 Because Iran pops up in the news frequently and mostly when it pops up It's often about censorship and surveillance and our speaker here Masa Ali Mardani. She's actually an expert on this topic She's a specialist. She currently works at the Oxford Internet Institute where she Researches politics of Iran and of the Iranian Internet, but she also works for the NGO article 19 And in in her talk, which we hope will have to slide slides up very soon In her talk, she's doing a rundown of the current state of censorship and surveillance in Iran So thank you for waiting until now. Please give a give a warm round of applause to Masa Ali Mardani Well, thank you for coming and being so patient to hear me talk today I have to admit I did not anticipate doing this without my computer in front of me But I guess it's a good exercise in becoming less reliant on my devices But I do still have my phone in my hand with the slides. So I think that will be useful so the name of the talk is tightening the net and so as The introduction went I'm going to be talking a little bit about how information controls work on the Iranian Internet You're probably listening to my voice wondering why someone with an Iranian name sounds kind of American I'm I grew up in Canada and I spent most of my life going back and forth between the various countries I lived in abroad and back to Iran So that's why I sound this way. It's a Canadian accent and so I I had slides to accompany what I was going to say next and It had a frightening Iranian vampire that I was going to get into later on But it seems that I can you know replace the frightening Iranian vampire for now So the reason why I am here who am I? Well, I wear a lot of different hats The introduction said that I am oh, that's not my slide. There's a frightening woman in front of me I So I I'm doing my PhD at the Oxford Internet Institute and there I'm studying how social media evolves in Iran's information control space To see how political participation shapes, especially during elections and things like that I also spend the majority of my time at a London base NGO called article 19 And there I work with a Iran team that tracks How freedom of expression and access to information takes shape in Iran and oh, I think my slides are on their way up here No, is it there? It will come. That's promising So article 19 My slides are here. That's so exciting Oh, can I actually Can I actually control it Sorry. Oh, I have to signal. Okay. We can go to the next slide No No This is fun. Okay. So this was the part that would appear when I'm explaining who I am What are you? It's a scene from the movie that I've been referencing. It's called a girl walked home alone And I think you should all watch it So we can go to the next slide So There was a troll on Twitter yesterday when I posted about my talk who were saying that I'm kind of doing warmongering or something Like that, so I just want to leave a disclaimer. I do work on human rights I am talking about some of the repressive things that happens in Iran, but this is not a Talk to scare you away from Iran. In fact, if you can go back In fact, if it if I weren't here and if I weren't doing this particular type of work I would probably be in Iran with my family for the holidays So I urge you if you have no security concerns, please go. It's like amazing Country lots to see But one thing you will find is that the internet experience is a little bit different than what you would experience here in Leipzig which Kind of brings me around to the topic of my talk. So the Iranian internet is sometimes known as filter net This is a term that a lot of us who do kind of digital advocacy for Iran know and often use I think the term was coined around 2009 or 2010 by a Iranian Journalists who focuses on technology named Nima Akbaipur You can follow the hashtag on Twitter and you can see lots of different things related to internet censorship and surveillance in Iran and so next slide There's also The series that I help run with a number of colleagues at article 19 Which is called tightening the net the name of this talk And if you want to get into the nitty-gritty details of what happens in terms of internet policy in terms of How users are put at risk in Iran? This is a series you can follow and it started initially with the national internet project, which is sort of sometimes known as the Halal net and then We looked at software and cyber tactics in Iran for the next edition and now every Quarter we come out with a rundown of what's going on Online in Iran with a series of advocacy recommendations for various branches of the Iranian government So if you want to get more information beyond the generalities of this talk to check that out next slide So understanding the filter net in order to understand Next slide So whenever I do this means next slide. So understanding What happens online? You have to kind of understand that in Iran there is infrastructure of control that kind of shapes how this works and I can show this to you Here which is kind of a map of what's going on In Iran and you can see that in Iran The head of state is in fact not elected. It's a supreme leader He's kind of a Religious authority, but also he has ultimate veto power over everything that happens in the country and you can see him up at the top I'm not signaling to change. I'm just pointing It's he's up at the top there and everything sort of like falls under his umbrella and What's interesting to know that every four years there are there is a democratic element to the government in Iran and there is a president that gets elected and within the president's cabinet you have the Ministry of ICT information communications and technology and within the Ministry of ICT you see a lot of what happens in terms of Control inside of Iran. So the Ministry of ICT runs the telecommunications company of Iran and they maintain and authorize all the ISPs and so in some ways this has been really good because The current administration that was elected Back in 2013 and it was reelected in 2017 is a moderate administration And so it's done a lot to improve internet conditions in Iran Internet speeds have Improved by huge amounts. So sometimes the Iranian internet was known as Kondnet Which kind of is like slow internet, but that's really improved since This government has come into the power and it's the government of president Roe honey and other things like internet access has come to Villages that often didn't have this kind of access. So in terms of ICT for development There's been a lot of progress over the past few years because of the work of this government and that ministry but in terms of how Surveillance occurs so all internet traffic is routed through the telecommunications company of Iran including private and government ISPs and The TCI as you can see right below the Ministry of ICT is responsible for blocking web pages and blacklisting keywords and In terms of surveillance the TCI also uses proxy servers for surveillance by logging all Unencrypted web traffic, which is why it's really important for there to be HTTPS over websites in Iran What was particularly? Concerning is that underneath the control of the supreme leader. There's a body called the revolutionary guards and so every time there's a protest movement in Iran or there's any sort of opposition to the status quo the revolutionary guards help the regime kind of You know well protesters arrest them gather intelligence and so the IRGC Excuse me In 2009 the IRGC a consortium owned by this kind of paramilitary Organization bought about 51% of the telecommunications company of Iran because the government was trying to privatize it But in essence its ownership falls fell under this kind of repressive body within The establishment so beyond strengthening the The revolutionary guards with you know financial through financial means they had direct access to the data of ordinary citizens, which is Super concerning We can go to the next slide now This was the news back in 2009 when they Got 51% of the shares of the telecommunications company of Iran next slide and so just to go over a brief history of controls because then along with the infrastructure of control there's kind of a Legal mechanism for how this kind of established itself so back in 2001 Filtering really started in Iran because there is a crackdown on Newspapers and a lot of people started migrating online The script for writing Persian on online was developing so there was This huge migration and it was only around 2001 that the government started targeting and doing censorship of these You know more reformist or progressive journalists and activists who are writing and kind of Going against the ethos of the regime you can go back. You want to head too much Is that are you doing it? Oh? Oh, sorry Totally did not make that connection So that was in 2001 and they wanted to codify how this system works in terms of the filtering committee that Enables this and so in 2006 there was a draft law known as the computer crimes law and Actually article 19 The law team and the Iran team. I wasn't part of it because this was before my time at the organization they actually are the only source of Translating and analyzing this law and so it came into a draft form in 2006 and then by 2009 they really wanted to mobilize it and make sure it went into law in 2009 I was when the green movement happened and so the government was kind of trying to reign in control over what kind of discourse was going on online because they They effectively shut down the internet for a small period of time during that protest movement And so right after this happened They picked picked up speed on this and made sure it passed and by 2010 this became law You can take a look at this document in more precise form Different things like article 10 which makes things like encryption illegal came out of this document different things like The filtering committee that decides through multi multi agency network of different ministries and different experts in the government What content needs to be filtered? Do you want me to do this and you can Sorry, I feel bad. I've made you. Yeah Here she is Okay, okay. Yeah, I'm sorry. I didn't I didn't realize and she was crouching here the entire time and that's not cool So So the next thing I have is a video which I feel like it's gonna get really difficult um so The law came into effect in 2010 and different bodies came into Formation as well things like the revolutionary Guard set up their own cyber division known as Geradob in 2009 right after the protest movement Iran's police forces also established their own police cyber force named fatah in 2011 and because The establishment was realizing that the internet was so Basically crucial to the functioning of the nation National security was being compromised things like cyber attacks against the country's infrastructure was happening The supreme leader basically wanted everything centralized to him And so he created the supreme council of cyberspace which its name translated into English is very sci-fi and fun to say sometimes and that happened in 2012 and So this is all kind of like boring and I guess lots of dates and lots of things But it's really important to how things happen day-to-day in Iranians lives and how they Experience the internet and so back in a few years ago a colleague and I Okay at the University of Amsterdam decided to go through the censorship redirect page So every time you want to visit a page that censored it's called pay Vanda dot IR You can probably look this up if you want and so we using the wayback machine We like traced it over the years and how it evolved and how it kind of reflects on this changing internet policy So I'm gonna take a crack at playing this. I'm probably gonna Really mess this up actually but So this is the video Can I do it without? Yeah The different versions of pay Vanda dot IR which contain a literature related to these laws and regulations Evolve as norms of what constitutes as filtered content becomes more entrenched with Iran from the inception of the very first version of the page Whereby users are told in the name of God according to the computer crimes act Access to this website requested is not possible. The message that users are viewing a censorship page is toned down in the next version Whereby users are only told that the links they are viewing are some of the registered links Within version 2 we also see the pay Vanda dot IR website creating pages related to internet policy The third version of pay Vanda dot IR Continues with the theme of religious references with a poem featured that states if you listen to the words of the poet Sadhi, he says he consents to require the consent of him Immediately to the right of this user see the text in the name of God and the merciful as if to subtly tell users that the censorship They are experiencing is by the will of God These religious references are continued in version 4 Whereby the main feature of the page is a changing image that makes references to national holidays and events Maintaining the theme of allusions to Shia Islam and national imams This image for instance depicts a mosque Marking the festival of imam Reza asking users to click on a link to submit ideas for the festival Version 5 of pay Vanda dot IR brings attention to the Islamic nature of censorship The links featured here are perhaps the most related to state propaganda in comparisons to the other versions While the previous version did not display any links all previous versions of pay Vanda dot IR Featured the popular Persian language blogging platform block va. However, this version omits the website The omission of the main image in version 5 makes it hard to establish a firm connection between the previous and following versions This finding is in line with the notion that archives of web pages are not always successful in capturing all of the content However, further research shows that this version still made use of images regarding Shia Islam the after the Green Movement internet controls in Iran from 2009 until 2012 report by the open-ed initiative has Captured and saved the version of pay Vanda dot IR as it was on the 25th of October 2012 This image features curianic writings the last two iterations of the website in version 6 and 7 are very similar in design The sudden change in design was explained by an anonymous source to make filtering more pleasant or Rather to appear as a subtle part of the Iranian internet experience Rather than one presented with indoctrinating aspects of the government The significant change that comes in version 7 however is the prominent feature of the internet policy links Concluding we can say that this historiography of the pay Vanda dot IR website demonstrates a timeline of the beginning of the heightened internet controls from the inception of the page in 2010 to the present day The changes in the page essentially demonstrate the evolution of the ways the Iranian state represents its censorship policies The notions of religious motifs decrease over time Whereas the focus on internet policy becomes more present by the last iteration of the page And that was that And as I struggle to go back to My presentation. Oh, I did it without any glitches. How exciting And so over the years there have been different programs that the government has kind of put into place beyond the censorship That they do things that I have been following through my own work have been the spider program Which comes from the Revolutionary Guards Garadab division the cyber kind of Iranian cyber division of the Revolutionary Guards and intelligent filtering the National Information Network and The different ways that the Iranian government has been trying to attack journalists activists and human rights defenders in terms of That's the attacking these kind of vulnerable individuals that pose a threat There's a lot of different projects article 19 had an Iranian cyber army report about this And there's been really great work to track this being done by the Campaign for Human Rights in Iran by their researcher Amir Rashidi and by two other researchers who've been tracking this with the Iran Threats project Colin Anderson and Claudio Griniere So there's tons of great research being done in terms of identifying these attackers The intelligent filtering Project that the Iranian government has been doing is something that I looked into with another colleague Frederick Jacobs in 2015 and basically at that time we were noticing that the Iranian government was making these really grand Statements that's the Ministry of ICT about how they had a sophisticated means to censor individual pages on different social media and Basically, this has been a old policy that they've wanted to do so sites like Facebook and Twitter were censored after the protest movement in 2009 actually in the lead-up to the protest movement they were censored and so for a long time Various members of the government have said they want to unblock these platforms and find a means to just censor individual pages or Problematic content and leave these websites open However, that's really hard to do unless the government has a relationship with these companies if they have a relationship with Facebook or Twitter And so back in 2015 they made a grand announcement that they had finally nailed it And they were doing this on Instagram and Instagram is one of the more popular social media platforms And so what we noticed was that the censorship intelligent censorship, which is just individual pages or Individual pictures or accounts being censored. It was only being done on the mobile app And the reason was that Instagram hadn't yet rolled out HTTPS on the mobile application it had Enabled it on the browser version of the website and so the Iranian government's great Grand unveiling of intelligent censorship was in reality Just Instagram not doing this. And so We found what kind of content they were targeting, which was really interesting kind of cultural research in terms of how censorship was working and then My colleague got in touch with Instagram and they soon rolled out the HTTPS on the mobile app and then Intelligent censorship came unraveling as the mother board of writer Lorenzo wrote Iran smart Instagram censorship isn't that smart and so that's just one example of these Grand policies that actually don't really add up to very much in terms of intelligent filtering The researcher Colin Anderson recently found This database of your URLs that different ISPs were giving to this Company called Sahab Pair does I can't talk too much about this But this was kind of a public notice he put out to ask anyone interested in this data set to see if this is actually another phase of intelligent filtering however the minister of ICT Did respond to this and said that they are not actually compromising users data And he condemned the work of this company Sahab Pair does which doesn't quite add up Which I guess helps illustrate how confusing Internet policy is in Iran like what are they actually doing where they what are they actually saying? How does it align with the laws and those kinds of regulations and 2016 Through the budget it was announced that Iran was spending about 66 million on the intelligent filtering project However, it's really unclear what that adds up to like what are the deliverables on this work that they're doing so Again, it's kind of like this chaotic quagmire of what's actually happening or not in terms of their ability to silence different voices in Iran they have been kind of targeting different users in different ways in 2015 2016 the Gerdup spider program was round rounding up series of models and people in the fashion industry in Iran that are quite prominently present on Instagram and While some of the Statements coming from Gerdup was saying that they had Technical hacking abilities what they were actually doing was arresting these models and Forcing passwords and getting their accounts that way But during that time, I actually got an Instagram request from one of these seized accounts Nikohang Clothing which you can see over there and you can see that Gerdup had taken it over Because there's a notice that saying because of such-and-such law this Account has been seized under the spider program and so that was happening for a while under this Again more actual physical takeover than technical sophistication of that kind of work another thing That's quite concerning that the campaign for human rights actually was the first report on was the Supreme Council of cyberspace requiring all telegram accounts to register with the government and so Telegram is hugely popular inside of Iran It's almost ubiquitous and it's often used as a social media application and so the public channels are Run by administrators and if you have more than 5,000 followers They basically needed you to register and get approval and by registering they would add a bot to the account And the bot could basically get information of the administrators and the followers Which was quite dangerous because last May when in the lead up to the presidential elections There was a roundup of telegram administrators that a lot of digital activists believe was through this registration program of having all of this personal data Excuse me in terms of the national internet project It's quite a contentious project in that a lot of people say that on one extreme It goes towards being like North Korea's intranet kind of closed off from the rest of the world. I Through my own work. I don't think this is what the Iranian government wants to do They do want to localize certain things like banking and different forms of infrastructure against cyber attacks like Stuxnet But in general what they want to do is keep data inside of the country so they can have access and control in Part of this project has been to create imitation versions of foreign companies. So Like I said, they couldn't Force Facebook or Twitter to censor things for them because they don't have a relationship But if they have local versions, they can effectively do this and so And they've come up with alternatives for things like Instagram with Lenzor, which you can see has a very oddly similar user interface But Oftentimes users inside of Iran don't trust these imitation apps. So usage amongst for like Instagram is always much higher than it is for the local alternatives one researcher a few years ago saw that the way that a Telegram Imitation app was implemented kind of traced how the data was going back to the government So there's generally a sense of distrust for this kind of work Throughout the year since 2016 this attempt to localize user content has really increased they put an ultimatum on Platforms that have not been censored yet like telegram and Instagram that they had a year to bring their servers inside of the country Or else it would be censored This obviously didn't work so in 2017 This past year they've been doing different things that kind of have basically added up to Net discrimination like they've been going against net neutrality values by offering incentives for people to Use local traffic access local traffic local platforms and websites over international ones and they've been giving million dollar incentives to developers to create apps and For example, if they got a million users, they would get a million American dollars for developing such a Such a platform Recently, we just translated and analyzed a new policy that's Forming into a law by the Supreme Council of cyberspace policy and action on organizing social media Messaging applications and this is just a set of rules For local apps and foreign apps that need to follow in order to operate inside of Iran Supposed to be a gift, but that didn't work So another point that's kind of come up over especially over the past year is how controls don't only come from the Iranian government, but they also come from abroad so Companies like Apple and Google in order to Comply and sometimes over comply with US sanctions. They've been denying certain services to Iranians So what has been happening? It has been Iranian app developers have been seeing their apps being rejected from the Google Play Store and the Apple the app store Mainly because they were providing Financial transactions over it and even things that weren't directly doing financial payments. We're getting blocked such as One particular app, which is kind of the uber of Iran called snap They were told to remove financial payments over the app or else they would get removed from the app store Once they did remove that it seemed that they knew that there was some sort of financial transaction Occurring offline and they still Remove that app from the app store just to comply with sanctions um there's also a kind of threat to other companies as The nuclear negotiations went through back in 2015. There's a lot of foreign companies going in There's been a huge influx of tele the telecom sector like Vodafone and Orange and Different companies like that going to Iran and there's kind of a fear that social media giants like Twitter and Facebook might find incentive to also go It's always good to keep pressure to For them to remain transparent about their dealings with Iran the new minister of ICT Recently said that he had started negotiations with Twitter to unfilter Twitter in Iran However, Twitter has refused to officially reply or say anything so the thing that I spend most of my time working on in terms of social media discourse is telegram because telegram is Kind of an exciting new territory and understanding social media especially in Iran because internet penetration and telegram Usage are almost on par. So there's about 40 to 45 million internet users inside of Iran and according to the company telegram There's about 25 million daily users and about 40 million monthly users So what this means for how people communicate how people are accessing information in Iran is huge Because oftentimes everything from shopping to staying in touch with friends to getting updates on the weather and traffic and news It comes from telegram and the public channels so understanding this and how How the government is responding to such an important Application for communication is also really important and as always it's become sort of a target For vulnerable at-risk users for example a number of journalists a few years ago. We're having their Their account sees through SMS brute force entry I mean through SMS logins they were able to get in and So there's those kinds of Concerns telegram has been kind of reactive to these security flaws When the journalists had their accounts taken over through the SMS hacks They did help we reinstate them a few weeks ago. There was a flaw in a notification That users got in Iran on telegram that hackers were able to sort of take over you can see in that picture over there and Telegram kind of reacted really fast and fixed the flaw, but the issue though a lot of Digital rights activists on Iran fine as that telegram is so important and it's so crucial to how a lot of Things operate inside of Iran yet. They're not really trying to prevent anything. They're being much more reactive So Yeah, there's also been concerns about how they interact with the Iranian government as well and however, telegram has kind of always made a Took taking a stand to say that they are not cooperating with the Iranian governments and But they they do say large Things boastful things that they stand for freedom of speech yet they have failed to really reach out to civil society and human rights activists for Iran and so There's a general kind of plea towards this platform that's so important for them to be a bit more cooperative And and prioritized These human rights concerns in Iran a little bit more I was going to slightly get into More security aspects of things, but I'll quickly go over it So obviously there's security concerns with telegram It takes up some of the work that I do at article 19 working with civil society and protecting them in that way So I'll just quickly go over it because I wanted to end on a particular note. So this is like a very Standard thing I'd like to say is you don't necessarily apply the same security Concerns to Iran that you would hear So just these grand statements of use signal use tour often don't work Telegram is hugely popular. So I often say why don't we work on making telegram safer because users are not going to migrate away from it Unless signal comes and creates a whole like infrastructure and platforms That's going to cater to those specific needs of being both social media and having the different usability features So that's really the last point. I wanted to take away with But I also just wanted to have one kind of message which is I am super privileged to be standing here and talking about this topic that I I'm really passionate about and I am Really grateful that I've had this opportunity since over the years to work on these kind of digital rights concerns on Iran and I've had certain personal hurdles in terms of without getting into the nitty-gritty of My personal life and the things I've had to go through but there's been this general kind of mood in the past year with the me-too movement and all these different stories of harassment and And Basically I've been really grateful to all the people who have supported me over the years to make sure that the hurdles I've had to encounter for the specific kind of Unfortunate personal events that took place that have affected my career To really help support me and when I was coming to Leipzig. I was super proud to be coming to the chaos computer clubs events and the stories I've been hearing about people who have been victims of harassment have really upset me and I Think it would be I would be remiss to not make a point of saying that I'm a little bit disappointed that I I've been reading these things and And While I really appreciate all of you and all the help you gave me to set up for my talk and I Appreciate that I've been given this platform, but I really hope we can do better because this is just not cool It's not cool for people to not feel safe, and I know how it feels personally and I Hope Dina I haven't seen her yet. I have chatted with her briefly. I hope she's having a great time at this Congress because And I'm really sorry to hear that some of some people that I think are doing great work and should be in the space or not here this year and I just hope we can do better in 2018 and That's about it. Thank you Thanks for your talk master Ali madani and for your patience with our technical problems. Thank you very much Please line up at the microphones. They are for microphones here in the room Please line up there. We have a couple more minutes for Q&A. You want to hold a Q&A? Yes, sure But first maybe there are the signal angels in the back. Is he waving or not? Are there any questions from the internet? No, nothing Okay, thank you There is someone standing at microphone three. What's your question? Hi? Thanks for your last statement really thanks a lot here My question would be about Instagram and Telegram I I don't know if I miss that part But does it mean that then the Iranian government has relationships with them because you mentioned that they help I mean they show these things so you've been blocked and this is because of this So why this why this happens and why is it only these two particular platforms? Like I understood that Twitter and Facebook don't cooperate if you could say more about that. Thanks yeah, that's a really great question and Something that's been really interesting So I think I mentioned that this new government the moderate Rohani administration Has kind of at least in terms of how it's positioned the words it says Has been a bit more open to internet freedoms and things like that And so I think one of the achievements of that government is stopping the censorship of Instagram and Telegram because there's a lots of hard line elements in the establishment that have wanted this to get censored and it's kind of like Come to deliberation to censor it over the years. There have been some rumors that telegram has been working with with the Iranian government although I Think that might be rumors because the Ministry of ICT every so often says that they have a direct relationship And then telegram comes and refutes it So yeah, that's up in the realm of rumors However, but I think it's mainly the work of this moderate Administration that's been able to prevent the censorship So they are in connection with Instagram No, they're as far as I know they're not working with Instagram. Instagram is owned by Facebook So Facebook is censored, but I mean there could be many different reasons, but these are all conjecture Instagram is just kind of more for entertainment So they have less of a reason to block it But also the work of this moderate administration to kind of keep Instagram going although for a short while during the elections They were blocking Instagram live because it was being used for like protests and gatherings and things like that Yeah Microphone number one, please Masa just wanted to thank you for your talk and also appearing persevering through all the adversity Not only of nation-state actors, but of also people inside the community that might a little bit closer to the microphone Please sure I just wanted to say thank you for persevering through all the adversity that has come your way and for being here today to Give this talk. It's important and vital and your voice is valued I have a question about Iran in a geopolitical landscape as it's exerting itself more and Yemen Lebanon rubs other places Do you see that the technology that's being pioneered by the state apparatuses the state bodies inside of inside of Tehran and in Iran? We'll have a trickle-down effect Into other countries that may replicate the oppressive Structures in which that Iran has as placed. Do you see it being a model? As Iran geopolitically exert its muscle. Well, do you see that some of these the technical sophistication and other things will Be picked up by other actors in the region. Yeah, that's a good question I am I think Iran would like to have the technical sophistication that would be replicated elsewhere and I guess in some ways The capabilities within the Iran cyber Iran cyber army, which is kind of very hard to associate Directly with the government because sometimes the affiliations are very loose They have certain capabilities, but in terms of like the technology I think for censorship and surveillance. I think Iran More models itself on the technology coming out of China and Russia because they have had more effective and more Sophisticated platforms and means of doing it. So I think it's a little bit the other way around Microphone number one, please Thank you for your talk you if I'm not wrong you mentioned some government supporters being arrested Is this correct? Do you see any kind of clash between the revolutionary guard or the religious power and the government the government? Yeah, absolutely. I mean after the nuclear negotiations the foreign minister Jevo Zerif who is like kind of a little bit Westernized he speaks perfect English and He had he has a huge fan base in Iran because he established the nuclear deal He had like almost physical confrontations in Parliament with the hard-line elements. So Yeah, there definitely is that and the reason why some of the telegram administrators who are actually supporters of Rohani Were arrested is because of this kind of clash between Hardline elements like the revolutionary guards and the more moderate administration. So there is this kind of yeah differentiation and nuance that happens I guess we're moving to the last question at MacGyffin number three, please Okay, I just want to ask a question What can we first of all? Thank you for your great talk is very well researched and great information and for your very brave proclamation What can we in the room do other than find your work? Can we put pressure on the companies? That you know work inside of Iran can we put pressure on the governments of the nations where citizens in like what's The next step for people who are listening and want to do something. Thank you Yeah, I mean especially if you're not American I think the Iranian government would be more open to hearing kind of the non-western perspective But I think like the reason why I think it's so important to be here in Europe is because Europe is actively engaging in Dialogue with Iran So if there's way to put pressure through the different companies that are going into Iran like like I mentioned There's you know the British Vodafone and like Francis orange that are going in if they can make certain demands for you know human rights Standards and things like that that would be that would also be really great I mean campaigning and putting pressure different ways through social media is always helpful the main thing that I think we could Perhaps have effect on is hopefully a company like telegram is listening and they can make The security and privacy of Iranians one of them one of their bigger priorities So that's really the place that I think can have The most change because we can't have more We can have easier dialogue with like Facebook telegram and all these different platforms to ensure that Privacy and security is upheld Awesome. Alima Danny. Thank you very much for the talk and please give her a warm round of applause