 Good afternoon everybody and welcome to the US Institute of Peace. My name is Susan Stigant. I'm the director of the Africa program here and very pleased to welcome you for this conversation to take a look at what's happening on the horn and gulf dynamics. For those of you who don't know USIP we are an independent federal institute founded in 1984 and dedicated to the proposition that peace is possible. But I have to say that what we're seeing in the horn at the moment suggests even further that peace is challenging and reminds us that conflict and violence is also very possible. So I'm not going to take any further time because we have a really tremendous panel and I think they have a lot of ideas to share. We also have people with a deep experience and ideas in the audience and we hope there will be an opportunity for some exchange. So let me hand it over to Peyton Knapp who coordinates our South Sudan senior working group and who has been some of the mind and the drive behind this conversation and unpacking and trying to link the Africa and Near East dynamics. Okay. Thank you very much Susan and thank you all for joining us today. This has proven to be a very timely conversation even though we had this preplanned before some of the recent developments around Eritrea involving Ethiopia and Sudan and Egypt and Emirates. So we really appreciate you all being here. Let me just briefly introduce as Susan said an extraordinary panel that we have here today and then we'll each of them will give some brief remarks at the outset and then we'll turn quickly to a moderated conversation and we have plenty of time for you all to ask questions and to comment. This conversation is on the record and is being recorded as not being live streamed but it will ultimately be posted on the USIP website. So to introductions to my right is Abedah Bayan. Abedah is an extraordinarily experienced and not just scholar but diplomat who has wrestled first hand with these issues for some years. He served as a desk officer Ethiopia's neighboring states of Somalia, Djibouti, Sudan and Eritrea. He's served in various embassies throughout the region and Djibouti and Hargesa as the chief of the Cabinet of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as the Ethiopia's special envoy to Somalia and as head of the Conflict Early Warning and Response Unit. He also found time to get himself a PhD from Northwestern University and he's now the executive director of the Center for Dialogue Research and Cooperation in Addis. To my left is Ambassador Princeton Lyman who probably needs no introduction for this audience. Ambassador Lyman has early served in or dealt with all of these issues again sort of first hand. He's currently the senior advisor to the president of USIP. He was previously the US special envoy for Sudan and South Sudan from March 2011 to March 2012 where he helped support the implementation of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement. He was formerly the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, US Ambassador to Nigeria, US Ambassador to South Africa during the critical 1992 to 1995 period and endless number of other senior diplomatic posts. At the end of the table is Michael Wahid Hanna. Michael is a senior fellow at the Century Foundation. He's also an adjunct senior fellow at the Center on Law and Security at New York University School of Law. He's a specialist in security, excuse me, international security, international law and foreign policy in the Middle East and South Asia. Michael directed the Century Foundation's 2015 International Working Group on Pakistan which was chaired by Ambassador Tom Pickering and has served as a co-director of the Century Foundation's 2011 International Task Force on Afghanistan chaired by Ambassador Pickering as well as Lockdar Brahimi. He's published widely in both scholarly journals and in the press and has deep experience on a number of the issues that we're going to discuss today. And then finally to my far right is Annette Weber. Annette is a senior fellow in the Middle East and Africa Research Division of the German Institute for International and Security Studies in Berlin. Her regional expertise is in the horn, conflict analysis, fragile states, non-state actors and a number of other issues again relevant to this conversation. Annette has served, has worked and studied extensively in the region so is very, very well placed to in fact start us off today. So Annette has just recently published for the German Institute for International Affairs a paper called Red Sea Connector and Divider which I'm going to ask Annette to sort of contextualize for us some of the events that we, I think all of you here have been following over the last two weeks, the sort of escalating tensions and volatility in the horn. Sadly it's not new but it very much speaks to I think the interconnected and cross-cutting political and security dynamics on both sides of the Red Sea that we're trying to, we're aiming to discuss today and to elaborate upon. So Annette if I could turn to you to sort of tell us what's actually going on here and where did this come from. Thanks. Great thank you very much. What's going on here and where did this come from and you already said it connector and divider. It's not an either or but what we see right now is basically an influx from policies from the Gulf States to the Horn of Africa but I would like to start off on describing a bid on the background on the Horn of Africa and the regional dynamics and then see what the policies and the interactions from the Gulf are doing there and then maybe we can enter into this discussion. I think there are two issues or two topics important to me when looking at these two regions. Do the two regions conceive themselves as regions? Do they have a regional identity or do they basically have much more of a national or sub-regional interests that are coming before the regional identity and do they conceive or do they perceive themselves as part of a region that is a Red Sea region or is it the Horn of Africa and the Gulf and bilateral maybe only bilateral relationships but not a regional perception and of course to this comes the question of collective security issues and I think this is where I would say one of the bigger problems we see in the Horn of Africa is that there is no collective security understanding or no interest in having a collective security because the countries, most of the countries are working against each other more or less rather than united, all bade we have and I think this is one of the big differences and a big plus on the Horn of Africa. We do have institutions, we do have the African Union, we do have EGAD that we don't see reflected across the shore in amongst the Gulf countries and I think this is what is important and where the work on collective security is possible on the Horn but how is it possible to go beyond the Horn and see the Red Sea as that center for collective security. Just to run through a couple of issues that are of concern in the Horn of Africa way before the Gulf influence and of course the issues of importance are also issues of interest at least to the Europeans but also we will hear later definitely to not only the Europeans but also to the Americans. For the Europeans it's important because it's our neighboring country and the trade routes going through the Suez Canal and the Gulf and not the Red Sea are vital importance to European economy. What is also important is the migration issue and migration on the Red Sea is a topic that is not just of importance to the Europeans but it's a topic much more important between the Horn of Africa and the Gulf states because most of the migrants from Sudan let's say in Ethiopia are not planning to go further to Europe but are actually migrating towards Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states. We have a militarization along the Red Sea coast. Djibouti definitely is basically the country or the state that can be described as a country that is existing mostly by hosting military bases including military bases for Gulf countries such as Saudi Arabia but also military bases for of course France who had the first military base there the United States and China was the only military base outside of their zone of influence. We have the Red Sea as a divider and uniter for traveling jihadis not so many or not so much traveling jihadis between kind of the Arab Peninsula and Al-Shabaab but of a bit of their ideas but also their weapons that are traveling. We have the Red Sea as a divider and connector in terms of trafficking we have it as smuggling of arms. So we have organized crime as a connector of the two sites. We have piracy this is where all of our countries are involved in fighting piracy that is part of the Red Sea. Yes so we do see that Red Sea as a region of security and security concern but also as a region of collective interest. I would like to go just quickly through the maybe last couple of years where we could see an influence from the Gulf states predominantly because of their interest in food security, the Yemen war and the TCC split. I think these are the three waves with a lot of consequences for the Horn of Africa. Consequences for the Horn of Africa that changed the dynamic in the Horn of Africa and brought some of the countries to the fore that we haven't seen or we have seen being much more isolated beforehand. With the drop of the oil prices and the food security issue for the Gulf states 70% of their food security is coming from outside. Predominantly agricultural investment in Sudan and Ethiopia. We have Sudan and Ethiopia being highlighted as important to the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia. We have the Yemen war where again Sudan is becoming very important for the Saudi Alliance, Eritrea as well. Eritrea was becoming important for the Saudi Alliance but also Eritrea made use of that alliance to bring themselves back into the conversation, let's say, because their port in Asap is now lent to the United Arab Emirates as a port for the war in Yemen. Eritrea is playing a much bigger role than they have been playing, let's say, the years before. In this conversation, Ethiopia I think is suffering most because it's being more and more isolated and I think Abdelta will talk about their internal issues much more but it's being more isolated because the militarization of the Red Sea is basically a threat to Ethiopia but they have no say in that militarization because they're not a country that has a port at the Red Sea and maybe my last part before I'm handing over, what we've also seen is because of the GCC split, a split or a fragmentation in the Horn of Africa where countries had to divide themselves or had to, were forced basically to take sides between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates and Qatar and the other side and I think we might have this conversation here later as well. This is also an indicator for a discussion on political Islam that we see the Horn of Africa being much more divided on than it has been three, four years ago. So I keep it there and thank you. Thank you very much, Annetta and I should have said that we have some copies of Annetta's excellent paper that she referenced here. It can also be found on the SWP website for those who would like to look for it. It's very important I think context for some understanding some of the recent developments that have been in the news. We were having a conversation just before walking in here where somebody noted that Sana'a is actually geographically closer to Addis Ababa than it is to Riyadh which I think puts into relief some of the dynamics that we're talking about here today. So I wonder Ambassador Olimin if you could, in the context of what Annetta's raised when we talk about some of these tensions around the Nile basin of the use of the Nile, some of these tensions across the Red Sea and the militarization of the Red Sea. We could talk about how that impacts U.S. interests. We have Lauren Plot-Branchard actually from the Congressional Research Service calculate the United States spends somewhere around $4.5 billion a year in the Horn of Africa across humanitarian security, peacekeeping, development efforts, it's a tremendous investment. And how does that, how did the tensions there and the overall dynamic impact U.S. interests influence? Thanks, Payton. Thanks very much. Thanks Annette. Look, our interests are very great. We are invested heavily. Brayton has talked about the cost in the peace and security of the Horn. But these changes that are taking place, this relationship and cross relationships between across the Gulf into the Arab countries and their influence on the politics of Africa are changing the dynamics very much. Just as an example, South Sudan gets drawn in and plays on these various differences and that makes the peace process in South Sudan much more difficult. The pressures on Ethiopia that Annette mentioned, Ethiopia is the key player for the United States but if it can't play the role that it usually plays as a leader with the Negat and the AU and bringing about the peace process, that's a very serious problem for us. But what's really extraordinary when you look at what's happening in the Gulf, we're not only the interest, the Arab interest coming in but the Turkish interest coming in, the president of Turkey coming to Sudan, talking about taking over development of an island in the Red Sea, it's a very strong reaction from Saudi Arabia, et cetera. Just think about that. Bureaucratically that involves three different bureaus of the State Department, the European Bureau or Turkey is, the Africa Bureau and the Middle East Bureau. How do we develop a policy which takes all this into account because we have so much at stake? We have so much at stake, not only in the horn but with these various players like Saudi Arabia, like Turkey in so many dimensions. So given the stakes we have and they're very heavy, we need a structure of policy that is higher up over the three bureaus that can bring together and integrate a policy in the horn that takes account of these special interests. And we have special interests in Turkey, we have special interests in Egypt, outside the horn. We've relied on Ethiopia very heavily in a number of ways. So that has to be integrated at a high level so we can take account of the changes that have taken place in the horn. Let me give you just a personal example. I was the envoy for Sudan, South Sudan for two years. I would not propose an envoy for Sudan, South Sudan today because it's too limited a part of the dynamic that's going on in the region that affects that peace process. We need something that takes into account a larger and given the stake and given that amount of money, four and a half billion dollars a year is a lot of money. It's holding on to the status quo but it's not moving us toward the peace we need in this area. So our interests are great and they're touched on in so many different ways that we need a new way of looking at it, identifying our interests very clearly. So we can talk to Egypt, we can talk to Turkey, we can talk to Sudan, which is now playing quite an interesting different role. Eritrea, with which we have a very quirky relationship but if at all. And the importance of Ethiopia to this whole process and develop a clear set of what our interests are. I think they're very great. And I think what this analysis illuminates is we need to come at it in a different, sorry, excuse me, a different way. Thank you, Ambassador Lyman. I've doubted it. If I could turn to you to say a few words about how some of these dynamics are viewed from Addison from the Horn more broadly. Thank you. For someone from the Horn of Africa, one would look at the developments from the Gulf and its impact across the region, probably in three, four layers. One is globally, there are major actors who are competing for influence whose members have grown tremendously these days. This is easy to see, one can see the United States, which appears to be in a retreat from the region. We have the European Union, although Brexit had impacted it a little bit. We have China, Russia on the other side and the Turkish as well, which of course has been explained by Richard Haas on the existence of non-polarity in world political arrangements currently. Of course, one can see also that in the Middle East, the Sunni Shia competition and sometimes rivalry has been manipulated for different purposes and the outcomes are mixed. For example, Iran, the Houthis and Izbollah on one side and the Saudis, the Emirates and the Qataris and the Sudanese and to some extent the Turkish share a sect of alliance on the other. But when one sees the subdivision within the Sunnis, you will find divisions between these actors, which forces of course the entire Horn of Africa region, Muslim community, which is more or less a Sunni follower, but doesn't compartmentalize itself into what you see in the Middle East as a Sunni Shia division. Of course, the fourth layer, which I see personally, is reflected at the local level in the Horn of Africa related to the Nile waters, the role of Egypt in the Horn of Africa, the structural placement of Egypt as part of the Middle East by Western powers, which helps evade scrutiny of what is happening in terms of Egypt and the Horn of Africa, et cetera. We find now probably competitions in South Sudan with respect to Eritrea and Libya also impacting the relationship between some Gulf countries and the Horn. I think the elephant in the room here is the development of the Nile Dam, a project that has brought a paradigm shifting in which the use of the Nile has to change from the status quo, especially with respect to how Sudan handles the outcome of the dam, because the dam in reality controls the flow of waters and helps Sudan plan further, in which, for example, the Sudanese foreign minister said that the dam will allow Sudan to use what is allocated for Sudan from the 1959 agreement. So this major shift that should be taken into consideration is witnessed also in the relationship between Sudan and Egypt. As you all recall, that Sudan and Egypt were together among the comprehensive framework agreement signatories, Egypt and Sudan have yet to sign the comprehensive framework agreement, but the Nile Dam has brought a new dynamism into this. Of course, obviously, the differences between Egypt and Sudan widen due to various problems. One is the dispute over the Halai triangle. Sudan's deals with Turkey recently regarding Swahakin Islands, even if the issue has been there for quite some time, but the visit of the president of Turkey has triggered some reaction to that effect. And at the same time, the changing relationship between some Gulf countries and the whole of Africa, whose relationship was somehow previously dominated by the role of Egypt. Although Sudan has been very close to Iran previously and Qatar, the process of lifting the U.S. sanctions on Khartoum demanded the political support from other Gulf countries which are closer to the U.S., which eventually forced the Sudan to cut its relationship with Iran. And at the same time, of course, Sudan agreed to support the war in Yemen and is fully engaging. Probably that role of Sudan in Yemen is helping to relieve some of the pressures that Sudan is facing from Egypt these days. In general, I think these regional realities, even forcing countries considered to be failed state to take positions on developments in the greater Horn of Africa and relation to the division within the GCC, you will all recall that Somalia, almost a failed state, now the federal government at the center is at least stating neutral, but sympathetic to Qatar while the regional administrations who are supposed to cooperate and revive the Somali state are supporting the positions taken by Saudi Arabia and some of the Gulf cooperation countries. This also is an indicative that the process of rebuilding Somalia will continue to be challenged because those divisions within the Gulf states have yet to be resolved. It means the federal states and the federal government at the center will continue parallely in reconfiguring the Somali state will continue to face a challenge. These different levels of analysis then influence the way actors in the Horn of Africa behave. Some are looking at the short-term interests and change side to suit their objectives and goals, as well as others, accrue some financial gains. Some have shifted their policies towards individual Gulf countries. Of course, the war in Yemen has brought some windfall incomes to sideline actors. That is why we should look at developments in the Gulf and the Horn of Africa having that complex challenge facing all of us. And we expect the U.S. to come back and take its responsibilities because we feel those in the region that the U.S. somehow has abandoned its responsibilities and it should take that. Thank you. Very sobering points to conclude your opening remarks. Michael, if you could talk a little bit about the view from Cairo, from Riyadh, from Abu Dhabi, what's animating some of those strategies and approaches towards this region? Sure. I guess one thing that seems to be happening quite quickly, kind of overview, is that from Egypt's perspective that we have this escalating crisis over the dam. And what is notable of late is the way in which that is intersecting and converging in a regionalized fashion with some of the other dynamics that are already happening in terms of Gulf involvement. And these things seem to be converging in a way that is, I think, quite new and potentially quite destabilizing and worrisome. For Egypt, obviously the dam is at this point something of an existential issue. Egypt's relationship to Africa has weakened over recent decades. I mean, in the period, in the early 2000s, as Egypt was very inward-focused on the succession, the kind of late Mubarak period, there was generalized drift in Egyptian foreign policy and that was even more accentuated with respect to Africa. Some of those traditional bonds had atrophied and withered. And timing is important in this series of developments because as this core dispute around the dam gathers momentum, I think initially there was skepticism on the Egyptian side that this was a feasible project. I think some of that is Egyptian chauvinism at play with respect to attitudes towards Africa. I think that they believed initially that financing was simply going to be prohibitive and impossible and that for it to happen would have to be a kind of regionalized process that they would eventually have input in. And I think we're quite surprised at the speed with which Ethiopia was able to put financing essentially on its own in place. And by the time the project became feasible and live, the big problem for Egypt is this is essentially 2011. So we have the uprising, January 25th, we have the fall of Mubarak, which ushers in a period of some chaos, some drift, real inward focusing. The dam is obviously quite important, but it isn't number one priority. I mean, it's a sort of an issue, an intangible issue that obviously is going to impact at some point in the future, but the period of 2011, 2013 is a period of tumult in Egypt, we have protests in the street, we have violence and real core questions about the future of the country, the identity of the country. And so the issue of the dam, unfortunately, sort of falls by the wayside. And so timing is quite important. You have this loss of focus and being consumed by domestic affairs. When 2013 happens, we have the overthrow of Mordesly in July, 2013, it ushers in another problematic dynamic for this set of issues, and that is hypernationalism, right? I mean, this is a military led overthrow. You have a period really in 2013 and 2014 of kind of runaway nationalism, and interaction with this question of the dam is quite problematic. It's often overheated. I think it also, at a societal level, reflects generalized Egyptian ignorance about Sub-Saharan Africa. It is just not a topic of social knowledge. And it shows in many of the ways in which Egypt as a society or Egyptian press talks about these issues quite distinct from the way that it relates to the Arab world. You see that distance, that lack of social knowledge or connection to Sub-Saharan Africa at large, and then this issue in particular. And so we have this recurring contradiction, this potentially existential issue, for the Egyptians, the kind of the first immediate issue, and I'm not an expert on these water issues, but obviously how long it takes to fill the reservoir has huge impact on terms of water that will eventually reach Egypt and a vulnerable sort of water scarce country to begin with. And if we look to sort of the present, to the very immediate present, the kind of tumult that I was talking about continues. So just yesterday, apparently, C.C. has sacked the head of general intelligence, someone who actually had, this is considered a national security issue, someone who actually had an important voice to play in these discussions within the Egyptian government. He's been sidelined. And so it's just reflective of the fact that this, I wouldn't say instability, because I don't think that's quite accurate, but this is still a consolidated regime. There's still quite a bit of churn, and that continues to affect Egypt's ability to focus clearly on these issues. You mentioned Sudan, and of course, in the interim, we have had the aggravation of existing Egyptian Sudanese disputes, many of them longstanding, like Aleppo. And of course, there's longstanding issues that the Egypt has had with the Sudanese with respect to their relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood that continue. But what appears to the Egyptians to be a moving away from Egypt's position on the dam toward Ethiopia, I think which is justified in terms of perception, has triggered these issues. And of course, what's overlaid on top of all of this is some of the regional realignment that is happening. I mean, I think we shouldn't get too carried away in terms of seeing these as kind of very firm divisions. Egypt and Saudi have had very difficult relations. Even Egypt and UAE have had some difficult relations of late when Sinmen succeeded Abdullah. There was a period in which there was Saudi Qatari rapprochement or an attempt at it at least. But of course, what has happened most recently has been in some ways a diplomatic boon to Egypt that brought them very close together with the Saudis and the Emiratis in terms of the crisis with Qatar. But this GCC crisis has again, as we've, and I won't go into it, it's already been mentioned, but it's played itself out in terms of these other disputes within the region. And obviously it has seen Egypt taking positions in the Horn of Africa that are somewhat new and play into this broader sense of polarization and division along a realignment in the region. Turkey- Sudan issues are playing into this. Egypt is obviously, there's a lot of, I think somewhat sensationalized reports about Egypt's relationship with Eritrea where the Emiratis have a military base. But that is inflaming and broadening the conflict in a way that makes it much harder to deal with. And it's happening very quickly. And I think that's really important. I mean, it's not that one doesn't need to be alarmist, but a lot has happened in the past two years and that cycle seems to be accelerating in a lot of ways. Others have talked about UAE and Saudi involvement and maybe we can get into that a little more in the discussion. I don't wanna take up too much time, but particularly the Emiratis have been quite aggressive for a variety of reasons, having to do with commercial investments, having to do with the war in Yemen, having to do with a projection of power. Power projection is quite important to the Emiratis at the moment. But the question of misperception, the lack of transparency about what exactly these kinds of relationships are, what they're intended to do, what is Turkey doing on this island? Is this port development? Is this a military base? If it is a kind of a military installation, naturally that's going to raise concerns among the Egyptians, among the Saudis, among the Emiratis. This is a quite unnatural projection of power in the modern era. And it's a period of military modernization. Egypt is undergoing naval modernization. Some of that is directed toward the Eastern Mediterranean, the natural gas there. But of course, that kind of military buildup is going to have impact in terms of perception of Egypt's role in the Red Sea. I'll stop there. A lot of issues on the agenda. Thank you very much to all of the panelists. Before we turn to sort of questions, I wanted to just give Abdul Mohamed, who's unfortunately sort of squeezed out of our space here, but from the AU high level, AU high level implementation panel, which is led by former South African President, Tabo Mbeki, and has the mandate from the African Union for some of these cross cutting issues within the Horn to just give some remarks on how this impacts multilateralism and some of the institutions there. Is that microphone not working? Maybe come around here, Abdul, sorry. Come to the big table. Come to the big table. Thank you very much for this opportunity. This morning seminar when Princeton was kind of giving a closing remarks, he said something like, through this process we have somehow exposed the complexities and the challenges that is facing the two regions. And he's absolutely right. This conversation started in Abu Dhabi about a year ago in a very amorphous way. And then it moved to Khartoum under the auspices of the African Union, start taking shape. And we are here at USAIP where it's getting sharpened. And I think the conversation should continue until our policy makers start internalizing some of the arguments we are having a discussion over. So the interconnectedness of the region between the Middle East and Horn of Africa is historic. As a matter of fact, for all practical purposes, historically they are one. The three Abrahamic religions, Islam, Judaism, Christianity, in the Horn of Africa they are as indigenous as they are in the Middle East. They didn't come through, you know, how do you say, missionaries. They were part and parcel and they shaped our culture. They shaped the way we look about everything basically. So the interconnectedness and its present manifestation is crying out for attention by the current policy makers. And so what we are doing is basically to bring to the attention of our policy makers how the region is changing. So Horn of Africa is exceptionally complex, exceptionally complex system of politics, security, intersection. And this operates both at the national level, at the regional level and also at the local level. This is manifested. In addition to that, we are interfacing with a region that has even a more complex political and security challenges. So when you have the two together, well, okay. So you have a situation where there are age old conflict. You have a situation where there are recurrent conflicts and you have a situation in which emerging conflicts are taking shape. And the problem is none of these conflicts of the past have been resolved. Okay, the best we have done is to manage them without solving them. And now the chickens are coming home to roost in some ways. So, and what's happening in the region, you know, will manifest itself eventually at the local level. Now, this morning I heard with fascination about the flurry of activities that have taken place, the visit of the Turkish president to Egypt, the base, what's happening here, some about the Nile issue and all of the current Al-Jazeera, you know, covered breaking news items and all of that. I think what we should, how do you say? How we should come to grips with is this flurry of activities are not driven by a thoughtful strategic approach. They are not strategically driven. They are actually driven by, for lack of a good English word, by survival. Everybody is on the edge and therefore they assume the worst about the other. You know, and it's driven by that. So how do we calm them down? All right, calming them down requires, all right, the global partners to act calmly. Okay, to be strategic. Not to be overwhelmed by the humanitarian catastrophe only. You know, what is driving and to make the region think strategically is actually very important. So for all practical purposes, the Red Sea is an Arab sea and it is also an African sea, all right? For all practical purposes, we are one security zone and potentially we are one economic zone. The Arab side have to realize, which they are not, I must say, that the Red Sea, we have an interest from the African side in the Red Sea as much as they do. There are more people on our side of the Red Sea than on their side of the Red Sea, all right? So that the Arabs have not comprehended and it will take time to do so. Regarding the Nile, a very good point has been made by my brother here and this morning, very thoughtful remarks were made. Let me say two things about the Nile, all right? One, a principle, all right? All trans-boundary waters and other natural resources are always subjected to a cooperative agreement, everywhere. If you have a trans-boundary resources, the best way to make use of them is by cooperation. All right? And that cooperation requires the parties to understand and really comprehend the sensitivities of the other guy. And to recognize that everybody has an interest and we need to really come together and see how we can address each other's interest. Now, on specifically on the Nile, there are one two major issues I think we should think about, reflect upon. One is regarding Egypt. Egypt, I respect Egypt very much. It's a historical country. It's a very important country. Therefore I have nothing but the greatest respect for Egypt. Now, Egypt's narrative about the Nile and especially about Ethiopia is based number one. This is a historical foreign policy establishment view. All right? Is they always think, they always assumed that Ethiopia will be so embroiled in its internal conflict, in its civil war that it will be incapable of undertaking meaningful development. They never thought Ethiopia will calm down for a period of time and undertake economic development. That's one assumption they had. The other assumption they made is that given their sensitivity towards the Nile water, they made sure that no international development agency, the World Bank, no international lending agency will put a penny in supporting Ethiopia to have any meaningful usage of water. Not only the Nile water, they repair the feeder. They didn't want any, and they succeeded. And they succeeded. The World Bank never touched Ethiopia's quest for utilizing not the Nile, but the tributaries, all right? So the fact that Ethiopia said, we have developed enough and sustaining our development requires ABCD and part of the ABCD is building hydroelectric power to fuel this development and also provide for integration. The Egyptians didn't know what to do. They really, and by the way, the Egyptians also neglected their Africa policy, totally. But one of the geniuses of Malis was he made the dam, not only an Ethiopian dam, but an African dam, all right? And he succeeded in mobilizing Africans, not looking for money to the World Bank and others to finance it, but to generate the finance for the dam internally. And therefore, an indicator of Africa renaissance. And then when the Egyptians woke up to this, the train already left the station, okay? And now, and the other thing that the Ethiopians did, which is very important, and our Sudanese colleagues here will understand better, is that historically, historically, Sudan has been looked as a footnote to Egypt. All right? Even the Americans and the others, whenever they want to craft their policy towards Sudan, the first call of the report was Cairo. And for a long time, people looked towards Sudan with an Egyptian eye, all right? In the past 20 years, out of a very complex set of things, the Ethiopians strategically, incrementally peeled Sudan out of Egyptian hand and integrated it into Africa, all right? And this is a nightmarish scenario for the Egyptians. And therefore, the response to that has a clumsy tendency. Yeah, you know, and so there is that aspect to it. But to conclude on the Nile issue, there is a framework document they signed in 2015. It is a good document. It articulates everybody's interest, all right? Therefore, try to get the politics of the Nile right, requires us to reflect on that document and make it more substantive than it is now. Now it is a declaration of principle. It's no binding, all right? So you translate it into that. And I think everybody's interest will be agreed to do that everybody has to be strategic. We cannot afford but to be strategic to face to the challenge that we are facing. And lastly, all the issues regarding the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa, the interface, cries out for a multilateral solution. Okay, and I must say that when it comes to multilateralism, to articulating collective security, to articulating collective win-wins, all right? And there is no substitute for multilaterals, all right? And Africa has gone far beyond in trying to resolve all of its problems with multilateral system than the Arab world. The Arab world, as a matter of fact, they have never utilized properly their multilateral instruments. The Arab League is irrelevant to all of the problems that are going on. The GCC are just a private domain on one or two countries. Therefore, that multilateral principle-driven in institution to address common issues is lacking on the other side. And this, I submit, the African can teach a great deal. All right? And then which brings me to a conclusion, the role of the outsiders, especially the Americans. The Americans have been providing the region as a whole with some kind of a security umbrella, all right? That is now at best diluting, okay? At worst, it's regressing. And therefore, a scramble is taking place. Not on the African side, on the Arab side, especially the Saudis and others are extremely jittery, extremely nervous, so they are taking unilateral action that is contributing to instability, all right? And on the Africa side, we were just waiting, listening to the Americans of what their policy towards Africa in general and to this region in particular will be, all right? Nothing. All right, the only thing we heard, you know, I tell you, in the African Union, there is this anxiety about U.S. currently. And that anxiety is will we hear U.S. policy towards Africa through Twitter, all right? Or will there be a visit by some high-level people, all right? The only high-level person that visited Africa recently is the Minister of Defense, the Secretary of Defense. And he went to one place, well, he went to Egypt, that's traditional, but the only other place he went was Djibouti. Niki Heli is another issue. You know, I'll wrap it up. The American policy towards Africa and the region, right now, the only conclusion we can draw is really military, security, all right? Security, American investment in Africa in that region is very minimal, while the Chinese is gigantic. The Indians are second another very substantive investment, you know? Therefore, American foreign policies craft towards the region could increase the instability, all right, could potentially also be a gap, stop gap. So we are waiting to hear. Thank you. Thank you, Abdul. Obviously a lot to digest and discuss and contest potentially, but it does strike me that one of the common threads that emerges here is the need for not just security solutions, not just humanitarian development investments, but political investments and what that looks like across whether it's multilateralism, whether it's other framework. So why don't we open it up for questions? We have a little over half an hour for that. If everyone's still pondering their questions, I can throw some out there, but if you can just sort of signal to me in some fashion, I will try to call on you in the order in which you've done. Andrew Steinfeld, please. Andrew Steinfeld, former State Department diplomat. I have a question, any one of you can take this. I'm curious about the gulf in the horn, other than the obvious, as you mentioned, destabilizing aspects of using the gulf as a strategic playground, as their aria peyi for their internal issues and Yemen and competition with Qatar. I'm curious whether their role in countries like Ethiopia and the food investments they're making in places like Ethiopia and Sudan, do you all see anything positive in that? Or is it wholly a kind of negative influence on a part of the world that they just now want to project their issues onto? Does somebody want to, do you want to take that question first? Anyone? Please. I think it's a good question, Andrew. I think what it does, I think the countries on the, and Ethiopia in particular, because it's landlocked and depends tremendously on its access to the Red Sea, that the African countries depend on that trade route heavily. So they have a direction just now. It hasn't been challenged before in the way it is now. And the alliances that are cutting across Sudan, Yemen, that kind of thing raises all kinds of questions and nobody quite know what it means. What does it mean for the UAE to take management control of almost every port down the west side of them? To the African states, what does that mean? What is the strategy there? And is it benign? Is it not benign? And it aggravates things like the Eritrea, Ethiopia. It's true because the Eritrea is taking full advantage of all of this to come out of isolation. So it seems to me that they may have not articulated this in the past, may have taken that for granted, but it's vital economically, wouldn't you say? Anyone else like to jump in? Abdul, go ahead. I think there are positive aspects which we need to encourage. I mean, the investment in the region is meaningful. But as Princeton said this morning, and that's why I mentioned multilateralism, et cetera, because in a multilateral setting, your investment, your security policy, et cetera, lends itself to some transparency, all right? But the Arab have a habit of doing business one-to-one, all right, and which opens up to corruption, which opens up to deals that will have ramification in internal governance, all right? So this approach, this system that is different, needs to be somehow harmonized. But the last thing I want to point out is access to the sea is very important for the Horn of Africa, all right? Especially for Ethiopia. We are 110 million people with no ports. So we depend on the smaller countries in the Horn to provide us access to the sea. But the problem is most of these countries that will potentially, we only have one port through Djibouti, even if there are potentially others, are already bought by the Emirates, okay? Kisimayo, start down, Kisimayo bought by the Emirates, all right? Mogadishu, the Turks, Barbara, the Emirates, Bosozzo, the Emirates, Asap and Eritrea militarized for purposes of conducting war in Yemen. So it's all militarized and we are 110 people there surrounded. Therefore access to the sea becomes very important. So a country like Ethiopia's strategic vulnerability must be understood. And whether the Emirates and others understand that, I'm not sure, but these are the kind of things. But for us to assume that they will understand our vulnerability, we need them to be transparent in the relationship. If they bought the port of Barbara for $300 million, most of it bribed to parliamentarians to vote on it. What makes them change their mind if there is a problem with Ethiopia? They will say to Barbara, close it. They could say, most of them are transactional countries that are surrounding us. And the Arabs are by and large transactional. So this does not lend itself for transparent multilateral approach to resolving outstanding issues. Thanks. Sorry, Aneta had a quick comment and then Michael. Yeah, I just would like to add on this that the question, of course, is also who is responding on the other side. And I wouldn't take it as just one side of the issue. I mean, what kind of countries are responding and why don't they have a regional approach to this? It's very bilateral. It's very, why are they bought off and if it's all transactional? And why don't they see or why don't they perceive of themselves as a region that needs a much more regional strength, not only security-wise, but also economically? And I think this is to me just to add on to this. That's not just for the Gulf States. That's for China, that's for India, that's for everybody else, including Europeans on their migration because they also try to be very bilateral and not regional. And I think this is where the strength needs to come from the perception on the Horn side as well. I was just going to say quickly that these are not robust national security and diplomatic bureaucracies that have extensive knowledge of these regions. This is quite new. And I think these are significant investments that have some potential, but perception is quite important. And I don't know that the Gulf countries have internalized just how important and how delicate that is as a diplomatic matter. I think there is a reductive relationship-based approach to some of this that is not focused on institutions and that lends itself to opacity and a lack of transparency. And so I think one great danger is that there hasn't been much thought given to what anybody thinks is going on. I mean, how do these countries, how do these regions, how do these societies view these infusions of investment? What is this all about? The Gulf countries have just not done a very good job of getting that message across, if there is one. Any very thorough answer to your question? I would rather take this even to have a historical perspective. There is a professor, Professor Borsock, who wrote about the historical relationship between the Horn and the Gulf states. In his book entitled, The Empire in Collision in Lette Antiquity. And he explains the competitions, changing relations and interactions between the Horn of Africa and the Gulf. The book explains how the Gulf sheikhs at that time found it increasingly effective to lend their support to client peoples in marginal areas where conflict between the superpowers could be played out more remotely. And at the same time across actors in the Horn who are trying to fulfill their irredentist claims. What's happening today in that part of the world is similar to what happened in the third or fourth century. If you see most of the contracts are signed between the Gulf countries and fragile regional administrations of Somali regional states. Somali land, Punt land, which goes up to Kismayo and so on. The only country you will find that is relatively stable is Djibouti. We know where it finds itself. So it is also, some of the Gulf countries are taking strategic advantage into the weaknesses of these countries on the African side. I agree with Annette when she says, the region, the Horn has to take itself also. It has to do its homework. There is no question about it. But how can you do that when Somali regional states do not have a framework in which they can regionally talk or negotiate with other countries in the region? So there are structural challenges as well to address this. I just wanted to mention that. Thank you. And I think it's an important issue that probably merits its own lengthy discussion and maybe we can come back to it a little bit later but Jason, you. So first, thank you very much. Sorry, I'm Jason Mattis with AECOM. Thank you very much. A very interesting briefing. And given the complexity and the competing interests of a series of regional actors, these regional actors are also responsible for negotiating a solution to the conflict in South Sudan and in Sudan. Do you feel that these regions, that these interests, that they can mediate, sorry, towards a solution that's good for South Sudan or good for Sudan? Because I think the future is in the hands of these competing interests. Thank you. Abdul is probably in a better position to answer this but I'll tell you what I think. I think what's happening is that Sudan's ability to play on a lot of these different connections now and Ethiopia, concerned with internal matters, that EGAD is actually weakened and Uganda is strengthened. And Uganda has always been the outlier in our attempts at peace in South Sudan. My perception, therefore, and then President Kier plays on all these things. He plays with the Egyptians and all the rest to strengthen and stay in power. So I don't think this has all been good for the South Sudan peace process. But Abdul, you know that better now. Well, look, the good thing is that there is a tradition of conflict resolution through a multilateral framework, as I said, all right? Therefore, the fact that in the region, both reinforced by the African Union and the subregional organizations, EGAD, to handle peace and security challenges through some multilateral forum, multilateral mechanism is good, all right? But the problem we are now facing is two problems. One problem is we have discussed this with Ambassador Lyman sometimes back. You know, even the Americans, when they make their strategic choices, they say, how many wars can we fight at one time? And they said only two, three, all right? How many conflict resolutions can we do at one time? One, two, the rest will subcontract it, all right? No, so this is the way they think. EGAD is really saddled with a monumental challenge. And in the past three years, they are basically monopolized by South Sudan, OK? So they are exhausted by South Sudan. There has been 14 or 13 summits on one single issue in South Sudan, all right? So they are overwhelmed. The UN and other multilateral institutions are giving them support, but they are really overwhelmed. And this is their last gasp, all right? So I hope they will succeed. If they don't succeed, we don't want the South Sudan issue to fall into a bilateral arrangement. We want another multilateral institution to pick up the pieces. And that could be the African Union. So we are really at this juncture. But EGAD has played one useful role. I hope they will sustain it, because of this collective endeavor, they are really managing, restraining, member state not to take unilateral action, all right? And they are not doing it 100% successfully, but they are trying so that Ethiopia and Uganda will not be at each other's neck, and they are behind the scene. But at least it is restraining them. So there is that. But by and large, no solution for a kind of region that we have and for the kind of countries we have assembled, being a mixture of failed states and state trying to do the right thing outside of multilateral mechanism. So US should continue to support multilateralism, even though this administration's view towards multilateralism is negative. If you want to get engaged in Africa, that is the only way, multilateral, all right? Otherwise, you will have a situation in which the Qatar and the Gulf countries' problem, if it was Africa, we would have sent an envoy to Qatar. We would have sent wise people. We would have sent a bunch of all the head of state whatever to try to mediate. We would not have cut them off. We could not have condemned them. We would not have isolated them. So that gives you a sense of there is a developed culture of multilateral approach to global solving in our part and it's missing in the other part. I think one of the challenges in moving forward with the peace process in South Sudan is the fact that other extra-regional actors having their role within EGAD. Previously, the EGAD region has been trying to make sure that all of them speak in one voice, especially, for example, when the CPA was signed. But on South Sudan, Uganda has been fairly an outlier, but EGAD as a region has been trying to contain the damage that emerged. Now, the challenge now we have is Egypt has joined Uganda. What will happen? In my view, EGAD might not be exceptionally unified to deal with the issue. But if you take out the peace process from the EGAD region, EGAD member states are going to be spoilers in my view. It is better to keep them within the game and then see how best you can coerce some actors who are outliers to have a positive contribution. Let's take a couple of questions just because we're halfway through our question time. So let me take two questions in a row and then we'll go to David Shen. Please introduce yourself. David Shen, George Washington University. This might best be directed to Michael. It's a Nile Waters question that we actually talked about this morning. And I'd be interested in your views as to what are the prospects for Egypt taking another look at its agricultural policy. And rather than trying to green the desert with very precious Nile water, use water in a more precious sense. Is there any prospect for that? Thank you, David. Michael, I'd like to thank you for your hand. Not to add to the catalog of problems and actors, but only Abdul made mention of China. And I'm just wondering whether this panel of experts can pull forward some sort of conclusions as to the net effect currently and potentially in the future on ameliorating the situation or worsening the situation of China given its interests in food and investment and so on. Thank you. And we'll open it up further. Yeah, I mean, we talked about it earlier. I mean, water management, irrigation practices. There's a lot of scope for improvement. And I have to imagine that any kind of amicable resolution is going to have to include some changes of behavior and practice in Egypt. This isn't a new issue. This has been raised for many years. It's a difficult time for issues of governance in Egypt. That being said, there have been steps taken on other longstanding issues like subsidy reform that people have shied away from and avoided for many years. And so maybe there will be an appetite for this kind of big venture, more so than in the past. But it's not new. It'll have to form part of the basis for a resolution. Better water management is going to lead to less demands. And so, yes, I hope so. I don't know how it gets resolved otherwise. But again, longstanding issue that hasn't been dealt with previously. Would you like to comment on China? Yeah, I'll say some things about China, Michael. China's very active, of course, in this region. You go to Ethiopia and you see huge amounts of investment and presence in China. They're also looking at Eritrea. They're looking at a number of other countries. And they invest a lot. Their agreements are also transactional. That is, they're not transparent. And that's the way, along with the others, contributes to a non-democratic, autocratic kind of system and pigeonage systems. We can get into all the depth of that. Some people feel, and I don't have the figures, that China is driving a lot of these countries into very high debt levels. And if that's true, it makes these countries very dependent on China either to restructure the debt or forgive it or something else. I've heard that. I don't have the figures for it. I would like people to think from the perspective of the developing countries, African states. If you don't have alternatives for investment, if you can't get an alternative investment, having something is better than nothing. It's a choice between nothing and something. If the West can invest, the richer countries in the West responsibly encourage their companies to invest and create alternatives for some African countries. There is no reason why they should choose between them and the Chinese. At the same time, it is the institutions, the capacity of those institutions in those developing countries that would matter to manage Chinese investment. Ethiopia somehow has successfully managed to some extent the investments of China. The debts or the borrowing that comes from China are taken by the most productive and effective and efficient companies. For example, Ethiopian Alliance that has linkages with Boeing Company is using the money that the Ethiopian government borrows from China in an efficient and effective way. Can one help those institutions in developing countries to have the capacity to manage the finances that come, whether to make those investments pretty efficient and effective? If you go to Beijing, you will find a lot of companies producing goods for American markets. Can Africans also have those capacities to manage what kind of goods they receive from China? Those are some of the questions that one might be interested to think about. I think Ambassador David also can comment on that since he wrote extensively on that. Were you trying to say something? Well, maybe just to add on this, I think it's also this is coming back to the US and to the Europeans. What's our comparative advantage? I mean, what are we doing better? It's maybe not the resource-based infrastructure. I mean, at least for the Europeans, that's not what we are known for. But what are we offering and what would make a difference? And I think this is exactly what Abdelta said. I mean, where are we dealing differently? And if you look a bit more to the West, Central African Republic, Congo, DRC, it's not China. It's basically us who are doing exactly the same there. So I think the question is more maybe a bit like with the Gulf States, how to bring them also into the fold? I mean, how to make that more multilateral in terms of economy? But also, I mean, China is not just there in Djibouti to have their own military base. They're also in South Sudan as part of the UN peacekeeping mission. So China plays various roles. I think the Chinese idea of One Belt, One Road initiative is, for example, for the Europeans, it's quite an interesting initiative that they don't see as negative. It's not just a competition. So I think we need to also see that more creatively. But again, come back to the question, what is the comparative advantage? And what are we doing better? And what is wanted from African countries? And maybe also, who makes the deals? What kind of leadership? Somebody mentioned it. Is it authoritarian states? Is it the elites? How much is that reflected with the population and who cuts these deals? And that's not just going for China. Let's just take. Let me just see if we have any other questions for the remaining five minutes. So everybody has an opportunity to ask. Please, and then, Abdul, just save your point and we can come back to it if you don't mind. Please. Oh, there. Hi, I'm Andy Snow. I'm the State Department Fellow at USIP this year. I'm not an expert on this part of the world, but my question for the panel, if anybody wants to take a shot at it, is what do you think Turkey is doing in this part of the world? Because I served in Turkey and I try to follow Turkish issues. But this area of Turkish foreign policy escaped me somehow. And it's not an area of historic Turkish interest. They have their hands full at home with Syria, with Iraq, with relations with the US, relations with Europe. What are they doing in this part of the world, as everybody wants to comment on that? Thanks. Can you handle this? You can say a few words. I can say a few words. I think probably the third or the fourth biggest investment in Ethiopia is Turkey. Turkey has invested billions of dollars in Ethiopia. They have built garment industries. Some other industries as well. So they are investing in Ethiopia. Politically engaging, they are there in Somalia. They have a military base in Somalia. They train the Somali federal government soldiers, thousands of them. I think that is the biggest Turkish military base that's found in Africa is where they have invested in Somalia. I think the humanitarian engagement in Somalia is tremendous. They also control the airport and the seaport of Mogdishu. Their companies run those two big institutions. That brings a lot of money to the federal government. I think they are investing in the Sudan. As I said earlier, even if Erdogan just showed up, and the issue of the Suwakeen island became an issue, but they were there for the last three years. But the last 10 years, Turkey was active in the Sudan. That's what I know. Just adding on this, the foreign politics in Ankara, when you talk to the people working on the Africa desks, for them it was also a different foreign policy, specifically Somalia and Sudan, where the question was more, who do the governments their trust? And they felt that the Turkish government, with a more political Islam agenda, is more trustworthy than, let's say, the West in general. I'm generalizing. Also, I think they do have a very strategic agenda. That is, who's paying for this? I think is another interesting question. I think we haven't touched on that. Is it really Turkey paying for all of these expenses? Or is maybe Qatar helping? I think that's definitely going to be interesting. But the question of Erdogan right now is much more connecting to an Ottoman Empire idea, projecting that idea. So it's not non-historical, I think, in that sense. Except it wasn't part of the Ottoman. None of these places were part of the Ottoman Empire, except Egypt and... What, so I can... Yes. Yes. Just quickly, part of it is vanity and the sense of what Turkey's supposed to do in the world. And at times that's been quite instructive, in Afghanistan and the Balkans. And unfortunately, it's oftentimes been led to overreach. And one of the things that became clear in Turkey's turn to the Arab world was how little Turkey knew about the Arab world. There was an assumption that they knew, because, of course, there are these historical links. But their knowledge of the Arab world had withered because they hadn't been again. That's not where their focus had been. And so they bumbled badly in places like Iraq, in Syria. And some of that was knowledge-based. I can't speak to... They've been engaged in Somalia for a number of years now. I don't know... I have doubts as to their capacity. And I worry as a general theme of Turkish foreign policy over the past 10 years, and in particular since 2011, is being prone to partisanship. Turkey has taken sides in regional disputes, takes sides in terms of how it approaches all of its issues. And that runs the risks of... More generally, not just in here, but runs the risks of aggravating existing fault lines. Thank you very much. With just two minutes left, I was just going to offer each of the panels the opportunity to offer any concluding thoughts before we wrap up, starting with Abdel, because I know you had a further talk with China. What David raised is very important, because that's going to shape the narrative about the Nile in the future, the issue of water management. So when you see the dam, this Ethiopian Renaissance dam, Africa Renaissance dam, it will have major implication on the future of the Nile. Why? The dam means very succinctly in Ethiopia, it's hydroelectric power. In Sudan, it's agriculture. In Egypt, it's water management. Therefore, you know, when we said we have to get the politics of the Nile right, it means coming to grips with this. And hopefully that will change. Number two, on China, with the minuses of the Chinese system and all of the thing that Lyman has pointed out, China for Africa is now the most tangible country, all right? It's tangible. They have a strategic view about Africa, for good or for bad, all right? They are tangible, they have strategic view, therefore they are predictable, all right? And the one, this one belt, one road, is solidifies that tangibility, all right? So they are there, you know, and US will end up having a very poor catch-up to do, all right? On Turkey, I think they have responded. Turkey, one of the things that makes the Egyptians nervous, and I will understand why, is that Turkey, in addition to having this grandiose vanity, the person of Edogran speaks to that, the other thing is that they are Muslim brotherhood, they are part of the Muslim brotherhood narrative. And Sudan is the remnant of Muslim brotherhood, they are still there, and Qatar is another Muslim brotherhood. So this alliance solidifying itself and having a foothold in Africa, especially in Somalia, bothers the Egyptians and the Arabs. So that we need to deal with that, yeah, final thoughts? Yeah, just very briefly. I've been, you know, I focus a lot on Egypt and that means that I generally focus on the Arab world, and I've been surprised with the rapidity of events of the past two years, and particularly the past year. And I think I've seen a bit of coverage this week in the Western press, but this has really kind of gone under the radar in a way that, I mean, understandable, but I think slightly troubling. And the pace of events seems to really be quickening, and I think we're playing catch-up at best. I'm not sure, well, I'm actually, I'm quite sure, the United States is not in a position to engage Nimboli at this juncture, which is unfortunate, and I don't know what's there to kind of fill that gap. But what's clear is that this is gonna require a broader multilateral framework because of some of these bureaucratic issues, but that framework doesn't exist to kind of try to corral all these issues under one umbrella. Thank you, very well said. Basterly. What I'm concerned with is bringing an end to the war in South Sudan, and how that's possible because that's one of the biggest humanitarian disasters in the world, and what worries me is it's become harder rather than easier with all these other developments. And with all respect to IGAD, they seem to be able to living with this disaster in their midst and not deal with it. And it's got danger in itself, but it is a huge humanitarian disaster, terrible for the people, costing the United States a ton of money. And we're not structured to deal with this because we're not taking in the context in which all this is going on. And so what I hope comes out of what we've been talking about and thinking about is that we have a policy-making process in the State Department, NSC, that takes all these issues into account. Some of them are long-term issues that go well beyond South Sudan. Looks at how our various interests in Egypt which are complex, in Ethiopia which are complex, and I think the situation in Ethiopia demands an enormous amount of attention, and then figure out how we can solve some of these problems, get the South Sudan thing solved somehow, deal with some of these other issues, be present in the area. And without that, you have to spend this money for and a half billion dollars a year, but we can do so much better than what we're doing. Thank you very much, Adara. No final thoughts, Annetta. Just what President Lehmann was just saying, I think I consider it's quite important to look at the developments on Egypt and Sudan and Ethiopia right now exactly for not having more conflicts if it's directly or through proxies in this region because that will have implications on South Sudan and of course on the region at rest. And maybe as a mirror problem on the other side, if there is no stronger negotiated peace effort on the Yemen war, I think it will have rippling effects not only on the Gulf but again coming back to the Horn and so I think it would be in our vital interest to engage there. Thank you. I think people are not thinking the implication of the war in Yemen. Somehow it's overlooked. Nobody knows for how many years this will continue. We heard that the war costs between 200 to 300 million dollars per day. What does it mean in four years, five years? And how would that change the alliances in the Gulf areas and what is the implication for the Horn of Africa and the greater global world that shift means countries like Iran, Qatar, who are not bogged down in a war are saving money? How would the balance of forces shift in the Gulf area? It should be one thing that people have to grapple with. Thank you very much. It's a very important note I think to end on. I think since we're sitting at USIP, I don't want us to conclude this conversation being overwhelmed by these very complex dynamics. They are complex, but I think it's also important to note that wars have been negotiated to an end and they can be negotiated to an end, whether it's South Sudan, whether it's Yemen, I think USIP and certainly a number of institutions and others continue to think very thoroughly about some of these ideas and hopefully there will be some leadership to move some of them forward because it's certainly these are gaping wounds sort of in the world order and I think we've talked a lot today about what the consequences are now and left unresolved. Those consequences will only get ever worse. Despite the tremendous security and other investments we've made, it's hard to see them being addressed without a commensurate political investment from many, many actors in a particular context. Thank you all again. Thank you to our extraordinary panel for coming some further than others and thanks so much.