 I'd like to turn to this morning's topic, which is military space activities. Over the last few years, we have heard very much increased concern from many countries about the militarization and even weaponization of space. Space capabilities are playing a bigger role in military power and national security. And multiple countries have been developing the ability to deny, degrade, or even destroy someone else's space capabilities. These include ground-based and space-based anti-satellite weapons, high-powered lasers, radio frequency jamming, and cyber attacks. From a SWF perspective, we have been tracking the proliferation of these counter-space capabilities through our annual Global Counter-Space Capability Report, which is available on our website. As a result of these growing threats and the increased importance of space for military uses, there has been a more public discussion about what to do about these threats from senior political and military leaders around the world. Here in the United States, these discussions have led to a significant reorganization of military space activities, which has included the creation of the US Space Force and the resurrection of US Space Command. But the US has not been the only country grappling these issues, as several different countries around the world have all been looking at how they should respond to increasing space threats with organizational policy and strategy changes of their own. So with that bit of background, I'd like to introduce a panel of international military leaders who are joining me to take all these issues. And if I can ask all my panelists to please go ahead and turn on their audio and video. These leaders have all been deeply involved in grappling with these issues of space security and dealing with threats and challenges in their own countries and implementing changes to try and address those threats. So I'd first like to introduce Major General John Shaw, who has served as a US Space Force operations professional for nearly 30 years, and currently wears two hats. One as the Combined Force Space Component Commander for US Space Command. And the other is Commander of US Space Operations Command in the US Space Force. And I think we're going to have a chance to talk a little bit more of what the different hats are as we go along here. I'd also like to introduce Major General Michel Friedling. He's a distinguished French Air Force pilot and strategist who currently serves as the commander of the recently created French Joint Space Command. We also have Major General Hiroaki Sakanashi, who has had a long career in cybersecurity and C4 systems with the Japan Air Self Defense Force and currently serves as Director General of the Project Promotion Group for Emerging Domains and Programs, as well as Vice Commandant, Air Command and Staff College at the Air Staff Office for the Joint Air Self Defense Force. And finally, we have Brigadier General Michael Adamson, who is a career navigator with the Royal Canadian Air Force and recently been chosen to be the Director General and Component Commander of Space at National Defense Headquarters. We're going to run this session as a conversation and hopefully an interesting one. As I mentioned earlier, if you'd like to ask a question, please go ahead and drop that into the question and answer and I will be incorporating those into our discussion as we go along. So I think we'll get started just by talking about what is happening in the space domain that is driving a lot of this discussion. And General Shaw, if you don't mind, I think I'll start with you. What have you seen in the changes in the space threat landscape over the last few years and how would you compare it to, let's say, 20 years ago? So good morning, Brian, and good morning to all those watching today. Good morning from the Central Coast to California here at Vandenberg Air Force Base. And let me also say it's an honor to be on this panel with some terrific teammates that you've already introduced and I'm happy to be here. Brian, I think if you don't mind, I'd like to, I think for proper context, let me widen your question to not just the threat landscape, what's happened in space that now has driven what we see as threats within the space domain. So we're approaching the 63rd anniversary of Sputnik here in a couple of weeks, 63 years, not a long time. And I think we could ask the question, what will historians write about human activity in the space domain, say in 2057, looking back 100 years? And I think that they will write that what humans did in the space domain mirrored what they did in other domains as they progressed. It started with exploration, then it started with state-only activity, and then rapidly expanded to civil activity, academic activity, commercial activity. We saw this, I think, in history in the maritime domain. We could say the same has happened in a much more compressed timeline in the cyber domain. And it's in that context that as things evolve, that there now becomes in that domain as humans have more activity in that domain, there's mischief and outright threats. And I think in some ways, we'll see, we will look back on it and say this was a natural evolution of humans expanding into the domain in all kinds of activities. And so what we've seen more recently, we tend to point to 2007, the Chinese ASET as an inflection point, so what we've seen is a steady drumbeat of threats increasing. You've already mentioned a few of those in the last 13 years. And most recently, even just within the last couple of years, Russia in particular has shown a wide spectrum of threats that they are developing and fielding. You could talk to some of our commercial partners about concerns of Russian satellites in Geo that might qualify as the mischief piece that I mentioned. And then even within the last year, we've seen in April a Russian ASET test from the ground into Leo. And even more recently, we've seen activity in low earth orbit with a Russian satellite shadowing a US government satellite. And then later on, launching what appears to be an on orbit satellite, anti-satellite test. And this particular test involved the ejection of a projectile from a Russian satellite. We had seen a similar test in 2017. We saw it again in July. The Russian explanation was that that projectile was an inspection satellite, but that doesn't match what we saw. They called it, if you saw a ship at sea launch a projectile at relative high speed to the launch platform in a relatively straight line and didn't do much maneuvering, I'm not sure you would call that an inspection ship. You would probably call that a torpedo. And that's exactly what I believe we observed the Russians testing was a space torpedo. I could add many other threats that we've seen along the continuum of counter space capabilities, the proliferation of electromagnetic spectrum jammers, directed energy and what we have done, I think is respond to those developments in order to protect our space capabilities that we rely on not only for national security means, but also for economic prosperity. I think I'll finish my stand by saying that your title of this panel is a good one. I think everybody wants a space force. And so I think a final amount of question could be why do so many nations now want a space force? And I would propose that the answer is analogous to why do ocean going or space varying nations want a Navy? It is to secure that domain for all activity and to deter threats in that domain. Nobody wants a war on the high seas. Nobody wants a war in space. And I think we are all looking to this domain as extremely important to the future of humans. And I think the development of space forces is a natural evolution in that regard. Thanks. No, thank you. That's a great opening perspective on this. General Friedling, I wonder if you could maybe expand on that and sort of provide the French perspective of what you've been seeing over the last few years that has sort of driven this discussion in France and in Europe more broadly. Sure. Good morning, Brian. Good morning to everybody here watching and listening in this panel. I'm not sure I could extend what brilliantly said the general show. We share the same concerns. We share the same statements about what is happening in space. So we are fully in line with these words. So our answer was, you know, our new space defense strategy that we released in 2019. The impulse came from the president himself saying the space was a matter of national security like cyber. And we already had a cyber command. We didn't have any space command or something appropriate to face these challenges. So we worked for one year under the direction of our ministry of armed forces, Mrs. France Parly. And we made actually, we made the same statements that General Shaw described very well. And first of all, and I don't want to state the obvious, but first of all, the crucial importance of space not only for defense purposes, but also for the daily functioning of our societies and for the economic prosperity. And from a military perspective, these services are really crucial to our self-sufficiency in terms of decision-making and for our military operations. So the second statement was the, you know, the upheaval of the world space ecosystem with the democratization of access to space with the appearance of many, many actors, non-government actors in space, commercial projects and the congestion of space. And then finally, the last statement was the vulnerability of space activities and infrastructure. And very recently all the events that General Shaw described very well again, we have seen them and we are really concerned about them. So this is the reason why we decided to release this strategy and there are four axes in this strategy, I would say. The first one is a new doctrine for military space operations. And specifically the main point of this new doctrine is the ability to detect, characterize, and respond to any hostile or non-responsible action against our space interests. The second axis was a new capability ambition. So capabilities to be able to do that. And so we are working on this quite hard. The third axis was to change the governance, the organization of the Ministry of Defense by creating a new command dedicated to space and in order to be much more efficient to face these threats. And the fourth axis was to develop and to increase the space expertise in the Ministry of Defense to be able to achieve these missions. All right, that's excellent. And I think a little bit later in this discussion, I would like to unpack some of those and talk about some of the details because I think those are challenges that I think all four of you are trying to address. How do you deal with capabilities? How do you deal with protection? How do you deal with expertise? So General Sakanashi, I'll turn to you now and sort of ask from the perspective of Japan, do you see a similar challenges as to what General Shaw and General Redling talked about? What is your view on what is changing in the space domain? Basically, how we see the security environment in the space domain is just as General Shaw and Redling said, and the security environment surrounding Japan is changing at extremely high speed. And so changes in the mass of power in the intentional arena are accelerating and becoming more complex. And uncertainty over the existing order is increasing. And in addition to rapid expansion in the use of new domain such as the space is a place to fundamentally change the existing paradigm of national security. So we regard the space security strategy as a very serious problem. And one more point is the sense of space and also the cyber domain, what we use for civilian purposes or if a stable use of these domains is impeded, it may entail a serious consequences for the safety of state and the citizens. From the intentional perspective in the intentional community, that there is a broadening and diversifying array of security challenges that cannot be dealt with by a single country alone. And so the space security challenges is a very typical example for the security challenge that I have. No, that's excellent, thank you. So General Amonson turning it over to you now. I think a lot of people are very friendly with Canada's civil space program and the amazing Canada arm you guys had first on the shuttle and now on the inter space station. Maybe a little bit less familiar with what Canada's military active has been in space. You kind of talk about the history of that and sort of what Canada's military has been thinking about space and how that may have been changing. Certainly. And first of all, I'd just like to thank you for including me on this panel as well. It certainly is a delight for me to be here with such an auspicious group. Canada obviously, as you mentioned, has a long history of space activities that are going back to our initially our annex satellite years and years ago in the space arm. From a military perspective though, there's been a growing awareness within the Canadian defense community and the government certainly of the importance that military space is playing in the overall picture, maintaining access to the space commons, maintaining mission assuredness. And so as a result of that, we published a defense policy in 2017 that really clearly articulates that recognized importance of the space domain to all of our activities from a military standpoint, but also how clearly they are interlinked with what we're doing on a civil and commercial situation as well. So that policy basically provides us the starting point from which we're moving forward and trying to expand and grow our military operations in space. We've had a longstanding relationship with the US obviously working alongside in the NORAD domain. And then we're expanding our alliance framework, if you will, through the Combined Space Operations Alliance and working as NATO develops and awareness of the space domain as well, working with our alliances there. So really keeping that military interaction piece with the alliances, understanding that very few nations can go it alone. Canada always recognizes the importance of that alliance structure. So we're trying to find those capabilities that we can bring to bear that contribute to the overall awareness picture. So whether it be our Sapphire system, which contributes to awareness of space domain or whether or not it'd be our radar staff constellation, which is providing a little bit of maritime domain awareness. And obviously there are other areas that we want to be up to speed in an expert center as well, such as global communications and specifically polar communications. So the military is looking at those capabilities, those that we have and the ones that we want to, to continue to have and bring forward. But what that means in the context of our alliances as well to make sure that we're a partner with everyone else that we're doing that with. Oh, great, thank you. So each of you mentioned that these challenges you've been experiencing have driven changes in your own countries. I'm gonna kind of go through and touch on those a little more significantly and talk about what those are. So I think General Shaw, I'll start with you. Cause probably it's been the most written and the most kind of public awareness about the recent changes in the US. He just briefly for those people that may not have been entirely following what's been happening, there's been a lot in the last year and a half or so to sort of recap what has happened in the US and what are the big changes that have been? Sure, Brian, and I'm there, you're right, so much has happened. I'm sure I will miss some big pieces just in the interest of time, but I'll start with US Space Force, again, approaching nine months, only nine months ago that United States Space Force was formed and already we've made some tremendous progress. And I would point to, again, my opening remarks of the creation of the United States Space Force was not only necessary, but it was inevitable. As we were going to further security interests in the space domain, it becomes natural that you would have a service dedicated to providing the capabilities and most importantly, the people, the expertise to provide security in that domain. And we continue to, General Raymond as our first chief of space operations has led us through some tremendous progress already in less than nine months in terms of reorganization, bringing people into the Space Force and prioritizing the development of capabilities for that force. That's one large planet, new planet in the solar system. Another is, as you mentioned before, United States Space Command. Brian, you used the verb resurrection, I think, or resurrected. I think I would throw out maybe reincarnation might be a better word, although we could probably find an even better word than either of those, because it is not the United States Space Command of 1985 to 2002. This is a command that's now addressing a much wider spectrum of threats. And in some, in many ways, General Dickinson as the United States Space Command will be a supported commander in future activities as we conduct all domain operations in future conflicts. And again, as you introduced me, I actually wear hats in either in both of those organizations. And it's been quite an interesting experience for me to see us evolve both of those organizations. A couple other pieces, though. One other thing that we did within the last year is we stood up the, we converted what was the Joint Force Space Component Command to the Combine Force Space Component Command. And over my left shoulder, you'll see the patch that has that word combined in it. I'm very proud of that in my duty title because it links to what you've, I've already heard a couple of my colleagues saying, and I'm sure we'll talk more about, is that it means an alliance. It means that we work together as allies and partners to secure the space domain. And I'm happy to be part of that. I would also say it's not just the Department of Defense. We've seen some movement in other sectors as well. And I think that, for example, I think we will see very soon here the Department of Commerce taking on a larger role with regard to space situation awareness and space and complimenting Department of Defense activities on space domain awareness. And so it continues to broaden. It continues to materialize. And I think we'll see much more happening in the next couple of years at the same pace that we were already seeing in the last couple of years. No, that's actually the point. And your point about the combined, I think that's one of those military terms that I think the general public may not be entirely aware of. But 15 years ago, I was part of the Joint Space Operations Center, which implied that it was joint across the different services, Army, Air Force, Navy, Marines. And then as you said, recently that's been changed to combined, which in military lingo means not just joint, but also bringing in other countries, those allies and even those commercial partners that we think we'll also talk about a little bit further on the conversation. Just quickly to go back to General Shaw again, can you kind of delineate what the difference is between your responsibilities with your Space Force hat and your Space Command hat? Yeah, thanks, Brian, for that opportunity. So I think there's still some confusion in our general American public about US Space Force versus United States Space Command. And I would point to this, this is how we organize as a Department of Defense in all domains. We have services, and that would be the United States Space Force analogous to the United States Air Force or the Navy or the Army that organize, train, and equip, and present capability, right? They're the ones that build the equipment, that train the warfighters, and then present that capability for a fight. Those are services. Combatant commands of which United States Space Command is the 11th of all of the combatant commands in the Department of Defense, and others would include Northern Command or Strategic Command or Central Command CENTCOM, that might be a little bit more familiar to folks in American public. Those are actually the warfighters. It's how we fight as a joint force with multiple services and use those capabilities that the services have developed in operations. And so part of my job is overseeing the service side of our space capabilities and ensuring that we're training our folks properly and that we're bringing on capability properly and are operating it effectively. And then in my joint have, we actually operate those capabilities for the benefit of joint warfighters. If someone in the Indo-Pacific region or in the European command needs satellite communications or needs other or missile warning capability, then it's in my joint hat that I ensure that that capability is there for those warfighters. So I hope that helps differentiate between those two, but I would point again, that is how we do things in the Department of Defense. It's not unique. It is actually normalized in how we do things in other domains and across the planet. Great, thank you. So General Friedling, I'd like to turn to you and sort of give you a chance to expand on what you mentioned earlier. So we just heard from General Shaw the organizational changes in the US and the US is all sides different than other countries demand. The US military tends to have a lot more forces and a lot bigger of an organization. And so this is their approach in these two separate organizations. Can you expand a little bit on sort of what France's approach in the past was to military space and what this new change of this new joints command really means? Obviously this is very different from the US, although we have some kind of similarities between countries and I would like to explain them. First of all, you know, this morning I was with the media, the French media, because tomorrow, we will have a military ceremony with the Chief of the Air Force and the Ministry of Defense, Mrs. Parley. And because the French Air Force is now named French Air and Space Force. So we kind of have a Space Force too, I would say, but so this morning I was with the media and I explained a little bit the history of space in France and the Ministry of Defense. And actually it started in 1947 and between 1947 and 1962 in Algeria, which was French at that time, we had the first space port, I would say a French space port and this is the place where the French Air Force and the ancestor of what is today the French procurement agency, the DGA and the ancestor of what is today the French space agency. All these together, they developed the French, first French rockets to go to space. And this is amazing because this is today what we do. We work with the same people, the French Air Force, the French DGA and the French Space Agency. So this was a long time ago. I would say in the around 19, in the mid 90s, late 90s, we created within the Air Force, the French Air Force two units, one dedicated to the control of the observation satellites, another one dedicated to the space surveillance. They were belonging to the French Air Force. And in 2010, 10 years ago, we created a so-called joint space command. But my opinion is it was everything but a command. It was kind of departments within the joint staff in Paris. Only 40 people there in charge of the military space policy. This is what the way we call it in France. It means procurement programs, space capabilities, corporations and so on. And all the operational units were belonging to the Air Force. And during the space review last year, we figured out that this organization was not consistent, was not efficient, was not visible. And we decided to create a single organization and to put together within this organization all the different units and people in charge of any aspect of the space domain, either in the joint staff or in the Air Force. And this command is very small actually. It's not like in the US. It's very small. It's there, it's a little bit less than 300 people. It will be 50, 500 people in a three-year time. So we row up and it's a kind of unique and hybrid command because it's at the same time in charge of the military space policy. So military capabilities, corporations in the space domain. It's also in charge of creating the space expertise, recruiting and training people. It's also in charge of its kind of operational command because it's in charge of conducting some space operation. So, and the other point is that it's a joint command. And this is a crucial point. This is a joint command, but within the Air Force. And I would say this is a kind of similarity that we have with the US because in the US, you have created the space force. So it dedicated service, but within the department of the Air Force. And this is somehow a kind of similarity because we have a joint command dedicated to the space domain, but within the Air Force. And so it's both joint and air. All right, excellent, thank you. So General Sakanashi, I'd like to turn to you. So Japan is also making quite a lot of changes. You talked about them a little bit, but that starts with sort of a different thinking about the Japanese, the role of the depth military in space, which was new. And you've also made some organizational changes very recently. Can you talk a little bit more about what these changes in Japan have been over the last, let's say 10 years with regard to the military in space and the new organization? So basically Japan has a long history for basically banning the military space activities. And only Jackson is an active space entity. But we changed the law and the government of Japan finalized national defense program guideline for fiscal year 2019 and beyond and in that, so creating the space unit is decided. So in this year, the 2020, in Kokuzi, Japan Air Force Defense Force, we have a very first space dedicated military unit which called Space Operation Squadron, which is a small approximately 20 personnel and so far fully equipped, but very effort-making and very huge leap forward for Japan's defense force. So 2020 is a very stretching year for us. Excellent. General Adamson, again, I think, give me a second to expand a little bit more on if there's been any recent changes in the way Canada's approaching space, but also something we haven't really talked about yet is the Combined Space Operations Initiative. And I know Canada has been playing a role in that so if you could talk with that a little bit, I think that would be very useful. Certainly, so from a Canadian perspective, we are certainly like most nations going through an evolutionary process in our organization, probably not to the same extent as what we see in the US with the creation of Space Force, but a very similar alignment of our organization and how we're structured. Up until a few years ago, sort of a nascent space capability was nested within our Vice Chief Organization with the original stand-up of Director General Space as there's been increased awareness and recognition of the importance of the military space aspects. A few years ago with the release of our new space, or our new, sorry, defense policy, we underwent some organizational changes as well. It was felt that the importance of space demanded that it really needed to sort of move out of that sort of offices within the Vice's organization and really head over to the Air Force where it could be shepherded with the full scope and benefits of that structure. We've done that. We've moved space sort of underneath the commander of the RCA after we're on Canadian Air Force, but as a result of that, have been able to leverage the Air Force really large in things like moving projects forward, interacting with industry, and that kind of thing. So now the Air Force is responsible for space across the entire spectrum of operations. As a result of that, my position really has been dual-hatted as well. So within the Air Force, I'm Director General of Air, sorry, Space Rather, which has an administrative and bureaucratic function to it. On the other side, I'm also the space component commander responding to our operational command. So as we do with other air platforms, whether it be air mobilities or our fighter or what have you, the Air Force is responsible for generating forces to make sure we've got the air crews and the capabilities. And then when time comes to employ those forces, they are chopped over to the operational command then to employ whatever they might need. And space is now no different than that. The Air Force is responsible for generating those forces and shepherding them and handling the projects and procurement aspects. And then we take that in a force employment perspective and chop that over to our operational command. As we continue to evolve that even further, we're looking at basically mirroring organizationally and doctrinally what the Air Force is about. So in that respects, we have air divisions that have got the air power that are generated and then handed to operational command for employment. And so similarly, we're exploring the possibility of shifting yet again and looking at perhaps a space division with associated wings that would generate the forces that would then go off and work with the operational command. So it continues to evolve and does so reactive to the environment that we're operating in. It's important, I guess, to be sort of observe what those required interactions are going to be internal to the Canadian armed forces and the joint aspects, but also make sure that we are able to react and interact with our partners. And you mentioned that combined space operations as well, that is a large portion of what we do. And in no small part, we organize ourselves to make sure that we remain interoperable. For instance, within our operational side, we've got the Canadian Space Operations Center, the CANSPAC, which is on a smaller scale mirrors what the Space Operations Center within the US is doing. And we've got a lot of ties with that organization and with the other CSPO partners and their operations center as well to make sure that we can back up what is being done. I think it creates a level of redundancy, which also creates resiliency, which as you know is extremely important in military operations. And so I think that really importantly shapes how we're moving forward and evolving our organization as well. Yeah, and it's been interesting to kind of follow the evolution of that. You think back, it was the 2010 Schriever War Game exercised this notion of a combined space operations center that brought in partner, ally partners and commercial partners. And it's been over the last 10 years sort of the ongoing shift in trying to bring at least part of that vision around. And then of course, now today, we have not only the CSPO which you mentioned, which is sort of the, how do we talk across different countries space operations centers, but also the combined space operations center now exists out at Vandenberg, which I think is a pretty interesting, the military is a big bureaucracy, right? It takes a little time to make some changes, but it's been interesting watching some of these changes over time. Donal, honestly, just talk quickly about, I think we generally mentioned earlier about the need for training and sort of building a cadre. I introduced you as a navigator because traditionally that's sort of in one of the main sources of space expertise. Can you talk about kind of the evolution of the, because you don't have a specific space career field as far as I understand it, and Canada, or do you? We don't actually. And that's a bit of a function of our size. I don't think we have the ability at the moment to dedicate an entire occupation stream just to space operations. That said, we do have occupations within the Air Force and the Army and the Navy that have over time really been the go-to occupations when it comes to engaging with space operations for a number of reasons. And those occupations, air weapons controllers, for instance, within the Canadian Air Force, air combat systems officers, which is what we've renamed our navigators. Folks with that air domain awareness that are used to operating in that environment and have relied a great deal on space capabilities as a consumer in their operational fields are folks that have demonstrated interest in that and have gravitated towards the space employment. For us, it remains a bit of an attraction issue for us. So, you know, we want to obviously let the rest of the Canadian Air Forces know what is going on in the space domain. We want to attract not just Air Force officers, but it is joint. So we wanna make sure that we include the Navy, the Army and the special ops folks. And we do have those folks seated within our organization as well. We are very much a joint organization. I don't know that we will get to a point where we have an occupation specific to space, but it's something certainly we could aspire to and it's something that quite possibly may manifest itself down the road. But in the meantime, we have a cadre of folks that will sort of come in and out of that space sphere. Come in, they'll do some time within the space realm, perhaps go back to a parent community. You know, go and move along in their career, come back at the next rank level. And our hope is as we continue to grow the enterprise that a future replacement for me, a future DG space, will somebody that has spent their entire career sort of moving in and out of that space sphere and intimately familiar with the work and the challenges that are out there and who's got a Rolodex full of folks that are equally interested in that kind of thing as well. So it's aspirationally is where we'd like to go. We're getting there slowly. Great, thank you. So I'm gonna start pulling in some of the audience questions now. And General Friedling, one of them is to you and ask this question about whether or not there may be a EU space command or more broadly, what do you see as the coordination at the EU level on some of these space issues? And I guess I'll add into that, NATO has also recently announced the new NATO space policy. I don't know if you can talk about that at all as well. Regarding EU, well, there are works being done about space surveillance, at least for civilian purposes, for SST or SSA. There are many questions about collision avoidance, debris and so space surveillance to avoid risks in space. We are, it's a long shot to have discussions for a kind of illiterate European space, space surveillance center. And so right now we are more trying to build national capabilities and to coordinate with Allied in Europe. And it's not a secret to say that we work with Germany. We work with Italy and we also start to work with Spain to build something, in Europe and to provide Europe with some capabilities. Regarding NATO, I think everybody knows that NATO declared the space domain as an operational domain end of 2019. So this is now a very new, the latest domain for NATO. And again, there are thinkings in the NATO on the way to address this new domain. And this is now the point for me to say that France has proposed to host and a center of excellence for space for NATO in Toulouse, where we will set up our space for NATO. And we will set up our space command and the space operational center in Toulouse, which is actually the largest space hub in Europe. So this is the place where the largest space expertise is in Europe. So we think it's a very good idea for NATO to have a dedicated space center of excellence in the new domain and to locate this center in Toulouse, where the space expertise is. So it's so easy across the street and to have all the space experts. So it's the proposal of France for NATO. Great, thank you. So General Shaw, question for you. We've used the phrase space as a domain, separate domain operations several times now. One of the questions in the chat is, where does that begin? So where, and I think this was addressed in the recent capstone document that the Space Force put out. So if you could talk about sort of how you guys are seeing where the delineation in between the space domain and other domains are and how you're thinking about that. Yeah, so I think in the most basic sense, what we've defined as a Department of Defense is that the space domain begins 100 kilometers above the surface of the earth. And that's where the area of responsibility, the AOR, a formal term in our doctrine of United States Space Command begins and there's no end limit right now. So it extends upwards indefinitely away from the earth. And so I think that's the short answer to that question. What it leads to though is a discussion of and the need to work, integrate closely with commanders, other combatant commanders that have areas of responsibility that cover the surface of the earth up to that 100 kilometers and to ensure that there is seamless all domain operations in a supporting and supported nature between all of those combatant commanders. I guess I could get a little nerdy and say why 100 kilometers? And I think the best answer I have is that's the old von Karman line where the amount of speed necessary for an aircraft to generate lift is actually greater than orbital velocity. So it's a nice physical limit and boundary that we find that separates the atmosphere from orbital activity. And no, it's, actually, I was gonna ask you to follow up with that exact same thing. Just the support it's supporting again for the listeners that are not deeply versed in sort of the military. Can you talk about what that means? And I noticed there was recently another new update to the UCP and sort of this broader question of how US space command interacts with the other combatant commands. Yeah, so if we go to when, you know, before space became a war fighting domain when it was a benign domain and that was most of my career, by the way, our focus in space was to make sure we delivered effects to war fighters in the terrestrial spheres and domains and ensure that they got the best possible GPS or the best possible SATCOM, the best possible missile warning that they could possibly get. It was all about supporting terrestrial activity and terrestrial war fighting operations. But now that space is a contested domain that it is a war fighting domain, a war could extend or even begin in space in which case there may be a need for commanders in the terrestrial spheres to support General Dickinson in the space domain. For example, if there was an adversary naval vessel that was sending electromagnetic jamming from that vessel into space and it was affecting our ability to do command and control, there might be a need for the geographic commander of that area where that adversary vessel is to maybe take care of that problem in support of continuing operations within the space domain. So this idea, this is new and this is what we are gonna have to work very hard on as a Department of Defense moving forward is how do we conduct all domain operations effectively in a content, what I see is a continually dynamic supporting and supported relationship all the time. It'll be working in multiple ways simultaneously. Got it, thank you. So I'm gonna ask the, this is open to all of you, the top rated question right now is why the establishment of military space forces by Russia and China is generally perceived as threatening? Well maybe, well why not the other countries as your four countries others also created their own space forces? Why would there be a perception of one is threatening and one is not? Can, does anybody wanna try and address that at all? I would say that it's not the fact in itself that we have space forces or space commands which is concerning, it is what you do with this. It's not the fact of having some space objects in space or ready to go in space which is concerning. It is what you do with it, what you show as intense or what you want to show with this. And so this is actually what is concerning about some actors in space. And this is the reason why we have to be ready to, nobody has interest in any conflict in space. So, but we have to be ready and John Shaw said that very clearly in the introduction. So if you do the parallel with the maritime domain, it's not because you have a navy that you want for war at sea, it's just not because you have space force or space command that you want for in space. So it's basically the same. Anyone else? So that sort of, sorry, John Shaw. Yeah, so I think a great question. I think, again, I'll go back to when historians write the development of space forces and in history. It will point to the fact that what we have done is in response to threats that we saw. We had space, we were using space capabilities again in a benign domain to support war fighting operations on the planet. And it was steps taken by other actors to threaten those space capabilities that resulted in making it a war fighting domain and resulted in what we have now done. I think I would add that the idea here is, is to now protect and defend our space capabilities and provide security so that we deter any kind of threat, threat activity in any counter space activity. I think our potential adversaries have seen that in order to fight, to conduct modern warfare today, you need space capabilities. And so they are now threatening those space capabilities. And our ultimate goal here, and my highest hope would be that by making our space capabilities more resilient and deterring attacks on them, that we not only deter a war in space, we deter a war, period. Yeah, General Anderson. Sure, and I'll sort of pile on, I guess, to General Shaw's comments as well. And I think from a Canadian context, where you've got a domain such as space and a significant overlap in our military and civil and commercial space enterprises, where we've got perhaps multiple utilities for a platform, and I'll use Earth observation for an example, there's obviously military application to that, but as we see increased incidences of natural disasters, fires, floods, ice storms and those kinds of things, protecting those assets and protecting those capabilities and ensuring that we have the ability to provide that service to the Canadian public or to our allies, as well as critically important. And so there becomes this sort of blurring of the lines perhaps between military capability and civil commercial capability when you've got these platforms and it is inherent upon a government to make sure that they can protect their assets and their interests and assure freedom of maneuver within that domain as well. And so I think that becomes critically important. And then for a country like Canada, the protect and defend aspects that General Shaw mentioned really comes from strong alliances that provide that resilience and redundancy in the domain itself. So just to pick up on that deterrence issue, which I think has just come up a couple of different times. In other domains, deterrence is not a unique to space, it's a concept that's been around for quite a long time in terms of military operations and perceptions of force. Generally, there are sort of two ways to approach that. One is deterrence by threat of reprisal. Second is deterrence by denying potential benefits through resilience. This is for anyone, are you approaching that in the space domain? Do you see spaces like the nuclear domain where the main aspect of deterrence is the threat of reprisal of return attack or is it more of a denial of benefits resilience approach to kind of securing that deterrence? General Shaw? Okay, I'll go. So first, I think I would answer that by saying the biggest challenge we have right now is protecting and defending capabilities that were built for a benign domain. And so the focus has to be on making those more resilient so they are there for the warfighter and they are not an easy target. Our space capabilities were built, the analogy I've used is our satellites a geosynchronous orbit built during the 1990s and early 2000s are analogous to super tankers or mega-containerships on the high seas. They were built for efficiency. They were not built to be resilient against threats. I'm not sure I would want to be on the bridge of a super tanker that's under threat of under torpedo attack. And so that is really the big challenge we have right now is how do we take what is currently an architecture that is not very resilient, that is seen as vulnerable and now protect it, deter attacks against it, make it more resilient. And it may start with some resilience at the platform level but it extends to resilience at the architectural level and move in that direction first. So that I think is our most near-term challenge that we're working on. Got it. And so General Prithikas? I would add, if I may, also the, so obviously I fully agree with John's show about the architecture. We have to think about new architectures for the future to improve resilience. But the other point is probably alliances, partnerships, and we come to the point of the coalition working together. We, even today, we improve the resilience of our space capabilities. And this is one of our great and I would say strategic advantage compared to some other countries that are quite alone in space. Thank you. So I think part of that, and it's become a couple of times before, is better awareness about what's happening in the space domain to help both detect those threats and figure out what to do about them. And this was previously space, when I was into a space situation awareness, it's now space domain awareness. I ask each of you to kind of talk about what's been happening in your country to kind of improve space domain awareness. I think General Sakanashi, I'd like to start with you because I think Japan over these four countries are probably the newest to that particular domain. But there's also been significant changes recently about what Japan is doing for space situation awareness. Can you talk a little bit about that, please? And so in Japan for years, the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency has been a conducted the SSA mission for civil space purpose. And then now we have a government plan to enhance the national SSA capability in a fall over government manner. So we have planned to establish a new SSA system, which is kind of a combined inter-agency system. One party is a JAXA, the other party is the Ministry of Defense, Kokujietai, SSEC Transports. And so we now are promoting the programs about the SSA system in each agency. So we hoping that cost effective SSA system capability. Thank you. I don't see, you mentioned Sapphire before. Can you expand a little what Sapphire is and sort of all the ways that Canada's been working on space domain awareness? Right, so Sapphire was launched, I don't know the exact date, but is currently operating beyond its expected life expectancy and actually doing quite well for us. But obviously that's contributing to a more larger alliance awareness of space domain and what's going on there. Acknowledging the fact that Sapphire is certainly not going to be a platform that lasts forever. Within our procurement practices, we've got surveillance of space too, which is a program that is moving forward. I think we've seen that Canada can sort of find some perhaps niche areas that we have both the civil commercial expertise to contribute to this kind of thing. And I believe that surveillance of space is one of those areas. So moving forward with the follow on platform in surveillance of space too is going to continue our contribution to alliance awareness of what's going on. You know, at the moment, the proposal is going to be a combination of both space-based and ground-based assets that will provide that. And of course, for us, then we feed into CSPO and our partners and contribute to their overall awareness of what's going on in the domain. You know, we want to make sure that we're not riding coattails. We want to make sure that we're a contributor to what's happening and maintain our place at the table. So that's our plan moving forward. Great, John. Jennifer? Hey, so we already have, I would say, a significant capability in terms of space surveillance in France. We have different kind of radar. One of them is named Grave and is in charge of watching the low orbits. We have data from different telescopes, optical data from telescope for different orbits. And so I would say this is a significant but not sufficient capability. And definitely we intend to improve this capability in the next years. And we are working already on this. We want much more data from, I would say, state-owned capabilities. And we intend to replace the radars I mentioned before. And we tend to buy some data of different nature from, I would say, to trusted operators. And because we definitely need this huge amount of data of different nature and coming from different places around the world and different sensors and to build a consistent and efficient space situation. And actually one of the points is that this amount of data that we need is really a huge amount of data. So one of the questions we address right now with the industry, with the space, French space agency and with the French DJI is how we handle this amount of data. So, and there are questions like, you know, the AI and you know, so fancy questions like this that we have to address in the next days, weeks and months. And so we have very interesting, fascinating discussions about this. And just a quick follow-up on that. There's also a European Union space surveillance and tracking initiative. Can you talk about what role France plays in that and where the EU SST program may be going in the future? Yeah, EU SST is, you know, I would say a combination of nations on a volunteer basis. So right now we have eight nations contributing to this initiative. And these nations are trying to put together all the capabilities that they have in terms of space surveillance and trying to build a service given to the European Union and the countries of Europe in terms of space surveillance, space avoidance, collision avoidance. But it is based again on, you know, the contribution of some nations of Europe. And so there are progress that have been made. And I would say that we have to wait a little bit more to see whether we can reach a very satisfying level of efficiency. General Shaw, I mean, U.S. military has sort of long been sort of the goals when it comes to providing space domain awareness, but also there's been a lot of change recently. I think some new centers coming online and also changes in terms of the data sharing agreements. Can you talk a little bit about those, please? Sure. I mean, a subject all by itself, right? I think General Friedling is exactly on, I agree with them 100%. This is in the end, space situation, awareness and space domain awareness are team effort. And it is a big data problem. If ever there was a big data problem, it's the tyranny of volume that we need to understand what's going on in the space domain and taking all possible data from all possible sensors and fusing that to develop a picture of what is going on. And I'll just briefly point out, every nation represented on this panel, we're working together on this. We routinely are talking with the Canadian Space Operations Center and the French Space Operations Center about what's going on in space. And we are, I think as General Saka, now she could affirm we are working with Japan on putting a space situation awareness sensor on their QZSS constellation of satellites. That's a teaming effort there. I think there'll be more teamwork to go. And I could go on and on, but just to point out that everybody on this panel, we're working with them, it is a team effort. I'll broaden the discussion a bit, Brian, and say that we have a space policy directive three on the current administration that directs that space traffic management move to the Department of Commerce. And I had mentioned that earlier in this session. And so what we're growing to is a distinction between the general understanding what's going on in space to support safe operations. And that would be more, I think in space situation awareness and space traffic management, it's analogous to what we have in the air domain or the maritime domain to ensure safe operations to minimize the chance of an accident. Space domain awareness is a different part of the spectrum and that's to make sure that we can rapidly identify and characterize threats in the domain. And again, that's analogous to domain awareness in the air and maritime domains as well. And I think you will see some differentiation between those as we move forward. And to this point in our history, the Department of Defense has really kind of done all of that and that's just how we grew up. We grew up when we started in space with the Department of Defense having the sensors and the ability to understand what was going on in space. But we're now I think at an inflection point where the Department of Defense needs to move more towards space domain awareness and understanding threats. And we would let, and then Department of Commerce is probably the, is the better organization from a core competence perspective to conduct space traffic management. And how we do that not only within our government but with our partners will be a major effort moving forward. And just to the time that one of the questions of the audience here is about transparency. Yesterday there we had a lot of discussions about orbital debris and the need for kind of more public information and more sharing and transparent with what's going on. Do you see that as a challenge for the militaries? How do you see this tension between trying to protect information about military activities in space or national creativity space and the need for more kind of just knowledge about what's going on to protect that safety mission that you mentioned. Yeah, again, I will point to analogy in other domains. In the maritime domain, the United States Navy the United States Coast Guard providing securing that domain do participate in making sure that they are avoiding possible accidental collisions and are part of a maritime domain awareness picture. And so I think the same will happen in the space domain as well. Got it. Anyone else want to mark on the transparency question at all? I'll just add in, I believe it's actually critical that we do share that information. Obviously, whether it be debris or what have you is not just a threat to military assets or to commercial and in civil assets as well. Within the Canadian context, we're looking at making sure that we have a commercial integration cell within our CANSPOC that will allow us to maintain those lines of communication both with commercial operators and with Canadian Space Agency to make sure that if we view a potential conjunction or there are other issues of concern that information is passed to those that most need it to ensure they have continued operations and are necessarily threatened by something we're not even tracking. General Friedling? Yeah, I would add to some extent that the French Space Defense Strategy is a first step in terms of transparency because in this Space Defense Strategy, we are saying exactly what we want to do and we will do exactly what we said. So it's not an issue for us transparency. I think we all need transparency in space. And what we did with this strategy is, I would say, I don't like to be the French-Aragon-Spanish, but it's a kind of unique situation in which we again, we say exactly what we're going to do and we're saying exactly what we're going to do and we will do it. And this is not the case of many other actors in space. And I think that also gets a bit more to the question we talked about a few minutes ago, which is this perception of threat and I think that may be part of it, right? Is if you put out more public statements on policy and on doctrine and on intent and then see how actions line up to that. As you said, that could go a long way to kind of, you know, is what is being done matching what is being said, I think. I want to pick up on something that the general items just talked about that sort of the conjunctions, which are close approaches in space and also bring in a question from the audience here about the conjunction in military assets and civilian assets. And, you know, you meant a couple of different analogies to the high seas, to the airspace where there are existing traffic rules for how ships and aircraft interact. Those are largely missing at the moment when it comes to space. So, you know, any thoughts about this issue of, you know, should military assets have a right of way when it comes to close approaches or just in general, how we get from the current state, which is not a lot of established rules or established norms of behavior, to one, will we have a little more of that for space? And it's open to anyone. Okay, general from the guest. I'm going to go first. I think the question that you rise here is the question of the responsible behaviors in space. And this is a crucial question and this is a difficult question actually. And this is one of the question we address in the SISPO initiative. And this is one of the reasons why this initiative is very, very important because we can have this discussion as a seven nation, you know, group and we can try to then explain in other, you know, arenas what we think we have to promote as responsible behaviors. And that is the, I mean, the think, I think sorry, the most important. Now, so General Shaw. I, again, I think I agree 100% with General Friedling there. I think we start from responsible behaviors and safe behaviors are the best place to start as we move forward in this discussion. As I mentioned before, we continue to see more and more kinds of activities in space. We haven't yet talked about in this session but I know you must have in the overall space sustainability event here about the potential proliferation and low-worth orbit of commercial satellites. In some ways, that might be the greatest threat that we have to space sustainability if we as a planet don't do that properly, don't have expectations and norms on how to properly dispose of those capabilities, how to properly, for the operators of those mega constellations to provide as much information as they can on how those capabilities are maneuvering and such. I'll throw another, you know, we will see more and more academic platforms in space, small CubeSats and such that probably aren't maneuverable. We need to think about kind of, and if they're the guidelines and responsible design for those capabilities so that we don't become a navigational hazard. And so I think it starts with that as we expand the, as we continue to expand across all sectors, our presence in space, how do we do that in a responsible way? No, no. So just to tie into that you mentioned the commercial, we haven't really talked about it yet either. We talked at the very beginning about how one of the big changes happening now in this space domain is the emergence and growth of the commercial sector. How do you see that from a military standpoint? Is that something you think is gonna help the deterrence and trying to increase resilience? Or is there other ways you're sort of looking at the role of the commercial sector in interspace activities? Yeah, for anyone? Yeah, General Sakanashi? I think the growing the commercial space capability and space technology is a very good chance, opportunity to enhance the military capability in a very cost effective manner. So we can utilize commercial capability to not only enhance our capability, but also to strengthen our resiliency. So growing a commercial space is a good news for us. And what's your general answer? Yeah, I think the comments that have been made on responsible behaviors are absolutely critical. But you know those discussions happen in a national level and certainly signatories would be governmental on something like that. Obviously we want to talk the talk. You want to walk the walk as well and set the example. And I think our allies partners are the kind of partners that would do that. The proliferation of commercial satellites raises another issue because now you've got to have commercial entities and private industry and business on board with responsible behaviors as well. And how do you enforce that? How do you maintain the integrity of what you're trying to accomplish in that regard? Perhaps when there's a business model that doesn't necessarily subscribe to responsible behaviors. And I think that raises a whole host of other issues that are probably worthy of further conversation, but something I thought I'd raise. No, it's an excellent point. And that was actually what we talked about yesterday a bit was there are actually some private sector initiatives to develop best practices responsible behaviors. There's a space safety coalition of 40 some operators that has put out a list of behaviors that they pledged to abide by. There's been some discussion of ways to incentivize a carer or a stick approach commercial behavior. But I wouldn't say it's not widespread yet and there's still a lot of that is still sort of in the nascent areas. Going back to a little more national security focus of this question, you know, let's say in the future militaries are using a commercial capability, let's say to augment remote sensing or like augment communications. And then a conflict happens. How do you see that role of the military in protecting commercial? Is it only those that you're directly using or do you think that there's maybe such on the high seas a broader role for the military and protecting commercial industry and sort of commerce in space? Any thoughts on that at all? That's, yeah, I try to give you a beginning of an answer. This is, you mentioned a few minutes ago the Shriver War Game and this is one of the issues that we addressed in the recent Shriver War Games. How do we coordinate with the private actors in space? Do they want to be protected or escorted or whatever? And this was very interesting last time. Actually, we attended a Shriver War Game because, you know, the opinions or the views of the different private players in the room, they were very different. And then, so I think we are at the beginning of the story right now here because we are still discovering the challenges, the threats and how to handle them and the norms of behavior and whatever. And, you know, I like to say that it's kind of what happened in the First World War where, you know, appeared the submarines, the first submarines, attacked the ships in the ocean. And then we, at the beginning, very rapidly actually, these boats, these ships on the ocean wanted to be escorted by the Allies because they were at risk. At the beginning, they didn't want to because they had too many constraints, I would say, but rapidly they were in kind of convoys escorted to protect them from the threats. And I think we have a kind of parallel here for the future and we don't think about it. Yeah, I realize this is sort of the theme of our discussion today has been we are at the beginning of a significant change in this base domain and there's a lot of questions of doctrine and policy that are still being sorted out. And I think that's an excellent sort of framing of how to think about the answer. And also, I think it's an important point. You know, I've seen it myself. We've had some discussions with industry on this topic. And there's not a universal perspective on how they view the potential interactions with the military and the things. So we've got about eight minutes left before we go ahead and wrap up today. I'm going to go ahead and try and get through as many of the remaining questions again and sort of a general question for you that's the most highly rated one I should ask at the moment. It relates to actually this afternoon's panel about what is the role of the space force will have or do you think might have in CIS lunar and lunar operations particularly stability and security standpoint? Yeah, I'll start more, let me more broadly the last couple of questions about this as more commercial activity happens in space, that is wonderful. I mean, that contributes to economic prosperity for our nation, for our allies, for the globe. And again, it's analogous to other domains, right? So we just need to do it right. How do we do it right so it's sustainable and further economic investment is incentivized. And I think the Department of Defense does have a role in that regard and it begins with transparency and understanding what's happening in the domain and then security against potential threats and that will evolve over time. Again, it shouldn't be anything new to us. It shouldn't be anything new to us in other domains. With regard to CIS lunar, it's inevitable that we are going to have to, you know, right now we have set our event horizon that we look at into space pretty much at the geosynchronous orbit and we've just done that traditionally because that's where the bulk of the activity in whatever sector, national security, commercial civil has kind of peaked out. While it's going to expand, we will see more activity beyond the geosynchronous sphere to the CIS lunar sphere and the Department of Defense, the United States Space Force, United States Space Command have to keep pace. And leading that charge will be space domain awareness out to the CIS lunar sphere to understand what's going on there, what potential navigation hazards there could be. And again, providing a security mechanism for other actors that want, that are venturing into that realm. And all of a sudden, I think maybe also extending that space domain awareness out probably to the CIS lunar sphere, is that part of it as well? So absolutely, absolutely. You know, there are already platforms operating well beyond the geosynchronous orbit. They're mostly exploration platforms, but we'll see more communications platforms as NASA, you know, advances the Artemis program and the Gateway initiative. We'll probably team with them in some regard with regard to space domain awareness, space situation awareness in the lunar sphere and communications networks. It's inevitable that we'll be part of that progression. We just need to anticipate that. Yeah. And just to make it specifically, unlike the TV show Space Force, Space Force is not the entity leading the return to the moon. That is still going to maintain the civil thing and any kind of, you know, human military presence is probably going to be a little ways off if I understand things. Yeah, I just, yeah, you're absolutely right, Brian. I've said before, the United States Space Force will not be putting humans into space for national security purposes anytime soon. I think it will eventually, but not anytime soon. We are going to rely on, as General Friedling mentioned earlier, on advanced machines, artificial intelligence, and such to do those missions with the humans of Space Force, commanding and controlling and making the key decisions to operate those capabilities here on the planet. General Sakanashi, thank you. General Sakanashi, there's a question here about how the establishment of the space domain mission unit meets with the historical concerns about Japan's space being peaceful in nature of the military space activities. So I guess, Frank, you talk a little bit about how the framing of military space in Japan has changed over the last few years and what it is the space domain unit that is now doing in space. Is it more awareness of space? What sort of activities do you envision them doing? All the Japanese defense program is structurally under the Japanese Peaceful Policy. So our Space Domain Unit, Space Operations Unit, mission is just for acquiring the space station awareness because of the importance of the space assets for natural and international security but also the economy or people's daily life. So I don't think there's any dilemma between building the space capability in the Safety Defense Force and our long-term peaceful policy. Great. Sorry, General Friedling, a follow-up question to you. The question was, you mentioned the NATO Center of Excellence for Space. Has that decision already been made to put that into loose or is that still ongoing? It is still ongoing. There are two different proposals to NATO from two different countries and these proposals are of a different nature. One is a dedicated center to this new domain and one is a branch of an existing center dedicated to space. This is really different and this is the reason why we think our proposal is of the best value for NATO but this is ongoing to answer your question. Okay, great. Thank you. So it's a question to everybody. This is actually at the moment we've answered a couple of other top-rated questions so the new top-rated question is about how we live up to the statement that General Shaw said earlier about nobody wants to have a war in space. Can each of you or any of you talk about how what you're doing, what your military is doing in space can be shaped to helping deter and prevent conflict as opposed to perhaps being interpreted as something that is aggressive that might lead to conflict? How are you thinking about this, this new expansion of military activities in a way that is going to try and hopefully prevent conflict in space? General Shaw, you mind going first on that? Yeah, I'll just give a real quick answer. Pretty much any domain in human history from a military perspective you look at you invite conflict when there's weakness and I believe you deter conflict when there is strength and so that is the path we're on. We are going to become more resilient. We're going to protect and defend our capabilities in space and that will lead us, I believe, to a more strategically stable situation that deters conflict in space. Great, thank you for that. Anyone else like to join in on that? Sure, I'll echo General Shaw's comments. I think that's well put and I think that strength comes from certainly shared, like-minded countries, collaborating, forming alliances whether it be within NATO, whether it be CISPO or beyond all of that through adopting best principles and best practices in a commons domain that sets the example and raises the bar in terms of expected behaviors for all participants. It's certainly the way to go and certainly Canada is going along those lines as well and working with our partners and promoting those behaviors and those responsible behaviors so I think that's the way to go for sure. Okay, all right. Jennifer, do you have one final comment? Final, I don't know, but I would say nothing better than General Shaw and just to add that there is a very old Latin proverb that all of you probably know which is the Siwispachian Parabellum because if you want peace, just be prepared to war and you have peace there. Okay. With that, thank you all for participating in this discussion. I thought it was very great, particularly since General Shaw is a very early start for you today and General Sakanasi, it's a very late at night so thank you very much for being up with us. I wish we could do this in person so you could hear the thunderous round of applause from the 250 or so participants that are currently listening on, but we cannot, so thank you again.