 Good morning. We're continuing our consideration of age 133 and I'd like to welcome Judge Brian Grison. Good morning, Your Honor. Thank you for being here. Good morning, everyone. Thank you, Madam Chair, for inviting me to testify. This is on H-133, a proposed amendment, which I guess actually got started by me. So I will say that, well, I guess one thing going forward is I'm listening to certainly some of the questions today and certainly having in mind the testimony that's been presented on this issue, understanding the issues, some of the issues certainly relating to any time we're dealing with firearms or the term has been used, deprivation of firearms. With respect to this particular bill, I think it's important the committee keep in mind that this is at best a temporary deprivation and it all depends on the final hearing, which as Eric has indicated, is scheduled within a relatively short period of time after the, if the order issues, but it's not intended to be a permanent deprivation and consistent with Eric's testimony. I think that's where the due process comes in with the fact that there is a post deprivation hearing held within a reasonable time period. Having said that, the amendment that is before the committee, to a great extent does mirror the testimony and the concerns that I expressed in my earlier testimony, I do think the movement or the relocation, if you will, of this section from a standalone section to another option under the first section adding it as a section E, is an appropriate placement for this relief because as I indicated my earlier testimony, it is not mandatory that this relief be granted and it is an option available to the court, much like the other items A through D. So I think certainly the placement there is appropriate. I guess to again emphasize to the committee members that this really is a codification of the practice that has the judges follow throughout the period of time that testimony has been taken here, I continue to reach out to the judges and I've yet to have a judge come forward and that I had not heard from every single judge that hears these cases, but I've yet to have a judge come forward who does not believe we have the inherent authority to do this. So this truly is a clarification, codification of the current practice of the judges. So when I look at the amendment, I will tell you that, and I've expressed this earlier to other witnesses, I agree with representative Lefler's comments with respect to that language, that language beginning online 13 that begins or that another person possesses their controls on behalf of the defendant. I'm not convinced that that is necessary because my reading of control is broad in that I think the use of that term in the first clause covers the situation that is in question now. And again, remember, this came from the original bill as introduced. This is not language that I added as part of this amendment. It is a carryover, I believe from the original bill, but I do not find that is necessary. And I've heard from a number of judges who find it problematic for a number of reasons. One, is it necessary in light of the earlier language? And two, an issue relating to enforcement could be problematic. So I would have no objection if that language is removed. I don't think it takes anything away from the proposed amendment. And finally, the last clause, a number of judges have indicated that for clarification it would read and to refrain from acquiring or possessing any firearms while the order is in effect. So some of them have proposed the addition of language acquiring or possessing any firearms while the order is in effect. So the amendment may be brief, maybe short, but I understand that it comes with a lot of concerns and questions and I'm prepared to try to answer any of those questions. Great, thank you. Thank you very much, helpful. Looking for hands, okay. Will. Thank you. Judge Gershwin, thank you for being here. I have one question. So a lot of times we're looking at this and there's concern that the accusation behind the emergency RFA is unfounded or whatnot. Just for, I think it would be helpful to have an understanding of the percentage of requests for emergency RFA's that are not approved. I'm curious to know how many requests don't go through just to show that there is some deliberation process, there is some requirements that need to be met. So I think there's a significant deliberation process. These are not filed and routinely granted and by way of illustration, I'm gonna give you some rough numbers so I can give you more specific ones. But of all the requests for restraining orders that are initially filed, ultimately only about a third of them get granted. So by way of example, I'll take 2019 because the 2020 figures, I'm not sure because of the COVID circumstances and the transition from one case management system to another, I don't know if they're complete. But 2019, 627 order, temporary orders were granted. I'm sorry, we're denied, 2,683 were granted. So that's out of a total of roughly call it 3,200 requests filed over 600 were denied at the temporary order stage. Of those 2,683 orders that were granted temporary orders, what we're talking about is that what we're talking about with respect to this bill, in other words, a temporary relief subject to a final hearing, only 1,200 were ultimately granted. And those numbers remain fairly consistent over the preceding five years, 2017 for example, 759 temporary orders denied, 2,300, 2,400 granted. But ultimately only 1,145 final orders were granted out of a total of almost 3,000, a little more than 3,000 originally filed. The numbers understand that there are, someone can be denied a temporary order but still request a final hearing. And so they tend to, they can be mixed but those numbers remain fairly consistent over the last four or five years. So a significant number of them get denied right at the outset and even more don't make it through to a final hearing. And there could be any number of reasons why that's the case. It could be that the plaintiff doesn't pursue a denial, it could be the plaintiff pursues it, but it's not granted. It could be the plaintiff received a temporary order but elected not to go forward for a final order. So those are the numbers, but the numbers don't tell all of the story as to why relief from abuse orders were either granted or denied. Hopefully that helps. Yes it does, thanks. Other questions? Felicia. Yes, thank you. Just a quick question for you, Judge. Is there a current process that's put in writing anywhere in the judiciary or in statute otherwise that has an exemption to my understanding of the law that individuals are charged for the cost of storage before they returned their firearms? That was an issue that when I was reviewing in preparation for committee today, I stumbled across any exemption to. And given that the language has of the expiration of the order, the firearms would be returned. I was just hoping that you could point me towards an exemption to that situation where they would be charged for the storage of firearms that were relinquished. You know, the only way I can really answer that to Representative Leffler is it depends on where the guns are stored. I don't know for instance, I don't know but I do not believe that if they're stored by law enforcement, whether it's a local law enforcement or whether they're turned over to the state police storage facility, I don't know if there's a charge. Presumably, if they were using a federal firearms dealer, there would be a charge associated with that. But that's not something we would order. In other words, that would be up to the individual if they want their firearms stored by a federal firearms dealer. On the other hand, if they come up with the third option which is seeking court approval of a third party to hold them, it's unlikely that a third party or friend, if you will, a relative of a defendant would charge them. So I really don't have any specific information on it but I think where you'd run into that primarily is with a federal firearms dealer which I think there's only two or three in the state that participate in that program. But other witnesses may have more information on that. Okay, I appreciate it. I'll save that question to come around to other relevant witnesses. I just wanna make sure that we are not putting forward a law that would create a financial separation stemming from an emergency revocation of rights. So thank you. You're welcome. Kate. Thanks. So I had a question. There's been a lot of discussion related to this bill about burden of proof. And I'm just curious, I guess I have a couple of questions. So when an emergency relief from abuse order is granted and then there's a final release order that is sought, is it ever the case that judges will sort of change the conditions? Like do the conditions of that relief from abuse get reexamined in the final order? Okay. So for example, if somebody had their firearms relinquished in the emergency order in the final order, that might not be part of the conditions. Right, that's possible. The conditions, keep in mind that the temporary order, what we're talking about in this bill is based on an affidavit in complaint. When you have the final hearing, assuming the final hearing goes forward, you're basing it on the testimony that's presented at the time of the hearing and that testimony may be different if you will or greater or lesser than what was in the affidavit. So it may call for change in certain conditions. The parties may come in with an agreement with certain conditions. So they can definitely change or not locked into whatever has been done in the temporary order. Okay, thank you. And then just a follow-up question to that just again because I think there's been sort of testimony to this. I recognize we're not talking about extreme risk protection orders here, but there's been some points made about a distinction between the final relief from abuse order and sort of evidentiary standards as compared with extreme risk protection order renewals and that there's this sort of difference in preponderance in the final relief from abuse order, it's preponderance of evidence in the extreme risk protection order renewal. It's clear and convincing. And some questions about those different standards. I don't know if you have any thoughts on that as it pertains to firearms. The short answer is no, the longer answer is that's really a policy decision on the part of the legislature. And I think you have to keep in mind that these really are two different proceedings. They are intended for two different, substantially different types of relief. So, although there are parts of the so-called urban orders that mirror the procedures of relief from abuse, it was done, I think, in part to tie it into the same timeframe that we address relief from abuse orders because of the issues relating to due process that Eric, for instance, talked about, the timeliness. So there were some parts of the ERPO order as I recall testimony that wanted to mirror that procedure because of its timeliness. But the basis for a request for relief from abuse is different than a request for an ERPO order. It may be that as part of a request for relief from abuse, some of the relief sought involves firearms, but separate and apart from that, if you will, common issue, they're two different proceedings. So whether the legislature chooses to change the burden of proof in one procedure or another is entirely a policy decision on their part. And I don't know, Chair Grady, maybe you can let me know if I'm getting off track with this question, but I guess I'm just curious, again, because it's come up so much. If you could, Judge Grierson, talk me through the difference between those two things a little bit more, like from the perspective of, I guess the way my mind thinks about it sometimes, it's sort of like from one step to the next, I think I'm still a little bit unclear on how they're different as you move through the system. So. I was gonna say, no, I think that's fine. I think that would be very helpful. And your Honor, you did just say substantially different types of relief. And what I'm hearing is that this is about firearms and extremist protection orders are about firearms, but in relief from abuse, there's a number of different types of relief. And maybe if you could talk about that. Sure, I mean, keep in mind that the relief from abuse order is the essence of it is, has the plaintiff been abused? Has that's defined in the statute? And as a result of that abuse, there are different forms of relief that either may be sought by the plaintiff or may be appropriate for the specific circumstances that bring that person before the court of which possession or access to firearms may or may not be an issue in a particular case, as opposed to an oracle order, which is by its, the essence of an oracle order is that the person does possess firearms and has presented themselves as a danger either to themselves or others, but it doesn't necessarily call for abuse having occurred, abuse in the sense of how it's defined in a relief from abuse order. I can recall when the legislature was taking up the issue of oracle orders. In my mind, and I think the way I testified was that an oracle order doesn't have to include the elements of abuse that are found in a relief from abuse order, but oftentimes the presence of firearms can be the issue in a relief from abuse order, but they are clearly two different procedures designed for two different forms of relief and actions. But to go to your question, I guess what's important in a representative, Gosland was asking about the so-called vendetta and if someone is not telling the truth at the beginning, I think it's important for the committee to understand that not only in relief from abuse proceedings, but in any number of different proceedings, criminal, civil, family law, the court is asked to make a decision based solely on an affidavit that is presented to them, at least a preliminary decision. So putting aside the burdens of proof, it's not uncommon for the court to receive a request or complaint based solely on an affidavit and the court has to make a judgment whether that affidavit provides a sufficient basis for granting emergency type relief and think about getting an injunction in a civil proceeding. They are often started with a request for relief based on an affidavit. The court has to make a determination the same way we do with these requests for relief from abuse or an upper order, but the standard of proof varies on the type of proceeding. So if you start with, let's start, I guess at the beginning, when a police officer stops an individual for a supposed violation, that's not probable, it's not probable cause for charge and maybe a basis for the stop, but it's not probably necessarily probable cause to charge someone with a crime. A different standard of proof is necessary, sometimes each step along the way. The way I describe the varying burdens of proof to a jury, and it probably seems silly, but think of the Lady Liberty with the two scales in your hands. I'm gonna hand it up here somewhere. And the way I describe it is if you are talking about a probable cause to charge someone that is below, that's not even 50%. That's a likelihood that a crime was committed and the person committed. That's very first level. The next level is a preponderance of evidence. And I think I've testified before that whatever tips the scale and the least amount for more than 50%, doesn't have to be 51, it doesn't have to be 55, it's whatever tips the scale. So the scales tip just that much. When you talk about clear and convincing evidence, there's more of a certainty, more of a probability. And so the scales tip that much more in favor of the relief being requested. That's the burden, the burden is heavier. So the scales tip lower. The highest standard is beyond a reasonable doubt, which is the standard in a criminal case. And that is a significant burden. And so that's the way that I describe it to a jury's because when we're drawing juries, it may be civil cases or it may be criminal cases. And so we explain all three burdens, but the preponderance is not in and of itself a, it may be a less burden than clear and convincing or reasonable doubt, but it's still a burden of proof that the plaintiff has to meet. In the first instance, yes, by an affidavit, but I've certainly been in court in these proceedings and listened to the evidence from the plaintiff. And if the plaintiff hasn't met their burden of proof initially, I don't even ask the defendant what their side of the story is. That's the significance of the burden of proof. It's not just someone saying this is what happened. It's an issue of believability, credibility. And there are times when the plaintiff states their case in court and the court, and as I said, I have done it on any number of occasions found that they did not meet that burden of proof. And so the case is dismissed without the defendant ever having to defend themselves or their actions or their behavior. So there's nothing, it may be a different burden, maybe a lesser burden than the others. It is still a significant burden in order for someone to prevail. Thank you, Judge. Martin. Yeah, thank you, Judge. That actually was going to be my questions. You've largely covered it as far as explaining that there really actually still is a burden. I think I've heard a lot about just a feather that somehow a feather is going to lead to somebody losing their firearms even temporarily. And that's not the case. There is the bar that has to be moved to over 50%. And that's something the plaintiff has to do. So I guess I'm just reiterating what you've just told us that it's really not just a feather of a burden. I've probably used that expression myself, but the reality is that it is a burden of proof. And it's whatever tips the scale to the slightest degree in favor of the person who has the burden. If they don't, that same feather that tips it their way could be the same feather that tips it the other way in favor of the defendant. So it's the burden, it is not insignificant at all. Thanks. Whether the feather is an appropriate reference or not, and I will confess that I have used it, what's important to understand is there is a burden and has to be met. And sometimes it's a difficult issue and it comes down to the credibility and believability of the individual before you. And sometimes it's not even the credibility I have, again, and been in situations where I've listened to a plaintiff present their case. And quite frankly, I agree with, I don't have any problem with what they have said, but it does not meet the burden of proof for the standards in that particular proceeding. And therefore, it's not a question of their credibility. They just, the facts that they have just do not support the relief. And that to me is the significance of the burden. It is not something that is taken lightly by me or any any judge. Yeah. Thank you. Ken, I know you had some questions before that you were saving. Make sure your question is answered. Yeah, thank you. I was just starting to go, although most have been answered, but good morning, Judge. Good morning. So what you just said, because as you know, I'm new to this. Not as new as you were. All the basically the whole judicial system in the state of Vermont follows the same protocol as what you just said with with these RFAs and all that, right? Yes. I mean, there's one procedure. And that procedure, depending on the facts of a given case, can be interpreted by a judge differently than other judge. They're all very facts specific. That's the difficulty with relief from abuse or on most proceedings. But it is hard to compare one to the other. And that's why I was saying, even with the numbers I gave representative on the number of cases filed versus granted versus denied, there's any number of reasons why they could be granted or denied. Yeah, I'm looking at those stats now. But I guess just one of my biggest concerns in the world that we live in now is just the vendetta factor. That's just something that always bothers us, and we've seen it close by. And that's something that always concerns me in the back of my mind when I'm making a lot of these decisions is am I hurting the innocent person more? You know what I'm saying? I think I certainly understand your concern. But I think the system, in my experience, not only in relief from abuse proceedings, but in domestic and civil proceedings has a way of weeding that out. In other words, what someone puts in an affidavit, I would agree with you, can be persuasive. But the affidavit will only take the individual so far before that person has to testify. And that testimony is where the court really weighs in and exercises its discretion and the believability and credibility. That there's sometimes clearly when you see something on paper and the person comes in and testifies, it's apparent what their motives may be. And I think the process deals with those issues. There's nothing new about a vendetta, believe me. You may be seeing more of it in the media, social media, and so forth. But in terms of what the court has to do in weighing requests for relief, that's certainly nothing that's new to us. I'm good for now. Thank you. You're welcome. And also, Your Honor, is it on the form is there that the plaintiff has to certify or attest or something? I know there's been concerns about false allegations or something like that. And it'd be great for us to get a copy of an order or the form. I know that they're changing. Right, it does call for that. And I'll just remind the committee under section 1104, emergency relief, the last clause under paragraph E. Affidavit forms required pursuant to this section shall bear the following language. This is in bold, caps bold, making false statements. And this affidavit is a crime subject to a term of imprisonment or fine or both as provided by 13BSA-904. So that language is in the affidavit, but it's also there by statute to make sure that it's in there. OK, great. Thank you. Barbara. So, Judge, you just answered one of my questions, which is if either party falsifies information, you have ways to deal with that. So we don't need this law to overcompensate in some way for a way we have to hold people accountable. I have sat in on relief and abuse hearings, which I found incredibly poignant. And I remember you saying a few weeks ago that no two situations are the same. And that was very clear. I am wondering, I mean, the other piece is there are times that false allegations go in both ways. When there's abuse and frequently emotional abuse, there's a lot of manipulation and gas lighting that can go on. And it's hard, I'm sure, to pull out the facts at times from the emotions. But in general, are you aware of situations where somebody was innocently hurt because the judge believed the plaintiff in this situation? Because I almost wonder if it goes the other way sometimes as well, like there's not a lot of credibility and then something happened. So I'd love it if you could share, like if there's been instances or discussion about those kinds of situations. I'm not sure I understand the question. I mean, clearly, I mean, I think you started by saying, and it has been my experience, that no one has a monopoly on the truth. So if it comes down to two people in court testifying, then the court has to make a determination ultimately. Oftentimes, it's not the facts that are disputed. It's what someone says, the repercussions of what happened. And so it's always a balance in listening to both sides and making the best determination you can based on the facts that are presented to you. Does that mean that, I mean, if your question is, has someone been the subject of a relief from abuse order when, I don't know, nothing happened? It's totally made up. I mean, I guess I can't say. I mean, we can only decide the case based on the facts that are presented by both sides. And obviously, what's important is not, I understand the consequences of a temporary order. But the court has been tasked with that by the legislature, by this law, to make that determination on that basis. And the remedy is to get a quick hearing where both sides have an opportunity to present evidence. And I think that's in part why you see the numbers go from, I guess it's ultimately roughly a third of the cases, final order issues. And some may think that's a very small percentage. Others may think it's a large percentage. But I think the numbers bear out that there's nothing more than that. I think that's sort of the question I should have asked is, when they've been denied, why have they been denied? What were the circumstances that they're turned down? Well, it may be, I mean, again, every case is fact specific. But it may be that the person just didn't prove. They may have made allegations in an affidavit that when you hear the testimony, it's just not borne out. I mean, I can think of one case in particular where the affidavit certainly described a situation that sounded like a sexual assault. And the temporary order was granted based on the affidavit. When the parties actually testified, that is not what had happened at all. It wasn't that the plaintiff was fabricating it. The way they described it, there was nothing untrue about what was in the affidavit. But ultimately, the facts did not support the fine of abuse under the statute. And that case was fairly unique. And that's why it stands out for me. But I'm not going to go into the details of what happened. But it's a good example of, on paper, that's exactly what it sounded like. And on the other hand, when you heard the testimony, it was literally one of these cases where what the person was saying was accurate. But when you heard it live and were able to ask some questions, it was apparent that it was not a sexual assault. It was not a forced. It was not anything like that. It was a totally different situation. And I've seen cases where one of the hardest things, and I mentioned in response to one of your earlier questions, talked about past abuse. And sometimes it's the threat of abuse. Those are the difficult cases, I think, for judges, where there has not been a history, if you will, of physical violence. But I've been in proceedings and been in the courtroom where the affidavit may have looked weak, but as the person described what happened, it wouldn't be an exaggeration in the case I'm thinking of, that there was almost a palpable fear you could feel in the courtroom as to what this person was going through. As it turns out, there were some very serious consequences down the road in that case. Again, that's why that case stands out for me. It's the best example I can give you of not having a history of physical harm, but intimidation and fear of what could happen if an order is not in place. And so more than a threat. But I'm saying those are the difficult cases. That's what we do. Better you than me. Thank you. Great. Thank you. Anybody else? OK, great. Well, thank you, Judge. Appreciate your testimony. Thank you very much. And I'll hang on in case of something. OK. Great. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you, committee. OK, Eric Davis. Good morning. Good morning. Eric Davis, Joe Nones, and Vermont. Thanks for having us back. A little embarrassed. We don't have a whole lot to present to you guys today. We've been on the agenda since Friday. And unfortunately, we didn't receive an updated copy of the bill in the amendment until yesterday afternoon. And I admittedly didn't even get a chance to look at it until last night when I got home from work and put the kid to bed and sufficiently apologized to my wife for staying up too late and spending too much time on politics and whatnot. So if it's OK with the committee and the chair, we'd like to postpone our testimony and give some of the other witnesses a chance to go ahead. And we'd like to come in here and give you guys some real good detailed and insightful testimony. And we just need a little bit more time than 12 hours to put that together. So if that's OK, I would like to defer to Chris or some of the other witnesses if they wanted to go ahead first. Sure. Thank you. OK, so why don't we hear from Chris? Good morning. How are we doing today? OK, thank you. How are you? Let me get my testimony up here. Can everybody hear me OK? Yes. I will assume so. Chair Grad, Vice Chair Burtitt, ranking member Christie, distinguished committee members, and respected others who may be watching, thank you for allowing me to speak again on H-133. For the record, my name is Chris Bradley, and I'm both the president and executive director of the Vermont Federation of Sportsman's Clubs. In the interest of full disclosure, I am a registered lobbyist with the State of Vermont on firearms issues. And I am proud to say that the Vermont Federation of Sportsman's Clubs is also the lead plaintiff in the magazine case currently before the Supreme Court of Vermont. I begin, basically, by acknowledging that the Federation is aware of 20VSA 2307. That would be where we left off at my last testimony, the storage of unlawful firearms. That statute states, quote, a person who is required to relinquish firearms, ammunition, or other weapons in the person's possession by a court order issued under 15VSA Chapter 21. That's abuse prevention. Or any other provision of law consistent with 18USC 922G8 shall, unless the court orders alternative relinquishment pursuant to subdivision two of the subsection upon service to the order immediately relinquish firearms. And it goes on from their ammunition or weapons to a cooperating law enforcement agency. According to our research on the genesis of Title 15, Chapter 21, abuse prevention. We believe we understand that when these statutes were created, the possibility of infringing on the rights of firearms owners was not envisioned. In proof of that, I ask you to search the entirety of Title 15, Chapter 21, abuse prevention. That would be statutes 1101 through 1173, looking for the word firearm, ammunition, weapon, relinquish, relinquishment, confiscate, or confiscation. You won't find any references. It is apparent that when the legislature crafted 15VSA Chapter 21, which is abuse prevention, and in crafting all of the subsequent amendments, of which there were many, with the exception of this latest one, there has never been any amendment that extended the RFA statute to provide the authority to suspend the right to keep or bear firearms or the relinquishment of firearms, or else it would have been provided specific language to specify that power. Title 15, Chapter 21, was written to provide for a way to legally enforce separation between two people who are in a relationship or abuse is secured, and that abuse is likely to continue. It was written to empower our courts and the judges that provide over them to take whatever actions were necessary within the context of separating the two parties, to include removing the defendant from the shared residence, requiring the distance be kept between the two parties, requiring that no contact, requiring no threatening actions or behavior, as well as addressing the status of any dependent children. That was it. That was the intended purpose of Title 15, Chapter 21. No relinquishment of constitutionally protected property was ever envisioned when these statutes were first written in the 70s. At some point in the past, we believe an incorrect interpretation arose in 13 VSA 1103C1, which states, the court shall make such orders as it deems necessary to protect the plaintiff or the children or both if the court finds the defendant has abused the plaintiff, such that something that the legislature never addressed was incorrectly extended to include the relinquishment of firearms. Subsequent to that interpretation being made, 20 VSA 2307, that would be the disposition and fee for storage of unlawful firearms, was passed in 2013, which is where I began this testimony. Since chapter, since 15 VSA, Chapter 21 never references the words firearms, ammunition, weapons, relinquish, relinquishment, confiscate or confiscation. It appears that the only current operative phrase in 20 VSA 2307 that applies is, and I quote, or any other provision of law consistent with 18 USC 922G8. So what is consistent with 18 USC 922G8? According to that statute, a defendant cannot possess firearms, which generally means that they cannot have them in their immediate custody and or control. If you are physically distanced from a firearm you own, you are not in possession of it, and that's the law. Federal law does not recognize ex parte processing for the removal of property that was related to a constitutional right. For federal law, the only way the defendant can be forced to relinquish firearms is through a hearing where the defendant has the opportunity to be present and defend themselves. That's federal law and it recognizes due process. It is our understanding that in almost all RFA cases at the point in time when the RFA is served on the defendant, we understand that the defendant is then typically immediately removed from the residence bodily if necessary. By removing defendant from their residence, we have effectively removed the defendant's ability to possess any firearms or weapons because the defendant will be forced to leave them behind when the police escort him out. If the defendant is later found in possession of a firearm while the RFA is or was in effect, they will have broken the conditions of the RFA and that has some very serious consequences. It is really unfortunate that we do not know today how many times the intent of 15 VSA 1104 has been abused and we only know anecdotally that it is somewhat rare. It has been suggested however, in testimony that however rare that may be, the number of these are not likely to decrease. In fact, it was conjectured that they may well increase. How could they not increase as the initial misinterpretation is now codified into law? However, we again come back to the basic fact that what can currently occur under section 15 VSA 1104, which is the emergency relief from abuse orders and apparently has been occurring as well as what will occur under the proposed amendments under consideration. Vermont is or would be perpetuating the use of the lowest standard of evidence that is possible, a standard that is influenced by just the weight of a feather without the required level of due process that our constitution absolutely requires. We cannot and will not accept the fact that an existing law has been interpreted as meaning something that the legislature never intended and or specifically addressed, nor can we accept the fact that a proposed amendment steps all over a basic constitutional right of due process. We do not believe you can accept these facts either and it's up to this committee, the House and the Senate beyond you to correct this. In searching for a solution that might have been acceptable to all, we thought we saw what appeared to be a very simple and straightforward answer. That answer was to leave 15 VSA 1104 pretty much alone but allow the judge to interpret 15 VSA 1103 C1 as meaning that they have the latitude to immediately refer the defendant if the abuse is likely to continue for further processing under 13 VSA 4053 which is an emergency protection order that requires the defendant to be present. This seemed to be a perfect solution. We have a domestic abuse civil case with a judge possibly granting a temporary RFA order with whatever stipulations that bear on separating the parties. If the judge sufficiently moved by the evidence presented that abuse is likely to continue despite that separation order, the judge can immediately refer the case for possible prosecution under the extreme risk protection order statute. Two cases, one to protect the victim, the other to address a threat. Given that there are situations however rare where this does seem to be a need to consider a linkishment of both weapons and firearms, we thought the defendant could be immediately plugged into an existing statute that was specifically designed to handle the separation of a person from weapons and firearms who may be at risk of harming others. We even noted that 13 VSA 4053 C3C petition for extreme risk protection order specifically references 15 VSA chapter 21 which are the abuse prevention orders. Why would that be? Could it be that the authors of the ERPO statutes foresaw that an ERPO case may well be accepting cases that originated from DV cases? In briefly discussing this possible solution with Judge Greerson, he expressed concerns about how it would work and what purpose it would serve but beyond that I will not attempt to convey his views. The bottom line is this, in order to affect the relinquishment of firearms in a manner that comports to federal law and the US and Vermont Constitution's requirement for due process, something that is at the very core of our legal system. The Federation must respectfully insist that in order for relinquishment to occur, the standard of evidence to require relinquishment must be clear and convincing and the language should be added that the defendant must be noticed and that a hearing must be scheduled before the court or the defendant can be present. All of which is already in 13 VSA 4053 which is the ERPO statute with the defendant present. In point of fact, and in order to be in line with similar statutes, we strongly suggest a reconsideration of raising the standard of evidence with the handle of final orders of a domestic violence case which would be 15 VSA 1103. So they are put in sync with a standard employed in a final hearing of an ERPO case which would be 13 VSA 4053. This would be done for consistency and we further request a reconsideration of the standard now in 13 VSA 4054 as that should be clear and convincing as well. And it had that higher standard after it passed the Senate when it was originally crafted after very lengthy debate. Anything less is unconstitutional and we conjecture that anyone who is forced to relinquish their firearms without due process as possible grounds to raise a constitutional challenge on this issue. In reading Benson versus Mascari which was provided to us all by legislative counsel, we know that the court ordered the defendant not possess firearms. And while the court struck out the provision for quote, other weapons as being overly broad, it did say that the final order to Vincent Mascari was to not possess. That was upheld as an acceptable limitation as it aligned with federal law. Relinquishment however was never part of that order. One further point about the resurfaced issue with storage of firearms that are relinquished. While the storage issue was one consideration, the issue of transport to that location is another. For anyone who owns a number of firearms, it is not acceptable to just toss these into the trunk of a cruiser or stack them up on the back seat of the or both and then go bouncing down a typical Vermont road. Safely storage is one issue. Safely transporting them is another. Thank you very much. I think that concludes my testimony. I'm happy to answer questions. All right, thank you. Thank you, Chris, appreciate it. Just looking for hands. Okay, not seeing anybody. All right, thank you. Thank you very much. Appreciate it. Sure, yeah, thank you. Okay, a little more. Good morning. Let me pull up my document so that I have it in front of me. Chris went so quickly and so efficiently. I had to clear my throat and drink a little juice to be ready to speak this morning. Good morning to committee members, Madam Chair and Judge Beerson and whoever else. I am just gonna read my testimony to the record as well because it's hard work and it's a bit complicated and I don't wanna get it wrong. So thank you again. Based on previous statements and further testimony by Judge Beerson, Assistant Attorney General, David Scherer and also South Burlington Chief, Sean Burke. Bill, before you go too far, I can't find or I'm looking. It's posted on the page. What's that? It's posted on the page. I'm starting in the second paragraph. Oh, there it is. All right, great, thank you. I'm with you, buddy. Better at snowblower repair than this. So we're going to add the following observations. And I think we dovetail quite nicely with Mr. Bradley's statements previously. First, the judiciary recognizes a base for discretion under 15 BSA 1101 sub five, 1102, 1103 sub A and B, 1104 B and 1106 A. To name just a few that the confiscation of firearms and other weapons may be ordered under both temporary and final orders under these relief from abuse statutes. The judiciary and attorney general support the bill, at least in part, to clear up and avoid any inconsistency across counties, quote unquote, of use of that discretion. Although they cite no hard evidence or data to support that concern, the validity of that anecdotal concern could be assuaged if the IRFO statute, Extreme Risk Protection Order for the record, were utilized for all future confiscations resulting from the petitions for relief from abuse orders filed under the above sighted statutes. I wanna say that, I wanna repeat that. The validity of these anecdotal concerns could be assuaged if the IRFO statute were utilized for all future confiscations resulting from the petition for RFAs filed under the above statutes. Any concern for the inconsistency is minimized if taken with data for the issuance of IRFOs as data could then be provided by county over time to see where any inconsistency appears. The family court already keeps similar data as Judge Beerson observed in previous testimony. Defendant concerns with lack of substantial evidentiary standards and the use of hearsay regarding the possession and location of firearm is not of concern to these witnesses as such based on their statements to date. Defendants ability to rebut assertions that the mere possession of firearms asserts a real threat is also not of concern based on Judge Beerson and other statements about the necessity to lock this discretion into a statutory mandate. I don't mean that in the majority of sense. I mean, they have not taken notice of it in their testimony. By enshrining the confiscation of firearms into the RFA statute, they well ensure the use of the IRFO will not allow defendants access to a higher evidentiary standard. This is the bare assertion and the intent of the bill, the original bill for IRFOS and the recent proposal of amendment for H-133. That will create an inconsistency of application of evidentiary standard for identical mechanisms seeking those confiscations. These happen in the same court under the same family court rules or procedure, perhaps even by the same judges in the same day. So using one and the other certainly is not a strain on the court. This committee along with many of the current participants in today's discussion were stakeholders and testified to create the IRFO statute in 2018. That process provided for a higher evidentiary standard for final orders requiring the confiscation of firearms known to be owned or possessed by the defendant. Although the right to counsel is not included in that process, it established a respect for the Article 16 right that demanded at least clear and convincing evidence of a threat to harm themselves or others. I would say that that is clearly a parallel to the RFA statute. And I disagree with Judge Greerson making such a distinction between the two. Threat to harm themselves and others clearly is part of the peer view of the RFA statute. I've included the original bill as finally signed by the governor. And the history there at that link has the whole history of the bill's consideration by your committee. Denial of access to the statutory process by legislation in H-133 represents a rollback of that legislation's intent and effect. All procedures requesting firearms confiscation under the domestic relation statutes should mandate the highest level of protection for defendant be accessed by the choice of venue, procedure and the statute applied. The IRFO provides a higher standard of protections and therefore all future requests where firearms are mentioned in the supporting affidavits under 15 BSA 1101 sub A should be by judiciary direction rules and procedures automatically forwarded to the IRFO venue for any final order request determinations involving firearms, period. As that venue is identical, referrals should be simultaneous with the initial filing of the affidavit and request for relief from abuse onto the statute. In the past with two years plus of having the IRFO statute in law, the judiciary should have been endeavoring to reconcile the usage of these overlaps in jurisdiction. Instead today we're asked to partially avoid the IRFO statute's intent and effect by enshrining the RFA's quote, suppose discretion in a statute with lower evidentiary standards, no access to write to counsel appointed by the court and denial of access to a choice of which procedure the defendant can prefer. All this to my non-attorney eyes says that the past use of the discretionary RFA firearms confiscation powers after the effective dates of the IRFO statute create a right to appeal on many fronts. Defendants access to the higher standard of evidence fully known to the judiciary raises questions of the common benefits clause under the Vermont constitution and precedent such as the aforementioned Brigham case. Especially if Judge Brierson is correct that the RFA confiscation discretion has been used inconsistently across counties. Since the effective dates of the IRFO process was available to judges, they should have been airing against the use of a created discretion in 15 VSA 1101 survey, et cetera, and leaning towards the use of the higher standards in IRFO, add to these facts that were submitted in development of the IRFO law, add to these the facts that were submitted in development of the IRFO law and H133 represents an attempt to undermine the legislative intent of a past legislative biennium and acts and resolves of the state of Vermont. A colorable assertion can be made that substantive due process, this is different from due process. Substitive due process is based on a fourth amendment, claim of unequal treatment. A colorable assertion can be made that substantive due process has been denied. Every time an RFA is failed to be referred to the IRFO process for firearms confiscation since it's enacted and that future similar file orders under 15 VSA 1101 survey be vulnerable to appeal for various reasons. Future orders that fail to make use of the IRFO statute as appropriate should be denied and referred for IRFO statute. And if not, a suit should commence under 42 VSA 1983 for violation of defendant's rights to due process. And I've included a law school citation, it's really just a reference point for that last citation and with a short explanation, it's not a big written paper. I just want to double up on this point. A colorable assertion can be made that substantive due process has been denied. Every time an RFA has failed to be referred to the IRFO process for firearms confiscation since it's enacted, the day that law became law, the day it became effective and judges received a memo, I'm sure of some sort or whatever the procedure is to provide them with the new statutes, updates and laws and crimes and descriptions and demands for procedures and rulemaking and form completion and forms were demanded under that statute. During that period, they should have all been well trained to recognize that the discretionary use under the RFA was now colored, was now tinted by this statutory, clearly described level of evidence demand in a statute, taking the two on a table on a balanced way of justice. The RFA utilizing discretionary powers that we have yet to see any documentation showing other than the general police powers that have been referenced. And then this actual specific statute with an outline process with two parts for ex parte and then final order with differentiation between levels of evidentiary standard at each point is such a clearly defined process for confiscation for people who are threatening harm to others. If you take those two and you don't defer to the statutory design written clearly option as a judge, I don't believe you're doing your job. And I think there should be strong, I think we should backstop this whole bill and have that conversation first because I don't think you can legitimately pass even this proposed amendment, which I think it's clearer, but it's no different in intent. I don't think you can pass that without having that conversation because I think it colors the whole bill as an enshrinement of judicial discretion, unnecessary in light of the fact that the RFA statute exists. And by all accounts, including Judge Greerson's has been very effective. Thank you for your time. I'm happy to take any questions. Thank you. Just looking to see if we have any hands. Madam Chair, I'm curious about my sound. It's fine. Yeah. I'm glad to hear that. Thank you. I have an old computer. Yeah, no, it's fine. And we also have your testimony here. Your written testimony. So that's helpful. Selena. Yeah, I'm curious. We've heard from a couple of witnesses now who feel that any relinquishment of firearms should be handled through the ERPO process and not the temporary RFA process. And we know that they're not the same process, right? And some of the hearing requirements are quite different for the ERPO process. And my understanding of the RFA process is, it's designed for these very temporary emergency situations. And I'm just, I guess I'd like to hear you comment on why you think for victims of domestic violence, why you, who we haven't heard a lot about in this discussion today, why the trade-off of just sort of having that higher bar around their own protection is worth it with regards to firearms, just looking through the lens. So the person who's actually seeking the RFA, like the move into the ERPO process requires a lot more than that. And timing question too, also the immediacy. So if I could respond to that and tell me if I get the question wrong. So in the level of evidence for the ex-parte's in both statutes, the RFA and the ERPO allow for preponderance. So there is an identical process. The judge sitting in ex-parte on a request for RFA could merely take the affidavit and attach it to another form, literally sitting there on the telephone and simply say, we're also issuing an ex-parte ERPO for confiscation of firearms, which would then trigger the final order 14 day later, clear and convincing review of that temporary order. I don't believe that my proposal or any, I mean, this could be done by judiciary rules. They don't need a statute change to do this. They can simply issue a ruling in their procedures that says that any RFA affidavit or any evidence in support of an RFA that contains mention of firearms and known possession of firearms, automatically gets stapled to another ERPO request at the same time, simultaneously, same family court, same procedures. No, there's no discounting of the immediacy or effectiveness of the RFA process because all of the other conditions of an RFA would still be, as Chris pointed out and as Judge Beerson acknowledged, all the other conditions are the, those are the preeminent conditions. The history of the statute says that. It's really about separating people by law and providing for penalties and hazards for criminal charges on the target, the defendant, if they violate it and the effectiveness. I might add there's several cases. I'm gonna get it wrong. I think it's Castle Rock versus Gonzalez that have grappled with the ability for local law enforcement to effectively respond to violations of RFAs. RFAs are only as good as, A, the respect of the people that are subject to them for the law. In other words, whatever hazard they're afraid of to maintain their own compliance with it and the effectiveness of local law enforcement to be able to respond to that. And that's a universal problem. And that's no different with an IRPO than it is with an RFA. The key to the RFA has always been to provide literally middle of the night, five candlelight, immediate relief for getting the distance between two people. And one of them is a threat. My suggestions, Chris's suggestions, don't change that one bit and the evidentiary standards are identical in both initial process. We only asked that any final order be triggered through for confiscation, just for the confiscation part, only for that, that it be simultaneously filed as an IRPO request so that that system that you folks set up with tons of work on our part actually is allowed to function. And is it okay to ask a follow up question, Chair Grad? Sure. So another thing I've been, another thing I've been trying to understand in some of the testimony is why just this provision about firearms needs in your assessment, the application of a higher standard of evidence because there's a number of rights that are essentially curtailed in some of the other conditions in current law, including, I think some could argue, including freedom of speech. And I'm just wondering what in your estimation is unique about firearms, comparing as it weighs against some of these other provisions? So it's really just my personal choice that this is the area of due process and constitutional rights protections that I've devoted time and energy to as a volunteer. But I guess I can answer your question of priorities only by giving you a personal perspective. My mother, who's since passed, she was raped by her brother when she was 12. He then left for World War II. He did not return. If he had returned five years later, and she by then would have been a young woman still living under her family's roof. The RFA would not have been available. There would have been no mechanism for her to deal with this except to either live with her rapist or to somehow just run away from her own family in order to get some solace, peace, and perfection from this person, this creditor. Fast forward to 1980, and we've created this robust, accessible, rapid response statute that I applaud. I have the underlying statute and the underlying relief from the threat, physically separated, creating conditions that allow some predictability on behalf of the victim, some ability to function in a somewhat less than normal world under threat. Go to work, go to known places where you know that your aggressor probably knows you're going and when. Creating that is a tremendous gift of the justice system. And I think it shows that Shakespearean concept from the merchant of Venice that this drop of mercy dropped sweetest here where we're doing the law. Mercy can be something you do between two people, but I don't think there would have been any mercy for my mother if her brother had come home and continued assaulting her. But having this RFA statute available to someone, I applaud it. And it's just very personal for me to distinguish between that and what I consider that constitutional right. No one would ask an RFA to tell somebody to no longer work for a newspaper, no longer be able to coordinate political efforts through this or that. It merely creates a distinction within two parties. It's really a civil disunion if you don't mind me using the expression. So for me, this is both personal and really a constitutional passion. Thank you. And I'm sorry that that happened to your mother and your family and really appreciate it. Live a long life, free of it. I really appreciate you sharing that and your perspective. Thank you. Committee members, any other questions? I'm not seeing any hands. Judge Greerson, if you're available, I think you're still here. It's great. Thank you. I just wanted to give you an opportunity to respond to some of the testimony if you'd like. Well, I think I will just to clarify the court's authority in these areas. And again, for the record, Brian Greerson, Chief Superior Judge, there is absolutely no way that the court can take a relief from abuse filing affidavit and turn it into a separate proceeding. So what Mr. Moore, Mr. Bradley are suggesting, we absolutely have no authority to do that. We are oftentimes accused of abusing our discretion, but this would be beyond the pale. I mean, these are two different statutory constructs that although, as I indicated earlier, they have some overlapping procedures. They are really two separate and distinct proceedings. The simplest way to differentiate them, putting aside the relief that both witnesses say make them in common is the fact that a plaintiff has to file for a request for relief from abuse, someone who alleges that they have been the victim of abuse. The IRF, the IRPO proceeding is filed by the state's attorney or the attorney general's office. We do not have the authority to take an affidavit and refer it or to tell the litigant that this is going to be treated as an entirely separate proceeding. So there's just is no legal authority to do what either witness is proposing. I started to say earlier, and this is the way I have differentiated IRPO from other proceedings. I always felt in the history of IRPO may not bear me out, but I looked at IRPO as representing a very narrow request, that it was a request that goes through the state's attorney's, attorney general's office, first of all, that was designed and intended to be used where, number one, there is no claim of physical abuse as defined by the relief from abuse statute. It's separate and apart from that. There is no allegation of criminal domestic violence, in other words, a domestic assault charge. And that's what it's there for, to is designed to address situations that don't involve those other elements. That's not to say that an IRPO order may not be combined with those, but again, that would not be anything that the court could direct. We can by statute incorporate and consolidate a request for relief from abuse in a domestic matter where the parties are both involved in both proceedings. In other words, the parties are the same in the domestic case and the relief from abuse. But again, that's by statute. So Mr. Moore, for instance, indicated the court has the authority to do this. They don't need a statute or we don't have that authority. If the legislature wants to give us that authority, that's certainly within your province. But as these statutes stand now, we have absolutely no authority to take one proceeding involving private parties and turn it into a proceeding involving prosecutorial discretion. That's their discretion. It's not ours. And the ability, if you will, the inherent authority to order relinquishment or surrender of firearms along predated the IRPO order. So there's nothing about the IRPO orders that has changed our approach on our authority to offer relief and relief from abuse. Relief from abuse, the statute is clear. It's what is designed to protect the plaintiff and or the plaintiff's children. And whether it's firearms or removing someone from the house, there's any number of matters of relief that the court can address, but you cannot turn one proceeding into another. We do not have that authority, period. I'll be glad to answer any questions, but I just couldn't let that go away. It just cannot happen. Great, thank you. Chair, may I clarify what I said? Briefly, briefly. Very briefly, but I think it was quite... What I think in my non-attorney language I was suggesting was that that referral to the state's attorneys, as directed in the IRPO statute, take place simultaneously when the judge takes note of it. I think that would be very simple. And I think you do have that authority and I think you just said you had that authority. Certainly you can communicate with the state's attorney, sir. Your Honor, if you want to reply... I don't know that... Okay. We don't have the authority to turn one proceeding into another. And that's what I understand both, Mr. Moore and Mr. Bradley were suggesting that because of some of the common issues in these matters that it's a matter of this, I would agree that if the state's attorney chooses to file an IRPO request based on the same affidavit, they have that authority to do that. That's within their exercise of discretion. Great. Thank you. Thank you very much, Your Honor. Okay, let's move to Sarah Robinson, please. Hello. Welcome. Thank you all. Thanks so much for the invitation to provide additional testimony on H-133 for the record, Sarah Robinson, Deputy Director at the Vermont Network Against Domestic and Sexual Violence and representing the 15 member organizations of the Vermont Network who provide direct services to victims of domestic and sexual violence across our state. And I'm going to be fairly brief and then happy to answer additional questions. Just wanted to say that we strongly support H-133 and the strike all amendment that you all have been discussing today. We believe that the proposed amendment clearly, more clearly achieves the purpose of the bill, which was not to expand or to narrow the court's authority to issue firearms related conditions and relief from abuse orders, but to clarify the current practice of including these conditions when it's appropriate in cases. And the language serves to clarify this discretionary power in our view, not just for judges, but also for plaintiffs and for defendants. Similar to other witnesses, Judge Greerson noted this, we believe that this strike all amendment more appropriately places the language in the statute, along with the list of other possible forms of relief that are listed. And it clarifies that firearms related conditions may be issued after two things. First, that the court has found that abuse has occurred and there is an immediate danger of further abuse. And I just wanted to highlight two items that came up in your conversation today. We would, Judge Greerson highlighted a potential for adding an order that would order the defendant to refrain from acquiring or possessing firearms. And we would be supportive of that language. And I also think that Representative Lefler's suggestion was well taken around language related to firearms and the possession of other persons. And it is certainly not our organizational position to impact people in, I think Representative Lefler, your words were the sphere of influence of the defendant. But really our concern is to ensure that firearms that are within the possession or control of the person who a court has found has abused the plaintiff. And there's an immediate danger for further abuse can be included in conditions when appropriate. So I'm happy to answer any other questions about relief from abuse orders, their impact on victims, or the link between domestic violence and firearms. But I'm happy to take any questions on that. Great. Thank you very much. Committee members, questions, looking for hands. Kate. I think I unmute it. That took a while, sorry. Good morning, is it still morning? Good early afternoon. So I'm just curious, Judge Greerson, and I didn't follow up with him about this, but through some numbers add up today about sort of the percentage of emergency relief from abuse orders that are actually granted. And I was surprised to hear that it was so low. And I don't know if this is really in line with the bill in front of us, but I guess since you're here and we're taking testimony on this issue, I'm curious to hear your thoughts about that. And maybe I'll just leave the question there. I can get more specific if that's helpful, but I'm curious to hear your thoughts about that. Yes, happy to speak to that. So I think Judge Greerson articulated that not all emergency relief from abuse orders are granted and I would just remind the committee the circumstances under which most of these applications are filed with the court and this relief is sought. It is often sought in the middle of the night on the weekend after a particularly traumatic event. So it is sometimes possible that for whatever reason, the court does not find that the affidavit that's submitted by the plaintiff rises to the burden that is expected of the plaintiff. And I would also just note again that the burden is solely on the plaintiff. So it's the plaintiff's responsibility for clearly articulating to the court the circumstances that give rise to the request for relief and the relief that is requested. And so in the emergency situation, I think that some of that may be circumstantial and certainly the court has discretion around how they assess the credibility in facts that are submitted to the court in the affidavit. On the final relief from abuse order, so Judge Greerson highlighted that I think in the year that he was speaking about that there is a larger amount of temporaries that were granted and a much smaller number of final relief from abuse orders that are granted. And I would say that that probably comes from a few places. One, there are some survivors that all they actually need is that short period of safety between an initial emergency relief from abuse order being granted and the date of the final hearing that those few days of safety when there are court conditions in place provides enough and sufficient time for a victim to safety plan and to ensure that they will be safe into the future or sufficiently safe into the future. And so plaintiffs may choose not to move forward with a final relief from abuse order. Their needs may have been met in that short window of time. And the other item is that, you know, a final relief from abuse order does require a final hearing and I think that survivors make very calculated decisions about what things they believe may escalate the abuse that they experience, what they are, the extent to which they're willing to be proximate to the person causing that abuse and may make decisions about moving forward based on those considerations. Great, thank you. Not seeing any other hands. Okay, great. Well, thank you. Thank you very much, Sarah. Thank you. Let's see, I think we, Chief Burke. Good morning. Morning, I'm Chairwoman. Pleasure to be here. Thank you for the invitation. Pleasure to testify before the committee. I'm Sean Burke for the record, Police Chief in the city of South Burlington and I'm here on behalf of the Vermont Chiefs Association. The Vermont Chiefs Association supports this proposed amendment, H-133, as it relates to codifying the current practice used by the family court in issuing temporary restraining orders. Also, we feel as though this is a strong point to ensure survivor's safety in these, these tenuous times, the 10 days that generally exist between the filing of the affidavit and the final hearing regarding the abuse prevention order. We certainly appreciate the careful attention that this committee has given today to the exact language. It allows clarity and that is needed in terms of figuring out the exact intent of these orders upon service. And also the Commissioner Sherling's commitment to have the Department of Public Safety assist those agencies that are faced with some storage challenges related to any relinquished firearms. That's greatly appreciated. And again, just thank you for this opportunity. I'm happy to take any questions the committee might have. Great, thank you. Committee members, questions? Thank you for your hands. Not seeing, not seeing any. There was a question about financial responsibility for storage. I'm not sure if you're able to address that or not. But if you can. I can, from the perspective of this organization, you know, upon my review of the statute, it doesn't appear that law enforcement has the ability to impose any storage fees until a final relief from a use order has been issued. I don't know if that is the exact interpretation. I know that South Burlington Police, we have not issued any storage fees to a fire owner of a firearms to date. So again, you're saying that you do not impose fees until a final order is issued. So is that, is want to make sure that I understood that? That's my reading of the statute. Yes, ma'am. Okay, so in this case, where we're just talking about a temporary order, your understanding is that there would not be any fees imposed. Thank you. Great. Okay, great. Thank you. Appreciate you being here. Thank you very much. Okay, Major Jonas, I think she's... I don't think she's on anymore. Okay, I know she was at another meeting. Okay, I know she was hoping to return, but okay. All right. Well, thank you. Thank you, committee. Thank you, witnesses. It was very helpful. And we will adjourn for the morning. So if we could go off.