 mistrence tiwr, lawd i'r rhain ond mewn gwirio ar resigned yn erbydd y bôn adwsol o f theres â osgron mawr minus stingyra denkw tripleo Dim Uber mae'r blaen nodd trwyd yn g wedyn flynyddill mae'r cyrder i'rлиmp呼 arbitrary ar gyfrannu c lysgr o'r Llyfr N ran datblyg ar blaen mae'r rhain' yn llёт mae'n gobeithio ar gyfer blaen mae'n rhan bod Electricity spineadau mae'r llyr yn ei bosking ac mae hi'r rhain yn nhadw'n gallu roedd yn cymorth o'r newid ar y cerddur wahanol ac roedd yn gweithio, fel Yn amddangos, os yw y t acres yng Nghymru, gen i'w man personsantau, i'n gweithio a'is ei dyn nhw'n gweithio. Yn ymddangos o'r Cerddur teimlo i ymddangos i hone y byddwn i ddweud o'r gyflawni ar y Llywodraeth, sy'n ddim yn ei gael o'ch cyflawni a chyfnod o'r cyflawniaid. I dimwysu i'r ei gweithio fel gwrthoedwch, chi'n, yn oed, ei gweithio'r hynny. Felly dyna'n bwysig i'r holl teniadau a'r holl arllangos o'r gofyn cywbeth. Fe yna'n gofyn i gael cwrdd, mae'n gweithio ar 4, 5 munud. Mae nid i'n gweithio'r myfyrdd y cwestiynau a chweithio'n gweithio. Mae'n gweithio'r holl yn gweithio ar y sefydliadau, alech yn fawr. Chwy ffwrdd. Rwy'n iawn, srif, ond yn ddigon ni i gyrdd i chi o'r bleddystiwn i'r bwrdd o'r pethau cyfnodau Gwyrdyn ni'n ddigon i'r bryd, pan oeddi'n falch ymlaen i gyrddio'r rhannu Cymru, ac mae'n ddigon i'r bach sydd ymlaen i gyrddio'r bach sydd o'i gyrddio'r bach sydd ymlaen i gyrddio'r bach sydd i gyrddio'r bach sydd. I'm working on a larger project that I've been working on for quite a few years, that essentially tries to understand better what we mean when we see Transnational Environmental Revolution. It's one of those terms, like Transnational Environmental Law, that has really taken off in the past decade, essentially. Mynd i ddugwyddol ymlaen o'r rhan o'r ddweud o'r rhan o'r ddweud o'r rhagisgu a rhagisgu sy'n gyhoedd y ddweud o'r rhagisgu o'r rhagisgu o'r rhagisgu o'r rhagisgu o argyngr, ac mae'n gŷn oedd yn ymddangosol, ac mae'n gŷn oedd ei wneud o'r llaw o'r cyfoesidol o'r starch o'r cwrdd fath gennu'r cyflwyn. Ond nid oedd eu bod yn unrhyw gan ydym ni'n ddiddordeb yn gynllun i'r mergellion, ond sut ydyn nhw'n gyd yn ddefnyddio'r ffordd? Yn ymgylch yn ddiddordeb, gallwn llawer i'r ffrostraethau'n ddiddordeb yn ddiddordeb yn ddiddordeb ymdryg o'r rhan fain gweithlion yn eu cyfnodau, maen nhw'n ddiddordeb yn ddiddordeb yn ddiddordeb yn ddiddordeb yn ddiddordeb ymdryg. ac mae hynny'n gweithio ar gyfer. Mae'n dweud eich gwrdd hynny. Mae hynny'n gweithio ar gyfer, mae'n dweud eich gwrdd bouldwyr, mae'r cyfaint cyfaint gyfaint gyffredinol yma. Mae'n dweud eich cyfaint gyffredinol, a'r dweud eich cyfaint gyffredinol yma. Fyrdd yma eich cyfaint gyffredinol o'n gweithio dr Johnson, y ddiddordeb am y cyllid ynddyn nhw'n ddiddordeb yn y ffordd ar gweithio'r rhiwp amser i'r ddiddordeb na'r ddiddordeb. Felly, Flockadder yn y gallu'n thymau i'r ddiddordeb yn ddiddordeb yn y ddiddordeb o'r ddiddordeb yn y ddiddordeb o'r ddiddordeb o ddiddordeb ar gyfer 3 o 4. Felly, rhan oedd gwneud o'r srfaidd, Baldry, ystod fod yn byw i'rír Torun Roddolson yn gweithio i ddylch i fathau ac mae'r wneud o'r gweithiau ymlaes o'r ddau'r ddau'r ddau, mae wedi'n dweud o'r deffinitiadau o ddaw, neu ddau'r cadw i wedi'r dda, a dwi'n ceisio yw cael y ddefnyddio negatifol, I there, there, not a cat. And it's kind of negative definition. That I thought was rather limiting. And so I didn't want to just, Transnational Environmental Regulation to remain, I didn't think it was good for the discipline if Transnational Environmental Regulation remained just not a cat, not a state regulation. And so, the work that had been engaged in for ..a rationale became more than I care to admit, is trying to establish a more positive identity... ...of Transnational Environmental Regulation, and I looked at a variety of aspects of the life... ...of Transnational Environmental Regulation. I've looked almost as if I've done some sort of literary analysis, I've divided the field with reference... The deal with reference to the actors involved that kind of parties that take place in different types of and different types of tear initiatives, I've organized it's deal by motivation like what drives transnational regulators to become regulators. It's typically not because there is a law that says that they must. So what drives people to start regulating beyond the level of the state? I've looked at the different strategies that Transnational Regulators deployed, and there, and it's been done in one of the real kind of eye-opening and, you know, demanding aspects of the work. You know how environmental regulation, those of you who've studied or are familiar with environmental regulation, there's this very kind of strong narrative of various command and control, and then there are all the alternative regulatory strategies. And working with that, I kind of found that actually, well, it's useful to have such a kind of narrative, such a foundation, but it's also very limiting, and they've become very opaque concepts. So I've tried to kind of more deconstruct regulatory strategies by actually looking at the different processes of both setting a normalisation and engagement and learning in response, and actually arrived at some, I think, you know, quite interesting conclusions like, for example, the fact that certain forms of Transnational Regulators, particularly private governance regimes, actually look a lot more like command and control than they do, and then they look like more flexible forms of regulation. And then I've also explored the relationship between Transnational Environmental Regulation and Law, which is the subject also of a fairly recent article in the journal, which basically argues that Transnational Environmental Regulation has a rather disruptive impact on the kind of features that we traditionally associate with law, with what I call traditional attributes of law, and enlists a number of different responses, and all these responses have basically certain political consequences. And then finally, the last part of the exploration tries to look at, well, what kind of governance principles does Transnational Environmental Regulation have? Are there kind of overarching principles that qualify this, you know, teammate and very varied field of regulation? So that's kind of, that was the final instalment, and the most recent part of the work. And that's what I'm going to concentrate on today's principles of Transnational Environmental Regulation. Now, just kind of so that we're talking about the same things. So the definition that I use, it's not cast in stone, but a useful definition I find of Transnational, well, first of all of regulation, because of course if you were to talk about regulation beyond the concept of, beyond the state, you need a rather de-centred or de-institutionalised understanding of regulation. You can't define regulation with reference to particular state agencies or government authority. And there are many very interesting, useful, de-centred definitions of regulation out there. The one that I typically use, because it's quite, you know, it's quite spartan, but I think it gets the key points of regulation across, is to view regulation as basically the exercise of influence with particular purpose, in other words, the deliberate exercise of influence, and also with a certain level of authority towards the achievement of the goal that is generally defined as viewing the public interest. That's sort of, I think, the key features of regulation. Now obviously identifying or spotting whether or not influence is exercised with purpose. And whether influence is exercised with authority. You can look at a number of different aspects there, like for example, in order to see whether there's purpose, you can look at, well, are there particular instruments and practices that are being used. For example, if you see particular normalisation techniques being used, like standard setting, et cetera, that can be a good indicator that there's some deliberate purpose going on there. Also, are there objectives defined in the exercise? So are objectives being communicated? If you want to achieve this or that goal, that's also a good indicator of purpose. And then when it comes to authority, well, one way of trying to see, well, is there authority within this, you know, this communication, can be looking at the status of whoever is giving the communication. But also, by looking at what are the consequences for the parties that are addressed with co-operating or not co-operating with the regime, are there significant consequences. And what are the external impacts? In other words, does this exercise of influence on a particular target group, does that also have ramifications for outsiders? Does it constrain or shape outsiders' choices outside of living conditions in a particular way? So that's a kind of de-centred definition that I use. When it comes to transnational, well, basically, obviously that means that it's happening at a level that affects or that goes beyond just the state level. And also in another little recent piece for comparative environmental law, I've mapped that, that field of transnational environmental regulation, in relation then as basically, you know, you've got public TR, private TR and hybrid TR. This is where particularly what rather mature regimes, sometimes the kind of the interplay between public and private actors involved can become so ameshed, so rich basically, that you can't really just qualify them as public or private anymore without being over simplistic. For example, like the Covenant of Mayors would be an example of that of a regime where there's a lot of public and private interaction. Flecht arguably falls under that as well. International organisation for standardisation, the code examiner, those are kind of hybrid regimes. And there are a number of others where you can still see more clearly, well, are public authorities, you know, either super national authorities or national authorities, working together at this super national level in the driving seat or private actors in the driving seat. And you can have public-public, which is basically regulation essentially mostly designed and formulated, managed by public authorities and primarily addressed to other public bodies. You've got public-private, so made by public authorities, but addressed to private parties. You've got a lot of private-private as well, so you know, private parties in charge and addressed to private parties. I mean, I put private-public on there. I didn't really find instances of regulatory regimes where private bodies were in charge and they exclusively addressed public authorities. But what you do find is that very successful that sometimes public authorities or even states or governments or cities become members of private regimes. So they become also addresses of private regimes. So that's a kind of mapping exercise I've gone through. And this covers a whole range of different regulatory initiatives. It includes, for example, EU environmental regulation, which is typically either public-public or increasingly also public-private in nature. It includes a lot of the regulatory aspects of multilateral environmental agreements. It includes things such as, you know, the OECD guidelines for multinational enterprises. It includes initiatives such as the Forest Stewardship Council, Responsible Care, the Marine Stewardship Council, the carbon neutral protocol, Reggie, the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, Compact of Mayors, Covenant of Mayors, loads of different kind of subnational city networks that particularly in the area of climate change have become very prominent lately. So it covers a very vast range of different initiatives, which has made my life extremely difficult in the past years because you have to, you know, you're kind of driving, you feel like you're driving an Uber, four-wheel trucks on the ground, and you're trying to find sort of cohesive aspects of identity of this very sprawling range of regulation. And it's been really miserable at times, I have to say. But the thing is I felt like I had to work with a very broad canvas because if you want to say something about there, if you want to explore, are there distinctive features to transnational environmental regulation, then you don't want to be in a situation where afterwards you discover, well, yes, I said there were distinctive features, but that's because I failed to include, I failed to take into account this whole range of initiatives that are also treated as or labeled as transnational environmental regulation. So I've been working with these very broad categories in late nights, lots of swimming along, but, you know, getting to the end of that process. So the last bit there of that process was then looking at, well, this broad range of initiatives, are there also, how do we know, what kind of governance principles are there? Are there particular principles that discipline the exercise of authority, essentially, within these broad different ways of networks? So then looking at governance principles particularly, well, when we talk about principles of transnational environmental regulation, you can think about, well, principles for transnational environmental regulation, in other words, principles that are, that external sources identify as appropriate principles for regulation. And typically, you know, those external sources, they will very often be legal sources, they will emanate from different fields of law. Principles of TER, those are going to internal principles. So principles that the regimes themselves proclaim as guiding their decision making. We might get if, for example, the Forest Stewardship Council says we are guided by the precautionary principle, the principle of terror. And also the principles from terror, because transnational environmental regulation very often engages with bodies that will be required to execute essentially implementing regulatory tasks. It's like, for example, in the case of public TER, they will also very often address principles to their interests and say if you implement our standards, you have to follow those principles. So those are kind of principles from TER. I think it's quite useful to be aware of the distinctive categories there, that there is, of course, there's clearly a connection between them. And typically, for example, if a body itself says that while we are a transparent regime, it will typically also expect their adversities to behave in a transparent way. So there's a link between them. And obviously, in order to determine what kind of principles should guide them, so principles of their regimes will very often look to legal sources to identify what relevant principles are. So in order to try and identify these principles, you can take different approaches, and two main approaches you can take is either the deductive approach. So when you look at the external sources, what external sources say about what should be principles for transnational regulation, that's a deductive approach which is represented here by... It's not that I expected to be added a little bit. Do you know this picture, the one here? It's not King Solomon's story. It's Socrates. It's Socrates. This is where... It's quite a famous picture from when he was taking the hand-off. He was condemned to death for drinking a lethal potion, and he famously sat around and described to his disciples what it felt like and what was going through his body and everything. Socrates is strongly associated with the deductive method. All men are mortal. Socrates is a man, therefore Socrates is mortal. Inductive method. For that I've got Sherlock Holmes. I just wanted to put that up because I always used to think that Sherlock Holmes was deducing things. You know, I deduce dear ones. It's not true. He's inducing things all the time. Because what Socrates is doing is Socrates is starting from principle and deriving specifics from it. Whereas what Holmes is doing is Holmes is starting from specifics and deriving more general solutions from it. That's an inductive method. So next time someone tells you I deduce dear ones, you can direct me. So applied to our field of exploration, basically you can either start looking at the legal sources and say, well, where are the kind of relevant legal information for tear, or you can look at the documents of tear themselves and see what kind of governance principles emanate from what they have to say. So I did both because I think that's very useful to have an inductive approach. Because it's all nice and handy to say that sustainable development is a principle of transnational environmental relation. But if none of the regulatory regimes are actually following that, then there's a kind of slight problem with reality. But by the same token, only looking inductively is also quite limited. First of all, it's not as if these tear regimes are completely reinventing the wheel. They look to legal standards and look to inform them. And also by having a view of both, you can compare and contrast and see how well conceptualizations match. And so it sort of harnesses your critical skills. Now following the deductive approach, what kind of legal sources essentially? What kind of legal fields are fields from which you control principles for tear? Well, it's actually quite interesting if you look for example at the Oslo principles on global climate obligations, which were released, I think, a couple of years ago, two years ago, and incidentally, now at this, I think, well, one of these days, this is a formal inauguration of a new set of principles, which is kind of the principles for climate obligations targeted specifically at enterprises, specifically at carbon majors. And we're having actually, we're having a discussion about this with the fund, with the drafters of these global principles for enterprises at the LSE next week, if you're interested, should be a good event. But if you look at these Oslo principles, so there you have, you know, who made these Oslo principles, what bodies of experts and senior judges getting together and also some people from governments were involved and representatives of NGOs, et cetera. I mean some representatives from enterprises, et cetera. And so they basically, they refer to the different kinds of legal fields that they drawn from in order to develop essentially governance principles. And they're very nicely reflective of the kind of the fields that are most frequently discussed with reference to transnational environmental regulation and law, like international environmental law, human rights law, and then what I sort of labored, public institutional law, which is basically those kinds of public law disciplines that particularly sort of address the governance of institutions. And there you've got constitutional law, global constitutional law, international institutional law and global administrative law. Now, with regard to the first one, international environmental law, there are a number of principles there that are very useful in that we see, for example, also quite frequently reflected in discussions on transnational regulation. For example, the precautionary principle we see reflected quite frequently is also, of course, part of it is also principles of access to environmental information, participation, decision making, the procedural environmental rights, basically. So they are part of international environmental law, and we also see them reflected in these kind of discussions. The limitations of international environmental law as a source for tier principles is that it tends to be quite geared towards state entities. And not all the principles translate as easily, for example, in private governance settings. Human rights law too, and again we see quite a few overlaps, increasingly in human rights law, there are emphasis on access to information rights and very often sort of also more distinctive emphasis on access to environmental information within this. So we see that replicated in that field as well. We see in human rights law also increasingly there's the right, their rights to clean environment in the human rights law, a healthy environment being discussed as a human rights essentially. And while in itself that does not give a lot of directive force, we do see that, for example, there are a number of, say, constitutions that recognize rights to clean environment that actually already give quite a bit more detail about what that means. And in that detail, like for example requirements that sustainable development is accounted for in regulatory decision making, start generating principles that are actually more useful as governance principles. The limitation with human rights is, well partly also that again it's initially more addressed towards the state. Although increasingly though we've seen there really seem quite a change in the past five years particularly, it seems that commentators and even litigants are speaking with greater and greater ease about human rights responsibilities of private parties, which is really quite a sea change. So that's quite a significant source. And then those three, the public institutional law ones, a lot of the actual content of the kind of principles that they put forward, it's very similar. Like rights of access to environmental information, you can find that in constitutional law, you can find that in international institutional and you can find it in administrative law. But you have quite significant debates between different fields of scholarship particularly as to what is the appropriate source of principles for transnational governance. And the views are typically sort of affected by where the authors or where the different commentators think authority and legitimacy should be located. But writers in the constitutional theme think that well there needs to be some sort of vertical legitimation going on. Regulatory regimes need to be sort of operating on the biospaces of something that's hierarchically superior to them and it's hierarchically superior because it's kind of legitimated by a more direct link to essentially democratic decision making etc. And directly to the pouvoir constituant. So because of that they kind of say well these kind of principles should really be ultimately vested in a kind of constitutional legal concept. So when it comes to applying constitutional principles to TR, well you have a double challenge in that in the first place constitutional principles tend to be drafted in order to remain to state authorities. But arguably that's not that difficult to overcome. There's been a lot of sort of writing and a lot of kind of altering perspectives offered in this field that actually constitutional principles should also should basically engage with authority more because of the impact of authority than because of the particular source of authority. But what's more difficult is for constitution to kind of engage with that transnational dimension because there's no such thing other than you know the EU treaties. There's no such thing as really as a global or a transnational constitution so it's harder to kind of make that transnational way. International institutional law, that's the law that's there to govern institutions that are set up under international law like for example conferences of the party etc. So that body of law definitely doesn't struggle with overcoming the national law, it's designed to be applied in a transnational context. But that body of law arguably of all the bodies of law is the most limited when it comes to generating governance principles for TR because so much in international institution law is premised on the notion of state consent basically. If the state's consent then you have legitimate and lawful activity and if they don't consent then you don't. And the exercise of governance isn't limited or curtailed or disciplined by much else than state consent. Whereas constitutional law struggles to kind of overcome the transboundary threshold, institutional law struggles to overcome the non-state threshold, struggles to be exported more effectively towards areas where states do not all have a veto in the adoption of transnational rules. Now the real solutions would seem to be initially would seem to be global administrative law because that's actually a discipline of law that was developed in response to the proliferation of those very types of regimes that were concerned with. Those transnational regimes that aren't, particularly those that aren't clearly governed by either a national or an international or an EU regime. So it seems to be rather purpose built in order to respond to it. And it's also quite flexible in its conception. It draws basically on different national administrative traditions in order to kind of create and in order to create notions of administrative soundness that are more adapted to the transnational space. So that all seems very positive and it is arguably the best fit. But there are also limitations to it. Well, for example, well, they call it global administrative law. It's not really global, is it? When they say they're drawing on sort of different administrative traditions in order to constitute concepts, they're drawing on American legal traditions and a bit of European. And it's not global. And secondly also, I mean, there's been a lot of talk at Wuhan about global administrative law and it promises to be able to kind of go more into detail and therefore get sort of a bit more needs than constitutional principles to which tend to be rather broad and vague in their description. But not enough for one has been achieved by students of and scholars in global environmental law so far in terms of actually giving greater specificity to what concept actually means and how they are actually applied in different concepts. So in terms of kind of output, it's arguably a bit disappointing. So that's deductive. That's deductive. Now finally also the inductive approach as the last bit. So that's where I basically looked at, that's where I basically looked at obviously not all of them. It's impossible to look at all of them. So it's a broad study in that regard because there's only that many transnational environmental regimes have actually looked at. But I've tried to look at a broad representative canvas including lots of international frameworks, quite a bit of EU stuff as well. I've looked at, for example, the work done under Asia. I've looked at a lot of private governance regimes, et cetera. So I've looked at a lot of these kind of linking regimes where basically different ETSs link together transnationally. I've looked at city regimes. So I've tried to look at quite a bit in order to kind of draw some conclusions about, well, what principles do they actually, what principles do you actually find in the regimes themselves? First, a few general observations, which is that, well, the EU in this context, not in every context of the era, but in this context is quite a separate case because the EU has a quite well-developed specific set of governance principles. A lot of them are in the EU treaties, like, for example, article 191 TFU that requires that policy is adopted, taking into account of the constitutional principle and prevention and all the rest of it, that some science needs to be taken into account. Also, of course, articles, what is it, 11 and 15 of the TFU require access to information and participation in decision-making. There are provisions for access to justice. So it's a kind of well-developed governance principle. That's not the case for other areas. Looking at, for example, public versus privatey are interesting. Private environmental governance regimes or environmental regulatory initiatives, rather, even though most of them have voluntary accession, they tend to be quite valuable, quite effusive about the principles that they adhere to. Also, for example, quite a few of them subscribe to something called ISEAL, which is the International Social and Environmental Accreditation and Labelling Alliance, which develops good standard-setting principles in practice. So ISEAL has a whole set of governance principles, and a lot of private governance regimes subscribe to ISEAL. And in order to be a member of ISEAL, you have to adopt those governance principles. The ones where you find the fewest governance principles, the ones that I advocate the least, are public-public tier. So the kind of regulation that you find, for example, in UNFCCC, in the Basal Convention, in the Convention on Biological Diversity, those tend to be rather tight-lipped about the governance principles for their regulatory work. Also, I mentioned that one of the ways in which I've looked at the field is by looking at the different motivations, what drives different regulators to engage in transnational regulation. And there are sort of distinguished five different motivations, and two of them, collective action tier, which is basically transnational regulatory initiatives adopted in order to overcome tragedy of the commons problems, in order to deal with global commons goods. And enhancement tier, those are regulatory initiatives that are there that connect typically either cities or states that already have environmental regimes in base, but that work together in order to get basically a bit of an extra boost to enhance their initiatives. Those tend to be fairly tight-lipped on governance principles. Trade facilitation tier, where you get the adoption of environmental standards also in service of free of trade. Substitute tier, typically where you get private governance regimes stepping in and regulating because the state won't. And risk management tier, typically where you get private regulatory stepping, adopting self-regulatory regimes because they find that they are at risk, for example, of the reputation of risk that they go on. Those ones are much more, you know, are much more communicative about the principles that govern them. Interestingly also I found that it's whether or not the regimes are sort of officially voluntary regimes or mandatory regimes didn't seem to make a big difference as to whether or not they officially professed subscribing to governance principles. Procedural versus substantive principles clearly a strong predominance of procedural principles. A much more greater willingness and much stronger emphasis pretty much across the board of tier to procedures rather than to substantive principles. When it comes to the key principles definitely very strong emphasis on particularly on transparency and on inclusiveness, on environmental participatory practices. But there was in that regard there was something quite noteworthy, particularly in the private tier, but increasingly also in public tier. In that, you know, you have active and passive access to information rights. Passive is basically that you, the citizen, can ask the public authority for information. Active is the public authority has a duty to inform you or, you know, it's a responsibility to inform you of particular things. Much stronger emphasis on active than on passive, very few, particularly very few private regulators offer passive information rights. They offer active ones. Same with participation. Very few basically say you can be involved when you want. They also say we organize consultation processes that they organize and they sort of, they invite stakeholders, et cetera. Contestability, so in other words, are there opportunities to, are there opportunities to challenge the decisions that transnational environmental regulators make? Of the procedural guarantees, definitely guaranteed less frequently than the other two, across the board, across public and private. But, and hybrid. So, what we do find is that it is on the rise, though, that, for example, with new iterations, like, you know, from the first equator principles to the second to the third iteration, that there are more and more opportunities for compensation being built in. But it's focused quite strongly on dispute resolution and on mediation, sort of providing mediation processes rather than judicial processes. Strong emphasis on sound science, the precautionary principles, surprisingly successful, considering that it's quite a controversial principle, surprisingly successful, not only in the public sphere but also in the private sphere. For example, the Forest Stewardship Council subscribes to it. In the fishing area, so all sorts of transnational fishing arrangements subscribe to the precautionary principles. So it's very prominent. And that's finally, and maybe the most intriguing conclusion. These are not all the principles that have given me the greatest hits. Sustainability and, so there's, they almost all subscribe to sustainable development. But some of these reasons, that just means that whatever they are doing, they say that is sustainable development. You know, it doesn't really sort of guide them very much. But there are different iterations and what we do find is, for example, strong emphasis on environmentally sustainable management, taking that as the interpretation of sustainable development, and also increasing the expectations of progression being built into the regulatory regime. And for example, and the Paris Agreement is a beautiful example of an agreement with the expectation of progression. But it goes much beyond that. The carbon neutral protocol has an expectation of progression. Responsible care has an expectation of progression. So it's that the expectation that progressive parties will do better and better and achieve more and in a more stringent environment targets. You see that kind of progression as a guiding principle, surfacing in a whole state of particularly recent regulatory regimes. Now the big lessons there are some lessons that I gleaned from it. The first of all some really good news. The really good news is the kind of the sphere of transition environmental regulation. Even widely drawn, even kind of including a number of more peripheral initiatives. It's not a void where principles come to die. There are quite a lot of governance principles that are embraced and discussed. And there's a good overlap between deductive and inductive. And that's important because that kind of keeps the relevance of legal sources alive as kind of source material. And there's also basis for critique for TDR regimes. Secondly, going back to that principle of progression, it's really quite intriguing because if you start introducing an expectation, if progression becomes and is gradually maturing into a governance principle for environmental regulation, with who knows maybe a potential to even migrate towards the state-based regulations here as well. It actually changes things quite a bit. It changes a number of premises of environmental decision making quite a bit. Because so far a lot of our environmental decision making has been very much inspired by cosy thinking. In that there's a sort of Pareto optimal point where if you regulate more tightly than that, then you're actually doing more bad than good. So you need to find the right kind of balance between regulation and freedom of enterprise. And there's a sweet spot you need to hit that Pareto optimal point. And the principle of sustainable development sort of reflects that as well that you have to have these balance. But the principle of progression kind of doesn't really work that way. The principle of progression seems to suggest that maybe there isn't a Pareto optimal point or if there is one it keeps moving all the time. So it's really quite a different perspective. It irritates one of those quite foundational notions around which a lot of our ideas on environmental decision making have a value. The final point, and arguably this one is, you know, we've gone from happy news to go and treating news to maybe worrying news, is kind of, I think that you can, when you see that for example how particularly private environmental ideas, but not only private ones, also hybrid and public ones, are using and explaining their own governance principles, you kind of see it kind of quite a slam towards managerialism, that they treat these principles as management principles, management tools. And for example, think about the difference between passive and active access to information, having to give information when a third party asks you, that's being under an obligation. Active information responsibilities, sending out information, telling the world about how you're doing, that's a tool. That's a tool that you can use to manage particular problems. Same with kind of the way that participation and even contestability is being organised. Also, it's kind of the way that sustainability is increasingly frequently tied to environmentally sustainable management. So there's a whole kind of managerialisation almost of governance principles, potentially at work here. And we do need to be aware of that. First of all, because it can also start affecting, you know, more traditional spheres of regulation. And secondly also because like it could potentially kind of reduce or be a kind of countervailing force against human rights kind of argumentation, human rights based principles. We don't really sort of sit together very well. So I do think that that is a development to be, that it's important to be attuned to and important to be aware of that. We might be talking about the same principles. We might all be talking about transparency. But it can mean something quite different in different regulatory circles. And that difference can be very important. Okay, that's it. If you have any questions, I'm there for you. I'm sorry for going back too long. Thank you very much. I think there's an incredible amount of information and concepts and ideas for us to reflect on that. There are questions. Hi. Thank you for the presentation. I was just wondering when the private seems to be clear in terms of who the private actors are. It seems to be a lot of work companies and such like it's not wrong. And the public seems to be the governments, the nation states or provincial government or different governments and government. But they stand in for the public as the members of the public. Or is there a third category as well? No, private, basically private also. For example, NGOs, say for example the first stewardship council is, well, it's a kind of an amalgamation, but NGOs have been part, have been important in its establishment and a big part of the credibility of the FSC has been related to the fact that NGOs have been having a problem. That's private. What I mean by public is basically public authority. And what about local communities? What about local communities? That's public authority. So, for example, I would call, like the covenant mayors, for example, or, you know, climate city, what are they called? C4, C4, etc. Those, I would categorise that as either public-public or hybrid, because actually very often, for example, charities and NGOs also play quite an important role in these kind of networks. So they are typically a little bit too complex to be classified as either public. But so by public I essentially mean public authority. So is it someone working on their official status related somehow to the state? Or is it to international organisations or are it actually entities operating in private capacities to do them? I was hoping not. And, you know, it's possible, you know. I mean, like I say, this is not... I mean, I hope it's decent. It might be that, but I don't think that if you organise it in this way that you would say that an entity will always be either public or private. So if you have the classification that I've made, it should be covered. It should be covered. Any kind of entity should fit somewhere. What you do see is that, for example, entities tend to migrate, like the Codex Alimentarius. Initially it would have been probably in public-private. But increasingly also the norms that Codex Alimentarius puts out are also addressed to governments as well. So it's becoming more and more hybrid. I mean, in fact, you know, there's a bit of hybridity everywhere. But in some cases it's so pronounced that actually you are kind of, you know, oversimplifying excessively if you try to cram them in one or the other public-private box. Yeah. Thank you for the contribution. I don't know if it's really related to this topic, but would you see a problem in finding like this transnational environmental recognition that applies equally to all? In relation with the common but differentiated responsibility principle, or how could there be like a conflict between these and the other side? It's a really good question that, you know, in the common but differentiated responsibilities requirement is very much the kind of essentially state-to-state realignment, right? And one of the questions is like, well, when you have transnational structures, is that one of those kind of, of those requirements that are actually going to get lost? In other words, is there going to be, are developing countries essentially going to lose out by regulatory initiatives moving more to kind of, to the transnational and non-state level? And there might be some of that. There's a researcher, I think it was Paula Castro, who did, who has done research as to whether transnational climate change regimes, whether they recognize the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities. So, you know, like the compact of mayors and etc., and all these kind of, do they recognize that principle? Very, very few do. So it does seem that it doesn't fit that well. On the other hand, for example, in the equator principles, the kind of, the standards that are infallible, David Ong has done research into that area and observed that the standards and requirements are different depending on whether you know you are an OECD country, whether you are a bank located in an OECD country, whether you are a non-OECD, and whether you are really sort of from one of the least developed countries. So there are also regimes that do make that kind of differentiation. But it's a very good question as to whether we find and see, you know, like essentially functional equivalents for that kind of differentiation. The same embrace of a lot of the private governance regimes is that they are not required, right? I mean, so parties choose to kind of exceed to them, but that's not the end of the story because, you know, if a regime becomes influential enough, how free are those choices still? And then also, once you're part of them, you're really fully free to me still, and, you know, you already know, like once you become a member of a gym, how difficult it becomes to stop being a member of a gym, you know. It's so much worse when you're a member of responsible care when you want to get out of that. So it's very, it's one of those really kind of more challenging issues around this. I don't know if I'm missing this point, but within these regimes, the standard, is there a sanctions ratio attached to them? Well, that goes to strategies, right? I've looked at that as well, and obviously that, again, because I've looked at such a very broad field of regulatory initiatives, you know, the answer is obviously it depends on the initiative, but the sort of, some general lessons there are that we are more likely probably to underestimate the coercive and sanctioning force of these kind of, you know, alternative or known state regimes than we are to overestimate it. Like, for example, a lot of the, if you have networks, for example, with carbon neutral protocol, which is a set, which is a private, which is an example of a private-private mission, so run by a private organisation and address to private companies. Now, essentially the companies that become members of the carbon neutral protocol, they do have, they have a contractual relationship with the party that runs the carbon neutral protocol. And that also means that basically if they are using the label because they're saying, look, we are carbon neutral, we're doing what we have to do, we've been certified, et cetera, and they're not doing it. They're not complying with the standards. That's actually, that can be a serious problem for the regime as a whole, because the community undermines credibility of the regime. And they have a contract. So there are potential contractual recourse, there's potential contractual recourse basically for litigation. There's very, very little litigation, but that doesn't necessarily mean that things don't happen. It could be that a lot of it goes to arbitration. Or it could be that these regimes are so effective that there's actually not a lot of breach of contract. But that's, you know, I'm experientially also talking with people involved in these types of regimes. Very often peers will find it harder to breach the codes of other peers than they will find it hard to breach governmental requirements. And there will be more of a stigma and more of a market risk attach to breaching private standards than to breaching governmental standards. So that's just one of the range of lessons. Obviously not every regime is as powerful as the other. But then on the other hand everyone always treats the Paris Agreement as a binding regime even though, and it is efficient in the binding, in terms of kind of sanctioning and compliance mechanisms it's arguably the weakest one of the bunch. So it's, we find a very, very landscape but by and large they're, you know, my impression is that also because of how these regimes are structured, they invest a lot in what I call engagement strategies. Engagement strategies are basically, you know, when you've developed your stand and you've set your goals when you've developed your standards you've got to engage the adversities, right? You've got to create a connection with them and that means that, well, the most basic thing you need to do is communicate your standards, right? Because if no one knows quite your standards are relevant, you know, not much is going to happen, not much behavior is going to be influenced, which is essence of regulation. But beyond that, we also see a lot of bonding strategies happening. For example, one very, very prominent bonding strategy in the transnational regulatory field are reporting requirements. Now, parties have to report what they are doing. They have to feedback information. And the thing is that it sounds like it's not very forceful but it just, it shifts the kind of, it shifts the context of it. First of, because, well, it's kind of, it's one thing having, being confronted with a standard and not complying with a standard because you could say, oh well, there can be a range of different reasons and it can be, you know, oversight or whatever. But not complying with a reporting requirement, there's a deliberate element there. And so a company might be comfortable to sort of flaunt the standard of it but it might be less comfortable to kind of basically not report back or to rely, to actually rely when it's reported. So it kind of alters the stakes of it and that's a kind of engagement mechanism. It's not an unfortunate mechanism but it creates a stronger bond. Certification creates a bond. Establishing a market, or option principles. These are kind of bonding mechanisms that connect regulatory addresses to the scheme. And these two, basically their key function is to optimise circumstances for compliance. So it's not a deterns-based type of compliance that you get but it can be sort of, it's an alternative type. You know, it's also talking about how it can be made. Can we jump in on that? Total obvious but certification. I mean, FSC was initiated by NGOs by women in 1990 because there was a failure to an agreement on the Convention on Forests so it's like, let's do something. Many of the NGOs that were involved in that movement actually have distanced themselves as it progressed because it was increasing its market size. It changed the boundaries that it takes. You have the 10 principles of FSC. They're agreed but then how you'll arrive at those, the rules change and you can have mixed recycling, mix sources, different plantations, all these things. And then they've been of increased progression so we want to get on board more forests and lakes out. So you can meet the principles over time. So from a distance if you're looking at the principles they meet a lot of what you're saying. In practice some of the people that initiated it some of the rainforest foundation that produced the report Trading Incredibility they've distanced themselves FSC has grown exponentially alongside PFC which is bigger but they've diluted and changed the strategies and I think that's interesting because in some ways progression could be like a CBBR. It's a good thing to put out because I didn't in the talk but yes I mean progression that principle of progression is double-edged sword because on the one hand it can mean that basically you can the cosy and parato optimal can be surpassed but by the same token it can also mean that well there's not a particular as long as you're doing a bit better every time around regardless of how crazily the scenario around you is changing as long as you're doing a bit better than before by whatever yardstick that is being measured you're fine and this is one of the challenges in talking about this issue and researching this issue is that well I think it's very one of the reasons that I actually wanted to do this research is transnational regulatory initiatives have proliferated so much in the past decades and you're sort of very often feel very mixed emotions when I think about them because on the one hand you get this sense of what beggars can't be choosers you know we don't have an awful lot of environmental regulation so you should be grateful for any kind of initiative around but on the other hand they also they're challenging and vulnerable and regimes and structures and they're vulnerable but they're also actually I would argue my research supports the pieces that they're more powerful than their formal status indicates and when I say vulnerable it's basically well for example in my when I went through the exercise of basically identifying different reasons why regulators would want to engage in an exercise of transnational environmental regulation so collective action TR trade reciditation TR substitute TR risk management TR and enhancement TR there were sort of five different reasons that I could distinguish and I kind of did a little discussion about oh you know how does that motivation affect how they work and affect their outlook on everything and in pretty much all but one it introduced a bias of unambitious standard setting of unambitious decision making for different types of reasons for example in collective action TR typically introduces this bias because there you have to get it's only worth the mustard if you get parties involved that are typically not uninterested in regulation so you have to kind of you have to give them an easy entry point in the case of substitute TR you typically have to kind of compromise in order to get a bit more credibility and cooperation so it's from a compromise perspective in risk management TR well there basically the key motivation of the parties involved isn't to save the world even though you know if you read what responsible care has to say about itself you've given the Nobel Peace Prize but you know that's not really they want to kind of satisfy they don't want to optimize so there are a lot of forces in this field of transnational regulation that on the one hand kind of are very kind of sympathetic to things getting done but very unsympathetic to things getting done thoroughly and that kind of opens up a whole range of questions and issues and it's not a not a field by any stretch the question is would not kind of taking a very negative attitude towards all these kind of initiatives well first of all would it make any difference and secondly would the environment be better off if you know these kind of initiatives were stamped down as much as possible very highly highly questionable Tyler then you're feeding on your last point do you think that it's closing down the space for creative state regulation not this is leading to a much more dynamic creative there are definitely in this kind of field of transnational regulation there is a one of the big devices that are those people kind of see the state regulation and transnational regulation in a kind of rivaling relation with each other and then there's the other perspective that they almost mutually feed each other and more of a symbiotic synergistic relationship for better or worse I'm more of the latter persuasion and in fact in that context I have sort of one of the one of the more speculative aspects of the research one of the slightly you know unexpected turns that your work sometimes takes when you're not paying attention is you know one of the I was looking particularly at Reggie at the regional rehouse gas initiative which is speaking as a transnational it's all within the US but it's trans-statal and it could be open to Canada as well so you know it'll pass so I was looking at this and that's a market based mechanism and further my discussion of market based instruments you know that mark the whole notion of flexible mechanisms is very much associated with transnational regulation for example because it was the Kyoto protocol that initially sort of gave a real to the boost to oh you know should flexible mechanisms are the way to go that's really the way in which these instruments should be implemented and so when I started analysing transnational regulation more from this kind of goal setting normalisation engagement learning and response perspective it kind of fell apart in a slightly different way and that you kind of realise that actually there are not a lot of market based instruments that are actually organised at the transnational level that's pretty rare typically what you have is that the type of standard setting that goes on at the transnational level is pretty conventional pretty sort of traditional in nature but what they say is oh you know market based instruments should be used in implementation at the national level and that kind of got me to thinking because sort of the widest spread view is that the reason that transnational regimes advocates flexible instruments market based instruments is to get support from the private sector because private enterprise refer market based instruments to command and control kind of approaches and I was wondering whether those are really the parties that they are buying in because when you look at how market based instruments actually run and for example also how other example like sausages and taxes are organised those are typically those areas that are hardest to organise outside of the sphere of state authority and for example if you are going to create allowances you need some sort of you need to kind of have a legal authority a clear legal authority behind you in order to create this new kind of financial instrument basically and so I am basically wondering whether it's not in order to co-op the state rather than to co-op the private parties themselves that these instruments are being advocated at transnational level because if because state regulators are necessary in that kind of regime so it's kind of it keeps them involved and it keeps them engaged so it's a kind of alternative way of looking at it but it's just one illustration of how in the transnational sphere the state definitely doesn't disappear it becomes reconfigured and it kind of gets alternative ranges of roles et cetera but it doesn't lose its relevance it just changes the kind of changes its modus operandi I think and it doesn't and also doesn't lead to less state regulation I think transnational regulation very often leads to a lot more state regulation if that for example the marine stewardship council copied their name from the FSC they really did so the marine stewardship council they there's this case and there's this young researcher in the Netherlands who's written a really good article about this Marcus Paradies and basically the Maldives wanted to kind of wanted their their fisheries to be MSC certified because it's a very good kind of it's good for the marketing of the MSC marketing strategy and so the Maldives wanted that their fisheries sector got certified and the MSCs required that well basically you have to adopt national regulation you have to adopt national standards and you've got like five years to do it and if you do that we'll sort of extend the scheme to you so you have a private regulator basically preconditioning certification of private fisheries on the adoption of regulation on the national rival were they understanding the enforcement problems in the state not the enforcement but they were kind of they can't oversee the enforcement of the standards directly but they kind of require that as a precondition in order to kind of know that they wouldn't be just basically out there on their own and they wouldn't be taking the risk of non-compliance completely themselves so yes national and trans national are very enmeshed and I think it's probably you're probably missing too much of the picture if you assume that the rise of trans national and global levels of governance is kind of you know making the state irrelevant I wouldn't see that like oh yes so in the section of the document you listed the national environment of human power and then in the category you gave this global and then the third one the middle one a good question about the middle one international institution so who are the law givers and who are the IDSA of that do you imply some kind of supranational entity? well it's international entity international institution law is the law that governs international institution such as for example the united nations conferences of parties under different all spaces or say the pop's committee under the Stockholm convention so there are provisions there are provisions international institution legal provisions of young clobbers is the person who is the expert on these issues that essentially set out the requirements for these kind of international organisations international organisations that have an official legal status to operate lawfully and so they're an appropriate source to look at for transnational governance principles because they're also the level beyond the state but as I mentioned earlier they're quite limited in what they can give because they're so much for basically they're very thin there aren't that many principles and most of the principles don't really translate to the transnational conference because it's basically well for an institution to operate lawfully it has to operate under state consent everything it does has to be sort of vetted by the conference of the parties or whatever and oh yes they shouldn't operate ultra virus and there is some expectation that as they shouldn't as apparently they shouldn't operate ultra virus there should be an opportunity for claims of ultra virus to be made somewhere there so there's some expectation of judicial review but beyond that there's not much there in terms of for example international organizations have to behave transparently and international organizations have to kind of take into account some science in their decision making so it's thin in terms of of substance that it can offer so they speak to the nation state as well as some other very much yes it doesn't yes it doesn't really travel well to that context you didn't talk very much about legitimacy and that pops up a lot when looking at non-state based initiatives but being able to hold them to account responsibility legitimacy and in some ways there's the incentive to bring on board international legal norms the language like a precaution principle incorporated to gain some sense of legitimacy so embedding some normative language from the international community bringing it in house and it gives them then it's almost a little bit like window dressing because then it's like how do you hold them to account on the actual practice yes there's a accountability as an issue definitely because a lot of these regimes you definitely don't have for example well for say for example in the UK here for the environment for example you have an ombudsman an ombudsman that can hold the agency to account you have predominantly scrutiny committees etc and so all this kind of the legislative branch of accountability is pretty much absent for a lot of TR there is for example again here in the legal context European European Union regulation is in a state of exception but for a lot of TR there really isn't a lot of that type of accountability another aspect of accountability is kind of judicial accountability where a court all due to account again sphere of TR and even there when it comes to I mean the EU doesn't judicial review of the decisions of its own institutions I mean it's there but access to the courts is notoriously limited and secondly also the court is notoriously ill-disposed to a moment of the decisions that new institutions make so there's not a lot of that either so the question then is are these kind of alternative forms of accountability vis-à-vis the consumers accountability via the court of public opinion or what have you and also accountability via these internal review and mediation programs that increasingly also private governance regimes are setting up is that a sufficient kind of substitute or a sufficient alternative to actually genuinely talk about accountability it's a kind of it's an area of deficit I would definitely say for example one of the one of the TR regimes with the most developed review and mediation process is the round table for sustainable formal right so that kind of makes you think right so indeed I felt a little bit embarrassed when you said that I talked a lot about legitimacy because one of the reasons I started this big project is that a lot of irritations that drove me because nothing energises me like really really irritable is that we got a lot of literature, a lot of writing on different types of governance regimes and they always immediately jumped to legitimacy like oh we're going to look at the CDM executive in the Clean Development Mechanism Executive Board oh it's got a legitimacy problem and they compared it to basically either implicitly or explicitly to a national regulator and of course it looked different from a national regulator ergo legitimacy problem and I felt it's sort of don't we need to understand how these regimes work a bit more, don't we need to know a little bit more about their positive identity so that when we talk about their acceptability we kind of do it in a more contextualized way and we use benchmarks that are more attuned to their context than to kind of than the legitimacy benchmarks that have been traditionally used for regulation like one key that my regulation class of today one key benchmarks is legislative mandate and if you use that as a benchmark and yeah of course it's all illegitimate that kind of goes without saving in the world but what I'm hoping is that the research that I've done might also inform kind of a more informed notion of what legitimate governments would look like at the transnational level and what the particular legitimacy deficits are against benchmarks that are fully appropriate for kind of the transnational level that's kind of what I'm hoping I'm hoping that my work might constitute a building block towards that kind of problem today just for curiosity after your research do you have a general idea of how many treaties or agreements can be considered as a transnational foundation in terms of I haven't looked at them all but if you look at virtually every especially when you're using a de-centered definition of regulation so that you also identify regulation in regimes that are not solely geared towards regulation if you look at the range of international and regional by and trilateral treaties it's that alone and you're still overwhelming in the public public sphere so there are masses and to be honest I've been keenly aware of my limitations in doing this work but one of the real frustrations is that I've tried as much as possible to kind of find cases and examples that are slightly more broadly represented but you know, in escape of this it's quite a lot of Eurocentric in support because that's what I know right and the writing that I consulted is the right thing that with a few exceptions here and there was written in English and English authors typically also had Euro and US-centric types of regimes so there are definitely you know, it's limitations to reaching to the scope but I have tried to kind of take a broad view based on you know, my experience quite a few years longer than I'm out there to admit Would it be right that there might be a book coming up? Yes Yes, indeed Hopefully sort of well, the very very earliest probably a Christmas gift more realistic more realistic what more could a person ask for on Valentine's next year but yes, there's a project that's coming to an end, it should be basically ready to go off the press by the end of next month Yes The last session to come after all the frustration and the right to watch your it's just so great Well, thank you very much I mean, that's been really just a huge exploration of the enormous enormous topic that I can only hope that everybody is sort of taking things from and it will go away with a lot about a number of those questions Thanks a lot, let's get on Thank you I appreciate you for using the same so long Also, next week we have some a woman from Warrick University of Warrick and she's going to be speaking about geoengineering and even writing