 Hello, I am Marcus Brandt, the head of mission of the international idea program for Myanmar, focusing on building federal democracy in Myanmar, working from outside of the country. And we're having a conversation today with one of the most seasoned international experts working on Myanmar, Ambassador Letitia van den Asum from the Netherlands. You have served in many bilateral functions as the ambassador to Kenya, I think South Africa, Mexico, United Kingdom, but also in Bangkok, accredited to Myanmar during a very interesting period, 1995 to 2000. And following your retirement from national diplomatic service, you served in the UN, or the UN-related Rakhine Commission under former Secretary General Kofi Annan. And ever since then, you have remained very active as an international, leading international voice and expert on Myanmar, especially focusing on Rakhine issues, but in particular after the coup also about on democracy and the restoration of legitimate government. We will talk today a little bit about the situation in Myanmar overall since the coup, particularly the situation in Rakhine state, and we will touch upon the Rohingya issue. We will talk about international accountability mechanisms, justice mechanisms, and we will see especially what this means for the prospects of the future development. You have recently spoken to my friend Mansur Hasan also in a very good podcast that I recommend to everyone, and I want to build on some of the things you said there. But I first actually would like to start with a personal question, and that is what motivates you and how, what inspires you and what drives you and keeps you hopeful that the effort is worth it and that your engagement will actually bear fruit? Thanks, Marcus, and yes, I mean, it surprises many people that I'm still at it, but you have to realize that when I first came to the region in 1995, there already was a major problem with the Rohingya and who had only just returned from yet another round of fleeing and returning, sort of the revolving door syndrome that they experienced for decades, and then having had the opportunity, as you mentioned, in 2016 and 17 to work with Kofi Annan and seven other commissioners in the Rakhine Advisory Commission, and trying the best we could to come up with recommendations that we, and I still believe in this, that if studied seriously and if discussed and implemented today could make a very meaningful difference to the situation, that, you know, it was a huge blow, not only for me, but I think also for the other members of the commission, that the day after we presented our report to the president of Myanmar and to the state councillor, Ang Tsung Suu Kyi, that was the 24th of August 2017, that, you know, literally hours later in the early morning of the 25th, a huge attack started, sparked by actions of Rohingya activists, but responded to by Myanmar's military in a manner that, I mean, the world, that astounded world, that shocked the world profoundly. For days when you saw these long lines of people walking into Bangladesh with the literal possessions they had enabled the salvage, that is something that stays on your mind and ever since I've been available to assist those who think I can contribute with their work to further the cause, not only of the Rohingya, but more generally the cause of bringing about and reviving, actually, the dream of democracy for Myanmar as a whole. And of course, you know, there were more difficult times after 2017, particularly, of course, the coup that took place, that is now soon, three years ago, that has that has profoundly changed the landscape of Myanmar and actually is also, you know, you always keep looking at where is their hope, and I think what happened in Myanmar since late, since late October last year, 2023, when various members of the resistance joined together to launch attacks that were totally unprecedented and that had an enormous impact. First of all, on the people of Myanmar themselves, it gave them hope, but it also sort of generated new energy in the international community. What is happening here? Did we get our analysis wrong? Is it actually possible to deal blows to the military regime that can contribute to a profound change in Myanmar? So you're continuously looking at what is happening and having spent some time in Thailand over the past two months and speaking to many people who are here in also in Chiang Mai and other places, it's clear that there is hope, there is a belief, there is a lot of thinking that discussions, heated discussions, difficult discussions about how to move forward. To so profoundly change the country that for 80 years has been subjected to very oppressive systems is no small matter. You are one of those who regularly point out that the solution to the Rohingya suffering must be part of a larger change in Myanmar and the larger change in the overall context in which Rakhine finds itself. This is also a message international idea, for example, has repeatedly stated in the UN General Assembly when we have various discussions on the Rohingya issues. I would like to, and you were talking about the late days of August 2017, which have now become actually the day on which the genocidal acts in Rakhine state are commemorated and notably in last year, even by the NUG itself. And I would like to ask you what you think of the changes that have taken place inside the broader Myanmar context on how the Rohingya issue is now viewed from the Myanmar majority, from the political leaders, from the NLB, because I think there has been a quite a remarkable shifting in positions also. So how have you experienced that? I agree with you and it was encouraging that so soon after the NUG actually decided on a policy paper that outlined their approach to the Rohingya crisis and how it might be involved. That was very fast. I don't think anyone had expected that. And later that was reinforced by the many messages that we were getting from various groups and from people who were meeting each other in the field as training, as soldiers or as members of the other movements that were there, that they were starting to realize that, hey, now we know how the Rohingya felt. We now, ourselves, are bearing the brunt of the worst of the worst that is almost unthinkable that the military is capable of. And so that's been very encouraging. And since then, I think particularly last year in 2023, the NUG again reaffirmed its policy and it's also been saying that it is working on a new citizenship policy. And that's actually something that is quite urgent and not only for the Rohingya, but for a much larger group of people in Myanmar who are badly affected by the by the current citizenship law of 1982. They've also been saying that they will scrap a number of ridiculous laws, the so-called four race and religion laws of 2014 and 2015 that are highly discriminatory and were actually adopted at a time when, by Parliament at a time when the NLD, the party of Ang Sang Suu Kyi, already was representative of Parliament, but didn't have enough votes to stop it. But so things are happening. On the other hand, you know, we shouldn't just, we shouldn't think that it's going to be easy, that from here on, everyone will accept the Rohingya. That's not the case. Attitudes, beliefs that have been instilled in young children who have been told whether it's like in Mekhain state or anywhere else that don't deal with Muslims, it's not good for you. And otherwise, you know, Muslim kids being told, be careful, you know, those people, you don't associate with them, it's not good for you. That has a profound impact on young minds. And it's going to be very difficult to change that. And what the situation is in Rohingya and how people there feel about what is going to happen over hopefully, you know, the coming years is not clear. We don't have any, I haven't had not seen any good studies about what the attitudes are. And it's important to take into account that, you know, from 2018-2020, the current state, you know, was at war with the military regime. It was a very violent conflict in which many people suffered. There were huge numbers of IDPs. And so that is the Rohingya trauma. And it's absolutely clear that if you look at all these decades, the Rohingya bore the brunt of the violence that was meets out by the success of military regimes. But others have suffered also. And what people remember, you see, the enforced exodus of the Rohingya is six and a half years, seven years ago, is it? Seven years. And what is in people's mind in Rohingya state, those who is pretty much the awful fighting that not only the Rohingya were left there, but also the other communities there are kind of particular had during that period. So you're looking at groups that have their individual traumas, have joint trauma. How can you deal with that? You can, whatever is being developed in people thinking about how to approach this, you have to look at the population as a whole. You cannot only look at the Rohingya, although their situation and their suffering is very specific. And as we know, there are cases, there are court cases about it being determined as a genocide. But you have to find a way of healing people together and not much attention is being paid to that yet. Because what has happened is that what has continued in Rohingya state up to today is a de facto apartheid state. Rohingya live in either enclosed villages or in detention camps since around 2012. That's 12 years. And if people don't meet each other, if their kids don't go to school together, if there are no contacts, if they don't have joint experiences, how are we going to deal with that? The important thing there is that the situation with the total lack of freedom of movement for the Rohingya is probably qualifies as a crime against the apartheid convention, as a crime against humanity, apartheid convention, which Myanmar has exceeded. And it is one of the first things that if you look at what needs to be done, as soon as it's possible, that needs to be addressed is how can that be changed? Because the last thing I would want to suggest is that the groups that are currently fighting for the liberation of Arakhan are responsible for the apartheid situation. No, these were the successive military governments who were to blame for that. But you have to think pretty fast about how can that be changed. And because it is, you can change it at once, you can't change people's mindset at once. But you have the program to do that gradually, so that people themselves decide what it means for them to be of Arakhan state or of Arakhan, and how they could weld together. But it hasn't been done. Usually, when you have a situation like that, transitional justice measures are put in place. In the case of Arakhan state, that has not happened. There have been some smallish efforts here and there. And that has been important for individual groups, but it has no comprehensive effort has been made. Except in relation to international criminal accountability, which is important, but not in relation to other justice measures, whether that is truth-selling, truth commissions, finding other ways of reconciling people, local justice mechanisms that might have to be considered, etc. You know, we're starting from scratch, basically. Patricia, I would like to take you up on some of these things that you just mentioned. And I think it's very important to bear in mind that the solution to Rohingya return, Rohingya reintegration is not just a question for the national government. And you said yourself that you have the impression that the NUG, the union institutions have actually moved quite a bit on this issue. But the return to the homes of where the Rohingya came from will, of course, be to Rakhine state. And it is the Rakhine state dimension that in the future decentralized federal union will be key for the Rohingya. So I would like to ask you about more about the situation in Rakhine state itself. And in particular, the political dynamics with the Arakhan movement that you mentioned, the Arakhan independence aspirations or ideas for confederation, the relations that may be complicated relations between the Arakhan army, the Arakhan movement, and the democratic national institutions, the NUG and others. We all remember the situation in 2020 during the elections when the whole setup was very different from the rest of the country, actually, and that still has long term repercussions nowadays. So how would you describe the politics of Rakhine state internally, the efforts of the Arakhan movement to establish its own autonomous institutions and their relations to what would be sort of a Rohingya returnees to live among them as equal citizens of Myanmar, of Rakhine state, of Arakhan state or whatever it will be called. So because you work with them, you're more in touch with them. What is your take on that from that respect? Well, you know, I think that if you look at the Arakhan army and its civilian branch, the United League of Arakhan, they have, I think, confirmed on various occasions that they're prepared to talk about the return of the Rohingya. They've actually said to Bangladesh and China, the group that were talking about it, yes, we are willing to talk about this. We'll give you our plans if you accept us as a key stakeholder. And of course, you know, that hand that stretched out hand has not been grasped by the other side. And unfortunately, that is because the other side has mostly looked at, okay, how can we quickly, as fast as possible, get a couple of thousand people, put them in trucks and take them up to Northern Rakhine state and put them in camps that they are preparing there. It was basically only about the transfer of a number of people from one camp to another, with perhaps a month full of Russians so that they could survive. But that was about it, as if I understood it properly. And I think I have. So I have been surprised over the past couple of years, since this has been happening, that in the international community, there has been so little discussion about this. Not much has been said about, you know, the conditions that we need. Everyone says, you know, the condition, you know, the Rohingya cannot be returned because the conditions are not in place. And then, you know, a number of conditions are mentioned. They have to go voluntarily. They have to have citizenship and all their rights. It has to be sustainable return. They have to need to be able to return to their old place, the places where they used to live, etc. But no one has actually bothered to look at now, how can that be done? The discussion has been dominated by Myanmar and Bangladesh and China. And the UN, UNHCR has, you know, constantly said, this is not all, the conditions are not in place, etc. But there has been a great rush to try to help create these new kinds of conditions. So that's the first thing that needs to happen. And once it does become possible, and we don't know when these conditions will be in place, I think it is important to first have a lot of different conversations. First of all, with the Rohingya who stayed behind, about 600,000 of them in 2017 and didn't cross the border into Bangladesh. Because the first thing, and probably the immediate most important thing is to make sure that their conditions are improved and that, you know, they are being taken seriously as residents of our camp. And that the worst restrictions that they have been suffering under for a long time are lifted. And I think one of the worst ones is an overriding one, is the restrictions on freedom of movement, which have led to the relative and the deliberate isolation of the Rohingya community. And it's actually probably in the eyes of many of the people in Rakhine state, only, you know, perpetuated their fear of the other, because that's what it is, it's a fear of the other. And that fear is mutual. And I've seen it in the eyes of both communities, the fear in the eyes of the Rohingya, but also the fear in the eyes of Rakhine, so afraid of the Rohingya, whom they have been told by terrorists and terrible people. So this is going to be very difficult to deal with. And you know, I think there's a reason to be grateful to Bangladesh for having hosted the Rohingya for a long time. And even though, you know, the conditions that we now see in the camps in Bangladesh leave a lot to be desired to say the least. But in order to develop a sustainable return of the Rohingya communities and the resettlement also of existing numbers of Rohingya over there, is going to be a major operation. You have to think of this more also probably as part of a larger effort of say, five to 10 years at least, of where does Rakhine State or Arakhan, if you want to call that, where do people want to go? What is their future? And how do all these communities fit into that? So where do you see this going? What are the trends? What are the chances for all these communities to be living together in peace and harmony in a federal state under Myanmar or even confederated unit? Because we are... I think if you look at what the leaders of the AA and ULA have been saying, it's clear that they, this is what they want. They're committed to it, but they have so much on their plate that, you know, what comes first? For the moment, if you look at what's happening right now, the fighting in Rakhine State is worse than it probably has been over the last couple of years. There's little information. Internet is cut off, but what we're getting is really a very violent conflict on many, many different fronts. So I think, you know, it will be necessary to as quickly as possible, once it is possible, to return a limited number of Rakhine and then not as guinea pigs, but in a manner that that to show and to try some approaches that are really needed. Because one thing is clear. You have the Arakhan Army and the United League of Arakhan, their civilian branch, but these are fairly young people who are more flexible, who are more used to think in terms of diversity, although not all, but you also have an older class of people. The politicians of the last couple of decades, the Arakhan National Party, various other parties, which include some politicians who have been openly racist, and who have openly advocated for violent campaigns against Turkey, they're still there. And some of them, if you look at the elections in 2020, some of them actually were elected, even though, you know, Rakhine State, the NLD government didn't allow elections in all of the state, but various people have been elected. And they are now, they might now be claiming that they have to be returned and they have a point. If that is generally accepted, that elections took place and some people are in these positions, you'll have to deal with it, even though the elections were based on the constitution that is totally undemocratic. That and of course the very discriminatory decision in 2015 to exclude the Rohingya from the voter rolls, which excluded Rohingya, as we know, very well from the 2020 elections. And that is of course the paradox after in 2008 and 2010, the military had actually used Rohingya votes to provide legitimacy to its own constitution and the first election based on the 2008 constitution. So that is, and that has all been taken away. And we have been of course saying repeatedly that a return, repatriation of the Rohingya to Rakhine also implies the full restoration of political rights and electoral rights. And so to imagine that future Arakhan State or whatever entity it will be will of course require, imply also a full political reintegration of the Rohingya community. And that will create a very different dynamics, presumably than what we see now in the states. Yes, because if you look at numbers, that is of course significant. You have 600,000 in Rakhine State, you have getting close to one million in Bangladesh. It's something that has to be looked at. And you have to look at against it. You have to also put it against the potential for economic development in Rakhine State. And with the Chinese investment in Chai Pew, with Indian investment, with other interests that are there, how can you gradually come to a situation that can sustain the population plus all of those, the current population, plus all of those who will return. And it's not only the Rohingya who would like to return. Since about 2015, a lot of young Rakhine particularly have been leaving to go to the jade mines, to go to Thailand, they're everywhere. The young people in Rakhine were late in coming to outward migration because life was relatively good for them. But the oppression of the Rohingya and particularly after 2012 to 2011 when they were gradually driven into detention camps completely changed the division of labor in Rakhine State. Much of agriculture dependent on Rohingya labor. If you look at fisheries as well, the boats were usually property of Rakhine, but the Rohingya took them out and to go fishing and to sell the fish. I mean there were divisions of labor that were disrupted abruptly and that led a lot of young people to leave. Will they come back? Will the development say in situary related to Indian investment and in Charpeux related to Chinese investment lead to employment opportunities for them? It's too early to say. Many open questions. I would like to also ask you about something related to your hometown, the Hague, which is home to the two international courts that play a very important role in the debate around the Rakhine and Myanmar, the International Court of Justice that is of course dealing with the genocide case brought by the Gambia against Myanmar and the International Criminal Court that has yet to start proper proceedings related to the situation in Rakhine. How do you see from your perspective as a diplomat also the confusion between these two courts in terms of the level of accountability they can bring and also with regard to the representation of Myanmar at these courts or let's say of who gets to be held accountable in the Hague so to say. So what have been the recent observations on this issue? I think that if you look at the International Court of Justice and the case of the Gambia against Myanmar under the genocide convention that is an interstate conflict, it is not a criminal court case. It is one state party saying to the other you have to account yourself for what happened against the Rohingya. I think it has been slow because it started in 2018-19. But it is making progress. What I find very difficult with the way the International Court of Justice works is that all of the paperwork that is exchanged between the parties and its thousands of pages does not enter into the public domain and that is really it's not made public until after the end of the case. Present estimates have it that we might have by early next year so 2025. The final hearing that the court would organize for the parties and that would again put more information into the public domain. But since then it's been fairly quiet. You know it's happening but you don't see much movement and of course once the court has made up its mind and rules and let's assume let's hope that they find in favor of the Gambia and establish that genocide was committed it's left right there. There are no immediate consequences except that the international community and others would probably take account of this in how they operate and work with Myanmar. So how does this relate to the ICC and criminal? Yeah but that was another thing I wanted to mention first. But to go to the criminal court the criminal court has been deadly slow. I mean it's now more than five six years that they have been at it and I know the court is understaffed and underfunded and all of that but it seems you know it's the court itself also which is the master of its own agenda and it could have done more if the prosecutor and his staff had set the right priorities and this is a really important case. I hope I have no idea where things stand nobody does but that this will be the year 2024 when they will finally decide to issue some indictments because that is the very positive thing that the international criminal court can do. It decides okay now I have enough evidence against specific people which means that specific names will go out into the world and people could be brought to trial. They know that they would have to stand trial which immediately almost as we've seen with other major leaders who have been indicted it makes it very difficult actually to move around the world and do business as usual. And I hope that that is underway but I'm frankly disappointed in the lack of progress there. We have to wrap it up already I would like to ask you at the end what more can the international community do to help Myanmar as a whole to achieve this goal of building a federal democracy that will be the precondition for a lasting sustainable return of the Rohingya and the peaceful development in Rakhine State. What more would you like to see you know international organizations bilateral partner countries diplomats do? Well this is a very critical time right now we're dealing with a situation where it's obvious that things are changing in the country and that members of the international community have to be shaken out of their wouldn't say their slumber because they've continued to follow it but their belief that the situation in Myanmar has been similar for the past decades and that the current military regime is invincible. It's now been shown that it is not invincible and that with with with dedicated efforts a lot of people inside Myanmar whether they're their politicians whether they are academics whether they are whether they are have whether they are have joined various of the armed groups are all united in their belief that this is now possible and this has led to a sense of much greater unison than I remember over the past couple of years but it needs support it needs a lot of support you do not reinvent a country and rebuild it into you know an inclusive federal democracy overnight it it takes a lot of work but a lot of work getting people together in particular having serious conversations and trying to bring everyone on board and that is not not not not easy to do in the country that is so diverse and where people for decades you know haven't been have been told that their own ethnicity is what matters most and don't don't don't get me wrong ethnicity is identity it is extremely important it needs to be cherished it needs to be protected but when it comes to building a new inclusive federal system that has to be based on equality with a lot of space for diversity and and that that is very difficult to do because you know many people still seem to have the impression that now will be a big opportunity for for their community to to to to take charge in different parts of the country and yes I mean under certain circumstances and structures that might be built to make that possible but they have to be agreed first and that is the big challenge that that that now lies ahead the people on Myanmar will need time a lot of time you cannot build such a structure overnight immediately and that means that you know the international community has to be prepared to stand by them not with them but by them to support them in what they want to do and give them the space and to to to to come together it's a huge task and and it will not happen overnight and it's particularly I think important that the the neighboring countries also understand that this is going to take time and that you know they have to to be understanding of of these kinds of of the situation and and really work work with with with the people of Myanmar to make all of this happen but it's I have no idea what it's going to look like no one does because it's a people driven it's a people people driven and it has to Myanmar people driven process that can take a long time but the international community is quite likely to be impatient and wants to know immediately who's in charge you know what are the structures how do we trade how we do that that you know that's understandable but 80 years is a long time and and profound changes need it well talking to you for me is always I learn a lot from you and it's also an inspiration and it's good to know that people like you are at it are into you know supporting Myanmar in this big effort in this long-term effort and I hope we will continue to have good conversations on this and are able to somehow master enough international support that our friends in Myanmar mean thank you very much for the show and thank you very much to the audience for watching us we will share some interesting links for further reading and we will certainly continue with this series of conversations on building federal democracy in Myanmar thank you