 Well let me start by saying how glad I am to be in this celebration of the 30th anniversary of WIDER. I have been associated with WIDER since the very beginning, it's a project led by Jerry Heliner and Lance Taylor. I actually had the opportunity to meet many people then that have been in a sense throughout my career and you know beyond that I had the opportunity to work with WIDER many times including of course during my time as in the United Nations which you know we put the research institutes to work also with the UN Secretariat to think about you know ideas for and after my UN days also associated actually this project that I'm presenting here has been supported by by WIDER. So let me since ten minutes is you know very short let me say what I think are you know the five essential features of what I consider to be a good international monetary architecture although I had here I would not work it talk about the financial issues more about the monetary issues although the last one is by its nature a link between the two. So the first issue the the first thing that the system has to provide is is an international research system that guarantees the appropriate provision of global liquidity and that is seen as as a fair by all parties and this is what I probably will spend my more time on today. The second is the consistency of natural economic policies so they are not major imbalances particularly in the the largest economies and you know there is a way to avoid negative spillovers. You you could think of you know this requires some form of cooperation among macroeconomic authorities this is something that the has never worked quite well ever in since the creation of the Bretton Woods system. The G20 tried to create a new mechanism of macroeconomic policy cooperation. My own view is it has not worked either. I'll mention particularly the issues of the macroeconomic imbalances that you know have been on the rise in recent years. The second is the regulation of finance but in my view this includes the regulation of cross-border finance which is an issue that so the issue of regulation of finance has been for example one of the success stories more or less of the G20 but at the same time it is very you can say even a schizophrenic that you know it doesn't refer to cross-border finance so in the whole agenda of regulation of finance in the G20 cross-border finance is not there. Cross-border finance actually has been the subject of analysis in the IMF but not in the financial stability board which is a very peculiar way it has attracted some attention you know which I think is good. The fourth is emergency financing balance of payments financing you know during crisis and finally debt workouts. The debt workouts of course is the second is the alternative or in in making it a complement to balance of payments financing but so far we lack an institutional framework to do that. There has been some advances but you know they are extremely partial including by the way the recent attempt but in the United Nations to draft some form of framework for sovereign debt workouts. So let me let me let me go and you know let me dedicate most of the time actually to this issue the global research system. Now the global research system has in my view three major problems which have been identified historically because they came out in a historical order. The first one which was the subject of Keynes reflections during the Second World War writings on the topic is the asymmetric adjustment problem. The fact that you know in international finance deficit countries have to adjust during crisis surplus countries do not and that generates a deflationary or recessionary bias in the global economy which is of course the the basic reason why you have to find a mechanism to manage the this asymmetric adjustment. The second is what came to be known as a tripping dilemma formulated by Robert Griffin or Robert Trafane which is the problems associated with the use of a national currency as an international currency. We have been the main characteristic of the post Second World War order and particularly the post 1971 order when the the US unilaterally abandoned the the fixed exchange rate with adult with a gold that had been established at Bretton Woods. Now the the basic problem is that the in Trifin's formulation is that these subjects in the center world economy to cycles you know associated to the confidence or lack of confidence in the you know the major reserve currency and these problems in my view have become even worse after abandoning abandonment of the parity basically because there are now not the restrictions that were previously present associated with the the availability of gold reserves and the links so when the US started to lose gold under the old Bretton Woods system eventually abandoned that and therefore after that it was subject to actually through stronger cycles that were typical in the past. And the third problem which you can say is largely the result of the debt crisis in emerging economies is a is the what I call the globe the global inequities of the system basically the fact that emerging and developing countries have to accumulate a huge amount of reserves to manage the instability of the system. And you know since reserves are nothing else than you know investments essentially in US Treasury bonds it's essentially a capital transfer to the developed country to the reserve currency country you know which is a you know it's a global inequity so it's developing countries investing in the developments. So you know broadly speaking you think of asymmetrical adjustment the European case the Eurozone case in recent years is the best example in history. You know you see here all the countries peripheral countries in large deficit Portugal Spain and Greece had had massive adjustments you know in the order of 10 to 10 percentage points of GDP but the surplus countries on top Germany and the Netherlands have done no adjustment. So it's a you know that is a basic reason why you know the you know the Eurozone adjustment has generated global you know regional recessionary bias but it has also been transmitted into the global level because the the Eurozone surplus which you see in red I mean the Eurozone actually as a whole was in in a relatively balanced situation until the the crisis but in recent years the line that goes up is actually the Eurozone countries. The only the so it has exceeded now the for some years the Chinese surplus and and of course with the collapse in oil prices the largest surplus part of the world which is the oil exporting countries are now running deficits so that the overall the you know the Eurozone which was a balanced part of the global economy became one of the imbalances and the I would say the incapacity of the G20 to manage this is one of the you know basic problems in the global monetary system in the issues of the that I mentioned second. Now in the case of the US the use of the US dollar as the currency my point is and I just go briefly over this is it has subjected the world economy to very to very strong cycles. Cycles that are at the same time in the real exchange rate of the dollar which is in red here so that the the world has at the center a currency with unstable value but also the current accounts but imbalances of the United States which are also highly cyclical and I must say every time there is a huge adjustment in the US current account there is a global crisis so it's not an irrelevant issue from the point of view of the global economy and this is finally the issue of the demand for reserves particularly after the Asian crisis there's a huge accumulation of foreign exchange reserves which is a you know a typical of all emerging and developing countries regions the only developed country region that accumulates reserves on a larger scale Japan so in the bottom you see the the not the the core let's say OECD countries you know they essentially accumulate no reserves so the most of the pressure to accumulate reserves as self-insurance has been a characteristic of emerging and developing countries so in in the face of that you know the the question is how it could the the system evolve so the first issue is the multi currency standard which you may say the the euro provided of course in a second alternative global currency it has more or less survived the crisis so that the euro continues to be used on the larger scale including as a reserve currency so it does provide the diversification and now of course if the renminbi gains an increasing hold on the world economy we'll have a you know a three currency system there of course secondary currencies around that is still are used internationally such as the British pound or the Swiss franc so it does provide diversification but it can also provide instabilities to the system so a major ships among the venue reserve currencies could be a new source of instability that so far we have not you know and known and it could be a potential problem and the the the the second alternative is to move into you know an SDR based system the special drawing rights is this funny name for the only global currency that we really have which is the you know that the money created by the International Monetary Fund now the so the so there has been lots of discussion I think in the reforms going forward this could be not an alternative but a complementary route or reform which could actually use also to manage the instabilities of the system so the the first thing is that they should be a very conscious counter-cyclical issues of SDRs you know such as the one that was done in 2009 but more as a periodic a practice a kind of you know a counter-cyclical global monetary policy but even more important than that is the is to make useful the instrument the SDRs are the you know it's a really secondary or almost irrelevant part of the system today essentially because the SDRs are managing a totally different accounts from the regular IMF accounts so the you know any so any useful management of the SDRs have to I think a you know go to actually to a proposal which was done by by Jack Pollack the late IMF economies of managing everything in the IMF in SDRs this means that the the issues of SDRs would be quote-unquote a invested invested by countries in the IMF deposited by countries in the IMF and with those quote-unquote the IMF will lend so that the source of financing by the IMF will be the SDRs which is something that is not done today due to this duality in the accounts of the IMF this will by the way totally delink IMF lending from this need to to get you know financing from different countries at times of crisis which has been a you know historical constraint on the operations of the IMF and the substitution account which has been in all proposals in the 1980s you know could be used then to to generate the you know more stability in the multi-currency system that is a it will be okay now that system could Jose Antonio I hate to interrupt you already run up to 15 yeah sorry 14 minutes so could you now draw to a close okay so let me just finish with this which is the the possible developing links so that they could be you know asymmetric issues of SDRs you know which actually take as one criteria for SDR issues the demand for reserves of countries so takes into account that the country that demand more reserves should receive more SDRs let's say not only quotas but you know you know the demand for reserve somehow estimated and the second will be the use of SDRs a to buy bonds from the multilateral development banks as a way to you know a to finance the the MDB's which are actually more broadly used than the IMF and and they are generally speaking a better also a contraceptive instrument of global finance the fiscal use in contrast to that which has been proposed by many which is to use SDRs to buy you know to finance climate change mitigation or financing ODA I think it's a wrong idea because it's mixing monetary and financial and monetary and financial issues which from the experience of you know at least my region of the world Latin America is a terrible idea thank you very much