 Welcome to this first session of the afternoon on Japan in the global system. When you look at the global system, as my old friend the late foreign minister in Japan several people would have said, the global system is somewhat messy. And what this panel is going to do is talk about how Japan is managing the messiness in the global system and what Japan's positioning might look like going forward. Japan, in many ways, is in the crucible of the huge challenges that have taken place in the geopolitical system in Northeast Asia, between China and the United States, and with the critical relationship, in the alliance relationship with the United States and the new Trump administration. The advent of Trump presents very big challenges for Japan and to the post-war system in which Japan has prospered greatly. Not only the security relationship, and I want to talk about this with Pamela Sloan, but also the international economic policy regime which is under threat from the emergence of protectionism, which Trump symbolizes more than represents in the United States, but also in Europe. So this is a big challenge to not only economic security, but also political security. Now, you know, we have the North Korean crisis, and that brings into acute focus all of these problems, and again Japan's right in the center of the action. And Japan's participation in the management of this crisis, or these crises, one would have thought was crucial to some kind of resolution of the chaos that's appeared in the international political and economic system. How's Japan coping with it? That's a question. What can Japan do about it? What leverage has it got in its relationships in Northeast Asia, but also across the Pacific with the United States? There's a very long held view, and I must say I contributed to this to some extent by inventing the super-kay Japan's leading from behind, that Japan's not good at a proactive strategic response in circumstances like we face in the international political and economic system now. But how well has Japan done, in fact, in this, and how well is Japan positioning itself to manage these, at least, trifold crises? That's a set of questions that I want to turn to our panelists to talk about, and they can talk to you in the audience about it. More specifically, how is Prime Minister Abe positioned in all this, and how can he project Japan's interests successfully and define some kind of decisive role for Japan in managing these circumstances in the global and regional system? The panel that you've met already, Professor Fumiaki Kubo from Tokyo University. There's a particularly good role there, and a specialist on international relations, especially the North American relationship. And introduced, another hero, Aizawa, who's a professor at the Akushi University in Japan, a specialist in international relations, and our own Amy King from the Department of Strategic and Defense Studies in Nicole Bell School in College of Asia Pacific. Three better panelists you couldn't imagine to take up some of these issues. So let me turn to you, Professor Fumiaki, and when you look at the circumstances that Mr. Abe has had to face over the last few months, I guess it is almost since Trump was elected to the presidency of the United States, what's at stake in the management of the Trump administration from the perspective of Mr. Abe, and what's at stake with Japan in this? Okay, great question. Thank you for having me again. Some of you may not like me to see me again twice, but I got a very good question. I went to a site in North Korea and China, and the threat from North Korea is, in a sense, very much existentialist threat to Japan. And also we have a territorial dispute over Senkaku or the U.S. islands with China. And last year during the campaign in the United States, Mr. Trump said that he might withdraw U.S. troops from Korea and from Japan, or Japan should, according to him, defend yourself, or he said that it would be okay for Japan to go nuclear. And also when he was asked about what he would do regarding the dispute over the islands, Senkaku, if he becomes president, he invaded the question. He simply said that I don't like to answer that question. So on November 7th in Japan, there was a really great anxiety about the incoming president. So Abe flew to New York to see Mr. Trump. And then we had a summit meeting, a formal one, after Trump assumed office in February. Our hope was that at least we need to get public assurance from the U.S. president, New U.S. president, that the Article 5 of the U.S. Japan Security Treaty, which stipulates the American obligation to defend Japan, would be honored by this new administration too. And otherwise, without that assurance that the challenges or escalation might be expected by China over Senkaku islands, and then we also need public commitment that the new administration, the U.S. administration would honor the U.S. Japan Security Treaty. And I think basically in February, we got all of this. So there's for the time being some assurances, the sense, we have a sense that the worst was evaded. But given a kind of erratic nature of Mr. Trump, unpredictable, you know, the worst, and the swings between negotiation too, like the military option, there's still some anxiety about what's the real intention of this government. And we have some assurances that Trump seemed to be trusting his defense secretary, Mattis, which is good. But in the final analysis, we don't know whether Mattis's decision would be kind of honored by Mr. Trump further. So we have an enormous stake here, and we have some assurances, some peace of mind. But we're still wondering what, you know, there's some element of predictability with this U.S. new government. But, you know, somehow I don't know why, but the personal chemistry between Prime Minister Abe and Mr. Trump seems to be pretty good. I don't know why. Your Prime Minister did have a summer, you know, fight with Mr. Trump. We don't afford to fight, but also, you know, and that's very telephone call pretty very often from the White House. In the last, like, just limited to the last two weeks, I think there are three telephone conversations between the Prime Minister and the President. I heard that there was a call from Mr. Trump before the G7 summit, and the question was, what did the summit all about? So, you know, what is interesting. Let me press you on that. It's really quite interesting, especially for scholars of Japan, but to everybody, because, you know, what Mr. Abe did was really get on the front foot there. Maybe I might have something to say about this too, but, you know, was this Trump, was this all Abe's initiative with Trump? I mean, the whole system must have swung into play here to position Japan with Trump in a very effective way. Looking from outside Japan, you must say that Japan scored high in its response to the character of the new Trump administration and securing the assurance that you just explained that it has secured thus far from President Trump. What do you think about how the system, how Japanese government work in that respect, quite a part from Trump? Just briefly, you know, I think, you know, Mr. Abe's personal leadership initiative worked pretty effectively in this case. There was an enormous sense of crisis on November 7th in Japan. So, I think that, you know, worked, that was pretty important. But, you know, please note that, you know, Japan lost on some fronts, like TPP, you know, that Abe tried hard to persuade Trump that the TPP is a good thing, but he failed. And the Japanese public is very critical of Mr. Trump, you know. Based on the public opinion that the Japanese tend to think that Trump is untrustworthy, arrogant, you know, not suited for the president, but still asked about the future or the direction of the US-Japan relations. The public said that it should be maintained. So, you know, we tend to differentiate the evaluation of Mr. Trump and the US-Japan alliance. What do you think about how the Japanese government mechanism machinery has managed the response to Trump? I think I fully follow what Kubo sensei's line. It's, in my words, will be like a damage control. So, there's two damages, possible damages has to be controlled. One is absolutely the public opinion. You can't afford the public opinion to turn against the United States because the US alliance is a pretty strong political pillar for Japanese strategy making. So, you can't have the public to go against. That's number one. Number two will be, actually, I mean, I don't think Prime Minister Abe has a very positive perspective, but he has done what he needs to do, especially, you know, one of the pillars is liberal democratic order. You know, all these principles that Japan strategically relies on could be, you know, at risk with this, you know, new configuration of the US-Japan alliance. So, he needed to, you know, stand up to make sure the damage could be controlled in the best way possible. And I think that was the leadership. So, I think that's what we do understand. Whether we like President Trump or not, I think that was the one favorable move that Prime Minister Abe has done. So, the Japanese government's got these key assurances on the alliance relationship, the defence of the territories, and reassurance about... It's not assurance, but we won't consider assurance, you know. But try, you know, there is a commitment to do that. So, this is the source of your doubt, the fragility of these assurances or other things that you see as still open questions with respect to dealing with the Trump administration. Well, if you listen to what Mr. Trump says, you know, he is very tough with North Korea at one day. But the other day, he might suggest like the demonstration. But also, at the same time, he's strong with the defence of the Republic of Korea. But he's also threatening to revoke the US clear FDA course, you know. And is it a balanced foreign policy, you know, to suggest that the US will terminate the basic economic arrangement between Korea and the United States? If you see that, you have to think that that might be coming to Japan, too. And so, you know, overall, we cannot be assured that the entire overall Trump administration foreign policy is balanced. We will consider, you know, enough attention paid to the details, you know. I'm a bit dubious about that. We'll come back to what Japan's interests are in the management of North Korean crisis in a moment and how they might diverge, or otherwise, from those of the United States and the management of the North Korean crisis. But in respect of, you know, Trump's dealing, well, he dealt everyone this bad, everyone this bad. And the Japanese public likewise are very skeptical of the Trump administration. Does this mean that, you know, Abe's political reverses are likely to be reversed in themselves and that, you know, Abe can take significant public credit by having dealt with a very difficult situation in Washington or doesn't impact on public perceptions of Abe and the Abe government? Okay. Here's, Prime Minister Abe's support rate, approval ratings are coming back, you know, last month and probably this month. The reason was first that there's a cabinet reshuffling and people tend to see new faces in the cabinet. But the second big reason would be probably is economy, you know. We have a labor shortage as we listened, you know, before lunch. And third is, as you suggested, this North Korean crisis. And Prime Minister Abe is pretty, or his team entirely, is pretty good at dealing with these international crises, whereas Japanese people still clearly remember how terrible it was under the DPJ government until 2012. So compared to the, you know, Abe's leadership in the international scene looks pretty good and probably not. He's doing pretty well and that's probably the basis of the judgment of the public. Do you know who see Abe's handling the Washington situation as bringing him more political asset or otherwise? Well, I think the public understanding of the challenge, I mean, if you consider the challenge, I think the public understanding of the Abe administration is very positive in how you deal with that, especially if you compare it to what maybe the South Korea is difficult with the United States, or maybe Australian difficulty with the United States. I mean, if you have that kind of comparison, maybe the public will understand how good it has been, but it doesn't guarantee the future. But at this point, I think it's fair to say that he has gained a public support of that. And just at an anecdote of North Korea, there was a parliamentary session. The opposition party asked for how he deals with the crisis, and everybody found out that he stayed in the Prime Minister's office before the missile launch. It's kind of the public sense that he does have good information in what is happening. So he's well informed, he's doing the job. So I think the foreign policy part of the administration is currently a big plus for him. So coming back to the Korean crisis and public diplomacy on both sides suggests that the United States and Japan and South Korea, for that matter, are at one on the management of the South Korean crisis. But you imply that there is risk of divergence. What are the major risks for Japan in managing the North Korean crisis alongside the United States and for that matter alongside South Korea and China? There are a couple of risks. First, the risk of the United States making a deal with North Korea in a premature way. So for the United States, for some Americans, North Korea is a new problem because now their intercontinental ballistic missile reaches the U.S. mainland. This is why they got alarmed very recently. But for Japan, this has been a more long-term chronic problem. So we don't like to see the United States making a deal just to stop the intercontinental ballistic missile. There's a more serious bunch of a lot of problems. Then there's a premature preemptive attack being kind of a concern because on the border of southern North, probably North Koreans have 10,000 rockets that could hit so anytime. So there's always enormous risk for human casualties. So that is one of the risks. Then another one is the Republic of Korea. You said that we have one, but sometimes South Korea, the Republic of Korea is reluctant to confirm the threat from the North. So they now tend to be with the U.S. and Japan, but sometimes their position is shaky. So we are still in a risky territory. Is that a quote with you of where you're at? Yes, very much so. I think just to add is maybe we now recognize how much U.S.-China relations really matters in our security system as well. It is so obvious at this point that that's really the security arrangement of whether we like it or not. We consider this Asian regional order in terms of very much U.S.-Japan relationship, but it's not the U.S.-Japan relationship that matters in the security review, but it's now the U.S.-China relationship that matters. I think even though we knew in terms of readings and everything, but with this crisis, what is reassured is that fact of regional order. I very much agree obviously with the physical risk to Japanese territory and populations and this question of Japan passing, I suppose, that the U.S. and China will reach some kind of deal that overlooks Japanese or South Korean interests. I think another risk though for Japan is that it doesn't have the relationship with China in place to manage or coordinate any kind of joint response to the North Korean issue. And partly that's because of the many, many issues in the bigger Japan-China relationship, but also because when you look at Japanese defense policy and threat perceptions, it's North Korea and China that are the two key issues. And so Japanese increases in defense spending and shifts in military posture are to deal with both the North Korean issue and with China, and of course that leads to quite considerable criticism from China, which is inhibiting the ability for Japan and China I think to work more closely together in resolving that key security tension. Now I think Japan's security moves are justified and are understandable given the threat that China has been posing in the East China Sea and elsewhere, but we don't have that relationship in place to talk about these really, really difficult issues, to talk about what future Korean peninsula might look like, to envisage a regional security order when you do have a more unstable United States. And so we, I think, are going to continue to see this little lack of coordination between Japan and China, in addition to the concerns obviously about the United States of Japan on this question. So the denouement of this thing, however it's triggered, would seem to require a really quite sophisticated framework for coordination and cooperation between all the major players in North Korea, Japan, China, South Korea and the United States. And that's the worry because apart from movement of the United Nations, where the work is done on sanctions, intensification of sanctions, and that's not in place. That's not in place at all. So what's Japan's interest in trying to engineer that framework, position on that? Of course, you know, whatever is done as the next step is if China succumbs and pulls a plot on all supplies for North Korea, that's not the end of it. What's North Korea's response to that? North Korea's response to that could be to feel very much in a corner and lash out in South Korea or China or whatever. The analysts in the United States suggest that's the most likely outcome of that, not their learning in China. And then who manages the consequences of that? What's the framework for cooperation between the major players and managing the consequence of that? So what's Japan's interest in engineering this kind of framework? First of all, the United States doesn't have a good working relations with China either on this North Korea thing. Mr. Trump had a big expectation originally, like in April when he met Xi Jinping. But now he understands that China will not work hard enough to satisfy the United States. Japan will not have a big expectation on China either. We have to defend our own territory. Defending our own territory is kind of a threat to our own territory. It's the first experience since 1945 to Japan and China is a big country. Its military spending is huge and it's growing by that double digit number. So no, we cannot trust China on this. Thinking about the nuclear development by North Korea, we have to understand that they have some technical expertise to develop other nuclear weapons. They somehow got the money and the materials to make the missile and the bombs. So there's no kind of a panacea to stop that. There are sanctions but the sanctions will not work as they are with the normal countries. So we have to be first of all very patient, very prepared but patient. One of the new attempts is what is called the secondary boycott or secondary sanctions. Secondary boycott or secondary sanctions which is first tried last fall by Obama administration in a very small scale. But now the Trump administration is enlarging that category of sanctions fairly dramatically. The Japanese government now follows some of them. This sanction will be applied to companies or individuals that deal with the commerce with the North Korean government. So that would include many small Chinese individuals or small Chinese banks. That means that there will be more confrontation between the United States and the Chinese government. And Obama administration was reluctant to do that because they are not willing to fasten their relationship with China because they were hopeful that China would be cooperative in the climate change program. But Trump is not interested in climate change. So he is pretty easy to apply this new sanction against Chinese companies and individuals. So these sanctions have not been tried in large scale. So it's worth looking at seeing to see these new measures have some effect. In Abe's position and all this is interesting because some of the conceptions of Abe at home and abroad are if anything he could be a bit trigger happy. He's got a philosophical inclination to support strong military action. But your story suggests that at least he's compliant and perhaps actively leading a much more cautious approach on North Korea. Is that correct? What the Japanese government is really doing is applying sanctions and strengthening them. So I think that's still the basis of Japan's policy. And to be with the United States is also something which is very important to Japan. But the judgment is that these sanctions sufficiently wide including broad and people's sanctions from China are going to be successful in constraining North Korean nuclearization or not. Is that the judgment? It's unsuccessful. To date they've not been successful and I don't think there's any evidence that will change North Korea's position. North Korea's most recent statement about the nuclear test and the ICBM test very much demonstrated that they have been able to achieve all of this despite very harsh sanctions. If anything, tighter sanctions will actually reduce Chinese leverage. So the objective is really to get a broadly based negotiation with North Korea. That's the real objective. In 1946 or 47 when the United States saw the aggressive Soviet Union, it didn't go to war except Korean war. It was started by North Korea. So the United States didn't initiate the war but contained the United States with a lot of patience. They never thought that it took like 40 or 50 years. But we need some degree of patience. So this is the immediate problem. It sits in the context of bigger changes taking place in the region including the rise and increased importance of China. However powerful China is, it clearly got some problems with managing North Korea and managing other things as well including the U.S. relationship. Although it was quite confident about managing the Trump administration in the early phases I think that confidence has been corroded somewhat over the last several months. And one of the possibilities you mentioned earlier was that a collateral consequence of the management of North Korean problem will be separate action by the United States on trade policy against China because China in some way has failed to fulfill the promise of reining North Korea back in whatever the benchmark was there. How does Japan view all that? Mr. Trump suggested kind of a new brand new sanction against China for being a trade partner with North Korea. But that would mean devastating loss to the U.S. exporters too. So that sound very rational or smart. So this might be just a bluff. But I don't know, you know, his threat to withdraw from NAFTA might be real and that is also might be the case with the U.S.-Japan FTA course. So this is a thing that is very unpredictable about Mr. Trump. And so we'll have a negotiation on economics and trade with the United States late this year and we are not very optimistic about that. And we'd like to see more balanced, more nuanced and more sophisticated expression of U.S. intention. Well, coming to the economic dimension of geopolitical arrangements across Asia and the Pacific. As you say, you know, Trump's discarded TPP. Abe himself had a huge stake in TPP. I think Foreign Minister Bishop mentioned this morning he had taken the Japanese Diagramifications on at significant political cost. He had a huge stake in TPP as a part of the U.S. pivot to Asia and part of the framework that was securing Japan's interest in rebalancing against the rise of China. Where's Abe at now on that? What does that look like in Japan? Well, yes, as you rightly frame, I think those two things like tied together, like one is the American backed security system in Asia and also like the TPP, the liberal democratic order of both economics and politics. I think those two were the environment that Japan has been associated and identified within the region. And the toolkit was always the economic cooperation to advance that values and systems. But now with the United States being questioned with this liberal democratic order and also the emergence of, for example, Chinese model of economic cooperation which is not the liberal democratic principle per se and also if you look at other countries in Asia like in Southeast Asia you have different, you know, coming like Thailand, the Ku, the Thai, you know it's not the democratic wave that we expected in the 80s that spreads the region but it's the otherwise. So it's now, the Japanese are at the crossroads so these three pillars, the U.S. security, the liberal democratic order and economic cooperation system, I think these three has to be like reconfigured and that's why the U.S. security system really matters because if the liberal democratic order and economic cooperation has to do without the U.S. security system which is like the TPP-11 I think that's the new challenge in whether Japan will associate more on this principle or more geo-strategic identification. I think that's what the prime minister is now trying to choose and seeking a new kind of identification of Japan. So I think now it's very much a critical situation. A little bit more into that. I mean, TPP of course critically, TPP critically depended on the centrality of the U.S. to the arrangements with each of the parts of the TPP. Essentially it was a series of bilateral free trade agreements negotiated from Washington and with TPP-11 what's left in that for Japan? Why does Japan hang on to that so desperately when the core of it's missing? It's a bit like the core of the alliance, security alliance relationship with Australia and Japan from Washington were missing. The Australia-Japan relationship would have to be reconceived in order to be effective as was discussed in the session earlier this morning. So why does Japan hang on to that so desperately? I think one thing is very much like if you have a kind of tension between this liberal order vis-a-vis the security system and you really have to kind of find a new equilibrium between the two. And I think like Japan has been identified, you know, for example a lot of political strategy in Asia especially vis-a-vis United States. We are not just a junior partner but we are like the agent state and the leading agent development state, developed state. But now I think one of the key is it's not always the U.S. that has a mirror to identify Japan but also with China as well. The China you have to identify yourself, differentiate from China. And I think that's one very important part. Before it was you have to differentiate from the United States but now you really have to differentiate from China. So I think that's where Japan always tried to find your identification. I think this TPP-11, you still cling on to the liberal democratic principle despite of U.S., despite of China. I think that's where the Japanese are trying to find out. China is a huge part of Japan's external economic formation. It's the biggest trading part. So would you do that separately from China in this context? I think there's no way to exclude that possibility. But how, that's still a big open question right now. In fact, the TPP had a lot of strategic aspects. You have to honor the intellectual property rights. You have to honor the non-discrimination principle for the domestic companies and foreign companies. And the government cannot be part of the private entities like PLA, part of the company. So some of the clauses are clearly anti-China or Chinese practice of economy. So this is why I said that the TPP had a lot of important strategic aspects. That is why Japan and the United States and perhaps Australia were very enthusiastic to accomplish this. Actually, President Obama tried to persuade the hawkish Republican members of Congress by stressing this aspect a little bit too late. So I think for Japan, just to have a free trade agreement or free trade agreement zone is important. But I think this strategic aspect is even more important. And for Japan recently, we are negotiating with the EU over EU Japan EPA has progressed. And that's a prospect for us to complete as a negotiation with EU. And so for the time being, this Japan-EU EPA might symbolize this high standard world trade system. Then, of course, we have a big expectation that the TPP will be implemented very soon. We are in a totally different world now on trade policy because of the range of the raft of actions that Trump has threatened. He has the power to implement. He's not constrained by Congress in many of these things. He's threatened to tear up chorus and so on. So, you know, holding on to TPP and letting it sit there, while this all evolves is hardly a strategic response to what's coming out of Washington that threatens the underlying political and economic security system of the international trade ratio. So, you know, how can Japan reposition in that respect because if all of us, Australia included for that matter, are to define the game in a way that protects the international trade regime and our economic and political security within that, including China, which is a huge part of basic order and our trade relationship, then we've got to take proactive action to protect that system. So, you know, what you are coming in this way. Yeah, I think actually, I think it's been quite strategic here. And, you know, in June he made this very significant speech where he set out his vision of the dream for Asia and talked not about only the TPP element, but also about ASAP, about the Japan EU partnership, but also about China's Belt and Road initiatives as all parts of the sort of centrality of Asia in an open international economic order. Now, of course, you know, there are reservations in Japan and are they those reservations about some aspects of what China was proposing with Belt and Road and AIIB and other things. But I thought it was quite significant that he went as far as he did and sent, you know, the LDP Secretary General to the Belt and Road Forum, which was very much celebrated in China, to sort of suggest that China, Japan were willing to play that, that quite traditional role that Japan has always played of extending cooperation with China in these sorts of economic initiatives and actually fostering China's engagements in the regional economy. And I think this is part of Japan's wider interest in, as you say, keeping the regional and global international economic order open and stable in the face of so much shift in Europe and North America in the shape of all this sort of rising protectionism. Now, you know, there's a long way to go before we see what that actually looks like and the extent of Japan and China economic cooperation on that aspect. But I think that was quite a significant turning point. Well, I'm actually just going to ask you about that. So, I'm anticipating that. What you imply is that Japan is beginning to articulate a very broad strategic response to that sort of issues in Asia and moving to a subtle but clear hedging strategy on this with China. Is that what you're saying? I think that's right. I mean, I think it is subtle. I mean, I don't think we're seeing a complete game change here by any means. And in fact, I think what we're seeing is Japan, as I said, sort of returning to this sort of traditional hedging role of engaging with China on the one hand, but also playing that very important role of constraining what it sees as some of the worst aspects of China's behaviour in terms of the South China Sea, the East China Sea, Japan was reasonably vocal on the India-China border dispute, for example. So it's playing that dual role. The big change, though, is historically Japan has played that dual role with the U.S.-Japan alliance system. And it's been the United States that could be relied upon to be the chief arbiter on all of these issues. It was the North Korean nuclear issue of the South China Sea or even the East China Sea. I mean, the U.S. was essentially that chief arbiter. Now, if there are questions being raised about the U.S. role in Japan, that could, I think, pretend a much more significant shift. So we're in this, I think, interesting phase now of wanting to see where the U.S. Japan alliance goes and principally where the U.S. role in Asia goes. Well, you want to see as a complement to that much more active engagement with like-minded countries such as Australia, wouldn't you? If it was going to be successful, otherwise we're guessing about it rather than we can rely on it. And it would have to be considerably more significant engagement. I mean, there's some cooperation around the edges, won't it be enough? I mean, the U.S. and Japan alliance was really, as you said, the principal agent of the U.S. foreign posture in Asia. This is an idea that you've achieved when you've actually articulated an article and then if you read that... I haven't read that. Do you see things as... Well, I tend to think that good old days of U.S.-China engagement may not be coming back unless until China stops its provocative activities within the Japanese territorial waters around Senkaku and it still happens on a regular basis like every week, close to or 0.7 days a week. They stayed in the Japanese state of water. And there are kind of a number of vessels increasing. But at the same time, there's a talk that Chinese leadership might change their policy towards Japan slightly in a better way. So we have to be alert to see the new opportunities. But overall, I'm not very optimistic to see the good old days coming back. And about the free trade between Japan and China, it would be pretty easy for Japan to lower the tariffs reciprocally. But for Japan, it is even more important to establish a kind of a quality high standard free trade agreement, touching upon other government involvement in the private businesses. Well, that's part of the... That is part of the asset negotiation, too. And in East Asia, as for Vietnam, Vietnam is let off the hook and that and the GDP. It's a long-term gain or longer-term gain rather than a gain that can be fixed very quickly. But I don't know what about you? Yeah, I'll take a little bit of a different aspect. I think the way Japan and United States has worked together in both in terms of economic orders and the security order was much more into domestic politics as well. So I think that aspect convinced which is the politics of productivity. So it's really the politics all about economic development, its production. And I think China was actually the resounding success in terms of convincing it's the development, it's the economics that is the important key politics. And if you think the foreign policy begins at home kind of rhetoric, I think that's where Japan still plays a role. It's not maybe the territory of East Asia per se or it's not the FDA negotiations per se, but addressing these internal issues not just in China but other parts in Asia as well. Everybody's struggling with inequality. How do you overcome that inequality and how Japan overcome that inequality? How do you deal with this kind of social and public system? I think that plays another new role in addressing a kind of political standard that creates the region or at least minimize the risk of the collapse of this liberal and security order. So I think that's where if you think back the history, this idea of purpose of politics is the productivity, the economic development. I think that's not gone yet. It's still there. And there are many talks between the Chinese, for example, the regional leaders with the Japanese, regional leaders as well. But it cooperates in so many ways, despite of the territorial issues. So I think that's a positive sign. And I think those communications do kind of plays well to give a strong platform. I can't predict how many years it takes. It is a positive platform that I can think of. I'll put one more question to you all and then throw it open to the audience to tease the conversation out as your interest is carried. It comes back to where Japan's thinking is at grass roots on some of these strategic interests. I've always had this long-time, burning ambition, as it were, to make Japan a more and more country and revise, I don't know, the Constitution. Do these circumstances that Japan faces now make that more or less likely than it might have been? My point of view goes first. Okay. His approval ratings used to be very high but sunk remarkably like three months ago, two months ago. He doesn't know his current law approval ratings, which is a little bit coming back, but still it may not be easy for him to deliver the amendment of Article 9. Although the international environment warrants the change in a constitutional arrangement. Yes. The interesting thing was that if we compare the public opinion pool between April and August of North Korea, what should the public expect? Is it the strong economic sanctions or diplomatic negotiations or a military action? I think the interesting part is that it's more leaning to more diplomatic negotiations and the ratio of supporting the military action is almost the same or lesser. So even though there's more missiles and nuclear testing, the public opinion really has a negative or a view on, for example, military action. And that kind of public opinion gives a very difficult situation, especially in changing the Article 9 in the constitutional change. So the time is, I think, a guest right now. The view of you on this, Amy? I think there are two actually opposing pressures on Japan at the same time, which makes predicting this really difficult. Although I think I would defer to the domestics, the domestic difficulties of actually getting this passed are pretty profound. But, you know, whether or not they can actually change Article 9, there is the broader question of, you know, increasing shifts of reinterpretation on the rest of it on military posture. I think the first sort of opposing one force is obviously the deteriorating international security environment and questions about the reliability of the U.S. alliance, or both of which would suggest we're likely to see a more active or normal Japan. The opposite force, though, is the question of China. And in an environment in which you need to work, which Japan needs to work much more closely with China to deal with issues like North Korea if it's facing a more unreliable U.S. ally, China is going to be the most vocal opponent to Japan doing these sorts of things in terms of Article 9. So that will push you the other direction. So I think the prediction is very, very difficult, unfortunately. OK, well, let's take questions and comments from the audience. First up the back here. I know I was speaker earlier, but I've been dying to ask a question about tactical nuclear weapons. So one of the things that's interesting about Donald Trump is he asks us to reflect on some of our statistical biases. Oh, right. Certainly there's a case with myself. During the Cold War, the ongoing concern of the Europeans was whether the United States would be willing to escalate given the ability of the Soviet Union to strike the continental United States with nuclear weapons. This is exactly the situation that we are close to walking into in North East Asia today. If North Korea doesn't yet have the ability to miniaturize a thermonuclear weapon and hit the United States probably within Trump's first term, that likelihood will, will, will eventuate. And in September of 2016, the Sahi Asyumbum reported that South Korean officials had asked, raised the idea of nuclear sharing to his one NATO response to that problem that is positioning US tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea, in order to give South Koreans some degree of control over escalation. So my question is to Mr. Kubo, Professor Kubo in particular, but also the other panelists, what do you think Tokyo's response would be to a nuclear sharing arrangement between the Trump administration, that is the United States, and South Korea, that is tactical nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula with control retained by the US? And do you think one response to that might be for, that Tokyo might also ask for US nuclear weapons to be stationed in Japan, recognizing that what happened during the Cold War in Okinawa? Thank you. Thank you very much. It's a very important and serious question. Relatedly, I read Walter Russell Mead's essay this morning which is on the Australian paper which said that Japan's nuclearization is inevitable. But thinking about the national feelings susceptibilities about the nuclear weapons of Japanese people, I don't think that Japan will accept to have a nuclear weapon on Japan's soil. That would include the sharing of nuclear weapons like the United States or Korea. No, the anti-nuclear weapon feeling so strong when China was about to have a nuclear weapon in the early 1960s, Prime Minister Sato thought about that option for Japan to have nuclear weapons too, but he gave it up. Probably he thought that there would be no merit and instead there would be assurance from the United States. Recently in Japan-U.S. security dialogue Japan thought guarantees of extended deterrence from the United States. And if you think about it's really kind of guaranteed no one could be sure but Japanese government policy would be to depend on the extended deterrence from the United States and the Japanese public would never accept to have nuclear weapons in Japan. They will never vote for the political party who advocate having nuclear weapons. This is my feeling. I mean I think the bigger question of course is would the tactical nuclear weapons actually resolve or have any role to play here. I think the research by people at Darrell Press is that there is no tactical nuclear solution to the North Korean issue largely for reasons of geography. So I'm not sure taking the question of whether or not Japan and South Korea actually want to go down that path whether it would succeed in deterring North Korea. Do you want to add anything? Yes, I think the difference between Russia and United States and in this case with North Korea is this sheer lack of information about North Korea. I mean how much we share the calculus of the damage. How much we have the same understanding of the damage. It's not really so sure. We might have a very negative view on the North Korean leader to its nation. So if that's the case it tactically doesn't work. I mean this deterrence idea has to have this kind of information or the sharing of understanding of the damage. Because we are not that sure we are not sure that having a nuclear sharing kind of guarantees like what Amy said will have a positive strategic impact. So if we are not sure about that it's very difficult to make a political choice because it's very difficult to convince this is the ultimate way to go. Peter McCord. Thanks very much. Addressing the question of Japan in a global order I'd like to ask a slightly broader question about Japan's role in Asia. Looking beyond China looking to South Asia looking to Southeast Asia looking across Asia. For 50 years, 60 years, 70 years for a long time Japan has had a vision of itself as a leader of Asia. Goes back for example to the article by Akamatsu in the flying geese paradigm. Now it would appear that now this seems to be fairly suddenly under challenge. It's under challenge from two points of view. First of all China of course is becoming much more powerful and second we now have this immediate crisis in North Korea which at the very least is distracting Korea, Japan at the very least. So my question really is looking at the global order where does all of this leave looking at in a broader sweep does this leave Japan's role across the sweep of Asia. Is Japan losing its in this global order is Japan losing its position of leadership in Asia? Well it's both yes and no. Maybe if you focus on the kind of quantity of economic power that Japan has is relatively being challenged and it's much more smaller than it was like in the late 80s and early 90s of course that's true. But I think the challenge is not just about China but I think in a broader sense which I already mentioned it's really the idea of you know development you know how development you know benefits to each and every society of Asia and if that model that Japan has is convincing I think they still have a normative power to that. But I think the challenge is here is because of the inequality the gap between the top and the bottom because the middle class is now struggling the middle class cannot dream for the upper echelon of the society and the middle lower middle class is very by suffering toward the lower part. And so how are you going to convince with the idea of development the current idea of development in that kind of social dynamics. The key solution that some country has is for example use religion like Islam. So there are a lot of countries these all Islam network is more convincing it's not about the economic development but it's because it's more your kind of standard of living which it's not like the American style or the Japanese style but it's the Islamic style of living standard you have to go for when you are suffering in the current situation of development system. So I think those identity politics creeping in every part of Asia not just about the Islam but many other religion ethnicity you know broadly speaking nationalism I think those are the challenges that will hinder this idea of the development which was the Japanese kind of standard of advancing its values and politics in Asia which made the Asia leaders. So I think now it's pretty much the time that it's not really about this geopolitical but inside the social dynamics I think the Japanese has to address the issues and especially like make sure that the lower part of the population has a hope in its society about their development model you know don't go for identity politics but go with the economics. I think whether Japan can propose that social system I think that will make a fundamental difference in the future ahead for Japan. What instruments or what mechanisms are there through which Japan can help to address that kind of I think it's very much healthcare and education I think health and education really I mean diplomatically. Well even diplomatically still I think environment health and environment health education I think these components in arranging like co-operations not just big infrastructure. So you see it mainly largely of Japan's bilateral national diplomacy not. It could be regional as well. You set a standard a regional standard. So again I just try to pin you down. What mechanisms can Japan use regionally to address these issues? Do we need new mechanisms? Can Japan create new mechanisms? Is the ADB or some other instrumentality going to be the mechanism? I think the current mechanism does work in a certain way but also we need more actors to be involved in this. The only one actor I can pinpoint is this local government the local government, the urban governance system that Japan has is quite a model. So when you talk about governance it's not just about national governance with the urbanization rising in Asia. Urbanization is the biggest social dynamic in Asia. Now 50% plus is living in the urban arena and how you manage a population of a million plus where there's so many million plus cities. The size is very different from the European model. I mean it used to have a European model of urban governance in talking about livability and everything, healthcare education and everything. But if you have multiple million plus cities how are you going to manage that? I think there is a way. So let's involve new actors in terms of it could be an ADB setting but this local governance expertise I think that's a very good tool that Japan has to make sure it's positioned in Asia. Thank you very much for a very important question. Certainly Japan cannot say that Japan is economically most powerful country in Asia any longer. But the thing is that whether you are on the side of destabilizing or destroying the current international order or whether you are on the side of maintaining or protecting the current international order and Japan stands on the latter position whereas China may not. In addition we have some soft power. Japan is probably still more egalitarian society than the United States or some of the European countries or quality of food is pretty good. The streets are safe and pretty green. So you know combined with this kind of newly acquired soft power with commitment to maintain the current international order with the new set of foreign policy which is called proactive contribution to peace we are hopeful that Japan still have its own identity in Asia. Another question? Thank you very much for your discussion and my question is I think the current trade most important in Japan is the North Korean issue and China on the other hand want to focus on some diplomatic approach or dialogue to resolve the situation under the current situation and I think is there any does China incentive to catch such kind of situation now to want to change Japanese like the stance to change their interpretation for the Article 9 or make the military force and if so change our fake Japanese attitude for that? Amy? You have a big question so I think you sort of situate Japan and China on opposite sides in some ways in the response to this issue I think the reality is there aren't too many options other than diplomacy and talking to deal with this issue and thinking about greater deterrent strategy I suppose for North Korea this is ultimately going to be I think an issue where we it's going to be impossible to remove very very difficult I think to remove North Korea's nuclear weapons from it there's very little that the rest of the world can offer North Korea to give up those nuclear weapons and so ultimately this is going to be a situation that has to be managed between the various players in the region through diplomacy through talking through much more North Korea it's unpalatable and difficult as that may be and it will be difficult so I don't think the North Korean situation will fundamentally shift Japan's military posture any more than it already has done I think Japan as we've heard already has been living with this situation for a long time now and has reinterpreted its constitution has for the last decade and a half been doing a lot more in the military space to deal with the North Korean threat particularly in terms of things like missile defence so I suspect we'll see more of that incrementalism rather than a sudden shift in Japanese posture the other side of it the incentives for China to resolve this issue and there's no way in the world that China wants a nuclear round North Korea on a school step is there? There's not, absolutely we'll see that but also China has other priorities one it doesn't want to see the collapse of the North Korean regime partly because of the refugee instability but I think more importantly because of the question of what comes down the line if you have the collapse of the North Korean regime reunification potentially under a US-aligned South Korean government that's very destabilizing for China having a US-aligned government China's borders hasn't served China so well in the past invasions to China have come through that border with North Korea so we have to be able to provide incentives to China as well and here is where we might need some creative thinking by Japan in particular about how you provide those sorts of incentives Did your question include the possibility of Japan changing the Article 9? Well, you know it's still kind of a possibility and doable but there are a couple of conditions like other approval rates going above like 50 or even 55% currently like below 45 then if his support rate goes up enough he might dissolve the parliament and make a bit then still he has to persuade many members of his own party there are some politicians who are not enthusiastic about amending the Article 9 he has to persuade his coalition partner which might be pretty difficult so there are a couple of hurdles but if his support rate comes back then there is some possibility Time for a couple more questions before we wrap it up Thank you very much for the interesting discussion if the crisis current North Korean crisis escalates or even if it doesn't and Trump follows through on trade sanctions against China what's going to be the response in Japan what is the political inclination by Abe and the government and what is public opinion going to tell us might happen there will be a lot of pressure on Japan to follow suit be close to ally America and secure the alliance the geopolitics above the economics sanctions on China or what might be the story I don't think you have got that well if the trend what we see now especially if you follow Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga's remarks he will follow his idea is to expand the scope of sanctions in that line it's more understandable that will come but of course the word sign is from the economic the industrial economic voice with the heightened tensions of security stock exchange market going down you have all these negative effects from Japanese economy we are trying to find a kind of point that's going to meet and I cannot tell to what extent the scope or where is the line is it the banking system or is it the trading system now we have certain banks that has already a trade deal in relation to North Korea being sanctioned those assets are frozen now so logical answer is yes Japanese will follow the economic sanction and the public opinion for economic sanction is not that bad but the voice from the economic sector is another factor so the easy question is it will follow through with the United States but to what extent it really depends on how much because our stake at China is very big as well so what kind of economic sanctions are against China by United States do you have in mind is it sanctions based on that trade act of like a 301 article 301 or it's a larger scale sanction for China because China still have a trade with North Korea in case of sanctions based on 301 Japan will be pretty quiet but work very hard not to persuading try to persuade U.S. officials U.S.T.R. officials not to do that with Japan the larger scale sanction based on the fact that China still have a trade with North Korea that's a really remarkable thing if the United States really do that so that's the kind of beyond my imagination but we'll be surprised to see that that's one more question Ben you've talked about the need to amend article 9 because of the deteriorating regional situation but what sort of amendments specifically would be most beneficial keeping in mind a balance between the need to respond to the new realities of the regional environment on the one hand and a balance with avoiding exacerbating the security dilemma particularly with China and South Korea possible reactions to amendments of article 9 what's the most useful amendment shifting the line from the most recent changes that have opened up limited forms of collective self-defense but where does the line go beyond that in the most ideal terms thanks well in a limited cases based on the newly legislated security act we can exert correct light of self-defense even now but there are many ways many proposals to change the actual wordings of article 9 and the most recent one proposed by Prime Minister Abe himself was to add that in spite of articles what was said before Japan can have a self-defense force which is pretty simple but many constitutional scholars hate that proposal but sometimes there will be no perfect way to satisfy everyone in this kind of controversy and the timing is now pretty important so my sense is that sooner this simple one might be pretty good although acknowledging that there are still many constitutional controversies left this is my interpretation I have a similar view it's what's going to be the best this legal discussion and the strategic discussion is very different right now I think the legal consistency now has its own politics and the strategic side the pressing strategic issue is the gray zone issues not really the one who we are discussing the constitution or the legal discussions so there's this gap here what we need to be done in our security capability and what we need to be done in the legal framework so that's making discussions very difficult I think we could have done much more easier maybe not amending but with the understanding of the constitution enabling not just the collective self defense but the gray zone that's the difficult part the unfortunate thing is that the prime minister's political capital being sucked by the legal side is the unfortunate thing because what is pressing more is more into preparing for this gray zone security threat just very briefly I would very much agree with that point about the gray zone being the issue that's critical for Japan to be able to deal with right now to then sort of bigger question about reaching that balance that perhaps China might accept or at least not find too problematic unfortunately I don't think there is much that Japan could do in terms of actual revisions to the constitution that China would find acceptable I mean it's been so critical up till now and so willing to call Japan out for revisionism and regularization that I don't think China hasn't given itself much room to move should Japan go down that path so I suspect something that Japan will have to do despite complaints from the region can I add one thing from a domestic perspective to Japan for the kids from elementary school to middle school to high school are taught that the self defense force is supposed to be against the constitution and it is not the military but it is a military in the ordinary definition of the world so this is a very confusing situation for kids, for students, for young stars as far as there is Article 9 in the current form we have to keep this confusing situation that is one thing one more case for constitution amendment good well there are other questions I know but we'll have to take them outside the session I just want to wrap it up in the last few minutes or so I mean one of the things that I think I take away from this conversation is that in all these new circumstances Japan hasn't been standing still yet it may be nascent but there is an act of diplomacy developing to explore with us you are with us it hasn't been possible and the last question to you all then in all these area issues that we are talking about in which of them and how can Japan make a difference do you think a real difference to the outcome so if you take the rise of China you know what's Japan's most effective strategy if you take the threat to the global order or the Korean crisis choose anyone you like and make a difference oh that's a sudden very surprising question well for Japan the pressing the issue is whether we can survive this North Korean threat and we can make some difference by telling Americans go so fast you need some patience because we will be patient enough for a long time also as I said this is Japan's first experience to be threatened by neighbor and we have a sense that we might lose our own territory this is not an area we can make some difference but we have to concentrate some resources on that for the time being yes I think there are many things but one thing I could say especially because of the south especially in overall you have the United States and you are always kind of politically pressured to pick for example you have to kind of bet on certain things I think there is a role for Japan that makes sure you don't have to pick it's a very good stabilizer especially because of the history of Japan which we count on in the 60-70 years the economic power of Japan didn't translate into a military power so I think that trust of positive economic power creates a space for many countries in Asia that there is always the second choice it might not be the best but there is always a second choice you don't have to rush for answers maybe for the North Korean case as well that political space that political choice that Japan can offer in every country in Asia which is pretty big in many ways not just in economic terms but in political terms as well I think that's where Japan can make a difference and that could be a big stabilizer when many countries are like the Cold War period especially in South East Asia the front line of the war is not that kind of friction so whereas how do you do that there is always the second choice third choice I think that's very important and that's where Japan can make a big difference in every part of it Amy, but change your visual in Japanese well I would say to Prime Minister Abe that I think finding a way to coordinate with China on managing a changing international economic order that we've had, but managing and changing economic order would be enormously significant and would be very much in Japan's interests I think there's enough overlapping of interests between Japan, China, South East Asian countries Australia and others that there should be a way to find a path through that and it would be enormously significant not just for that bilateral relationship but also because I think what would be symbolised to other countries like Australia India and others would be nervous about what there is in China means that it's possible for the most adversarial relationships in some ways to actually eke out some kind of negotiated new order thank you Amy and thank you all very much thank you thank you thank you