 My name is Rachel Rizzo. I'm a senior fellow with the Europe Center at the Atlantic Council and pleased to welcome you all here this afternoon We are here at an event co-hosted by New America and Nordic West and this afternoon We are hosting an extremely Timely panel on Ukraine and the future of NATO a new era in transatlantic collective defense Last year since Russia's illegal and unjustified invasion of Ukraine The way that we think about security has been completely transformed Especially when it comes to the transatlantic alliance and European security in general the post Cold War consensus That borders could not be or should not be redrawn by force has been shattered There's instability in the region and the norms and institutions that have underpinned European security since the end of the Cold War are immensely strained But there's another side of that coin that we've seen as well The invasion of Ukraine has reinvigorated NATO and we've welcomed a new member in Finland And we hope to welcome a new member Sweden in short order, but we'll see how that goes Something Putin wanted less of Putin wanted less of NATO, but he got more of it And that just shows how important this alliance is to transatlantic security and unity The US and Europe are still deeply committed to supporting Ukraine and for now transatlantic unity seems to be holding strong Another thing that has I'm sure surprised to Putin and Moscow over the last Year and three months at this point for the next hour We're going to discuss the political and strategic implications of the war in Ukraine as well as the challenges and opportunities It presents for NATO's collective defense mission and we have the perfect panel to have this in-depth discussion First I'd like to welcome Colonel you are helly Finland's at Defense Military Naval and air attache to the United States and Canada welcome We have Ingrid ask the Minister Counselor and Deputy Chief of Mission at the Embassy of Sweden here in Washington DC. Welcome Marta Keppe who is a senior defense analyst at the Rand Corporation and Dr Angela Stent a senior advisor to the Center for Eurasian Russian and East European studies and Professor emerita of government and Foreign Service at Georgetown University as well as a non-resident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution we also have our moderator Candice Rondo director of the future frontline initiative and planetary politics initiative Here at New America and with that Candice I will hand it over to you to kick off the panel. Thank you Thank you very much. It's really good to be here. It's actually a For me an honor to be sitting alongside all of these great thinkers and doers in the world of security Democracy and protection of human rights Each in our own way. I think we all kind of have been thinking over the last year about what that means You know, we've tended to think about it as an abstraction until The beginning of the latest phase of hostilities between Russia and Ukraine But we have seen unfold on social media on camera. We've heard the voices of the victims in Ukraine We've seen the suffering also. I would like to say I would like to note of Russians who've courageously stood up and Said no to Putin's aggression and I don't think we should forget them. But most importantly, of course This has greatly affected our understanding of collective security for the transatlantic alliance. It has transformed once again relationships between the United States between Europe and with the Nordic nations and We are at a very historic inflection point. So we're going to talk a little bit about that today And kind of dive in a little bit. So I'm not going to sugarcoat this I could sort of start with the hard one, which is what about Gotland? But I think we'll get to that a little bit later. That's a little bit obscure We're going to start with I think just a simple question that's been on our mind here at New America Which is, you know, how should we be thinking about the strategic goals of the multiple? stakeholders who are now engaged in trying to ensure collective security Across the transatlantic, but in specifically how should we think about the ways in which the United States? Versus Europe versus the Nordic nations that are now engaged in NATO. How are they all thinking about what? The strategic ends look like for Ukraine. So let me start first with Colonel Halle Thank you for having me here today and Wearing uniform I must say for the start that I'm not representing my governmental government's official view My views are mine. Not even my wife shares with them with me. So That gives me at least a little bit of flexibility There's so the strategic end state in In in the war in Ukraine from the Ukrainian point of view It is clearly To restore the borders of 1991 and they are not willing to level anything less than that and and their willingness to Fight against the aggression has shown the world that they are committed to that end and I believe because of their strong resistance and fight Moscow would have to Reassess their end state and if their end state in the beginning was to basically conquer Ukraine Knowing how things are moving in the battlefield, they would Perhaps and this is my personal view They would have to come up with a situ end state where The the rest of the world from the muskos point of view Would be accepting Crimea as part of Russia But everything else they would be able to or they would be willing to kind of Give up in Ukraine But as I said Ukraine is not ready for that but This is my understanding now For NATO for EU This has been a question of Commitment for the US it has been a question of commitment and Over the past let's say six months. I have fortunately not seen any change in other words All those stakeholders are very committed to continue. I leave it here, and I think we continue All right. Thank you Thank you new America. Dr. Slaughter just came in Ben and the others and of course all the Finnish friends in the room It's great to be with you and to have this very timely conversation today There are so many things to say. I'm not sure where to start, but I guess For us, of course what has happened this past year shows that we have a big neighbor to the east that has shown contempt for international law and rules-based world order and of course our and Strategic goal cannot be any other than to show as an as an European partner and ally to Partner to Ukraine and to show that European borders cannot and will not be shifted by military force in this way We have to do everything to prevent that from from happening because of course it will have repercussions also for us If we show that this is the new norm In any way or form That cannot be accepted and that's why it's so important that we continue to cooperate on this also cross the Atlantic With the United States and all our partners in the world to push back Russia at this point in time So I'll ask you the same question What what do you see in terms of the strategic end states and goals for each of the stakeholders here? Thank you. First of all, thank you for inviting me to be part of this really interesting conversation and again The opinions that I will express here today. Do not represent the opinions of the rank corporation I think that the question is really interesting and I think I wanted to highlight another aspect that I've been thinking about Think the question of strategic aims and goals. There's also the question of this is essentially a question of war termination And in terms of war termination, we do discuss a lot the territorial aspect of war termination and That is of course very important but I think we also need to look beyond the positional question the positional aspects of war termination and was that what I really mean is is Signaling that You know, there's full support for Ukraine and the Ukraine and that also the West is really in it for For years really for as long as it takes For Russia to stop the war when you talk about war termination. I think a very important aspect of that is when we do have War termination state it is very important for us to also be convinced That the war will not continue in a year or two that it will not come back so I think that is that is a Question that I think when we do think about strategic goals and and what is the end state of the war? So Angela, I know you've got something to say about this I'm gonna run through all the countries that we talked about before so let me begin with the United States I mean the Biden administration has not been clear about You know how what its stakes are and how it thinks the war should end all it will say is that Ukraine should still be a sovereign Nation with territorial integrity, but it doesn't talk about actually what that territorial integrity is And I'm not aware that the European Union as a whole has formulated a view of this either maybe some individual countries Have so I think it's very difficult. I mean we know now that the Biden administration is certainly not pushing The Ukrainians to negotiate with the Russians. I mean we're way far away from that But I think they've been maybe deliberately And every time one tries to sort of nudge them in that direction, they don't want to say anything I'm not sure how helpful that is. I I'm not sure that this Creative ambiguity helps that much, but I guess because there's so many many unknowns they haven't done it now on Russia I would respectfully disagree With what my colleague has said I do not think Russia at this moment would would be willing to withdraw its troops as long as it gets You know recognition that Crimea is part of the Russian Federation I mean Putin started this war to conquer all of Ukraine and change the government and those that Final aim has not disappeared. It's just that obviously the Russians have done so badly on the battlefield That it's taking them much longer and they may never do it But I don't see any sign That that he's willing to do it because I think if he were then there would have been signals at least Already sent about this and the signals we get from Russia about negotiations is will negotiate when the Ukrainians surrender completely And by the way, we don't really want to negotiate. I mean Dmitry Peskov Press Secretary said that the other day and then finally China. So this is interesting We know that Xi Jinping does not want Russia to lose this war He wants Putin or someone like Putin to stay in power who can be a fellow autocrat heavily dependent on China now And and that is why we saw him go to Moscow and that's why he said the things he said and You know, we don't know what Xi and Putin discussed in the four hours They had a loan the day before they had the public discussions But we think and there are some leaks about this that they in fact did talk about the provision of weapons So I think the Chinese stake is not to see Russia lose But Not to have the conflict spread any further Those are the that's what we've seen so far Yeah, go ahead on on China I would continue that in their interest it is to continue waging this war as long as possible Because it is at reason to the West and it's in certain ways at recent definitely and actually many ways to Russia So the weaker those two elements the Western Russia are the better for China So they would balance their moves to make this war continuous as long as possible It's interesting. I I wanted to pull in a couple threads that I heard here I just make a little comment about about Russia and maybe, you know Some perspective additional perspective on on ends ways and means means there I mean, I think that I would rather agree with you Angela that It's not really just about Putin, right? I mean we often talk about putinology and it's really become a little bit of a disease in in the in the Balab and how we think about foreign policy vis-a-vis Russia There's an entire oligarchy that really depends on the system being as stable as it can be it is now Increasingly unstable. I think we greatly underestimate that the the the level of instability there But we're starting to see the cracks right and the biggest cracks that we can talk about and you know I think everybody knows about it clearly is being shown through this ultra-nationalist schism that is occurring between you have any pre-gosin And even even recently Alexander Dugan so-called Putin's brain wrote a love letter To to pre-gosin saying how Russia needs to Wagner eyes its military, which is really a very frightening prospect if you think about it But also maybe speaks to an inflection point for the internal dynamics of Russia That right now in Washington have not been fully considered In terms of where we're going next It really doesn't matter if it's Putin at this stage who's in charge I mean, it's helpful to have the the mantle of the czar Continue as as such, but I think the system is what it is system a yeast system so Having said that there are some additional dynamics that I think I'm not China front that are worth considering that I also want to pull out because I think you both alluded to this question You know China does not need to see a A disintegration of Russia cannot afford to have that in the near term or in the long term And so the question is Does Xi Jinping and that apparatus understand enough the calculations of the now 31 nations that make up NATO? And I would argue that that no because we barely understand it actually I think you know Washington barely understands what has happened With the addition of Finland and what may happen with the addition of Sweden We're just beginning to understand that calculus and I certainly would not You know wager that anybody in Beijing has a better beat on it than somebody in Brussels or Washington So having said those two things I want to turn to the question of war termination because I think it's very important point That is not discussed enough. We've been dancing around the strategic strategic interests There have been a couple of different scenarios that have been put on the table One is a demilitarized Crimea Right sort of Allah the 38th parallel North Korea South Korea and another is a Some sort of rump state for Russia in Donbass Maybe a little bit more unified a little bit more aggrandized So I want to put those two and there's probably another here, which is of course, you know just that you know Victory for either right the toppling of the government in Kiev versus the toppling of the government of Moscow. So Pick your poison Which one appeals to you most? Let's maybe I think the demilitarization of Crimea is the one that's least discussed and I'd like to put that first to you Marta Yeah, I think it's Really interesting question about what is what does victory look like it's a question in everyone's minds But I mean The reason why I think it's a very difficult question. There are many reasons, but one is that I Think that there is essentially a risk for the war to be a generational war That it will simply not end that soon and the further we go the further It's more difficult to predict the future as many of us know who who try to understand. What are the trends? and essentially the Yeah, what essentially what what could be the winds you mentioned the demilitarized Crimea The what happens with Crimea what happens with Donbas is then we also talk about regime change Seems like it's will be unlikely in your in Ukraine at least for now Then you know or Or Victory for Russia could also be essentially a political extension of Ukraine in one way or another So not just these couple of regions, but what happens with Ukraine as such? Well, is it does it end up going forward? You know towards this is past past towards the West Or is there some sort of another situation and I think that You know, that's actually probably something that Russia could be interested in the longer term of making sure that Ukraine does not Does not Say become closer with the West in one way or another that it continues to have Influence in one way or another on Ukraine and essentially create a situation where Ukraine becomes Also a burden on Europe so Make sure that there is you know Disagreements within Europe about the future of in Europe and the West in general about support to Ukraine So those are some of my thoughts on the and the victory or maybe lack of victory in Ukraine Yeah, I'll stop here because I think I weird off a little bit from your question. Sure anyone want to jump in demilitarized Crimea, what does that look like? How do we enforce it? What are the verification measures? Go for it Well, actually, I will be a bit of a boring panelist here because I think it's It's not up to us to define really. I think it's up to the Ukrainians It's not as though this is an sort of ambiguous situation It's completely clear that Russia bears hundred percent of the responsibility for this aggression It's not like a civil war with warring parties where you might have sort of a situation where you need to find compromises And as long as I mean that is the situation It's up to the Ukrainians to decide what you know if they want to move forward to watch some kind of negotiation or some kind of of Settlement but as long as I mean I mean for us territorial Integrity is incredibly important. And that's also what they are Defining as their end the goal and all we can do is to support them so that will actually be my very brief answer to this and I honestly think that I Mean, there are many who know the Russian political sort of or the psyche Better than I do and I have a colleague who often says that Trying to be in the head of Putin is not a very healthy place to be And it's very hard to you know to see I think what's sort of what is the Russian calculus here But I honestly do believe that what Russia wants here is to prevent Ukraine from being a Western oriented Democratic liberal state. That's really what I think is the Russian Goal and if that means that they want to have a broken state or prevent them from in various shapes or forms joining The EU or other constellations that will bring them closer to to our own community Yeah, but we don't know exactly how that will be but Our as I see our role now both from the Swedish side and right now I also speak for as president of the European Union It's really to support them, you know However, you can to to help them to preserve the in territorial integrity All right, I'm gonna come back on that the very polite diplomatic answer there like that Yes But let me go to Angela and then I'll pick you up so well first of all You know carry on from where you left off I mean Putin's goal all along has been to relitigate the entire Settlement of the end of the Cold War. He does not believe that the collapse of the Soviet Union is final He said that in different venues and so Ukraine is really part one and probably the most immediately important part of Revisiting the entire settlement including as we know from the Treaties that were presented to NATO and the United States in December of 2021 Including countries like Poland in other words the vision is really to restore Influence over a sphere of influence was fit of control over the post-soviet states But a sphere of influence over the Warsaw Pact states So I think we have to bear this in mind This is in his mind and then a mind of people who think like him a much longer process I mean, I think if you extrapolate what's happening now in this war of attrition That's going on where neither side has really gained or lost much territory for months It looks as if this so-called Korean scenario could be a likely one And that might be the best that would be attainable for some time if both sides are willing to accept this You know you said Zelensky will you know be in power for a long time I'm not sure that Zelensky even will remain in power if there's a Korean solution He certainly wouldn't remain in power. There were any territorial concessions So but but still having said all of that that might be the only thing that is possible I think a rump stayed in the Donbass is less likely Just because I mean Russia doesn't control all of the Donbass and and may not for some time Okay Having seen the level of commitment in it by the Ukrainians I don't believe in in in the solution you you recommend it from their point of view just a table Yeah, just a table not recommending anything and I table the Moscow's potential and state How they would see it but having said this I believe that There is a challenge in in in my work in my thoughts and the challenge is that although Russia has already been defeated politically I don't believe it can never be defeated militarily or economically They can continue waging this war from economical and military point of view for quite long time And that that's the challenge to to the topic All right, I'm gonna offer my own opinion. I'm allowed to do that. That's modern moderators moderators privilege a couple things that I would like to pick up on so I Won't speak to the demilitarized piece I just will say that I think that that is certainly a very that's the greatest possibility On the horizon in terms of actual termination. I don't see rum state For a variety of reasons chief among them as you've said It's just not an area that is very easily controlled for you know You can control it by depopulating it and committing a genocide, which is essentially what's occurring right now And I think that that is a strategy that has certainly been forwarded by you know Shoigu and others as an option And we're seeing it So those two, you know are kind of out there rum state no demilitarization potentially, but only if Washington and frankly Brussels and Europe And all the other partners who are allied behind Ukraine Do one very important thing Which is learn a lesson from afghanistan And I can speak to this I think very personally having lived there for a very long time And covered that war for the better part of my career for the last 20 years One mistake I saw in afghanistan while I saw two very important mistakes strategically One mistake was that the afghans will determine for themselves the goals With all due respect The self-determination of nations is determined also by its allies And its friendships and the commitments that that nation might make To its neighbors as well as to Its own principles and values and I think the ukrainians have said time and again We are committed to A different future than the one putin has in mind for us and we should listen to it And because it's being said to us very loudly that they believe that that ultimately Our existential Future is very much bound to theirs And I think we are starting to feel this in the grocery store When we go and buy a dozen eggs we see And when we go to the gas pump when we turn on our heat That this existential Cordon or thread between us is very real. This is a global War At this stage yet nobody wants to declare it as yet But these things do connect us and the ukrainians have said very clearly We want self-determination, but we need your help and To do that We also need your help thinking about what war termination looks like Right and so to some degree we have to decide How long can we sustain This effort before it becomes corrosive for our own societies Um, you know, we live through this with the war in afghanistan here in the united states The fallout from that war to wars 20 years two million people churning through Maybe about a million deaths easy considering indirect deaths The cost of that was the election of donald trump And an insurrection on january 6 here in washington So i just offer to you that self-determination is a Nice idea, but it also requires us to be a little bit realistic and pragmatic about what we mean when we talk about alliances Now also question about war termination a little bit further because you talked a little bit about the question about territorial ends But there's a psychological end here That you alluded to what what does that look like? I mean beyond sort of like it's over a victory party We're not going to be 1945 You know dancing in the streets in manhattan kissing sailors, right? So what what does that look like? Um Yeah, that's a also complicated question like many of your questions um, but I think um yet, uh, it makes me think about the uh, Democratic democratic transition from wartime to peacetime And they're you know the the concerns That are related to that part of war termination And what does it mean for a country that has been in war for a long time? To do that, right? And i'm thinking i i study more, you know europe european resistance movements and transition to peace and and such So I guess my remarks are based more on that sort of analysis and research, but um So I think there's a lot Regarding that process that will really be reliant on Uh, or be a result on how what does ukrainian gardens look like during the wartime? How well is the ukrainian government? The state-level government but also on the level of municipalities ukraine is a very large state A country How well they're able to maintain democratic Control democratic principles in how the country is governed, uh, right? How how it maintains the legitimacy of its state governance Structures how well it ensures rule of law Even if you have You know, uh mobilization going on at the same time, right? So That is, you know, ukraine has been working on the anti-corruption aspect right now A lot of that is also because We we want to make sure that the assistance that we provide is used in a good and accountable way and actually Reaches the people that really needs the assistance But then there's also the other question off. So in the longer term as the country transitions to peacetime There's the concern that A country could become essentially a nation of in arms, right? It becomes a more militarized society Which then not only in terms of militarized organizations, but also the whole of society So that may not necessarily correspond to let's say the use requirements for for how how how societies are And how the division between the military and security organizations, for example is done, but also So how the division between military society as security organizations And the civil society is happening and then Some other things that that also come to my mind I'm I think that we already need to start thinking about it like For example, repatriation of the displaced persons either internally but also from abroad So what will be the support systems for them as they're returning home? I think As a fog and that is all data from from 2022 Right there were 11 million People that we were talking about that's a lot of people And those of them who do return how do they we ensure that they are able to return homes? Easily and also those of them those of the people who do not return How do we make sure that they integrate in their new societies? Well And you know as I was standing down and thinking about you a historic example of such a large-scale repatriation Very far in few between to to have a comparison historical comparison And then on the gender side, we have to talk about gender potential threat of gender balance inside of Ukraine So it was women and children who were able to leave men of fighting age had to stay So what does that mean for the future for a longer term future of Ukraine? And also regional disparities Already today we have to think think about those regional disparities in the areas that are not occupied where we are able to influence things But also after war we specifically will have to think about regional disparities in The areas that were occupied or had or really see saw a lot of war destruction So I see that we're almost at time, but I want to just Actually ask our Swedish and Finnish colleague here To reflect a little bit on on some of this question about self-determination and talk a little bit about some of the internal debates perhaps or you know questions that came up as The challenge of whether to join NATO Was coming to the fore because I think you know in listening to Marta's answer here In a way The failure to join You know NATO would risk potentially this type of future For sweden or finland or for other parts of the Baltic states So I wonder what the internal debates are now. I'll turn to you Ingrid and then to you kona. Hello All right. Well, uh, you all know and I don't need to tell the the Finnish friends in the room this how dramatic a transition We saw in our countries after the breakout of the war how the opinion shifted even quicker in Finland than in sweden But it it was very clear that it had a very profound effect on public opinion and for us it it it basically changed 200 years of military non-alignment. It's it's quite extraordinary actually You have to remember that and I think it all began. I mean we we still see I know It's the same in in Finland and you will we'll speak to this but we see a very broad support in parliament not by everyone but a very solid majority of the parties that that support both membership and that support our support for ukraine interestingly including Through all kinds of military equipment and you should know I think You all know in this room, but this is the first time that sweden provides Another country in war with weapons since 1939 when we did the same for finland during the winter war against the soviet union Support across the board unanimous support actually by the all the political parties So of course we've had a debate Less now I would say but initially whether I mean you would see in media discussion whether this would somehow affect our you know position as you know The confidence that we had actually earned by being a neutral nation But then you should remember that we haven't been neutrals in nine since 1995 when we joined the european union It's not as though russia didn't know where our loyalties were we've been practicing with nato the EU Or EU countries european partners nordic partners through military exercises and and in various kinds Since a long long time But still we were militarily non aligned and in in a very short period of time Both sweden and finland decided to to change course and this was very dramatic. So I would say kandace that the debate that we had was not so much as to would this Provoke russia or would this be sort of something that is not in our interest because it would be seen as a provocation it would rather be Perhaps initially would this somehow affect our ability to be an honest broker elsewhere or or to to sort of use sort of our position as as a As a country without also without colonial baggage and and sort of being have having a Enjoying a high degree of confidence. You don't see much of that now actually We still have a public opinion in sweden has reached I think 67 69 for nato membership in finland. It's it's even higher But it's solid and interestingly even with the debacle that we've had and that we still have with with Turkey and to one a certain extent so to hangry those who have not ratified our our accession It has not affected support for nato membership In sweden, of course, there is there are lots of opinions about the government's way to handle it Should we have done things differently and so forth? There is a media debate about that But I think the overwhelming. I know the overwhelming majority of swedes are feel very confident that this is where we belong within the alliance I think we feel it even more now with finland a member. You look at the map, right? It's Fairly clear where the missing piece is it's sweden right there in the middle. You mentioned the island of gotland and of course for us This is not just a matter of gas prices or general solidarity. It's a very concrete thing I mean russia is very close to us. Would something happen for instance in the baltic countries? We would inevitably affected by that It's about our own security in an extremely concrete way really and of the security in northern europe And we know both sweden and finland and i'm sure you have will also speak to this that that we will also Contribute we will be a net contributor to security within the alliance and in northern europe We will make the alliance stronger and you are already doing that What about your debates? When it comes to last spring I don't need to explain it to this audience because they have been there following it more carefully than I have But the debate was very thorough and the political process was also very thorough and because of that Actually, and this is an observation. We just had the parliamentary elections and foreign policy was not an issue So it was everything else, but not foreign policy So it kind of explains that if all the parties are behind this decision And and there are other elements in the political arena to discuss and debate, but foreign policy is not one of them so And that's a very good sign for the future that Finnish people are By vast majority behind this decision Very good. Well, I suppose we could hear from our audience here certainly we have lots of expert minds from Finland with us today What are your questions and comments and and concerns? Listening to this conversation. Please feel free to jump in. I see somebody in the back here There's a mic right next to you I wonder if this works. I don't think so. Can you check that mic? It's on. There we go. Okay Actually, I don't have any question more like a comment number one is that I don't like the idea of putting any kind of equal sign between Afghanistan and Ukraine. There are totally two different cases First of all, Afghanistan is not a nation like Ukraine is Ukraine has economical possibilities It has education It has some kind of a democratic structures Existing even though it's highly corrupt. We all know that The second point is that the only way we can affect Russian aggression is to use force. That's the only thing they respect We have seen that through the history that this only thing that we can do is to use force and be very decisive in our actions We have started the process and this is not the moment to stop it. Now It's the moment to take it to the end what the end might be. I don't know about Crimea, I'm sorry to say it seems to be a very difficult case to take back Donbass area. Yes, there are possibilities. However, as our other says as mentioned the Russians are able to take casualties And they can carry on for years to go So my only worry here is that the western countries are getting tired in giving their support It has been going there with drops by drop It should go there with big bang and early enough because Giving small pieces of equipment packages doesn't help the military to build up Propocatabilities So I think we are in a track where we should go on and carry on and the difference between Afghanistan and And Ukraine is there is the major difference that we have no western boots on the ground We are outside and the Ukrainians are doing the fighting and we should respect that one Indeed, I didn't mention the second Lesson that was not learned from Afghanistan Which is the need for air superiority for any nation with a modern army facing another modern army to your point Uh, that has been the one question that has not yet been resolved is to how to Enable the Ukrainians to have air superiority Because that is one piece of air termination. I mean war termination Regardless of, you know, the status of Donbass and Crimea It will be an essential Piece of the puzzle unless we want to see key and fall Other comments and questions from the audience Well, I do want to respond on Afghanistan, but that might be a little bit long I'll simply say It is true that Afghanistan is different than Ukraine But what they both have in common is a post-soviet legacy And both were at various points Attempted to be colonized by the Soviet Union And the legacies are different largely because Uh, Afghanistan was colonized or tried to be, you know, there were many attempts to colonize Afghanistan not only by Russia but by Britain, of course, and the Persian Empire before that When you have a country that is repeatedly Colonized or has an attempt And then resists that you're going to have an erosion of human capital like you've never seen before So while I agree that there is no comparison, I think it's it's a little bit You know Injudicious to think about them as too different. There are a lot of Defenders of human rights in Afghanistan Still there today Struggling to try and get by a lot of women in particular who are struggling to get by Despite enormous privation And really what is basically a gender apartheid The fact that Ukraine has not chosen that as their path for their future is a little bit geographic and a little bit historical But it also I think, you know to Marta's point We could see something on the order of a kind of gender apartheid emerge although it'll be very strange It will look quite different, right? But the one reason, you know Afghanistan has the legacy that it has and maybe is often perceived as not a unified state Is largely because of the repeated attempts to conquer people And not paying attention to the fact that all people desire to be democratically ruled Regardless and that they even even if we do not perceive them as nations that are unified They believe that they are On the persistence piece Ukrainians have clearly showed that they they want to Safeguard and maintain their independence and restore the borders in Afghanistan, I wasn't so sure about the afghan people's Commitment, I mean the final commitment. So I would neither Compare those too much But when it comes to support to Ukraine And and then in comparison to afghanistan and the western support to afghanistan I believe In the western countries. There was certain war fatigue over afghanistan Deploying troops for from years after years And of course deploying Equipment as well, but mainly troops with Ukraine I think every nation in Europe and in the west can afford the war in Ukraine. We can afford it We can afford supporting Ukraine so In those terms the commitment from the western side to support In my logic will continue for years and years Other questions and comments from the audience, I know we must have some here. We have one. Thank you Matti Mananen from Technology Industries of Finland and I'm coming back to this position that you said or the point that Russia is trying to restore the Cold War situation in in a way and and now just recently I was reading an article where There was an article about the shipping armada or the fishing armada that the that the russians are having and they are they are like Investigating and mapping the Electric cables and and and the communication cables and all this So how likely do you see that? This will be hit or that how far will the russians go In in there like undeclared war Would you like to answer that? Well, there's been evidence for decades for for russian Scientific ships doing what they what according to this report they are doing. So there is on the military side There is nothing new about about these news Are they willing to do that already? Are they ready to do something like that? I think there's already evidence in the Baltic sea in the in the also in the Atlantic Of the cutting cables. So yes, definitely that will remain As a tool in their toolbox and they will be using it for sure. They would try to perhaps deny their attribution but since they have already lost their kind of Diplomatic, let's say respect. There is less to lose on that side either That's an interesting point actually. I mean, you know when a state reaches this kind of state of almost I wouldn't say neutrality in in attrition, but we're getting there With ukraine and russia in some ways. I mean, I think we've seen very little movement territorially And I think we would have expected to see something different by now Where don boss is concerned and where bach mood in particular is concerned, but we haven't seen a breakthrough And I think we should expect to see more and more sort of asymmetric means Being deployed primarily by russia because they have the means to do so The question is, you know, at what stage will NATO partners begin to enable ukraine to do the same? Will there be a moment when Allowing ukraine some Means military or otherwise to change the balance asymmetrically Will there be a point there? What do you think angela? So I wanted to go back to our The first comments we had and I agree with you I mean the only thing that the russians will recognize and will respect is force Um, and you know when they look back at what we didn't do in the west in 2008 when they invaded georgia and in 2014 when the annex cromium, I think that emboldened putin What we've seen in this war is that our deterrence failed right the west we tried to deter russia We declassified all this intelligence. We showed it to our allies. We also showed it to countries and not our allies And you know, william burns went to mosco and he warned them. They still did it, but their deterrence is working on us We're all on some level intimidated by putin's nuclear threats And the more he does that the more you get these kind of worried populations for good reasons In in the west and in other parts of the world That you know, we have to restrain what we do. Otherwise world war three is around the corner And I don't know how you get out of this dilemma because you cannot say Definitively well putin would never do that because we don't know that but I think we have to recognize that you know that That russia is deterring us and we're not really deterring russia and As I say, I don't know how you change that situation Well, the first step of the 12 steps is to admit Right That in fact, this is world war three. Is that possible? I know people don't like to hear that message But I I do genuinely believe that we are at an interesting point in history Where all of the norms all of the rules All of the charters all of the treaties are now called into question Very similar to what we had before world war two and one Where every single instrument of diplomatic engagement in every single institution I will just note that the un is probably one of the most broken institutions out there You know We're teetering and we are teetering And we don't really have too many more pathways left to us. And so to your point on the escalation risk and Acknowledging that we're kind of there now I wonder If we could future cast a little bit And this is a dangerous thing for diplomats. I think so I'll I'll invite you to be as diplomatic as you need to be But if we could future cast a little bit and think about the moment in which tactical nuclear weapons are used in the context of ukraine What should be the response of nato in the united states? And the world frankly You're the nato ally Nice dodge Um This tactical nuclear piece has been discussed thoroughly in in my view and There are different opinions on on the answer and I'm not going to give A single answer on that one However, what I can say is that I still believe that the leaders of these nations although they are ideologically very You know strongly motivated In the end there is a level of Sensibility and understanding In their minds so They would avoid Using nuclear weapons as long as Their existence is not threatened And and the war in ukraine even the war in taiwan, which luckily is not taking place It's not about existence If anything so I I stand on the positive side of of the nuclear piece saying that it become it remains a a threat But when it's an equal threat, they won't use it All right, I sense that you maybe Well, I can't speak for for the nato, uh, but um for nato, but no, I mean it's yet. Thank you. Thank you Yeah, you know, hopefully very soon No, you know, of course, it's an extremely powerful threat. It is the ultimate threat, right? And I'm not surprised that that put in uses it and you know I think most experts agree that it would you know, it's not very realistic because The costs would be so tremendous for him and also for us But of course we need to have this conversation and I mean that's very important to conversation for the alliance to have how to respond All right, now I'll turn to the two endless who are not bound by diplomatic decorum Well, I mean So one of the arguments by the way that's used as well, you know, the indians and the chinese have warned Putin that if he were to do something like that, you know, there would be serious consequences I think we all have to admit that You know, if this is something he decides he wants to do, he's not going to be that concerned about the chinese or the indian response to it Um, you know, I I'm not going to put a likelihood Statistical likelihood on this But I think if something like that were to occur, there would be a very robust NATO response and I mean the president Biden said that other NATO leaders have said that Um, it would clearly I don't think it would be a response in kind, but it would certainly be a military response and it would affect russian military assets What? Yeah, actually two points that I wanted to make one is about deterrence and the other one is trying to answer your questions. So first The question about Has deterrence worked? I actually think that NATO's deterrence has worked in Russia has gone to great lengths to avoid any military kind of Conflict with NATO countries And it hasn't even gone for the, you know, west Ukraine's supply routes to the west So I think that that that is a message towards To us how russia doesn't actually want to engage with NATO in a war um Having said that there, you know, the Baltic states and Poland are of course concerned about any military threat um military threat or also sort of uh threats under Under the threshold of war right there a threat assessment has not decreased. It's actually increased Um, so I wanted to highlight that actually NATO deterrence for NATO member states I think is working and the fact that Finland has chosen to become a NATO member state. I think is also um, you know a symbol of that um Regarding a nuclear Use of nuclear weapons. I mean, I will also not put any likelihood on that. It's just I think it's impossible um But I think that uh, you know, there Certainly is some concern that uh, there could be a degradation of the use of Sort of the degradation of the taboo of the use of nuclear weapons um, and also when I think I Probably a concern that Maybe an even bigger concern that the um nuclear weapons can essentially be used as a means of Blackmailing The other parties into a certain outcome of the war Interesting. Okay. Well, I'll offer maybe a prognosis also and and then I'll go back to the audience, but um, so I think it's been very interesting the conversation about the, you know The tactical nukes in the context of Ukraine, whether they would be used Many people have framed the question as likelihood. I think we have to get way beyond likelihood Ultimately our job as analysts, right? I think and as policy experts is to try and predict The what if not the likelihood but the what if So let's I want to talk about the what if and I'll just give you my sort of two fingers or my two cents as it were um The what if These are dangerous things to say out loud Anywhere, but there are of course, um prime targets inside of of of Ukraine Uh, and I think we could name those cities relatively easily. It would not be kiv Because that would not pay for moscow to hit kiv. They haven't done so They've been actually been very delicate in many ways, although I recognize that it's very relative And that is not the way the ukrainians are experiencing You know the war at this moment, but simply saying it from a strategic perspective There are reasons why you know kiv is not on the table Which leaves, you know, some places in the east most likely For a variety of reasons because it would give great advantage for Crimea And donbas as a as a hold And I think that the russians have shown Both in Chernobyl and zaporizhya their willingness to do Absolutely mad insane things when it comes to Trampling on ground that is Contaminated working in areas that are very dangerous That could really be a tripwire for the entire continent if not the world So I would certainly say that that that is first of all, I will say that Likelihood doesn't matter. Um, we have to start thinking about what does it mean when that happens? So A couple of scenarios I just would like to throw out there Um, things that are in the newspaper, okay, that we've all heard nothing's secret here Uh, we've heard conventional response from, uh, NATO partners Uh, and I think that um, that that is where the timing of this becomes very Important because if sweden is not yet, uh, you know, a member of NATO Then we have a very different scenario for european security going forward for the next decade or generation If in the instance of a tactical news being used in ukraine if that happens If sweden is a member then we have a different scenario because then the conventional response becomes much more muscular And much more robust much more sustainable And so forth and so that will be a calculation for anybody sitting in the kremlin for sure if i'm thinking it they're thinking it That's one thing to be mindful of because i'm just you know an average joe who thinks about these things And i'm sure there are other less average joes somewhere in the kremlin who are thinking about these things So timing is going to be a very important piece of this And i would argue that if there is not somebody over there Across the river at the pentagon thinking about asymmetric responses, then we should all be very scared Because if we don't have that on the on the table As an addition to conventional responses Then we are into a territory that i think Is unprecedented In terms of the future of security not of ukraine not of europe not of russia but of the human race Well, i have a number of factors. Do you want if you want to go into it? So um If you want to effectively stop um an escalation You need to turn off the ability to target Well, there are options in space, right and there are options in cyber And those two combined Have a lot of power to shut down the ability to escalate further, but we don't know How much is known About the system inside of russia, right and there's been a lot of debates about whether or not even russia has the ability To to do all the things that has it's unplanned for for nuclear use So i'll leave it there because i know that we're at time. I think we have about two minutes left, which means Maybe we can take one last question or comment from the audience Observation when the soviet union attacked finland in 1939 it was kicked out of the league of nations now when russia attacked ukraine It was the president of the un security council and it is again So the future of Not only nato, but the future of the un, of course, it's a big question But my question has to do with timetable again for the benefit of our scenario work and we were in oxford with this group a couple of weeks ago And to our surprise The experts there said that by 2030 this will be over. We will be back to doing diplomacy trade Not on the same level but nevertheless with russia So what's your reaction to us doing? Business with russia by 2030 and of course their thinking was that by that time They would have been a leadership change in russia So any reactions to the timetable great question great question to end on and i'll just say In the classic fashion of an mpr host you've got 30 seconds I would be disappointed if that was the case. I would be disappointed on the western moral I wouldn't be a swedish diplomat if I wouldn't also defend the un a little bit and I think it's interesting that what has happened You're completely right. I mean, it's really stalled in security council But interestingly the center of gravity has moved to the general assembly in the un And there we see a very different and very solid support also for ukraine And also the secretary general has been extremely outspoken and I'll use my remaining five seconds to say that I think That the un and potentially other bodies also could play a very important role in The matter of accountability when this is over This is not the response to your question, but I think I needed to say it anyway Okay, I'm actually quite skeptical. I think that the Those opinions I think hinge on a quick end to war On a belief that with regime change. There is going to be a massive let's say democratic transition in russia Which are things that I'm also scattered about about I think that there is a concern risk that Everyone's going to be you know, we are in this war and it can be Can go on for a longer time than we would hope for And I don't necessarily think that there there will be such a massive Change of Russia even if there is even if Putin was no longer the leader. Let's put it like that So So, yeah, if worst ends right now and we have a very big sort of free consideration Movement going on maybe but otherwise I have a lot of question marks there at frown Question marks and frowns. Yeah, Angela. Just briefly. I am very skeptical that there will be a government in russia in the year 2030 with whom You know, Europeans and Americans will want to do business as usual Whatever happened. We don't know how long Putin will be there if he's not there anymore He's probably going to be succeeded by someone who shares his views And so the idea that you'll get a more kind of pragmatic group And willing to reconsider relations with the west coming to power Eventually one hopes that happens But so far most of this pragmatic technocratic elite in russia whom we all knew from the sainte-petersburg International economic forum all those places the governor of the central bank headman greff all these people have now Accepted the war they buckled down and they're supporting what Putin's doing So I want to see the next generation of people who in fact would form a government with whom we would like to do business as usual Very good. I'll just say it depends on whether we're at 1.5 degrees or 2.0 in terms of our emissions reductions goals Because ultimately at the end of the day russia is fighting this war Largely because of the need to shift away from hydrocarbons It's dependency on hydrocarbons for hard revenues As well as its entire military industrial complex is a good reason for this war There are some very material motivations And if we do not get our reductions of emissions under control Ultimately, I think we will be dealing with a very dangerous russia much more dangerous russia If there is still a russia at all so with that I want to thank our panelists And Merry Christmas I want to thank our panelists and give them a round of applause