 Here on the sidelines of the Crawford Australian Leadership Forum, I have the great pleasure to interview Professor Song Min-Soon, who is the President of the University of North Korean Studies in Seoul and a former Foreign Minister of the Republic of Korea. And we're going to talk about North Korea's nuclear program. Professor Song, could I start by asking you, why has North Korea developed its own nuclear capabilities? North Korea has a long history of developing its own nuclear weapon. It continued about, I think more than half a century. So in 2006, they first tested nuclear bomb. There are some motivations they have in mind. I think first since 1960s, 70s, they thought they are conventional firepower, conventional capabilities, not in their favor. So they wanted to compensate the military balance. And they also wanted to develop nuclear technology for the sake of power plants because they are shortage of electricity. In South, we do have about 30% of our electricity is provided by atomic power. And I think most of the important thing about these two motivations probably is to uphold their regime. You know, the North Korea is a dynastic dictatorial regime. They want to keep their regime by having some prestige, showing the prestige to their people that we do have nuclear power, we have nuclear power plants, we are a great country, so please support us. That kind of domestic political region I think prevails as well. And does this demonstrate a paranoia about the outside world? Is North Korea's concern, security concern justified in your opinion? Well, they are in paranoia situation, but to our view, I don't think it is justified. We don't have any intention to invade or attack them, actually during the Korean War. North Koreans attacked South. That means they put their vice-president, when they are weak, they may be attacked by the South, allied with the United States. But that's not totally not true. So I think it's because of their regime's paranoiac mentality is behind there. So since the mid-1990s, in fact since 1994, South Korea, the United States, Japan and other countries have tried to develop regimes for managing North Korea's nuclear ambitions since the first North Korea nuclear crisis. These regimes have not worked. Why haven't they worked? Have they been inadequately designed or will simply nothing work to deter the North Koreans? Actually, before 1994, there was another agreement between South and North in 1992. It was a South-North Joint De-Nuclearization Declaration, and then it failed. And then in 1994, there was an agreement between United States and North Korea, which was mentioned, the Geneva Agreement. And then after that, also in 2005, there was a Six-Party Talks. We call it September Joint Statement at Six-Party Talks. These were three major agreements we made with North Korea. As you said, it failed. Why? We failed in implementing these good agreements because of the lack of mutual trust. When we implement the agreement, it is something like exchanging mutual cards. I give out what my card and you give out your card, and then we exchange in the middle. We need sort of art of synchronization of give and take. But in the case of North Korean nuclear problem, the cards we are having, both sides, are not symmetric. For example, North Korea wants to stop their post. North Korea is demanded to, we demand them to stop their nuclear plant's operation, like reprocessing or something. But at the same time, for example, the United States lifts sanctions step by step. And on all parts, give some economic assistance. These cards are very difficult to synchronize. At the beginning it goes, but in the later stage, when North Korea was requested to dismantle actually scrapping their facilities step by step, they want to have secure the United States action on normalizing relations, normalization of relations with North Korea. But as you know, normalizing relations with the country is a long procedure, right? The United States wants to discredit the transparency of the regime and the human rights, and they are guaranteed not to affiliate with any terrorism or something. So, these cards to be played by Americans and the North Korean steps to dismantle, scrapping the facilities, very difficult to match. They want the Americans act first, but the United States could not give out the first before North Koreans take concrete steps. So we need to coordinate these two steps by both sides, well, synchronized. That's the key, and we failed to make it. But actually in 2005, North Korea clearly pledged in the presence of five other parties, including China, that they would give up all nuclear weapons and the existing nuclear programs. Even though these days they are now stepping back, but so far most clear and formal agreement was that joint statement in 2005. Now you were a member of the Six Party Talks. You were one of the negotiators. Is this an effective mechanism? Is this something that you would advocate starting up again as a way of trying to moderate North Korea's actions? Or in your opinion have the Six Party Talks outlived their usefulness? Actually Six Party Talks, if it fails, I don't think we can find an alternative. People say that the Six Party Talks is dead. But when it is dead, we have to find an alternative. But nobody now produces an alternative. I think the talk system itself was not a problem. The basic, as I said, the basic mutual mistrust is the problem. And then how to reduce this mutual mistrust is the key to succeed in any negotiation. Iran's case, for example. In the case of Iran, Iran has been exposed to the outside world for many years. Even before the Homeini. And then even after Homeini, Iran was interacting with the outside world. North Korea is not doing that kind of interaction with the outside world. I think we would first promote the interaction between North Korea and the outside world and get these people know about how to build mutual trust. To my view, for example, South Korea, United States, and Japan combined, we do have strong power, formidable power vis-à-vis North Korea. If we do have more confidence that even a small failure in implementing, we can afford. North Korea think that they cannot make even a small step of failure. So we take some initiative and lead them out of their isolation. I think it's the way to start it. Now North Korea's closest ally is China. China has obviously become frustrated with North Korea over its nuclear weapons program. And yet China has backed North Korea over things such as the sinking of the Chonan, for example. What role should China be playing in helping to moderate North Korea's behavior? And does China have leverage over North Korea? Well, China certainly has a very effective leverage. Even today, if China shut off its pipeline on oil and other food assistance and other daily life provision, then North Korea can hardly sustain the system. But China cannot do that. People say that China has a concern over North Korea's nuclear program. But China also has a fear about the collapse of North Korea. China simply cannot accept a collapse of North Korea that may lead to a Korean peninsula unified by the terms of South Korea, which is militarily allied with the United States. That's simple. Long history, China proved it's policy. Thousands of years. That's geopolitics. So we have to overcome these geopolitical constraints. That was the reason why in the 2005 at Six Body Talks, we introduced peace regime on the Korean peninsula, means denuclearized the Korean peninsula between South and North peacefully coexist for a longer term. And in the longer term, we would find a modest bebending of Korean peninsula, which is acceptable not only to both Koreas, but also these geopolitical constraints, means United States and China's mutual interest. That was the formula. So I think this formula we reached in 2005 is very good, better than anything that has ever been formulated, but implementation. And then implementation means in the course of negotiation, stronger power needs. When stronger power take actions, it is regarded as an initiative. But weaker power takes initiative. It is regarded as a subjugation, right, capitulation like that. So China, China has that kind of predicament. But still, I think China now needs to take more bold action in moving this implementation ahead. As I said yesterday's seminar here, Chinese are saying that Asian security by Asians. Xi Jinping said it. But if he really meant it, China needs more proactive action in implementing this agreement. So you mentioned the broader region. Is there more that the broader region, including Australia, can do to help bring about a more satisfactory situation on the Korean peninsula? I mean satisfactory to whom? More stable, more predictable, peaceful situation on the Korean peninsula. Well, I'm reminded that people say without stability of your neighbor, without the neighbors, the stable labor, you cannot have your own security. So I think we need to keep some not only security assurances, but also some economic and social assurances to North Korea so that they first live in stable condition and then find a way to give up weapons. The first way they argue is, North Korean argue is, leave the sanction on us and recognize us as a country, normalize relations, and talking to Americans. But as I said, Americans, United States policy does not allow it. United States is not going to normalize relations with a country which has nuclear bomb outside the NPT system. And then this gap should be a bridge between some parties. I think to my view, that job can be done by South Korea in collaboration with China because China has to guarantee North Korea's follow-up action of dismantling their nuclear program in case United States takes on initiatives. In my country, on this position, there has been always diverging views between governments, change of governments, like in your case, change of governments changes some policy, but we need some consistent policy in that direction.