 Well, ladies and gentlemen, welcome to our third and final session for the 26 Japan update. My name is Amy King and I'm a lecturer in the Strategic and Defence Study Centre at the A&U and a fellow of the Australia Japan Research Centre. I'm really delighted to bring what is an all-star panel here this afternoon to talk about Japan's national security and foreign policy and to think about Japan in the wider regional context. Rather than sort of a lecture-style presentation, we're going to mix things up a little bit in this final session this afternoon. I know that there are lots of questions in the audience, I've already heard from various people today, so we want to make sure there's plenty of time for Q&A. And what our three speakers are going to do is to offer us a few minutes, five minutes or so of remarks on various aspects of this issue of national security and foreign policy. I'll then throw some questions to our speakers, but that'll be the opportunity for you to start thinking about your questions because we're going to leave plenty of time for that. So in the order in which they are going to speak to you today, let me now introduce our three speakers. First up is Professor Penendra Jayne from the University of Adelaide, a ways professor in the Department of Aging Studies. Professor Jayne has been president formally of the Aging Studies Association of Australia and the Japanese Studies Association of Australia and is an expert on Japanese politics and foreign policy as well as wider regional agencies of security issues. Our second speaker from Japan is Professor Nori Yamaguchi, who's also a retired Lieutenant General, not working, Noris, from the Ground Self-Defense Forces of Japan. Professor Yamaguchi is now a Vice President of the International University of Japan and Dean of the Graduate School of International Studies and is previously served as a Japanese Defence Attaché in the United States. And finally, Professor Jerry Curtis, who was with us, of course, this morning with a terrific keynote lecture. Professor Curtis is the emeritus, sorry, Professor of Political Science from Columbia University and although emeritus, I understand, is busier than ever, former director of the Weatherhead East Asia Center at Columbia University and an eminent speaker on Japanese politics, electoral processes, foreign policy and wider questions of Japan's place in the world. So without any further ado, could I please hand over to Penendra to kick us off. Thank you very much. And I'd also like to thank the organizers for inviting me to this Japan update. Well, I have been asked to kick off and also I was told that I have about five minutes to start with and then we will enter into Q&A later on. I want to actually I just want to start with my borrowing two terms from the world of business. One of them is what we call disruption in a rate of disruptions. How companies like Apple, they have disrupted the traditional market. Two, the other term I want to borrow is networking, again, from the world of business, the network and I want to relate these two terms to what's happening with Japan's security and the strategic policy and how Japan has been strategically challenged because of these strategic disruptions and how Japan is dealing with those strategic disruptions and one of the explanations which I have followed or written and trying to follow it with more than explained is by creating what I call networks, international, global networks. So what are these strategic challenges of disruptions which Japan is currently facing? We all know and we have heard so much about China. We have heard about North Korea, but they are not the only disruptions which Japan is facing. There are others, for example, Japan's view that the US is weakening and this is kind of one view in terms of his economic influence and to a certain degree is diplomatic and political influence. Then there are a rise of others. For example, here I want to bring India in the picture in the equation. So all these things, if you put them together, Japan has never faced this kind of challenges, these kinds of challenges which Japan is facing now. I mean, Japan used to be in the 1970s and 80s, the leader, the regional leader, but Japan has become kind of a regional player and in this region we have got so many other players and some are of greater consequences than what Japan quote is about. And this Japan is trying to deal with, as I said, through forming networks. And I just had a look at the number of countries which Mr. Abe has visited since he became Prime Minister. It's just amazing. About 50 different foreign visits with up close to 90 countries which he has visited in the last three years or so, three and a half years since he became Prime Minister. And you may remember in the early 1960s when Prime Minister Ikeda went to Europe or he was traveling throughout the world, famously or infamously, the president of France branded him as a transistor salesperson. And then Japan was characterized as an economic animal. And I was just thinking, what Mr. Abe is trying to say, what Mr. Abe is trying to do through his visits to these many countries around the world and to almost all the continents, Abe is trying to set his diplomacy and this diplomacy through selling this diplomacy, he is trying to create these what I call diplomatic networks. And now I give you some examples. For example, as you said that, you know, US, as Professor Gerteson morning, he mentioned that, you know, the US expects now its allies to do more and perhaps it will expect the allies to do more, even further. So what Mr. Abe or the LDP or government has done, if you look at the kinds of strategic networks which Japan is building, and, you know, for the first time in 2007, there was a security agreement with Australia, for example. One year after that, there was a security agreement with India, and there are so many strategic partnership agreements which Mr. Abe recently has signed that I have lost count. So he is creating that kind of strategic network. And India and Australia, I give you two examples. The other aspect, perhaps we don't hear much or we heard in the past, which has become very important in my analysis particularly, is Japan's foreign aid. In the late 1980s, Japan was kind of dubbed aid superpower. Japan no longer is aid superpower because Japan doesn't have, we have heard from panel experts previously about how the Japanese economy is stagnating or not performing very well, and the budget is shrinking, so Japan doesn't have that kind of money to throw around on its foreign aid. But what one could see very clearly that the aid money is being utilized very strategically, and this strategic aid or the characteristic of aid, which is becoming very strategic, one could see very clearly through many examples. One of them perhaps maybe well known is that how Japan is using its aid money to provide patrol boats of surveillance aircraft to countries like Vietnam or to Philippines and so on and so forth. But since my origin is India, I always follow what's happening in Japan and India as well. Very recently, Mr Abe not only committed 10 billion dollars towards a bullet train project in India, but actually he has signed other kinds of agreements which are very strategic in nature. And one of the examples is India's northeast, part northeast which is especially the state of Arunachal Pradesh, which China claims as its own territory. And now Japan is trying to help build infrastructure growth, connecting India's northeast to Southeast Asia through Myanmar and so on and so forth. So if we look at some of these examples, what Mr Abe, particularly the last three years and also in his previous position as prime minister in 2006-2007, if you look at all those things, it's very clear that Japan is trying to create these kind of strategic networks. And that brings me one more point I know my time has run out. If you look at only this month actually, it's called HICAC, which is the Tokyo International Conference on African Development. Which Japan started in 1993 way back before China or India thought about engaging Africa. So Japan started that way back in 1993. You remember it was kind of just after the first World War and, you know, nations were struggling with their economies and so on and so forth. And Japan decided to engage Africa. Now for the first time in its history since 1993, what Mr Abe did was to take Thai, Thai, Thai care from Japan to Africa. So for the first time it was held on African soil. And this move is in my analysis is very, very strategic because and he committed 30 billion, 30 billion US dollars in public and private capital to help Africa's development. And this was to match Xi Jinping's 60 billion dollars which Xi Jinping last year had committed to Africa. But the point is that Mr Abe's strategy is not about what the Chinese are doing, but what Abe is saying that it is about partnership. It is about developing Africa as a partner. So the term which I use is Mr Abe is creating a horizontal network. It's not kind of vertical networks which Japan created in the past or which Japan remains in that kind of vertical network with the US. So Japan is trying to create this more kind of horizontal network. And Abe has emphasized about quality, quality infrastructure and quality infrastructure such as bullet train in India, quality infrastructure for Africa. And all these things and if you put together the final point I want to make is how Mr Abe is trying to give some flesh to the balls of his strategic engagement is the project is to change the constitution, and the change in constitution means change Article 9 of the constitution to make it more formal what Japan is doing or what Japan intends to do. But I think that's the point which we can come back on about the changing amendment of the constitution. Thank you very much. I mean a terrific start I think to think about those sort of strategic disruptions to Japan and its policies in the region and some of the sort of signature moves that Abe is making in terms of networking, use of foreign aid and some of the ways in which that is differing from China. Yamaguchi-san, over to you. Does it work? Yes. Is it working? Okay, thank you. First of all, I have to apologize for my voice. I'm recovering from the slight surgery of my throat a couple of several weeks ago. My voice, original voice much nicer. I have been learning a lot from this morning from optimistic side to very pessimistic side and I belong to the former. I was trained as a helicopter pilot to be optimistic. So I never thought my plane was going to have engine failure. Even if I had engine failure, I thought I was going to save the plane by auto rotation, force landing. If I was not able to save the plane, I want to be injured. Even if you got injured, I won't be killed. When I got killed, I don't realize it. So I'm basically optimistic and today I'm going to have a very daunting task, very much daunting in five minutes. I'm going to talk about new legislation about Japanese security policy and March 29th of this year, a new set of new laws came to effect. This is a very drastic change of the national security policy based on the laws and 10 laws are amended and one new law was enacted. Don't worry, I'm not going to say all the 10 laws and new laws, but even the title may take five minutes. But basically what I'm saying is we expanded the mission areas of the self-defense process by putting something within the existing, the old set of laws and policy set. And while amending the change in the interpretation of the constitution, by adding very, very little part, let me start with putting what I call my generation knows that Tom and Jerry, Captain Rand, Jason Rand, and I keep telling my students that the new laws put something in the openings within the cheese, Swiss cheese with holes in the meantime, putting a little bit of cream maybe on top. And the putting, putting things in the hole includes expanding, expanding the right authority to use weapons. And even under all the interpretation, SDF members were allowed to use weapons to protect our weapons because bad guys take it, it is very, very dangerous and weapons are expensive, so we are allowed to protect those weapons. And this was expanded to include the use of weapons to protect other countries' weapons, the weapons system that might be used for protection of Japanese population. For instance, US forces, the weapons in Japan or any other forces that might be protecting us, we can use weapons to protect them under even the peacetime conditions. And another point is that we expanded, expanded mission areas in terms of international missions by, by loosening or by lifting some of the limits. For example, we were not allowed to do what we call Kaketsuke Keigo, that means we can use weapons to protect me and protect you if you are working with me for UN peacekeeping operations from the beginning in 1992. But if the next guy, the people are asking me to help, I was not able to allow to go and help. So therefore, those kinds of missions which might cause that kind of situation is what we, the government of Japan, did not take because, you know, if I am asked if I have to say no, it is embarrassing and it is, it may have negative, negative impact. So we were a little hesitant to take that sort of mission, but now we can do that several other cases included. In addition, you know, a little bit clean top of the cheese is a new interpretation of constitution which allows us to, to exercise, exercise right on collective self-defense in the very, very limited case. Up until the last, last March, Japan was supposed to use force for just only for individual self-defense, for defense of Japan. But now if something happens next to us and if Japan lets it go as it is, Japan might be in serious danger of existence. In such a case, even before, before being attacked, we can use force to, to, to save others. I'm not representing the government anymore. I used to be the part of the government for 45 years. I decided it was long, long enough. I'm now a private citizen, I was a full-fledged freedom of speech. So I can say this, that station, that, that cheese, maybe, cream on top of the cheese, maybe the case, something like September, 1950, after several months, after the Korean War broke out, Putin, Perimeter was almost two-four. If that happens again, and if Putin, Perimeter, falls, Japan's future is going to be the front line, and Japan will be under the very, very serious situation. So in such a case, we might, we might be able to, to, to participate in international efforts to, to save the sort of situation. Then my conclusion is very simple. As simple as soldiers. We have, since 1992, when we dispatched first-ever peacekeeping operations missions to Cambodia, up until now we have come a very, very long way, but still we have a long way to go. One example is new legislation does not touch upon the what we call collective security. That means under the UN Charter, Charter 7. Chapter 7, if somebody is doing something really nasty, everybody is going to standing up against, against him or her. That is collective security. That's why I, I am refrained from doing stupid things against Amy. But you know, if that, that, that has, that comes to, in other words, if UN force, UN, United Nations force is organized to do, to do good thing for the world. The international community should work very, very hard. But the new legislation does not touch upon this. In the future, we might have to, to look at that area as, as well. Thank you very much. Yep. I think that's really highlighted, uh, helpfully some of the specifics around the new security legislation. And you've opened up, I think, some areas that we'll want to discuss further about where Japan might go next. Jerry, do you want to finish us off with some thoughts? Well, I don't really don't, because it's kind of difficult. I, I don't want to repeat what I said this morning, and I don't want to repeat what these two gentlemen have said now with, with, which I agree. So I won't, I don't, maybe I won't even need the, the five minutes, but I, I want to sort of build a little bit on something I said this morning, which was when we think about Japanese security policy, we have to understand it's not Prime Minister Abe so much that's driving the policy. It's the changes in the international system that the end of bipolarity, the end of that time we thought was America's unipolar position as the, as the, is the only superpower. Now that's gone. And where we've entered a fluid, uncertain, dangerous phase of transitioning towards some sort, some new form of, of a multilateral system in East Asia. And we have to think about how that is changing the dynamics of Japanese security policy thinking. Now, particularly from my perspective, how it's changing the U.S.-Japan relationship. So it's on that latter point, I want to say a few words really about how it's changing, I think U.S. thinking, there is no one U.S. thinking about Japan, but in the United States, there are trends about thinking about our relations with allies and our relations with Japan in particular that are different, that are new to the relation, to the, to our relationship. And I am concerned that policymakers in Washington don't necessarily get it and that actions that they take may come up against the fact that what worked in the past isn't necessarily going to work now in the president. So there are two points in particular I want to make. One relates to the so-called free ride. Ever since John Foster Dulles negotiated the San Francisco peace treaty with Prime Minister Yoshida and Japan adopted its post-war constitution with an article that prohibits it from having a military, Americans have complained about Japan getting a free ride. We have a nice symmetrical security relationship in which we're obligated to come to Japan's defense. And even though there's been some very significant progress made in terms of Japanese commitments through the new guidelines, the adoption of the reinterpretation of the constitution to permit collective defense, from the point of view of a lot of Americans, Japan is still getting a free ride. And when Donald Trump said on TV that we have an alliance with Japan where we're obligated to to come to Japan's assistance if it's attacked. And if we're attacked, Japanese can sit and watch it on their Sony TV. This resonated with a lot of people in the United States. So the idea that Japan should do more now has a lot to do with the fact that Americans feel we're being stressed because we're asked to do so much when other countries now have the ability to do more and that if the Japanese have a security concern, they should be stepping up to the bat more. I don't want to exaggerate it. I don't want to exaggerate it. But it's an important shift. I think the pressure, as I said earlier, on Japan to do more to contribute to the alliance, not only in terms of money, but in terms of roles and missions. You know, when Prime Minister Abe was in Washington in April of last year, the time of the guidelines, the new guidelines be adopted when he spoke at Congress, he was very bullish about what the reinterpretation of the Constitution and the new guidelines meant for Japan's role, potential military role. And Secretary Kerry, very enthusiastically, said at a press conference while Abe was still in town, Japan is now committed to come to the defense of American territory. So Japan's committed to defend us as we ought to defend them. And then Abe walked us back a lot to get the bill through the diet, because the political support was not there. So how we manage this relationship from here on forward requires some different thinking than I think it did in the past. We want Japan to do more, I think that's a general feeling in the U.S., but we want Japan to do more of what we want Japan to do. And it's not necessarily the case that Japan will want to do what we want to do, and they might want us to do what they want us to do. And we have not much experience with having to respond to doing, to figure out whether we're going to do what Japan wants us to do, or with the Japan that's doing things that we don't necessarily want them to do. Like Abe's, what I think is a good initiative towards Russia. So just keep these, I think we have to keep these things in mind, and I hope American policymakers keep them in mind. And just one particular point about what we want Japan to do, and because I'm interested in reactions from some of the security specialists in the audience. The concern over China's aggressive bullying behavior in the South China Sea and the East China Sea is a major concern for all of us. And the U.S. has been not, I don't think doing enough, but it has been doing a frame of navigation operations around these islands, the artificial islands that Chinese have created in the South China Sea. But do we want Japan to join an FON operation? There's a lot of people in the United States who think, yeah, you know, Japan, these sea lanes are important to Japan, Japan too. I think it's very dangerous. It's very dangerous. And you know the Chinese will try to find out where is the weak link, if there's multilateral efforts to do these FON operations in South China Sea. And they may well conclude that the weak link is the Senkaku Islands. And you can see the Chinese responding to Japanese participation in a frame of navigation operation in the South China Sea by upping the anti vis-a-vis the Senkaku Islands. Then what is the U.S. going to do? These issues need to be thought through in ways that we haven't thought about before. The second point I want to stress is this. You know, after the war, and actually until through the debate and the diet over the security legislation, the Japanese had a great concern, which was that alliance with the United States raised the danger of entanglement. The Americans would do something and drag the Japanese into it when they didn't want to be part of it. So you know, in this alliance theory, there's the danger of entanglement, there's danger of abandonment. I don't think the Japanese ever worried that we would abandon Japan, but they did worry about getting, that they would get entangled by our actions. For the U.S., we didn't worry about either. We didn't really count on the Japanese to do very much. So it was a question of being abandoned and the Japanese weren't doing anything that was going to entangle us. But this has changed. This is something that's very important to understand. When Abe visited Yasukuni, the end of 2013, the U.S. government issued a statement, the State Department issued a statement of disappointment. Our disappointment was not the disappointment of the Koreans and the Chinese. We're angry, not disappointed, angry that Abe visited a shrine that paid, that enshrined the souls of convicted walker mouths. It's not a big issue for Americans. The big issue for the Americans was that Abe did something that raised tensions in East Asia and raised the danger of entangling us in a conflict that we don't want any part of if we can avoid it. So it's very critical that... So this danger of entanglement is no longer only a Japanese concern. It is an American concern. And as the Japanese are asked to do more and do do more, they will want to do more about deciding what it is that we do jointly. And as they do so, it raises the possible dangers that will be asked to do things we don't necessarily want to get involved in. All I'm trying to stress here is that this relationship requires... The U.S.-Japan bilateral relationship requires a level of attention and knowledge and from the top levels of American decision-makers that I don't think we have ever had to deal with. And I don't think we're prepared to deal with it. I don't believe, frankly... Well, God only knows that Donald Trump is the last person you want to be in a position of responsibility to have to deal with it. But I don't think Hillary Clinton gets it either. That's my... That's my sense. Well, there's other things to talk about. I mean, I'm going to stop there and let's get the audience to get involved. Terrific. Thank you. I might start with you, because what you've just said prompt some questions, but then I'm going to turn to H. L. Penendra and Yamaguchi-san with some questions based on their presentations as well. But, Jerry, this morning you talked about public opinion, perhaps being the last real... The last real check and balance on are they in terms of some of the national security policies and constitutional revision that he is taking. The opposition is not that constrained along the media, perhaps not that constrained. So public opinion has been more constrained. But there's also another constraint, I guess, on Japan doing more in security in terms of what the US might want and that is China and perhaps still extent South Korea. They don't see Japan doing more in a security sense as being perhaps legitimate. How are they going in managing those two sets of constraints, the public opinion one and the two most important retail neighbours question? Do you think he is doing what he needs to do to engage the neighbours and public opinion to manage that national security direction that he wants to take the country in? That's a good question. I would say there's a third constraint which is obvious perception of what is... His perception of what's in Japanese interest is itself a constraint because he does not perceive it to be in Japan's interest to do things that will raise tensions with China unnecessarily. And I think so far on the point I mentioned earlier about the freedom of navigation operations, the Japanese government has not expressed any intent of participating and I hope they continue with that position. What China thinks, I don't think is a constraint on Japan. What China is and what it's capable of doing is a constraint. But I think Abe compared to the Abe I have known in the past, I once had a TV debate with Abe about China politics. This is what he was I think maybe between his times as the first time as Prime Minister and the second. And he was so hawkish and so hard-line and when the debate, when the TV program ended and went back to the makeup room, take off our makeup, we continued to have a rather heated discussion. And he, which ended with him saying to me, you know Japan has never cow-towed to China and it never will. And we will defend ourselves. And that is what he believes. But over the last two years he has been very cautious in dealing with the Chinese I think. He's been very firm about the Senkaku Islands. But he's also been enthusiastic about having face-to-face conversations with Xi Jinping about encouraging greater Chinese tourism into Japan, which is huge, about trying to develop a more economic relation. So I don't think it's what, so I think Abe is dealing with it that they do it the Chinese that way. So the major constraints on what he, what he does, it's not what Chinese think. South Korea, I think, actually, despite all the bad rhetorics between the two, increasingly are their own concerns about China. And I think our, see, as long as Japan is closely tied to the U.S. in its security policy that more, a larger Japanese role and greater multilateral activities, including with Australia and so on, I don't think South Koreans have a problem with that. So yes, the major constraint, our major constraint is public opinion. But you know, Japanese public opinion on this issue has changed in a very important way. If you look at the numbers, yes, most people oppose the reinterpretation of the Constitution about collective defense, don't want to see revision of Article 9. They didn't like the Classified Secrets Act. But compared to the past, compared to 1960, at the time of the security treaty crisis, when people came out in large numbers, in massive demonstrations, some violent demonstrations, to try to stop this from happening. Do you see that the intensity of the opposition any more? No, the intensity is not there. So what you have now in public opinion is a lot of acquiescence. People didn't like the Classified Securities Act. And Abe's popularity went down when it passed. A month later, it was back up to where it was before. They didn't like the collective defense reinterpretation Constitution. And the same thing happened. He's up there somewhere in the high 50s in terms of popularity, in spite of having done all of this. So I don't think public opinion is as much of a constraint on what the Prime Minister, what the Japanese government does. The key issue is how sophisticated the leadership is in trying, in figuring out a strategy to deal with this fluid, multilateral transition, systemic transition in East Asia. I think so far, so good is my conclusion. Thank you. Yamaguchi-san, on this question about public opinion, and you sort of said that we'd gotten somewhere with the collective security legislation, but there was a lot further to go. How do you see that changing? What could change the public attitudes towards these new operations for yesterday? They actually expanded the mission area more active. In South Sudan, we have troops, a couple of hundred troops, along with Chinese and Koreans. Now, we are doing the same job for the first time, has sent combat unit, for the first-ever combat infantry unit to South Sudan for protection of those activities. In such cases, we need to work harder. And in such cases, our soldier and soldier relations are really good. Koreans and Chinese, we got along with quite well. Since 1992, we started peacekeeping operation in Sudan. We have tension over Senkaku, differences in the political position of international rules. But we have common things, too. So in that sense, we may have to have wider views on the relations with neighbors. And as to Koreans, Japanese and Korean, Koreans, I'm a private citizen, so I can say this, that both Japanese and Koreans have got tired of beating each other. So basically, we are ready to work together again. That is my feeling. During the time that Korean-Japanese relations were not good in the last maybe three, four years, I never declined any opportunity to be invited to Seoul or Beijing. And I tried to do my best with my colleagues in Korean and Chinese. And now, no, the reaction of Chinese, Chinese media, Korean media, are totally different from two, three years ago. So we may have to find common things while we may have to be clear that we have differences and we cannot tolerate, tolerate the violation of common international rules and so on. But it's a sort of complicated world which we are facing. And this is not my mission to think about the future, that it's a younger generation's mission. We trust you. Thank you. Penendra, I mean, one of the ways in which Abe is trying to deal with this more complicated world is he's set this network approach and sort of he's going around the region selling his new diplomacy networks. Does the region want what he's selling and particularly in Southeast Asia? And are there limits to what Abe is trying to do? Yeah, I mean, what the narrative of Abe's sense ofmanship is still pacifism. And we know that Japan moved from passive pacifism to active pacifism. And that narrative of active pacifism has become proactive contribution to peace. So this is what Abe is trying to do. He's trying to project. And it's not just selling to the foreign audience but also to his domestic audience. What Abe is saying that, look, whatever we are doing is to preserve peace. And whether it is collective security, whether it is rescue operations, whether it is through ODA or giving rescue boats or weapons aircraft, these all kinds of activities are put in the context of Japan's pacifist peaceful ideas. So he's not saying so in other words, there are takers of this. That's one point. The other point is that we have already talked about it and I think this point will come up in Q&A that many of the Southeast Asian nations, if not all, they want some kind of balance in the region. And they see China's influence being too pervasive, too strong. So how to moderate that influence of China? And they see Japan as the best possible country which can bring that kind of moderation. So yes, I think through my travels, I have talks with my colleagues in Malaysia, in the United States, who I get this impression that is strongly that they, more or less, they are the support of what Japan is trying to do OK. Well, I think just to add to what I've just said. I'll be probably could write a thank you note to Xi Jinping for having, for helping him so much to improve relations with the countries in Southeast Asia. Because it's because of everybody's concern about Chinese behavior that that Japan is not only expanding its economic and cultural political relations, but it's expanding security relations with Vietnam, with the Philippines, with Australia. Japan is a popular country in Southeast Asia. You know, the historical, this problem of history that has bedeviled Japan's relations with China and South Korea, bedeviled relations with Korea and China and South Korea. But when you get beyond that into the rest of Asia, it's not that people don't have memories of what happened in the war, but it's not the same. When you go as far as India, you know, it's not an issue at all. But China is the issue. China is the issue. And so the countries in the region are looking, I think, to Japan. And I may phrase it as, you know, pacifist or peaceful, positive contribution and so on. Look, he wants Japan to be more of a so-called normal country and have security relationships with countries that are on China's periphery or that can help him be sure that a balanced in East Asia can be maintained, even if the U.S. role in it declines somewhat. So this is what he's about. And so we're seeing kind of a new honeymoon in Japan's relations with a lot of countries in Southeast Asia. Now, I want to make sure we have plenty of time for your questions. So I'm going to hand over to the floor now. I'll take as many as we possibly can. But if you want to grab my attention, I'll try to keep a bit of an eye out. So please identify yourself. So your name and where you're from is also be helpful. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you for the presentation. My name is Rukor. I'm a master's student. My question is to Professor Jen. Can you give us insights into Prime Minister Awe's diplomatic groups in Central Asia? Especially after they were drawn of the U.S. troops in America, I think Japan has been trying to get the HCO member-ship for long. Can you give us insights? Okay. I mean, Japan is certainly now, as we have heard from Spain as well. I mean, it's expanding its partnership and friendship and what I call networks. And Central Asia comes very much in that picture. I mean, one of the reasons is that, you know, like China is quite strong. And India's influence is long. I mean, it's not weak. So China and India have been two players and a lot of them are Russian so much. But Japan's interest is in Central Asia, is rising. And this is because of, I call it a number game. Mr. Awe is after having as many friends, as many interlocutors as possible. And Central Asia comes very much in that context. But more than Central Asia, actually I think we should think more of Central Asia here because, you know, we have heard this explanation about the stream of worlds around the human subcontinent, influence of China, in Pakistan, influence of China, in Sri Lanka and Nepal. And there, we see that India has has become a very important partner of Japan. I mean, in 1998, when India tested its nuclear device, Japan was one of the strongest critics of India's act and put sanctions on India. But two years later, three years later, it started with exchange of not only with prime ministers, but also defense level initiatives. This never happened in the past. So one can see very clearly that it's not just Mr. Awe, I'm talking about Mr. Modi as prime minister at that time. Hope to be so initially about to engage India. And I think besides very clear that they regarded that South Asia, India in particular, is a very important, going to be a very important player. And that's why we see there is more of a strategic security, defense kind of partnership with India than with economics and trade and investment, which is quite unusual. You see kind of bilateral engagement, more economic and more trade and investment, all of these kinds of things, tragic change in the age band or as it has been. I'm not sure if to answer your question, your simulation has become very important in terms of work with you. Next, so we'll go to Murray and then what I might do is take a couple of questions from Murray and then we'll go to Manuel. Peter. Actually, I was going to believe just going to make a comment, particularly, leading particularly from what Jared said but also from what Professor Jain also said earlier. And that is really, I completely agree that it's very unusual for a Japanese prime minister to have visited so many countries and he's got out there very deliberately to ensure that Japan's faces there in Southeast Asia and more broadly, of course, in Africa and elsewhere. And that's all very important from Japan's own self-respect, its own image generally and all the rest. And Japan will be able to continue to do that in spite of the increasing weight of China region which is really what I'm about to get on to and that is essentially, I think that all of this is very nice. India is to a certain extent doing some of the same thing and that's important. I think China is really playing a long game. They're playing the game that really is to diminish the influence of the United States and its allies generally in the region and they don't really care how they are seen. They are seen as thumb power in the region. That's what they want to be. If you go back in history, obviously, they have had tributary states in Indochina and elsewhere and that's actually how they'd like things to be in the long term. And the situation, therefore, I think, is one where they will put up with some rough rides, say from Vietnam or the Philippines under the former president, but under the current one. And as long as they, using effectively 19th century gun mode style diplomacy to establish their position as a thumb power, the greater influence in the region and preferably even the United States. And I think that's really what they're on about and they really care about South East Asia and the others think because they will, they believe that with their economic might and increasing military projection that they can achieve that outcome. So that's just my take on the situation. Sorry to be optimistic. It's cold, I'm realistic though. So before I let you respond, if you want to, we'll go to Manuel and then Peter. Hi, Manuel and Giotopoulos. This is primarily to Jerry, based on your speech this morning, which is fantastic. One of my 45 questions, I guess, I'd say that the word that most has been most frequently used today from the morning till now is Abe. And I'd like you to tell me what you think would happen. You've completely unexpectedly, Mr. Abe, was removed from the political scene tomorrow. What would happen in Kante? What would happen in the LTP? What would happen? Me and Peter. My question is on a different tank, really, but I want to get back to the last session and connect it with this session because I think pretty obviously political security outlook for Japan and strategy must be connected to it with the economic outlook for Japan. And what we took away from the last session on the economic outlook was, well, the most optimistic outlook we took away from Lyoko and Bytes was that we've got an economy which is facing a very, very low potential rate of growth. Abe was sanguine about the risks either of an inflation breakout or a recession in the medium to long term. But they're not inconsiderable risks. Japan is not good for Japan, not good for Japan's friends in Asia, and not good for the region. And if the more optimistic conclusion is a genteel decline, it really means that in relative terms, but also absolutely, Japan's cloud and standing in political terms and security terms is diminished. So I want to put a question to Jeremy, to the others, too, about what that means for Japan's foreign and security policy options and the conduct of its foreign and security policies, especially in the region. When the flip side of the conclusion from the last session is that the increased importance of GNP or GNI means that Japan's stake in the multilateral system is bigger and bigger and bigger. So if you're the new leader of the DP in Japan, Jerry, how would you define a foreign policy strategy that's attractive to the Japanese electorate, however it's shifting over time, that could carry the persuasive case of meeting those circumstances, not only in Japan, but in the international scene that it has to come from? So we've had a question, obviously, on how we manage a Japanese foreign and security policy, given those economic circumstances, one on what happens if no more are there and perhaps a response to this idea that China is playing a game that Japan is not really up to right now in terms of a more China-centric order and whether our base strategy can actually handle that. So, Jerry, I might start with you. I'd like to give Nindra, I know we just have a sudden opportunity to respond as well. Okay, well, I'll read your questions and talk about your answer. First, about basically China playing a long game to dominate the region in various ways. Well, I think that's true, but I don't want to be as pessimistic as you are. After all, the Chinese have played a long game, their economy has to be competitive, and that's very difficult to imagine if they have a bad relationship with both the United States and with Japan, two majors of investors and trading partners. And what the Chinese are trying to do the last couple of years... That's funny, are you looking for something there, Nindra? I'm just sitting there like that. Thank you, Nindra. So, where was I? Well, I actually do remember where I was. So, I think the Chinese tried to play a game of driving a wedge between the U.S. and Japan, and isolate Japan. And they were helped by this history issue and by Abe's visit to Yasukuni. But once Obama went to Tokyo on his way to China, actually, and said in Tokyo what has been American policy all along, but said it in Tokyo that the Senkaku Islands comes under Article 5 of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. In fact, don't mess with the Japanese on this issue because you'll have to mess with us. I think that did a lot to convince the Chinese that this wedge strategy wasn't going to work. So, I think if we coordinate, and more broadly than just U.S.-Japan, but U.S.-Japan, Korea, Australia, and other countries, in trying to impress on the Chinese, if they want to be successful economically, they have to get along with us. And if they keep on playing the game they're playing now, it will not serve their interests. We're obviously not making a lot of progress in getting that message across, but that is the message to continue to give. And to hope that if we can play for time, over time, China will evolve. That all these Chinese who are studying here and in Japan and the United States, where they're going back and when they're in their 30s and 40s and have influence in the country, that you can hope that what we saw happen in Taiwan, what we saw happen in Korea, what we've seen happening in this part of the world in terms of the evolution of political systems, it's not gonna, I don't wanna be optimistic, but I wanna be hopeful. So, I think that's where that is. Now, what happens if Abe would to go tomorrow? One reason why he's likely to get a third term as Prime Minister is Japanese don't wanna think about what would happen if he goes, because he's a known quantity. People are pretty comfortable, I think, now with Abe, unlike three years ago, when there's a lot of nervousness about him. I think a lot of that is gone. But as I said this morning, if he were to go, the next person might not be as effective, at least not initially, but I don't see any fundamental change in what this foreign policy strategy would be. I think this, what you see is what you're going to get for some time to come. And if by chance, the Democratic Party came to power, which is really, as I said, the only thing more inconceivable than coming to power, I hope is Trump coming to power, but even if that would happen and someone like Prime Minister Noda were back in an important position, it would be very much the same because this is being driven by national interests. Japan's national interests is not to let the Chinese dominate the region if they can help it. They can't do as much about it on their own, but they're surely trying hard to do it together with the US and with other countries in the region. But there will be some differences to be certain. Well, I don't want to say I can talk about individuals, but there's no point at this point doing that now. But it's the same point about the point that Peter raised about, you know, so what would you do if I were the head of the opposition party given Japan's economic stake in the multilateral order and so on? I would do what Abe is doing. And I think that's what the Democratic Party would do. I don't see, I don't see on the foreign, I think on the foreign policy side, there's much more of a bipartisan consensus that people are willing to admit. And I thought what was really so disappointing about the diet debate over the national security legislation was that the Democratic Party didn't want to debate the foreign policy issues, they wanted to debate Article IX rather than what national security, what national interests would require because I think they pretty much agree with Abe about that. So I don't see big changes even if you had a change of leadership in the country. And then, do you want to comment on any of those? Yeah, just about Peter's comment on the relationship between economic and strategic orientation of Japan. You are absolutely right there. But I don't, I mean Japan has got, in my view, a strength in the region, which still many other countries don't have. And Japan is still, is the region's second largest economy, world's third largest economy. And it's technological superiority and it's still, I mean we heard that Japan's not innovating but there is a lot of innovation happening in Japan. And countries around the region, they are very much after Japan's, not just capital, but technology transport for example and they see Japan as a source of that. So I do not see Japan like declining in a way that is cloud will decline to the extent that regional players will look away from Japan. So it's still, they will remain engaged with Japan for obvious reasons that Japan has got a strength. And those strengths are economic, technological. As well as in a sense, sort by a strength as well because the region really want to engage with Japan partly because of China's role in the region. So for those reasons, I think I do not see how Japan is going to deteriorate to an extent that it will have, it will lose its cloud. I think its cloud will, if at all it might grow a little bit more as China tries to assert more and more rather than Japan's cloud declining in the region. That's my take on that issue. About post-Abe, as Jerry said, when Abe resigned in 2007, no one thought everyone kind of said, oh Abe thought that he has gone into the same. And he came back, as he said in one of his speeches in the U.S. that Japan is back and I'm back, so he's back. And so for the last three, three and a half years he has made an impact. And certainly for some reason Abe is out of, he goes, I think there are options for any party. So we know, I don't want to talk too much about individuals, but recently Mr. Ishiba, he resigned from his, or he didn't accept the official or any party in the ministerial position simply because he wants to prepare himself because of course I'm a possible prime minister. And there are many others we hear about, in other now as young upcoming women, female politicians, then of course Kishira is a possibility again. So I don't think there will be a huge political turmoil in Japan for some reason. Abe goes on a suddenly normal expectant. Yamalishita. Yes, from strictly Japanese security or defense policy point of view, I have two concerns. One is China's rights and second is U.S. commitment. China's rights is a fact and we have to admit. And China's rights, how nice or how aggressive China will become in the future is a concern. And how strong the U.S. commitment to the Asia Pacific, maybe Australian friends agree with me. This stronger commitment is better for Japan. So better, the stronger commitment of U.S. and nicer rise of China. That combination is an ultimate goal. If it takes 100 years, we need to start today. And for doing so, I want to point out three considerations. One, China is not Soviet Union at all. During the Cold War, one day, Soviet is gone. Nobody was so much worried. Nobody could have any problem at all. But now, if when China sneezes, some countries get cold. So we are not living in such simple world. And secondly, this is the first time for the Chinese to face real international relations with a similar height of major powers. China used to be central, center of the empire for thousands of years and after that, what they call 100 years of humiliation. Now it is the first time for the Chinese to face the similar height of major powers in the world. In other words, this is the first time for them ever to face other countries with borders. So that is second thing, something U.S.-Japan alliance. I'm a religious believer of U.S.-Japan alliance. But in the future, the strong alliance, strong alliance does not mean everything we agree. We may have differences in opinion or in policies international security or international politics. That is not necessarily bad. There may be things Japan want to do but politically cannot do which can be done by the U.S., politically can be done by the United States. There may be things the U.S. may not be able to do politically, perhaps a congressional register sort of thing. And Japan can do. In such a case, Japan can do. It's sort of complement relations. The Russian policy. Our policies vis-à-vis Russia are different but differences are not necessarily bad always. So just one thing, you know, if we can make the difference to let things go better. Japan's better relationship with Russia in comparison with U.S.-Japan relationship may help Russians to look at Asia-Pacific region through Japanese lens, not only the Chinese lens. As such, we can help each other from a different point of view. Thank you. Thank you very much. I mean, there is obviously one immediate response to your sort of the two dilemmas question for Japan is are they mutually incompatible? Would China's rise be nicer at the same time as the U.S. commitment to Japan be absolutely guaranteed or would the Chinese always see that U.S. commitment to Japan as fundamentally a problem? Before I ask you to respond to that question, let me see if there are more questions from the floor. Carrie? I'm Carrie, I'm a PhD student in the Department of International Relations here at ANU. I just want to thank all three of you for your wonderful, thoughtful comments. They're really useful today. My question to Professor Curtis, following on from something you mentioned in this morning's session when you were talking again about Okinawa and how you would suggest that the U.S. intervention has taken a new approach to what's happening there. I studied Okinawa and U.S. basic relations there and I mean, the way the media presents it is probably a bit less, it's a bit more complex than how the media presents it there. For example, even though they've covered the protests most often, like even when the U.S. has a lot of elements that don't want, for example, a large reduction in the U.S. military presence in Okinawa immediately or perhaps even in the long run for economic reasons, but on the flip side then you have the strategic concerns such as if you do greatly reduce the number of Marines or reduce the U.S. presence in Okinawa, it might be seen as an invitation to China, for example, to become more aggressive in around the south China Sea. So I was just wondering if you could comment a bit further on that and what your suggestion for a new approach might be considering all of these constraints, all of these concerns. I might just see if there's any other final questions that we want to take at this stage. Yeah, Ben? Ben Ashliono, I was a PhD student here at the ANU and we've been talking a lot about, like, in that session just now about domestic constraints on foreign policymaking and so in that regard I would like to ask anyone who could elaborate more on how they see the role of the LDP's junior coalition parliament. The comment or, as how critical a factor was that in shaping the final outcome of the new security laws. Thank you. And Ben, if I could ask you to pass the microphone towards your right, thanks. I had a question, sorry, I need a print of a line from the defence. I had a question particularly for Professor Curtis. Following on from what you were saying about the potential for Japanese engagement with South East Asian nations, what do you think is the potential for Japan to engage with Taiwan, particularly given that Taiwan is also a claimant to the Senkaku Islands but they have a new president who's potentially more sympathetic to them? Thank you. Great, those are particularly the last question I'm particularly interested in so I'll talk about first. So let me be brief. So on Okinawa, no, I don't think anybody, I don't think the, I wasn't advocating that we withdraw from Okinawa but we have too much, we occupy too much land, we have too many troops and the marines that are at the air base at Fatema should be relocated to Guam, come to Darwin, there's lots of, get beyond boats, there's lots of ways to get them out of Okinawa without building a new base in Henoko in my view. But also, you know, when, in the years immediately following the reversion of Okinawa to Japanese sovereignty, American, the contribution of American military personnel in Okinawa to the Okinawan economy was roughly around 15, 16% of Okinawan prefectural income. Now it's down to about 6%, tourism is way up and tourism would be up much further if there was, if there were less troops there. And as I said this morning, I think the strategic, the changing technology of warfare, the fact that in a sense Kudena is a sitting duck for Chinese ballistic missiles, hardening these bases and having so much firepower concentrated in this land area seems to me to be very problematic. So I think we can have a rational policy of reducing the American presence in Okinawa that would not stimulate the idea, that would not make the Chinese think that it's less of a commitment to the region. It actually strengthens our, it can strengthen our commitment to the region. Also it seems to me, but I'm particularly concerned about the political fallout from all the incidents that happen in Okinawa and the sense, you know, this is a domestic Japanese problem in some ways more than it is a US-Japan issue because the real concern about Okinawa is that they're so discriminated against by the rest of the country. Japanese want American bases in Japan, but nowhere, but they don't want them in their own prefecture, you know, it's not in my backyard kind of thinking, so Okinawa then ends up being the place where it all happens. About the Komito, I think its role was very important in defining what the reinterpretation of collective defense was to be, and it was much less, it was much more constraining than what Prime Minister Abe had set out to get, and the chairman of the Komito said just the other day, they will not be revision of Article 9 as long as the Komito is in the ruling coalition, and he means it, and it won't happen. So unless Abe replaces the Komito with some other party that's more amenable to constitutional revision, its role is very big. Now on Taiwan. I think the, you know, Taiwan is trying to diversify its trade relations, so it's not so dependent on China as it is now, and Japan is a very important country as far as the Taiwanese economy is concerned, both in terms of trade and investment. We've seen, we've seen, you know, Taiwan investment increasing in Japan, buying sharp, the Chinese, the Taiwan Company buying sharp and so on, but there's a real danger in the Japan-Taiwan relationship, which is that even though the DPP is sort of to the left in Taiwan politics, its best friends in Japan are on the right, and when Tsai-Enwen came to Japan, just before she became elected as president, had met with Japanese here, it was the LDP right that fed it her, and that want to see Japan develop some kind of security relationship with Taiwan. This would be very dangerous in my view. You do not want to provoke the Chinese by making it look as though Japan is trying to develop a security relationship with Taiwan. So I think this is an issue that the Japanese need to be extremely cautious about, and that the Taiwanese need to understand does not serve their interests, it does not serve their interests to have relations between China and Japan become more tense because of Taiwan. That would be disastrous, so I'm concerned about the Taiwan relationship. Just one point about Komeito, I especially wanted to comment on that because I had about an hour, one-on-one conversation with Mr. Yaomichi recently. Initially his secretary said ten minutes, but the conversation went for more than an hour. His secretary was knocking on the door that is another point. But the point I want to make here is this. I agree what Professor Curtis has said about Komeito's take on the amendment of the constitution. But they have been a partner in incremental changes in what Japan's SDF and Japan's SDF role. They are happy to do that, but they are not willing at this stage to change the constitution to the point what the LDP Committee has recommended. 2013 LDP Committee on Constitutional Change. But the point I want to say, which you said that perhaps if Abe finds another partner, it is very difficult for the LDP to find another partner and be a winning party because, you know, still Sokabe Kai has got, it mobilizes its members to deliver votes. And the LDP is very, very aware of this fact under the revised electoral system, which is first passed before system, where the role of Komeito becomes very, very important in delivering votes to the LDP. So my take is that the LDP is not going to commit suicide, brutal suicide by safe ring crystallization of Komeito, and that's going to continue. And that puts a constraint on the LDP, whether Mr. Abe or anyone else, to change the constitution despite the fact that Japan has got a two-thirds majority in both houses. Thank you. I'd like to touch upon two points. First, Japan's dilemma between China and the U.S. Another one is Okinawa. And as to the dilemma between China and the U.S. for Japanese, my position has been the same. In the late 1990s, there used to be argument between a dragon three years and panda haggars. And at that time I used to say, I want to clinch the dragon. In order to clinch the dragon, I need to have strong arms, and if a big guy pushes my back towards the dragon, it is easier to clinch or hug the dragon. That is the only solution for the better for all. And in this sense, I'd like to agree with Professor Curtis on the Taiwan issue. We never want insecurity of China. So in that sense, the Japanese policy vis-à-vis China, the Taiwanese policy vis-à-vis the Taiwanese-Japanese security cooperation should be very, very careful. We don't like insecure China at all. And secondly, Okinawa, the two points. Okinawa is located at a very strategically important point. Many of you may have heard about the anti-access area denial capability of China in which China may diffuse US-mainly naval access towards the Asian continent by using mainly strategically defensive weapons. China may have enough capability, denial capability, even Japan has denial capability too. And if we have denial capability on Okinawa, it may help US forces reinforce us. It's easier for the US forces to come to Okinawa and other places, close to Okinawa, and if US forces come to those places, area denial capability will become much stronger. So Okinawa is very located at a very important point. And secondly, Okinawa has 1.4 million population among within which in comparison with only 20,000 US military personnel in Okinawa, the visibility is too far high than the reality. And this is simply because in Okinawa, there was a land combat ground battle, so everything was flat. And after the battle of Okinawa, US was preparing for the landing invasion of main islands of Japan. So US Air Force, Army Air Force Navy and Army occupied the flat and easy access to road and ports. That means easy for the population to gather. After that, for instance, is located in a sort of choke point, most choke point of the populated areas. So it is far more visible than necessary. If you go to Okinawa, you land on Nahaya boat and right to Nahaya boat there is a port facility, US port facility. Right next to the very, very busy road and green, very beautiful facility. And after going through the traffic jam in Nahaya city, you will see either right or left side the fence of US bases. It's not necessary. So if we put half the amount to other places that exist in place, visibility will become much, much lower close to the reality of 20,000 to the military personnel as opposed to 1.4 million Okinawans. Well ladies and gentlemen, I'm afraid we are now out of time. We've had an extremely rich final panel that I think has touched on some important domestic issues, the wider regional context and then some of these sort of continually thorny issues in the US-Japan relationship such as Okinawa. Would you please join me in thanking our panel.