 Hello everyone, my name is Yu Wang. I'm from USCC. Our title is Unconditional Secure Needskin in a Fine-Green City. It's a journal work with a judging panel. Usually, in the standard cryptography, we require that the only spot he runs in polynomial time and this game can be secured against polynomial time adversaries. But now there have been a lot of primitives proposed based on various assumptions. However, it's still unclear whether these assumptions hold. If, for example, we prove that when we function does not exist someday, then most primitives will not be secure anymore. So it's desirable to propose schemes based on our assumptions or just some mild complexity assumptions. Although this is quite difficult in the standard setting, Marko initialized the study of fine-green cryptography to approach this problem. In the fine-green setting, we just require that the only spot he uses is less resources than the adversary. And the resources of the adversary can be a prior bounded. Since the power of the adversary is limited, it's possible to propose schemes based on very mild assumptions or even no assumptions in this setting. By now, there have been many fine-green primitives proposed. And recently, we proposed a fine-green NISC, which runs in NC1 and secure against adversaries in NC1 under the assumption that NC1 is not equal to parity L-poly. Although the underlying assumption of the previous fine-green NISC is already very weak, it's still left open whether we can construct fine-green NISC under no assumptions. In our work, we solved this problem by proposing a fully fine-green NISC for AC0 circuit-cessed viability. In our construction, all the algorithms, including the CRS generator, that prove that the wavefire and the simulator run in AC0, and it has perfect soundness and composable zero-knowledge against AC0. Steel mode has perfect zero-knowledge and computational soundness against AC0. It's under no assumption, so it's unconditionally secure. Here, by AC0, we mean a class of circuits with constant depth, polynomial size, and uncondifying using AND or AND node gates. And we also note that a statement circuit cannot go beyond AC0. Otherwise, if the only prover in AC0 cannot decide with the winners whether the statement is true or not. But if we allow the prover to run in polynomial time, as in a previous fine-green NISC proposed by Bohr and others, our NISC also supports all the statements in NP. We can also extend our NISC to non-interactive ZAPs and also NISCs in the URS model. All of them are unconditionally secure in the AC0 fine-green NISC setting. As applications of our work, we first note that our NISC can be used to provide unconditional security against adversaries with limited parallel running time. Also, our NISC can be used in systems requiring online security, where the attacks are valid only if they succeed immediately. For example, our NISC with composable zero-knowledge can be used to protect secrets only valuable in a short time. Also, its dual mode with computational soundness and perfect zero-knowledge can protect the secrets perfectly and can guarantee the security in the system requiring the users to provide proofs in a short time. If the users cannot provide proofs in a short time, then we can just deny it. At last, I would like to talk about the impact of our work. Before our work, it seemed that cryptographic assumptions implied in PKE were necessary for NISC in the standard model, which means that NISC seemed to be in the land of crypto-mania. However, in the AC0 fine-green setting, only in the mini-crypt primitives, such as the one-way function, are known to exist. While we achieve NISC, so our construction may have provided evidence that NISC is in the land of mini-crypt, even in the standard setting. And it would be interesting to prove it. Thank you.