 So, ladies and gentlemen, thank you very both here in the flesh and online. Thank you very much for being with us this afternoon. Our topic is as you know the German national security strategy which was published at the end of beginning of the summer. And the title of the talk today is the German national security strategy. It all depends on the implementation. And we're very lucky to have to talk on this topic to have Dr. Marcus who's a senior fellow in the international security research division at the German Institute for international security affairs. And we're very grateful to him for doing this for us. Just a few points. He will talk as normal for 20 to 25 minutes. And then we will go into question and answer. Anybody on the floor who's asking a question we would ask them to give their name and their affiliation. And equally, I'll be picking up the zoom questions as well. The talk and the questions and answers will be on the record. If you want to tweet, or X, you can use the handle at IEA. And we're also live streaming this on YouTube. So I'd now like formally to introduce Dr. Keim and hand over to him. As I say he's a senior fellow. He was Helmut Schmidt fellow with the German Marshall Fund of the United States in Washington from 2019 to 2020. He was taught as a visiting scholar at the Institute of European Russian and duration studies at Carlton University Ottawa as DAAD professor for German and European studies at the University of Toronto. And as adjunct professor of foreign policy and international relations at the University of Constance. He's an adjunct professor at the University of Zurich at the Heritage School of Governance in Berlin and the Busserrius Law School in Hamburg. And we found anybody better to talk to us on this topic. So I'll hand over to you and thank you indeed. Thank you. Good afternoon to Dublin. It's a pleasure to talk to you and it's quite flattering that so many people are interested in Germany's national security. Well, I would like to do is to make eight points. I give my assumption that many of you have maybe read parts of the national security security certainly it would make sense to walk you through the document and document in detail. So I would make four I would like to make four points, more from an analytical point of view and more four points more from a critical point of view. And let me start by making my first point. It comes as it might come as a surprise, but this is the first national security strategy of Germany. We had over the last 70 years of German foreign policy, quite a few, quite a few documents of several important documents, defense white papers, defense reviews and all this usual documents, which are produced by bureaucracies, but no national security strategy. Therefore, the key question or the first question, the question which might arise will be why now. And I think three answers should be these consider considered the first one is the Germany now is confronted with a different world like your country like all other Western countries. And it is expressed precisely in this document at a center stage when it mentions the change environment. We're living in an age of increasing multipolarity some countries are attempting to reshape the current international order, driven by the perception of systemic rivalry. The key elements of the change security environment mentioned here, multi polarity international order systemic rivalry. I think this is something will be widely shared in nothing all Western capitals in all EU capitals in all NATO capitals. Therefore, I think the starting point of this whole national security national security strategy comes as no surprise but already before the process has started in 2022, March 2022, there has been a growing concern in the foreign policy establishment that Germany has not really reflected and not really reacted to the changed environment, which has not changed with Russian attack on Ukraine as such, but with a Russian revisionism with a rising China, with a declining United States, over the last, let's say, 10 years, 15 years, and this process has been accelerated and strengthened tremendously with Russian attack on Ukraine. However, the whole endeavor has nothing to do with the Russian attack on Ukraine as such and was already part of the coalition treaty of December 2021. But it reflects the change security environment as well as we see it. The second reason I would give is that Germany has seen or suffered from certain form policy major form policy failures over the last couple of years, let me mention only three. First, the victory of the Taliban in Afghanistan, the fall of Kabul and the withdrawal of NATO troops, German armed forces from Kabul. Germany has been engaged for more than 20 years in Afghanistan and until the end was working under the assumption that Afghanistan was on a good path. So finally, it was some kind of the one of the major form policy failures or the last, let's say 1020 years. The second form policy failure is the totally missed interpretation of Russian form policy for a security policy of the last, let's say 10 years at least since 2014. Another blow to the German foreign policy and the German foreign policy establishment. And maybe the third one is the situation in Mali, which has developed in contrary to German expectations and hopes and therefore should be considered as the third form policy failure. So one of the key question for the German foreign policy elites has been over the last couple of years, how could this happen? And how could we not, how could we did not see it and realize what was going to happen. So this is in my view, the second reason for this endeavor. And the third one. In my view, it might sounds a little bit ridiculous. It's coming of age experiment for the German foreign policy. For the last 70 years of current foreign policy, we have realized that the usual answers that have been given over the last 70 years. There are no German national interests. There are only European interests. We do not play a particular security role because we are protected by the United States. These answers are not applied to the Chinese security environment or cannot be applied to the Chinese security environment. And this process has also started way years earlier, I would say at least 2014, with the Munich Security Conference, where we had major speeches by the then President of Germany, the then Foreign Minister of Germany, and the then Secretary of Defense for Germany, all making the point that it's now Germany has to carve out some kind of independent role, more robust role, more autonomous role in international relations. And if you combine these three, let's call it drivers, you get an idea why we see this in national security strategy now. As has been mentioned, it has been presented to the public on June 14, and the whole process started with a major speech by Anna-Lena Baerbock, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, in March of the last year. So it was a project of one year and three months participating or including a variety of seminars, experts, think tanks, so it was a quite inclusive project. And the second point I would like to make, it's the national security strategy of a coalition government. I'm emphasizing this because usually if you hear national security strategy, you think of the US president or the French president. And usually you think of a presidential system, where one man or one woman is in the political position to define the political priorities, foreign policy priorities, to conduct certain foreign policies, to change foreign policies, to fund foreign policies and other things. So here we are confronted with a typical German situation of a coalition government. This is not so typical because for the first time we have a three-party government since 2021, not as usual, a two-party government. And then it's reflected right from the beginning in the effort to write or to create the national security strategy. We built on consensus and if you read it, if you read only parts, certain parts of it, it's easy to identify that it's driven by consensus. There are no any clear statements, no sharp statements, no clear statements of preferences of interest. And at the end of the day, this has led to how to put it, a lot of tensions within the government already before the publication of the government. Actually, and this illustrates Bob one, it should have presented at the Munich Security Conference in February, given the fact that the coalition parties could not agree on the priorities, could not agree on the wording, could not agree on the consequences, could not agree on the priorities. That date of publication, this date had to be postponed until June and then illustrate from this simple point of view that it was a difficult decision for the German government and that explains to a certain degree the vagueness and wording everybody had to be satisfied. My third point, I would like to emphasize is, if you read the title, you get the basic ideas and integrated security strategy, robust, resilient, sustainable integrated security become integrated security for government. So the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Annina Baerbock made right from the beginning quite clear that the whole strategy would rest on let's call it three pillars. The first one is robustness. If you translate into in German, it's in quite an old fashioned what we are halfed. It might, it means basically capable and willing to defend your country. Very old fashioned term, nobody uses it anymore. But if the first pillar is what I would call the more traditional security concerns and the more traditional security issues of German foreign security policy. It's translated as defending peace and freedom and here we're talking about classical foreign and security policy, which is represented by the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defense, and the Ministry of Economic Cooperation. The second pillar it's resilient, safeguarding our values. And here it reflects the more, let's call it modern security challenges. This information, cyber activities, resources, and all this more migration. The more modern security planet list, which are categorized as the second pillar of German security. And the third one is sustainability, safeguarding the national resources. Here we're talking about everything which is linked to energy, climate security and the those factors influencing or endangering the national resources. So again, it's about robustness about resilience and about sustainability for German purposes. This is in line with the recent policies of the last couple of years. We have to remember German approaches to Afghanistan in conflict management. The key word has always been, we have to integrate our efforts, combined civilian measures with military measures. This is basically an extension of these approaches which have been used in a single country, on a single occasion, in a given region. Now the integrated strategy is to an integrated perspective and is the overarching perspective of German and foreign security policy. This integrated approach comes with a price. For the first time, ministries have been involved in drafting this strategy, which have been involved in this kind of documents for the first time. For the first time, the Ministry of Agriculture had a say in drafting a security document for Germany, the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Health and a variety of other ministries. So it was an holistic, all-inclusive, all-ministry-inclusive approach of the German government, which is okay or it makes sense if you start with the assumption that security alternatives are multidimensional and multifaceted. However, if you read the document, you cannot try away from the impression that it looks like a Christmas tree, that every ministry was keen on hanging one particular issue, one particular project on the tree or at the tree. And that explains why it's no fun to read, to be honest. It's quite diverse, quite vague to a certain degree. And that explains why this approach which makes sense, this integrated approach, comes with a bureaucratic price. And this, the price has to do with effects, the precision of the paper, the readability of the paper, and in my view, the effectiveness or the impact of the paper. My fourth point is quite a simple one. It's conceptualized as an, I would call umbrella paper. Umbrella paper in so far as a variety of follow-up documents have been already had been drafted over the last year, during the last year, and have been with hold. And now this national security strategy should serve as an umbrella paper, as an umbrella strategy for the next strategy papers which already have been published in July, for example, the German China paper, the German China strategy, sorry. And we are expecting follow-up papers like a new cybersecurity strategy, a new natural resources strategy, and a handful of other strategies. To be honest, I have my doubts if given the diverse and very correct character of the national security strategy, it can really serve as an umbrella paper, from which all the follow-up papers, the follow-up documents can be precisely derived. To me, it looks like more a coalition treaty 2.0, in which every idea which is being kicked around in the German foreign policy establishment is somehow included. And now I'm coming to my four more critical points. The first one, the title for my more critical point is the four surprises. The first surprise was when reading the paper, I got the impression, and I'm not the only one here in Berlin is, is this really a strategy? Because if you read the academic literature, what is a strategy, depending on the author, several elements always come up. It has to be, it has about strategies, about defining goals. It's about defining resources and instruments to accomplish these goals. And it is about to define timelines in which certain goals have to be or should be accomplished. And it's about control mechanisms and some kind of feedback loop to check if these goals have been accomplished. And if you read them, the wording and the tone of the national security strategy, it's quite, I would say, good in analyzing the situation in which we operate. And we give you an example, regarding Russia. Russia's war for aggression against Ukraine is a violation of international law and of the European security order. Today's Russia is for now the most significant threat to peace and security in the eurotlantic area. I think this is common sense in all Western capitals. But then, after the end of the sentence, you should, as many observers were expecting, then that now certain precise goals will be defined. And nothing of that. So it's good in analysis, but nothing is derived from that. You should expect or could expect a clear statement. We want to accomplish until 2030. This or that now relates with Russia. Or for the time being, Russia will be considered from Berlin's perspective as this or that, and this has this consequence. And this is the major in my view flaw of the paper. It's good in analysis, but it does not really, really deprive political goals from this analysis. If you do not define goals, you cannot define priorities. This is the major and I think, in my view, appropriate and fair criticism in the German public to this paper. If you assume a strategy paper of which character ever defines goals and defines priorities, it's quite a disappointment to be honest. It does not define any means and therefore you can make the point. It's not a strategy in the narrow sense of the meaning. And to give you a second example, which has to do with a second key challenge to Germany, not only Germany, but also to the West. When the National Security Strategy talks about China, it uses the word China as a partner competitor and systemic rival. We see that the elements of rivalry and competition have increased in recent years. But at the same time, China remains a partner without who many of the most pressing global challenges cannot be resolved. End of sentence. And again, exactly like in the Ruffa case, I quoted the perspective sentence, you would expect certain points being derived from this. That would mean for our political priorities in the next eight to 10 years. That would make necessary the following steps. We will find certain endeavors, institutions and nothing of that. And therefore, and this may be the biggest criticism. It's not really a strategy. The second surprise by six point. Germany's foreign and security policy is, I don't have explained it to you, is multi lateral pussy. We cannot think of a purely national German foreign security policy. When we talk about German foreign security policy, we always think in terms of within the EU, within NATO. Within the United Nations, and to name only the three most important institutions for us. And actually, you would have, what you would have expected from such a document is to bridge the German paper, the German priorities to the existing documents of other international institutions. And we have to, most recently, NATO's strategic concept of 2022 and the EU's strategic compass. And actually, here you could have expected and I'm my view, you should have expected something about strengthening the European role in NATO, for example, one of the key developments or key challenges for the next years to come. Given the assumption that the United States won't be committed to European security as it has done in the past and it is, and it is recently. Therefore, I think the key challenge for Germany, or the key task could have been in my view, should have been to follow up NATO's strategic concept and to define in clearer terms, what is Germany's perspective on the European people of NATO and their rediscovery of the European people of NATO and what is our contribution. And some discussion about how we are seen in NATO as an important plan in European security. The same argument applies to EU's strategic compass only picking up one element of this one issue of the strategic compass. It names or it calls for the creation of a rapid deployment capacity under 2025. From a German security strategy, you would expect some kind of consideration. What is our contribution to this? How do we see this? Is it complementary to NATO? Is it reflecting our priorities? You get the point. Therefore, the national security strategy is not in my view properly embedded into the existing papers and does not bridge the gaps. My seventh point is you need resources for this policy strategy and the priorities which are reflected in it and it might come as a surprise but times of austerity have to return to German politics. Maybe we're not the only one but it has become clear that we simply cannot afford everything and that the 100 billion Euro Sonderful, the special fund which has been given to the German Armed Forces will be used until 2026, maybe until 2027. But the key question remains, how will Germany provide the necessary funding for the foreign security policy in the years after this? The defense budget is not increased. It remains at 50 billion Euro with 1.5% of GDP being spent in security and defense and we expect a decreasing defense budget in the years to come. Therefore, it's easy to emphasize what we're going to do, what's going to happen, but it has to be clicked with the reality in the years to come. And here, therefore, it's not a lack of priorities reflect that nobody really has thought about the implementation of this national security strategy. My eighth and final point, the last surprise, it wasn't, nobody mentioned the institutional reform. And you would make the point that we institutional reform and so it's not about, not only about making another or a different German foreign policy, but it's also about making German foreign policy in a different way. What do I mean by this? I mentioned the foreign policy failures in Afghanistan, I mentioned the foreign policy failures in Russia. And we have a linear narrative saying, we didn't see it coming because we couldn't see it coming. Although there have been several members of the parliament warning about Russia, warning about Afghanistan. Therefore, the key question or one of the key questions could have been how good we are, how good are we in receiving, gaining information and processing information in the foreign policy establishment. And nobody mentioned this, even after the failures in Afghanistan, even after the failure with Russia. And the final point, since 15 years now we're discussing the creation of the National Security Council, which would make sense in following the idea of an integrated foreign policy approach. This has been one of the key issues of tensions within the government between the foreign ministry and the federal treasury. Nobody could agree upon the creation of this National Security Council, National Security Agency and where to institutionalize it in the treasury or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Therefore, this question has often been answered and the institutional dimension does not play any role in this whole National Security strategy. Therefore, I would say, it's important to read, it's interesting to read maybe as a signal to our partners and allies, but I don't expect anything being derived from it. And the key function you would expect from such a document, providing guidance for the years to come, providing guidance for conducting foreign security policy for Germany, I think this expectation will be disappointed. I'll stop here. Thank you for the attention and I'm looking forward to the question and answers.