to internal security architecture regional dynamics and long-term political system I think the weight of it would be too much for a transitional a transitional government to bear in particular once the attention that is focused on Afghanistan in the course of a peace process fades because because one can declare that an agreement was achieved now you know that you could say that the experience in Afghanistan of the bond agreement in 2001 was an exception to this and that a transitional government and process with the roadmap was put in place that was essentially adhered to but the conditions in Afghanistan are different now than they were at that time we are now in an era of declining international commitment to Afghanistan not rising international commitment to Afghanistan and though I would hope that the international community in the aftermath of a peace agreement if there is one would recognize importance and value of supporting implementation including financially supporting implementation I don't think it's realistic to expect a repeat of the post 2001 history of not initially but eventually a flood of international resources and attention and UN mission at the scale that it was and the other international efforts there and so there was an international guarantee and particularly a U.S. guarantee of implementation of the bond roadmap that I would not expect to be the case in Afghanistan after a peace agreement at this stage and so I think it's very risky to see that as an explicit model to follow once again in in Afghanistan that's not to say that a comprehensive settlement couldn't be negotiated in stages and I think if there is a need politically in the United States to show progress and achievements in a peace process it could be done in that fashion where you you agree in stages on elements of a comprehensive settlement that can then be declared but aren't really in effect until the whole agreement is is concluded and that would that would fit with experiences elsewhere in the world but that's different than settling for a partial transitional agreement that as I said sets in place principles and processes but doesn't really resolve the hard issues that will have to be resolved thanks the I think the the U.S. approach being right now having a sort of an an open commitment and now having appointed someone to be in charge of diplomacy and apparently having that that appointment of Ambassador Khalilzad actually marking a shift of U.S. attention being squarely on a potential peace process I think that is something the United States is doing right and in a way that is is more comprehensive than what we've seen before so making sure that that is is not just sort of you know something that looks good but something that is actually true that basically the diplomatic effort to push for a peace process is enabled by a team by a negotiating team that is supported by all the elements of U.S. national power that's that is that's powerful and that means there's someone authoritative to talk to both the Taliban and the Afghan government to say we can let's find where this common ground is and bring the various parties to the table that also gives you the weight to bring the region to the table which is what's which is ultimately going to be extremely important for any long-term success of a deal you know there's there's a there's a lot of risk of rushing or be doing a thin a kind of agreement to sort of declare victory and get out which I think is something that would be very attractive and potentially politically very attractive that said I also think there's a there's a there's actually a lot of space to put the effort into the long slog as Lauren calls it of what peace processes normally are even if it's not a long slog to get to a piece process it is a long slog to implement one the majority of peace agreements fail um they fail in large part because there isn't the economic support and the enforcement and enforcement mechanisms for that agreement after it's after it's eight and the and the interested parties step away this is this is an unfortunate reality it's very well documented another mistake would be to sort of continue to debate is peace possible or not possible at all rather than simply plan for a process and plan for implementation early so right now it's time to shift thinking from can we get you know this many dollars for afghanistan this year can we keep supporting just these programs start thinking what does it look like to support in afghanistan that's actually trying to implement what will be a difficult peace agreement right to make that sustainable or we start can we start getting commitments you know in advance to to bolster that kind of an agreement you always have to remember that the losers become the spoilers so what about all the you know it's easy to forget that it's not just the afghan government the taliban united states and the neighbors there's a whole bunch of segments of afghan society that also feel alienated from the government and they need to be a part of any kind of settlement process so you know if the if the americans have a have a credible negotiating team what's that afghan credible negotiating team look like how does it include representatives of different elements of afghan society such that it'll have the broadest possible legitimacy to carry forward this kind of a mission including women including minority groups including you know probably can't just be you know a government delegation that's only of the actual government it's going to be have to have some way to tie in more broadly into afghan society and the same goes for the taliban at the end of the day we don't yet know if there's a credible afghan afghan taliban negotiating team that's empowered and that's going to be a necessary that's going to be a necessary part so just as I wouldn't want to rush forward I also wouldn't want to negotiate with non-empowered counterparts right so confidence building measures become something that you have to be done to some degree I think there's value in getting quickly to the issues at hand so what is power sharing going to look like what is security going to look like what are social rules and norms going to look like is there going to be a new constitutional process is there you know what kind of reforms I think all of those matter but I think getting there absent enough some confidence building measures to make sure we know you know you're sort of at the dance with the right people I think that's that's a potential that's a potential avenue of mistakes right of having you know a lot of effort going into something that doesn't necessarily have the potential to go anywhere I mean I think this is you know most a peace process probably has you know 10 chance of succeeding anyone you want to start out on it's not these are not it's not like you just decide oh we want to have peace and then we have it much like military operation they you know they rarely survive you know plans don't survive first contact with the enemy and that's true in general a willingness to put the energy into a peace process should be at least commiserate with our willingness to put the energy into a military a military mission that has potentially a low likelihood of success and so I hope that we can find the the wherewithal to give this a real try look I'll just very quickly point out I think one of the most underappreciated elements of last year's south asia strategy review was that for the first time you had unanimity across the u.s. interagency that the top priority in afghanistan is the attainment of a political agreement that includes the taliban now that is pretty profound given our history since 9 11 in the country now what has been the the subject of a lot of discussion and debate within the interagency since then is how to actually go about facilitating that and to just amplify what vicram just said I think the u.s. can do more to productively press the collective cobble elite meaning the national unity government the opposition and the key elements of civil society to have some of the tough conversations and to start being a little bit more articulate when they talk about what they might be willing to engage when if and when they talk to the taliban and and you really fundamentally ensure that the the interest of what is a very diverse polity are accounted for in any negotiations and I'll just stop there thank you all for that I'll say that when we embarked on this exercise for cent come I wasn't sure that any five questions could really capture the full range of considerations involved in such a complex peace process and maybe they can't but I'm really struck by how far the four of you ranged from these starting points I think we'll only have time for one question here but I want to give right a first refusal to our friends at cent come for either any reactions you've had or any follow-on question that would be especially salient to the command for any or all of the panelists thanks johnny just a quick introduction general Langley had to depart he had to go to another meeting I'm Brigadier McPregna from the Australian Army I'm Deputy Director of J5 branch here we've also got in the room a number of coalition and regional partners plus from US folks so we've got a very diverse audience in here thank you for the incredibly insightful comments from across the panel as you said they were diverse and you know a lot of food for thought in there there's a couple of a couple of key takeaways from me I think we've your final question about are we doing the right thing or are we undermining the process you know you could probably sum it up and we've maybe we've finally sort of reached the right approach after having tried every other possible approach to get to this point I've spent a lot of years in Afghanistan over the past sort of 14 years and yeah one one thing I know you cannot win a war in Afghanistan with 150,000 foreign troops it has to be an afghan centric solution over there a couple of key takeaways that was Ella made a comment about the that sort of light bulb emotional moment when with the ceasefire that is first time in 40 years that has happened I think that is a really important moment and opportunity Laurel commented on the whether the you know whatever happens in a peace process is it a merger or is it an acquisition I think that is a you know I don't think we ever thought that we would be talking about a merger at this stage I think we always thought in terms of hostile takeover or acquisition Jason made a comment about the sort of three camps and that I think that is important are we looking at Taliban as a monolithic bloc or is there phases of extremism and I saw this with the Higg reconciliation last year when Higgment year was coming across and my question is going to be about Higg reconciliation is that what Taliban reconciliation looks like we sort of have a pragmatic element that looks to reconcile and partly that's about economics you know we we need jobs we need to feed ourselves but as they tried to reconcile the hard line elements of the Taliban were assassinating Higg leadership and many of the Higg leadership were fearful of the warlords who was on the government side so there was a sort of a carrot and stick element to reconciliation there as well so my question I guess is is that what peace eventually looks like or does it look like pragmatic elements kind of joining the government believing a unreconcilable element that will always be there and over to you I'd be happy to take that on I think there is almost no respect in in which the Higg deal is a model for reconciliation with the Taliban except at just the most general conceptual level of some kind of agreement I wouldn't even call that you know an acquisition I would call that a you know a buyout of a spent force it from a Taliban perspective it's completely unacceptable as a model because it looks like a surrender for you know it looks like they're they sold their honor and dignity cheaply and the agreement is just all about goodies for the for the Higg in exchange for a nominal reconciliation that in fact hasn't even been implemented very well particularly what might have been some more interesting elements related to reintegration of the forces have been very difficult to to implement so even in its practical details it hasn't been a particularly good example I would also say you know it's it is much more like what I described as as what I would consider a very dangerous agreement for the United States to support one that just sets up processes mechanisms principles and procedures for the future lots of committees set up but not actually resolving any issues which for that agreement perhaps made sense in that there weren't any big issues that could really be addressed in a in a way that would bring peace to Afghanistan in a in a deal with the Higg but it was also a little less so in its final version than in some of the interim versions but I also thought it was a very imbalanced agreement from an afghan government perspective it was predominantly give from the afghan government perspective and very little get other than you know a had to be wrung out of heq matia at the end of the day statement against terrorism which he didn't even really enthusiastically make so you know wasn't something to stand in the way of if the afghan government saw some benefit in it but I didn't personally see it as really advancing the cause of peace or something that I would look at as a as a model in fact there's some elements in which it's now set a threshold that you would at least have to meet or exceed in a deal with Taliban even on some elements where you might not have wanted to like on amnesty provisions for instance how can you give less now to the Taliban than you gave to you know the butcher of Kabul not to put to find a point thank you for that we have one minute left if any of other panelists like to add a word I would just say that I think that likelihood of a deal that doesn't have some irreconcilable forces out there is kind of zero so the question becomes enforcement mechanisms and in a in a deal that is you know the problem with the fragmentation approach is you often end up with little monsters that are even worse than what you're trying to settle with right and it's also the problem of decapitation you often you often kill a senior leader and a you know high value target gets taken off the battlefield and something worse comes up behind less discipline less plan less controlled you know that's so there's a lot of risks to that in a in a successful deal there's enough of a critical mass in the deal that those that the that the that the parties to the deal are all parties to the enforcement of the deal so that is to say the Taliban will self-enforce against any potential spoilers too and drive them either over to ISIS or into isolation or to see how you know see how well those guys do but but they would be they would be party to enforcement of a deal that suggests that you have to get a certain level of deal it has to be it has to be it ultimately a political agreement to end what is ultimately a political war about about how the how the afghan polity is divided and and run and orzala did i hear you we can go to you for the final word yes uh just to add to excellent points regarding a hig in knots making that's comparable with any potential settlement that is going to happen with Taliban i think i fully agree and i just one point that i would like to add is that that agreement to that agreement to begin with was nothing to do with with peace except with the usage of peace as something more of a rhetoric it was more a power politics the way that it actually played when it happened and the way that is playing in practice now we can see why he was brought in he was brought in in general so the critical message that i would like to be here with is this conflict has local regional and global elements and in a natural fact even resolution of this conflict is also becoming another conflict if i can say there are multiple actors now strongly trying to engage and taking the ownership of the so-called peace settlement we have to watch out for that and make sure that we all speak the same language and with the hope that Afghanistan would return to a more stable and peaceful country in a place that can embrace all of you here in Kabul for another nice discussion about culture history and how we can talk about this as a memory thank you thank you as a as one last final word i'll just say peace is possible in this conflict it's tremendously difficult in the process it always has been and if it succeeds it will require some really difficult trade-offs from every side that push every side's beliefs and interests to to the utmost but this is a special moment where i think you can begin to see enough openness to this process on all sides that one can imagine where the venn diagram overlaps and what a compromise might actually start to look like that can address every side's interest and certainly this notion is overwhelmingly popular in afghanistan by by any measure that's possible to make so i'd like to thank sent com for their interest in this issue their amazing work on it more broadly for their service both the united states and afghanistan and many other countries too that they're responsible for and i'd like to thank our amazing panelists please join me