 Hi, I'm Andrew Weiss. Welcome to Carnegie. We're delighted to see so many people out here today to listen to Andrey Kolesnikov, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Moscow Center, who leads our work on Russian domestic politics. Andrey has a very long and distinguished career in both the world of foreign policy, sort of domestic politics analysis. And as a journalist, before coming to Carnegie, he also was at the New Times, at his Vestia. He writes political columns a couple times a week for places like Viet-de-Mestis, Forbes Rue, and is one of the most prolific writers on Russian politics today. We're going to talk now about a study that Andrey published in the past couple of days. In English, it was published in Russian a few weeks ago that is all based on a series of polling and focus groups that the Carnegie Moscow Center conducted with a very important partner of the Lovato Center, Russia's most prestigious independent sociological and polling organization. And the goal of this project, which I encourage folks to look both through the slides, but also the report that Andrey published, which is called The Perils of Change, Russians Mixed Attitudes Toward Reform. The goal here is to see what are the bottom up pressures for change inside Russian society? How do those connect to the regime's attitude toward the status quo, the persistence of conformism and passivity in the Russian electorate and figure out what those kinds of trends tell us about the future of the Russian political system on the eve of the presidential elections, which will be held on March 18. Andrey is going to walk through the slides and the data, and then we'll talk after that about some of the broader conclusions. So anyways, Andrey, welcome to Washington. I know you've made this presentation already in New York and Boston. It's great to have you do it here in Washington. My place for any presentation, the capital of the world, thank you for the opportunity to talk here. So the survey is really quite important, found out that we made really quality work with my co-author, Denis Wolkov, who is a rising star of Russian sociology right now. And the other center is the only independent sociological organization in Russia, apart from Kremlin sociological structures. So the title is, Do Russians Want Change? One of the main questions, because we're coming to the next presidential term, with quite low expectations. The same president, presumably, the same agenda, the same actress, political actress. We can discuss this later. But it was a reasonable question, because we must know not what elites think. There are a lot of surveys concerning elites opinion. But we experienced a lack of research about opinion of average Russians concerning possible reforms, possible changes, possible modernization of Russia. So the first slide, this is a big picture. Paradoxically, you can see that more than 80% of the population want changes. So to say, against a mainstream understanding of expectations of Russian population, 42% are for the size of radical change, 41% for gradual change. Only 11% say no. They don't want any changes. But this is only the big picture. And the devil is in details, as we know. For example, here is such a myth that Russian youth is the most active actor in the political sense. There are a lot of new young faces during protests in the streets and squares in Russia, not only in Moscow, but big cities somewhere in Siberia or Far East. And here is a myth that Russian youth is ready to change everything and begin a revolution. This is not so. You can see here that the youth, in a sense that this category of people is 18 to 24 years old, this is the most conservative, most cautious, so to say, part of the society. Even if we compare it with Elder Group 55+, you can see here that, for example, middle-aged groups want more changes. We have very simple explanation of this phenomenon. This kind of youth is, so to say, irresponsible for anything. They were born under Putin. They are living under Putin. Putin, this is a constant factor of our everyday life. So it's a natural feature of this category of people to not to be involved in political issues, to be politically apathetical, to be concentrated to their private life. But the situation here is the kind of a generation gap between, so to say, general youth, and youth which is more responsible for something. This group of people, 25 to 39 years old, they have families. They have incomes. They have responsibility for at least themselves. So they are ready for more changes, more, they express demand even for political rights, even for economic changes, something like that. This is also youth. And the last notice, all these young faces which we can see in the streets, this is a minority. Majority is right here. The next very important thing. Yes, 42% of the population were radical changes. But we are talking about lower classes. They simply want normal life, better life, not more. If Stalin will deliver better life, it's OK they will accept it. If Putin, they will accept it. If somebody from the liberal flank, yes, that will do. But primarily these groups of people, they're waiting for something from the state, from the iron fist, from the strong side of our reality. This is the explanation of this desire for better life, the prioritization of goals of any reforms, any changes. You can see that the first place and the second place in this ranking, this is all about well-being, all about better social protection, all about economic issues. Small paradox. We got a customer to think about Russians as a nation which is obsessed by the idea of a great power. And a great power status, this is only the last goal in this long list of possible goals. Why is it so? Again, very simple explanation. We have achieved this goal in recent years. We are, right now, great power. We are, right now, a trendsetter in the global sense of the word. So today, Putin and all the nation and power must concentrate its efforts on something more material, more substantial, on economy, national economy, and social issues. This is one more explanation of this understanding of this great power status. This is a phrase of one of the respondents of the focus groups in Moscow. It is time to work on Russia's domestic policy because foreign policy seems to achieve its goals. This is a very important slide. You can see here that the majority wants more state, more state interventions, more state delivery of different services, relocation of resources, price regulation paradoxically living in the market economy for many years. People want a price regulation. By the way, right now, annual rate of inflation in Russia is unprecedentedly low, 2.2%. This is January to January. But until now, people want price regulation. You can see here that only 17% want market economy, completely free markets. This is not tragedy because all the polls, all these years, are demonstrating that the share of liberals, Western-oriented part of the population, is just like 13%, 14%, 15%, 16%. So this is one more evidence that here is the share of liberals in our society. And nearly the same figure, we can get it when we are assessing approval or disapproval of the annexation of Crimea. So this is plausible picture. And here is a very important quotation from one of the focus group respondents. This respondent describes his understanding of the prevailing views in small cities and rural territories. These people want Comrade Stalin to come back. They want all rich people to be shot. They want kind Comrade Stalin to come back and save everyone and redistribute national income. This is not prevailing ideas, but quite typical in everyday talk among average Russians. So another group of people, Moscovites, very special group, which is more advanced, which lives in one of the biggest cities in the world. This category of people want more prosperity and because of that here we can see more demand for even political rights. But I must say that Moscovites, being more liberal, more democratically oriented, simultaneously can express demand for state regulation as well. We think that it is not about paternalism as such, but it's more about understanding that state must deliver services to its nation, to people, to inhabitants, especially it's typical for Moscovites. But again, really capital of these countries more liberally oriented, so to say. The next slide and another important question. Who is Mr. Reformer? You can see that the most popular response is no one. Mr. Nobody is the main reformer in Russia. But the third place is under Vladimir Putin, 25 percent. No alternative figures in this political field, monopoly in the political field. And because of that, even advanced respondents say so maybe Vladimir Putin can implement reforms. Despite the fact that he's here with us for 18 years, this is a period of time typical for Brezhnev, for example. Brezhnev was the ruler of Russia for 18 years. And other names in this list. This is a typical list of politicians, legal politicians, official politicians in Russia. A typical list for questions which a politician is trustworthy for you, for whom you will vote the next Sunday. And the same list of names. Zhurinovsky, Zhuganov, and so on and so forth. Shoigu and Lavrov, the most popular ministers in Russia because they are defenders of our borders. Shoigu is a minister of defense and Lavrov is a minister of foreign affairs. He is the main participant of the hybrid war with the West. The main actors inside the concepts of besieged fortress. The last place among official politicians is Dmitry Medvedev. And you can see Alexei Navalny in this list with two persons. But this is much more complicated story with Navalny because he is illegal. Russian electorate in any country is quite conservative and cautious. He isn't ready to support illegal unofficial politicians. And if Navalny would be a legal official politician he could be overnight extremely popular even among conservative electorate. Here is very vague demand for something new. Yes, Putin will be with us. He will live forever. He is a portrait on the wall. He is just like weather outdoors. But when it's something new. And it was a survey of this summer. We made it in the August of Russia's survey. Right now a new politician appeared in our political field. His name is Pavel Grudinin. He is a candidate of communists, not being communist at all. He is a successful entrepreneur with such a populist-like views. But not non-liberal views. He wants, for example, nationalization, something like that. I think he occupies the niche for Navalny. Being at the same time not liberal at all, Navalny exploits liberal rhetoric. Being populist at the same time. So it means that here is a demand for change in this list of politicians. But we didn't touch this topic in this survey because it was not time for presidential campaign. And our respondents tried to find reformers somewhere abroad. Successful reformers and somewhere in the past. For example, the classical list of successful reformers of Russia. Peter the Great, Peter Stalipin, Catherine the Great. Alexander II. When we ask it about successful reforms somewhere abroad, people mentioned frequently oil-rich Arab countries primarily. In terms of justice, in terms of good redistribution of oil incomes. The next slide and another question. Yes, and this is a continuation of the same story. Here is a kind of fatalism about reforms. By the way, when we ask the participants of focus groups, what are the reasons for failure? Why reformers are always unsuccessful? We have got very good analysis of the situation. Political compromises, a lot of big country. A lack of political will. Everything which what experts can say about the failure of reforms. But here is a quotation which describes this fatalism about Russian modernization. No one has conducted reform successfully in contemporary Russia. Even Putin can't fix this problem, even Putin. I must say that a lot of advanced people support Putin. Being the part of middle classes. Having good incomes. Having such a sceptic about everything here. But they have to support Putin because they can't see anyone else in this political field. The question was about personal involvement of people into the process of modernization. People don't want to be involved in reforms. They don't want to pay any price for it. They want to get results. You must do everything you want. It's a very top of political Olympus. But we are not ready to be involved even as a level of paying minimal cost for it. So frequently discussed idea of higher retirement age for example. People are not ready to accept this idea. Despite the fact that we have aging population. In the year 2030 every third Russian citizen will be pensioner. It's a great burden for Russian budget for the state. Despite this fact people are not ready to share this burden with the state. So the same situation with social benefits which could be monetized. People are not ready to accept this idea as well. Very important popular idea among Russian reformers group of experts which is working with Alexei Kudrin who is trying to present to Putin the new program of modernization such an idea of partial payment of medical expenses and educational expenses. So if state can deliver the services for you you must share it understanding that this is a good option for the future. If you assess yourself as a part of the middle class you must understand that you have to share this burden for medical expenses and educational expenses. But the majority of Russians say no to this idea. But we get much better figures in Moscow again. Moscowites understand the logic of reformers. But Moscow this is not Russia. These are some quotations from focus group's respondents. You can see here that respondents quite soberly assess the logic of average Russians. Most people want changes but they don't want to do anything to make them happen. Another point of view. People say that the common folk should pay the price for reference. Why can the oligarchs pay this price? You know this is not quotation from typical communist thinking. As I remember it was quotations from respondents which was assessed by our group of researchers as young liberal. So the last maybe important question. What are the main instruments to change for changes for you personally? Paradoxically the main instrument of changes is our elections. Voting for the three persons. You can see very large gap between voting and other possible options to deliver changes to achieve changes in this country. In Moscow we have got even higher figures concerning elections. 64% it seems to me. But Moscow was quite active in a sense of, in this option, volunteer for public political organizations. Moscow experiences kind of a civic awakening in recent years. But this is unique experience and unique situation for Russia. We explain it that way. In Moscow different groups of people were damaged by the behavior of Moscow mayor who intervened into private space of Moscowites. And it was the beginning of the process of self-organization of Moscowites. Non-political. At the end of the day it could be political organizations and political involvement but primarily it was not. And there are several stories, success stories. At the end of the day Moscowites, small groups of Moscowites and districts were winners. And in the previous work which we have made with Denise Volkov self-organization of civic movements in Moscow we predicted the resistance of Moscowites to the actions of the Moscow mayor. You can remember then that in the year 2017 the mayor initiated a great campaign for demolition of five-story buildings in Moscow. He thought that it would be popular. But people assessed it as a penetration, as an intervention into their private life. Again, the authorities decided what is good and what is bad instead of Moscowites. And it was a wave of protests. Again, non-political protests. But as I know, authorities were tremendously afraid of this new, unexpected for them movement which wasn't led by Navalny or somebody else. Which was led by simple Moscowites of different ages and different political orientation. It was a new phenomenon. So again, in the context of the presidential campaign we must say that people can assess elections as a possible instrument for changes. Not in the case of presidential elections, which are not elections at all. This is more about reconformation of the empowerment of Putin, not more. But in the future, this very instrument can work, can be actionable. So I will stop myself here in order to leave the space for discussion. Thank you, Andrei. It's a very powerful set of slides. And the paper is also quite compelling. The picture I get, and I'm probably oversimplifying, is of a stagnant and exhausted society and a very stagnant, exhausted model for ruling it. And the two are just kind of almost slowing down to a point where it's hard to see how it changes direction. Either it goes downhill or in the ideal scenario becomes more reform-oriented. It's also hard to find any external requirement that would force that kind of change other than demography or the actuarial table, which is that Putin can't stay in power forever just because eventually he'll be too old. But the status quo could go on for a very long time. Is that your assessment as well? The paper you published about a week or so ago about Project Inertia started to develop that idea. I'm just curious if you could expand it a bit. Yes, I think that our society is in the sense of depression, permanent depression, not only in the economic sense, in the social sense, in the sense of perception of reality, in the sense of moods. Everything is assessed as a new normal. So if the member of a middle class is falling into poverty, so okay, we got a customer to be in poverty for many years in Soviet times in the first years of liberal reforms. And the culture of poverty is coming back without any problems. And it is assessed as a new normal. So right now it's a very interesting phenomenon. Right now we are experiencing a credit boom in Russia. But it means this is not the sign of recovery in an economic sense. This is a sign of fatigue from bad gloomy moods. People want to buy, I don't know, to buy something, to buy fridge for example, new fridge to buy more clothes. Because of that they want to express their personal optimism. But they can't return this money because this is the fourth year of the decrease in real incomes. You know that Putin, who is overwhelmed by the feeling of complacency, is confusing figures. He said publicly that incomes are growing. This is an increase right now in incomes. This is not true. We are experiencing an increase in real wages, in official salaries. But in Russia we have a very big grey sector, so to say, an unobservable sector. And in this sector salaries are diminishing, deteriorating. And in some we have a decrease in incomes, a permanent decrease. How was this economy works? So in a sense of the behavior of elites they don't know anything about themselves. Because Putin is not ready to say whether he is lame duck or he is not lame duck. Whether he will go away in a year 2024 or not. Whether he will change constitution or not. But it's too early even for him to be so decisive. Because the first years of the next presidential term will be the years of understanding what will be in a year 2024. Before that we have parliamentary elections of the year 2021. Before that Putin must reconstruct the party system. Because everything is exhausted, depleted and party system as well. The leader of the Communist Party, Zhuganov, is 75 years old. With Vladimir Zhirinovsky he was one of the two pillars of the system for more than a quarter of a century. Yidina Russia joint Russia party as a party of power is simply the trade union of the bureaucracy. It is not workable. Its activity is not noticeable. So the authorities maybe initiate the process of reconstructing or inventing a new liberal party. A party which could spoil the activity of real opposition. Ksenia Savchak, who is now in the USA, could be the best leader for such a party under control of the Kremlin. A lot of different goals and problems. Not to mention economic problems. Not to mention the balance of the elites. I can name this process as a Francoization of the political system. From the name of Kaudyuli of Francisco Franco. Putin is aging. Putin is not ready to touch political fundamentals of his system. But he is ready for some small adjustments in this economic system, in administration. He is ready to balance different groups, different camps inside his inner circle. Just like Franco did it since the middle of 1960s. It's just like in a very famous Spanish anecdote of this epoch. Franco is sitting in his room in a palace. He has two bunches of papers before him. One of these was the title problems which were solved by the time. The first bunch is problems which will be solved by the time. His only activity is to remove papers from one bunch of papers to another one. It looks like this. In the very beginning of the first Putin's term I compared him with Mussolini. He was full of energy. I would say youth energy. He was ready to reconstruct the system. But I thought that he will construct a corporate system with controlled groups of people everywhere. I think I was right. We can see this system right now. Everything is under control. Everywhere in every sphere we can see monopoly. Monopoly in the economy. 70% of the economy is the contribution to the GDP from the state side. This is the state economy. Monopoly in the political sphere. One party, one leader. Everything is under control. Real opposition is illegal opposition. Monopoly in the spiritual sphere is so to say. Russian Orthodox Church, official Russian Orthodox Church. This is the main instrument to maintain this monopoly in the spiritual sphere. Spiritual bonds, our spiritual history and so on and so forth. Orthodox Church is responsible for the ideology of imperialism, nationalism and so on and so forth. But this system is actionable until now despite of this depression, permanent depression. But we must be honest. We can't predict what will be after the parliamentary elections and before the next presidential elections, I mean the year 2024. Six years too long to predict anything for sure. I wanted to go back to one of the most interesting findings in this poll, which was the findings about Russian younger people and their apparent conservatism or lack of desire to shake things up. I take the point you make about this is the only world they've lived in and they've sort of grown up in a Putin submarine and the submarine has moved around pretty successfully in their lives. But you clearly have a breakdown in the model that originally the regime used to create that level of control that you were describing. Because younger people are more connected to each other, they're more connected to the internet, there's a slight difference of how older people and younger people receive information and the control over their media diet is going to be very different because the social media networks have sort of created more horizontal connections within Russian society. Could you talk about the paradox which is we see street demonstrations, we see social media use and internet use exploding, but then this conservatism about where Russia should go. Is that just because they think that's the answer the pollster wants to get and they're trying to satisfy a paternal figure? This is the gap between I would say majority and general trends and minorities which are quite significant because we mustn't belittle the role of minorities, active minorities in the story of this country and in the future of this country. I can suppose that the use could be a nectar in the agent of changes despite the fact that again majority is very conservative and very apathical. The picture is very contradictory and we have a lot of discussions in Russia, expert community about the youth especially. My friend and colleague from European University in St. Petersburg, Mitri Travin says that we need to wait for generation change and everything will change not overnight but steadily, slowly, but it will be changes for good, for a brilliant future so to say. I had a talk with Ivan Krastev, Bulgarian political scientist. He said a very interesting phrase. He said that the successor of Putin will be not man or woman but generation. This is also a contradictory idea because we can say in our country about so to say hereditary aristocracy. The result of the process of transmitting heritage from high FSB officers who are at the same time controlling state companies and state banks to their sons. This is a very dangerous process for the health of the economy when sons of Bortnikov, Patrushev, Ivanov, all of them are cronies of Putin. The sons of these guys are controlling state enterprises and state banks. So it means that we have so to say hereditary state capitalism, non-efficient at all, founded on this nepotism, political nepotism. At the same time, what is wiring? Here is new sociological survey of FOMA. This is not Lovato Center, this is more or less controlled by Kremlin. Foundation for public opinion? Yes, foundation for public opinion, but quite professional. And here is a new survey about the attractiveness of FSB for the people, but not in terms of political attractiveness. But in terms of being fascinating as a working place for the youth and service in FSB is much more popular among the youth as well. So we can compare figures from the beginning of 2000s and the figures of this year 2018. The youth said 18 years ago, 17 years ago, that the service in FSB is attractive. The share was 42%. Right now the share is 76%. Because it's a stable working place and stable salary. It means that all these people will be the basis for the future middle class. Right now we have middle class, which consists of primary bureaucrats and military men. This is a horrible trend because if we want to have normal middle class as an agent of changes, the main actor in economy, they must be businessmen, entrepreneurs. But the share of incomes from entrepreneurship, one more figure, in the year 2000 it was 15%. In the year 2016 it was 7%. Such a decrease in incomes. It means again that the basis for the middle class is somewhere in the state. State servicemen, state secret servicemen, state military men and so on and so forth. The question is how this economy can be developed on the basis of such a middle class. Okay, so let's open things up. A couple ground rules before we do that. If people could identify themselves before you start speaking, end your question with a question and finally wait for the microphone. Why don't we start with you, sir, over there. Hi, Dan Liebman. Just two questions. First of all, Putin is running as an independent and is wondering what is the significance of that. And second thing, you didn't mention Cassina Socek as one of the candidates, but you did mention her later as being a possibility of forming a new liberal party. I did hear her speak here the other day and I was wondering do you consider her a credible candidate? And if so, why would she come to the United States? That's sort of equivalent to Trump going to Russia during the election. It seems she would have ruined her chances. Do you have anything to say about that? Yes, really. Putin is an independent candidate. He doesn't need any support from the party, which is a fake party. I mean, the joint Russia needs Putin. Putin doesn't need joint Russia in that sense. Putin doesn't need even support from his corporatist structures, just like United Front, something like that. Yes, they're supporting him, but this is the game for political technologists which are getting money from this campaign. Putin isn't different, I think, for this activity. If you won't do it, do it. If you think it will deliver me more voices. Okay, I agree with it. He's a very quiet person. He's an observer, so to say. It was a funny story which is not about these elections, which was told by one of the insiders. It was the year 2013, the year of mayor's elections in Moscow. And Volodyn, who is now the Speaker of Duma, he was the main person in that time in the presidential administration responsible for political issues. He came to Putin to his dacha with the report. So, Vladimir Vladimirovich, we allowed Navalny to participate in mayor's elections because we think that he will get two persons, three persons, not more. It will be very good for understanding that he is not significant for this country. Putin was swimming in the pool this time, so he began to complain himself, something like that. And he said, okay, but you are fools. You are not right. And he was right, assessing the situation. It was dangerous for the system allowing Navalny to participate. Right now they don't want to repeat this mistake with Navalny, with somebody else. So, at the end of the day, Putin is really, he's not living flesh. He's a symbol of Russia, so one symbol of Russia is going to the elections, and he will be the winner. So, he doesn't need any additional support. He's the president of the old Russia, he's not the president of the party joint Russia. This is one more, maybe, explanation. This is an enigma why sub-chuk is coming to the USA. It means that she doesn't think that she will get a lot of voices. He has time to go abroad, he has time to talk with foreign electorates, so to say. She has time to represent herself for the foreign audience, maybe as a future leader of, so to say, liberal party in this country. I think that she sincerely wants to be a real politician, but partly under control of the Kremlin with some opportunities which are delivered by Kremlin. So, she knows for sure that this is her game not as a real candidate, but as a future politician, which must be significant for the West as well. And the USA is the main country in the West, so why not to visit Washington and New York during, in time of presidential campaign. If we continue the topic of Xenia sub-chuk, I would say that she has got a proposal from Kremlin oligarchs to participate in this campaign in order to make this campaign more, to deliver intrigue to this campaign. Women, young women from aristocratic family and so on and so forth. But for the presidential administration, this is a win-win story because on the one hand they need liberal discourse during this presidential campaign. And sub-chuk can express liberal ideas. At the same time, she has very big so-called anti-rating. She's not popular among average Russians. Because of her origins, she's a daughter of Natalia Subchuk, who was mayor of St. Pete in the Perestroika times and in the first years of reforms, which are not popular. She's such a high society girl with bad credentials. She was the host of television reality show. So, it means that speaking about something liberal, she discredits liberal ideas in the eyes of average Russians. Russian rednecks, so to say. And in that sense, this is a win-win situation for presidential administration. We have liberal politician. This politician is not popular. You can see it. So, okay. Let's go ahead. Wayne, up here. Wayne, Mary, the American Foreign Policy Council. For an individual or a family, probably the most decisive and comprehensive change they can consider is leaving the country. And, of course, is to leave the country, to immigrate. And, of course, there's a great many Russians living abroad. Many of them have one foot abroad and one foot in Russia. Many have gone abroad and come back to Russia. This is a fairly fluid population. But to what extent do you, in looking at the numbers and looking at the results of your questions, get a sense about a generational difference in attitudes about whether this new generation you talked about, the generation that will come after Putin, sees its future as being fundamentally in Russia or being partly in Russia and partly abroad, or is there some kind of a dynamic there? Because this is one of the first generations in Russia's thousand-year history for which that has been an option. And, obviously, Russians are a very dynamic part of the world population today. And how does that feed into your overall analysis? Yes, it's a very good question. But when we're talking about big statistical data, for example, an immigration rate is insignificant. But we must talk about quality working for. Working for a high-quality, skilled, new, young, graduates from the best universities in Russia. Good education in Russia is for working in state companies, state banks, or for an expert. For exporting, working for us to the west, primarily, not to the east. Right now, according to some assessment, the figure of immigrants with higher education is nearly a million, which are living in the west in the developed countries. This is a significant figure. Taking into account this, this is the best persons from this nation. So, and one example. I was in New York on Monday, and I have met with my former colleague, my former chief. I worked in Izvestia 13 years ago as a deputy editor-in-chief. And the editor of Izvestia at that time was a very talented young person, Vladimir Borodin. I was his deputy. There were two more deputies. So, we tried to make from Izvestia something new and advance it and so on and so forth. Right now, this is totally a programming newspaper. But I'm talking about another thing. Among four deputies and editor-in-chief and I am the only person who is living in Russia because editor-in-chief is in New York as an owner of two restaurants, quite popular. Lobster, something like that. So, the second deputy editor-in-chief is a successful start-up in digital sphere in Australia, in Sydney. The third one in his 50s went to Toronto, learned for a year English. Then he studied digital media. Right now, he is working in Toronto and living in Toronto. Here is three, four Russian stories, personal stories. This is an example. So, it means that the situation, environment in Russia is not too friendly for educated people. But at the same time, I will be cautious to predict mass immigration from Russia. This is more typical for Eastern European countries for Baltic states, terrible figures. Right now, I try to understand this trend which is too significant. Millions of people are living more or less economically stable countries like Poland, like Hungary. Less prosperous countries like Bulgaria. A quarter of the population of Bulgaria is living abroad right now. Lithuania, which we assess quite as a quite successful country. Very pleasant for normal life, with cheap conditions for normal life. But people are going to the West, being inside the European Union. Maybe the fact that we are not in the European Union is a bad condition to stay here in Russia. All the way in the back. A. Lee Feynman from the State Department. This is a question that refers back to the election campaign. We all know that the Levada Center is not publishing any coverage from its polls of the election campaign. I'm wondering how you think that's going to affect analysis. Maybe not among the public, but among people like you. How are folks going to understand what's going on with the election without one remaining independent voice in public opinion research? Thank you. Interesting question, but it will not have some implications. Serious implications, serious consequences. Because, yes, the Levada Center is the main actor in this field, and it was such a decision of Lev Godkov, the director of the Levada Center. On the one hand, they are trying to behave according to the law, because if they will publish this data, they could be punished according to the law. On the other hand, this is kind of a political gesture. We are foreign agents, so you made us foreign agents, and here is my answer, my personal answer. We will not publish this data, so be satisfied with your own Kremlin sociologist, not more, but I don't think that it can influence the presidential campaign. Any researcher like me can try to secretly to get this data from the Levada Center in order to understand the situation. It's only a month left to the presidential elections, so I don't... The only intrigue is whether Pavel Grudinin will get a lot of voices or not, whether Tsabchak will get more voices than one person or not, and it's really interesting in terms of understanding the future of this political system, not understanding Putin or presidential elections as such. All right, so we have one more question. Yes, sir, up here. Thank you very much for the servant ambassador of Latvia under statements. Well, when I looked at all these figures, it looks that there is no internal domestic political pressure on current regime to change something. Among priorities, there are improvement on social nature, that means people are quite happy to get retired in 55. The very low-scale demand is economic reforms, industrial reforms, anti-corruption, and they are expecting that this should be done, at least 70% are expecting that it should be done not by people but by states or by leaders. By leaders who they don't know who will come, and they are putting on the scale Zyuganov Zhirinovsky hires and even Medvedev or Navalny. Well, what should happen in Russia that political and young generation is less active in demanding of changes than older generation? Well, that's all what we can get from these figures. Well, don't you see the gap in assumption in the West what actually Russian people are expecting and demanding and what aren't they demanding actually in Russia and what should happen in Russia that internal political demand for substantial changes, substantial reforms is growing or it will be just a lucky number who will come and bring us new surprises. Wow, new era, like Peter is a great. This is a good question but this is the most frequently asked question in different audiences what must happen in order to start doing something. I will tell you the story, not story, but just a quotation from one of the reformers in these experts groups which were working on a new program of modernization of the so-called Kudrin's team in the Center for Strategic Research. It was a discussion about how to present the results of this work to put in order to be successful and somebody said we must frighten him. If he will be frightened he will begin to do something but he is a courageous man and this is a problem for the beginning of any changes. Yes, here is a small political pressure and not from the political opposition but from some groups inside elites primarily from Alexei Kudrin but I think it's not enough to frighten and put in this way with Kudrin's rationality without strong emotions. Putting this overwhelming by the feeling of complacency seems to me he doesn't believe in best scenario and he sincerely thinks that everything is more or less normal in an economic sense for example but the problem is that he is not ready to touch political fundamentals of this regime because he knows the story of Gorbachev who touched political fundamentals and the whole country disrupted. I think that Putin was frightened by Arab Spring and the Ukrainian Maidan to the same extent as Brezhnev was frightened by Prague Spring in 1968. So it means he is not ready to democratize and liberalization of this regime. One more point, Putin was frightened even by the revolution of 1917. This is also a bad experience for him and because of that we didn't celebrate this anniversary in any official way. Okay, well, Andrei, thank you very much. This is extremely powerful stuff. Thank you. Thank you very much.