ário ొľшего ొľ cetera  fictionalism of mind which plays vital role in the contemporary issues of sagt foulasopio mind. Functionalism may be defined as a theory that explains mental phenomena in terms of ʎ ḥ Correct ʎ Ḥ Current ʾ T automatic ʾPathки Ḥ ʎ NXT- skeletitzer ʁEN. ʎ搭i Ḥ Aaa ʎ ʁ ʎ ʋ ʃ ʋ as yas of behavior where one causes and another effect is there and at the same time this functionality statuses which is against also dualism because the functionality holds that the mind is not something that exists apart from physical because for them mind is not something physical rather than it is something functional therefore it goes against dualism. వ్బర్టిండాకోనోరిందర్గానిలెచిందోటొసిండిధోత్ఞ్తిందిండాంంది చారోతింటాఢికోటిక్ందొిందింది నిదోటన్తాన్టాపోఋలరనేస్టిఘిం నావాస్స్థతా విస్సికిసిం. మిత్నిత్ పిపెపి విసినాట్తోని మి విసిట్కిస్పకా. పిసిమాటిసికిసిరౡంసికికి. are simply computational states of the brain. Even if there is no psychology according to functionalistic model of mind, according to Putnam, the proper way to think of the brain is as a digital computer. Our psychology is to be described as the software of this computer, its functional organization. The main concern of the functionalism is to specify the relations between the different sorts of thought and behavior. It is the view that mental states are defined in terms of their causal relations to sensory inputs, behavioral outputs and other mental states. It acknowledges the fact that it is impossible to identify mental states with behavioral distributions. But it characterizes mental state by referring to behavior as the output. By characterizing mental states in terms of other causal roles, functionalism explains how a subject behaves in different circumstances. For example, when we experience pain, our experience has a characteristic feel. Thus, we have a conscious experience and experience with certain qualities or qualia. But for functionalism, these qualities are particular kind of causal role in our psychological processes. But in the case of qualia, as we know that qualia is a qualitative conscious experience. This concept plays vital role in the philosophy of mind. Whenever we explain the non-computational view of mind, mind is non-computational which goes also against functionalistic thesis that establishes. It is because of the conscious experience which is qualia which cannot be explainable in third person perspective. But the way functionalists are explaining is a kind of third person perspective of mind, not the third person perspective of mind. According to functionalism, there are three different kind of causal relations for mental states causal role. First, there is the input condition that a subject's environment states can cause that subject to have a certain type of mental state. For example, injury to one's leg causes him or her to feel pain. Secondly, there is the output condition that a certain type of mental state can interrupt causally with other mental states of the same subject that is feeling pain in his or her leg causes him or her to believe that the leg has been injured again. Thirdly, there is the internal role condition that there are characteristics which in which a certain type of mental state can give rise causally to the bodily behavior of its subject. For example, the subject believes that his or her leg has been injured and he or she has desired to relieve the consequent pain and causes the leg to withdraw from harm's way. Thus, there is an input-output relations between the environment and the mind and the behavior of the subject. But for functionalism, mental states are characterized as software state of a computer-like in terms of their relation to the computer's inputs and outputs. But according to P. M. Churchland is one of the profounder of functionalistic model of mind as well as a nidocentific model of mind. For Churchland, the term hardware refers to the physical computer itself and its peripheral devices such as the keyboard for input, widows, screens and printers for outputs and external or passive memory, tapes, disks, drums for both. It contrasts with the term software which denotes a sequence of instructions that tell hardware what to do. Thus, software of a computer means it is storing of a particular piece of information which is like a subject possession of certain belief. A software state may be contrasted with a hardware state of the computer such as an electromagnetic state of certain of its circuits which correspondingly is linked to a neural state of a person's brain. For example, the computer inputs are key strokes on its keyboard whereas its outputs are patterned displays on its video screen. These are linked to stimulation of a subject sensory organs and movement of his or her body. But according to this kind of functionalistic model of mind says that the biological functions of the heart is to circulate blood through the body and thereby keeping the body oxygenated and nourished. The biological function of the brain is to gather information from the body's environment and processes that informs in accordance with certain programs that have been installed in it either by genetic evolution or else through learning processes. For a functionalistic the same mental state can be physically realized in a variety of different ways and so it is multiply realizable. The multiple realizability model of mind is one of the classic example for the functionalistic model of mind. This model says that there can be indefinitely many different physical properties which are total realization of the same functional properties. According to Schumacher and White having a given total realization of a functional property is sufficient for having that property. It is not necessary for it that same functional property could be instantiated in virtue of the instantiation of some quite different total realization of it. However the block and the photo have argued that the same physical state can realize different functional properties at different times or in different circumstances or in different creatures. But according to functionalism mental states and processes are functional kinds to accept physicalism and claims that our mental states are implemented in a neural stuff and not in a spiritual stuff. So on the level of descriptions there is the causal and logical relation among perceptions, beliefs, desires and behaviors and on the structural level there are spiking frequencies of neurons, patterns of excitations and many other mental activities. But on the other hand if you see the multiple depth model which is given by Daniel C. Dennett he suggests that the similar kind of explanations and he says that the function of the human mind and those of the computer the brain system function in relation to the different sub system. So there are multiple drafts which operate within an artificial system. Such an analogy is beneficial because it analyzes consciousness from the point of view of language processing. This is given importance precisely in the sense that a linguistic or language speaking being is considered not only as a conscious being but also a rational being. Even the robots as information processing systems can also be characterized as intelligent systems. According to Dennett we are machines we are just very very sophisticated machines made of organized molecules instead of metal and silicon and we are conscious. So there can be conscious machines like us. So the human thought processes and language processing in the artificial systems are analogous to each other. In the case of the conscious thought processes we are aware of our thoughts at the same time there is a psychochemical process which goes on in our brain. Dennett is one of the strong functionalistic model of mind and he has been arguing that mind is can be explainable in terms of machines. Dennett's functional analysis of consciousness is divided into two parts namely the proportional view of consciousness and the multiple draft model of consciousness. The sub-personal model of consciousness explains consciousness and other mental activities through the help of neurological states and processes of the organism whereas the multiple draft model discusses how an artificial system behaves intelligently. Dennett's offer a functional explanation of consciousness at the sub-personal level. The sub-personal level of explanations of consciousness tries to explain not how the human beings are system of organism but how the system is being constituted and how the various functions involved in different physiological patterns of the organism function together and that functional structure would help us in defining the capacity involved in causing consciousness or what we call conscious behavior. A state of consciousness is simply one which exhibits a certain characteristics, patterns of causal relations to other states both mental and physical. For the cognitive theorist a functional state of the brain is just like a computational state of a computer. It seems we have a perfect model of functional organization in a computer program. A computer program can be described as being functional organization of the hardware. The programmers provide the organization of the hardware which causes it to produce a described result. Nowadays functional state argues that mental states are like the information processing states of a computer. The way human mind is functioning in the same way a system is functioning therefore for functionalistic there is no distinction between or difference between mind and body or mind and machines according to the computer functionalism which is artificial intelligence or strong artificial intelligence especially on the strong AI and AI artificial intelligence model of mind which I will be discussing elaborately in the future lectures. But the concept of artificial intelligence or strong AI is very much related to the functionalistic thesis of mind. The way AI or strong artificial intelligence scientists are claiming that there is a possibility to have a machines which are minds in the same way in the classic way functionalistic models are trying to explain that the brain is a computer and the mind is a computer program implemented in the brain. Mental states are just program states of the brain however the functionalistic face a problem regarding consciousness this seems to think that our conscious feeling of pain consistent entirely in the functional analyzed program states of a digital computer in our skull thus when it comes to conscious feelings such as pain there is a difference between functionalists and others according to our ordinary common sense conceptions pain are on present sensations that is they are on present in our qualitative subjective experience whereas the functionalists believe that pains are physical states that are part of patterns of functional organization in brains in human beings the functional organizations like this certain input stimuli such as injuries causes physical states of the nervous systems and there is in turn causes certain sort of physical output behavior these are computational information processing states in humans these functional organized physical states do not causes pain they are just pains a functional defined any mental states in terms of its typical relation to other mental change and its effects on its behavior functionalism can be more easily understood through a comparison with the relationship between a computer and its program while talking about computers it is convenient to make a distinction between hardware and software the hardware of a computer is what it is physically made of of transistors circuits silicon chips screens keyboard and many other physical properties are there the software on the other hand is the software of a computer program the system of the operations which the hardware carries out the hardware can usually be adopted for use in a number of different systems the software is usually a complicated system of instructions to the computer hardware which can be physically carried out in a number of different ways but achieving the same results is a theory of mind as I have explained which is concerned with the software of a thought rather than the hardware it is not a theory about the hardware of thought at all although it is certainly compatible with various kinds of physicalism it is neutral about what sorts of physical systems mental programs operates in it its main concern is to specify the relations which are held between the different sorts of thought and behavior therefore function does not give an adequate account of conscious experience and sensation such as what it is like to be in pain or to be unhappy or to be thinking about whether or to be thinking about pain or to be thinking about something else why it is not committing because of its commitment to the physicalism functionalism is criticized by many philosophers as it does not give a sufficient account of conscious experience and sensations because it fails to account for the real nature of the mental states because it reduced mental state to the machine states the way material list reduces mind into matter for functions they are reducing mind into machines the function is to always live out the qualitative subjective feeling of some of our mental states they are certain qualitative experiences involved with our mental states such as seeing a red object or having a pain in leg and many other mental states but functions describes only these experiences in terms of their causal relations and lives out the qualia which is one of the important concept in mind because without this is very difficult to explain the concept of mind and consciousness as well as in the metaphysical way self metaphorically we can explain about consciousness metaphorically we can ascribe something as consciousness but metaphysical we cannot ascribe or explain something machine as a self which is belongs to some conscious subject therefore functionalism is able to explain the mental states in terms of the functional set of the brain but cannot explain the inner or qualitative nature of our mental state in case of color sensation for example when viewing a tomato I have what really a sensation of green where you have the normal sensation of red but since we have no way of comparing our inner qualia and we both have the same observations the discriminations among objects there is no way to tell whether my spectrum is inverted relative to yours the problem for functionalism is that even if my spectrum is inverted relative to yours we remain functionally isomorphic with each others my visual sensation is functionally identical with yours visual sensations therefore they are the same type of state and it does not make sense to suppose that my sensation is really a sensation of green if it meets the functional condition for being a sensation of red then by definition it is a sensation of red according to functionalism a spectrum inversion of the object described is ruled out by definitions therefore functionalism fails to characterize our color experience in case of spectrum inversion there is no difference between my color experience and your color experience because in respect of color experiences we are functionally equivalent that means my color experiences and your color experiences would exhibit exactly the same pattern of causal relations to environmental states other mental states and also other mental states and also other behavior after all they would have exactly the same causal role our color experiences have the most striking feature called qualitative character which we have already discussed that according to functionalism the mental states are functional state that is the mind is a complicated machines and mental processes are computational processes which can be realized in a machines but mental states are realized by their relation to their sensory stimulations or inputs by other inner states or their behavioral aspects consciousness would be mental processes with certain kind of causal relation to the inputs there are so many different varieties of functionalism is based on different model and all of which try to specify the different sorts of inputs output relations the main concern of the function is to specify the relations between different sorts of thought and behavior it tries to individuates mental states causally as mental states have mental causes and effects as well as sensory causes and behavioral effects thus functionalism explains that our mental states are naturally related to what goes on in the brain or the central nervous systems in any case there are physical states and are related with each other through causal relations for example an intelligent robot has mental states but its thinking depends on silicon chips rather than biological neurons some of the limitations and criticism is to AI model of mind which I will be discussing in the next lectures but let us see the varieties of functionalism according to the computer functionalism which is atypsa intelligence or strong AI the brain is a computer and the mind is a computer program implemented in the brain mental states are just program states of the brain secondly the strong functionalistic model of mind says that our concept of a particular mental states type as a state whose tokens have a strictly defined causal functional role or ultimately sensory input and behavioral output for every psychological distinct type of mental state m there is a distinct corresponding functional role r in case of but in the case of moderate functionalism for every psychological distinct type of a mental state m there is a some functional role r which can be assigned to m in this case which functional role correspond to whose type of mental state has to be determined by empirical investigations but in the case of common functionalistic model of mind this common functionalistic model claim that the same mental state can be physically realize in a different way of ways that is for every mental state m there are different ways of realizing it what matters is the functional organization of the state and not the stuff out of which it is made this is called multiple realizability theories on which I have already explained and some of the things which I will be explaining in the while I will explain on artificial intelligence model of mind but loose in his essays on mad pain and martin pain discusses two kinds of beings pain differently than normal humans in the case of mad pain the subject experiences pain when doing moderate exercises in an empty stomach it improves his concentrations for mathematical reasoning on the other hand martin pain takes place in a martin organism constructed of hydraulic hardware rather than neurons here the point is that pain is associated only contingently with either it causes as in mad pain or its physical realization as in martin pain we cannot specify a priori its causal role or physical realization as you have seen that according to multiple realizability there can be indefinitely many different physical properties which constitute the realization of the same functional properties however it is also true that the same physical states can realize different functional properties at different times or in different circumstances or in different creatures the functional states are multiple realizable in the sense that a functional state cannot be identical to any particular physical realization of it for example someone could write a program using two completely different types of computer which use different source of hardware to run the same program in this sense the program said to be multiple realizable in that any number of computers may be used to realize the same program functionalism state of mind and mental property to be functional states and properties but in the case of mental properties according to multiple realizability model of mind they are multiple realizable by but not identical with material properties for example the same mental property the property of being in pain may be realized by one property in a human and to a certain extent by another property in an inverted breath for the functionalist if someone has now a particular pain then he or she can imagine that this pain is realized through a particular neural state that neural state has an identifiable material structure and this may be studied by low level hardware science like neurobiology therefore for functionalism what makes the state a realization of a pain is not its material constitutions but its occupying a particular kinds of causal role within our nervous systems thus multiple real reality models implies that there is a higher level functional description of physical state in terms of their causal role which abstracts from their low level physical constitutions it is within such functional properties that mental properties can be identified now we have to see the way network block is explaining functionalism according to him there are three kinds of functionalism the first is simple decomposition functionalism which refer to a research program that relies on the decomposition of a system into its components and then the whole system is explained in terms of these functional parts secondly computational representational functionalism that describe mind as a computer or computer as mind psychological explanation under computations representations functionalism is akin to providing a computer program for the mind thus mental processes are seen as being decomposable to a point where they can be thought of as a processes that are as simple as those of a digital computer or simply a touring machine lastly block identifies that metaphysical functionalism this form of functionalism is a theory of mind that hypothesis that mental states simply are functional states the metaphysical functionalism or the metaphysical functionalists claims that mental states are functional states because they have the causal relations between inputs and the mental states of the system as in the touring machines but the machine functionalism dexterized human brain in three levels the first two are scientific level such as biological and the machine program or computational the third is the common sense level of folk psychology at the first level biologist describe human neuro functional terms and makes available neurophysiological description of brain states at the second level psychologist work out the machine program that is realized by the lower level neuroanatomy and describe the same brain state through more abstract computational terms at the third level psychologist also explains behavior characterized in everyday terms by referring to stimuli and to the intervening mental states such as beliefs desires type identifying the mental states with functional or computational states as they want the functionalist thinks that all of our mental states can be defined in terms of functional states functional states play a causal role in the system it does not matter what the increasing make up of those states is in humans they are certain kinds of brain state but in martins which I have already shown in Lewis examples and he says that they would likely be different sort of states in the case of martins in an appropriate programmed computer the electronic states and these would be different physical realization of the same causal roles the functionalist thus identify our mental state with causal roles according to net block functionalism is guilty of physicalism because for the functionalist pain is identical to a physical state or it is a fast order physical property or that is token physicalism however some philosopher do not accept this because they argue that if functionalism is true then physicalism is probably false if pain is a functional state it cannot be brain state because creatures without brain can realize the same Turing machines programmed as creatures with brain states but blocks part objection to common sense functionalism that it is too liberal that is it attributes mental state to too many things including things which intuitively have no mental life because in the case of common sense functionalists which specify that inputs in terms of light and sound falling on one sense organs and output as the moment of arms and legs mental states in terms of causal relation to these inputs and outputs the creatures which are capable of having those mental states will have inner states standing in causal relation to inputs and outputs of those sorts but what about creatures that lack our sense organs and lack arms and legs what about creatures with different neural structures or creatures with no neurons these non human creatures obviously will lack mental states according to functionalism that will be a kind of chauvinism according to net block but functionalism accept the idea that according to such view that it is a possible to imagine that mind is like a conscious creature that do not possess qualia such creatures which fulfill functionalistic criteria for possessing a mind could not be said to be human in the full sense of the term in other words the non functionalists argue that qualia are necessarily in addition to any functionality explanation in order to account for minds functionalism agrees for mental states but disagree that they are identical with them it argues that neurological states or brain activities helps to realize mental states which then lead to behavior in this way it solves the main problem by proposing that brain states are low level activities that helps realize high level mental states to understand this point we discuss let us discuss about a computer suppose we ask a computer to add the numbers 3 and 7 on the one level at that is at a low level what is happening in the computer is dependent on the hardware but on the other level the computer software is calculating the answer since computers have different hardware and work in different ways we cannot describe the process of the process of calculation as the activities of hardware however the functionality argues that the processes of calculation is simply realized by the hardware therefore the software is function of the hardware for a functionalist consciousness would be a mental processes with certain kinds of cause relation to the inputs to the other mental states or processes and to certain behaviors one can also posit the instance of zombies on conscious beings that have the same behavior and the same brain states but having no quality the functionality theory fails to prove the qualitative aspects which I have already argued and which I will be explaining more on why I will explain David Chalmers concept of mind especially the phenomenal concept of mind but in the case let me explain little bit about the limitation of the functionalistic model of mind but what is like to be consciousness is not there in the case of machine function because it is possible to say that brain states causes consciousness or the functional states are caused by brain state but these things do not tell us how those objective experiences themselves arises the problem with this is that our subjective experience are the most real for us we know what it is to feel pain or to remember being at the park but the functional view does not look like include this picture therefore functionality fails to account the conscious mind or qualitative experience many limitations to functionalistic model of mind that I will be explaining in the future lectures thank you