 Ladies and gentlemen, I'm delighted to be here today to share some thoughts on where we find ourselves in Egypt about six years after the first revolution in 2011 and just four years after the second one in 2013. One thing that is sure is that Egyptians are discovering today that there is more to a revolution than toppling a president. In fact, it is hard to believe that six years have already passed since we were down in Tahrir Square full of hope and trepidation that we were making history and were optimistic and open and an openness system was shaping the political climate. Since the emergence of modern nationalism in Arab-speaking countries, intellectuals and political elites are caught between two options. One is the supremacy of al-Ummal Islam, the nation of Islam, and the requirements of the modern secular nation. Egypt, as you know, is the most populous Arab nation. About 100 million it was declared only this month. It is a Muslim-majority country with a significant non-Muslim minority, the Christian cops, who number around 15% of the population. Since 1952 and the toppling of the Egyptian monarchy, all the leaders from Nasser to Sadat to Mubarak and now to Sisi have hailed from the military and assumed power at a time of national trauma. They have all used secular nationalist political vehicles to monopolize the power of the state. They all retained military backing through extensive political and financial patronage, demonized Islamist forces, and drove them underground, keeping a tight lid on the media, the opposition and all forms of dissent, and thanks to geo-strategic calculations, they all at one point or another enjoyed the support of the United States. On the eve of Egypt's uprising in January 2011, it was an authoritarian state under Mubarak, but it had long ceased to be a military regime. The military was removed from governance and civilian politics and more concentrated on the economic interests of the institution. The uprising therefore represented a major political opening for the Egyptian military, and the aftermath of Egypt's failed political transition during the Morsi Muslim Brother period resulted in the military's direct intervention supported by the majority of the people. However, the constricting of space for regional politics boosted the fortunes of political Islam in light of the lack of credible alternatives. In fact, on the evening of the January revolution, the political scene had few ideological stances for mobilization aside from the Muslim Brother, which helps to explain the inability of many non-Islamist groups, who call themselves liberals or leftists, including the youth, to organize effectively. With the result that the hierarchies within the present regime have evolved in a way that prioritizes the military and the security establishment. The reliance of President Sisi on a close circle of military figures is matched by the regime's distrust of civilian politics and civilian politicians and has instead sought to cultivate a civilian political sphere that would serve as an obedient supporter of government politics exemplified by the present parliament. In fact, this is one reason that you must understand I was kept out. The corollary to the growing influence of the security establishment has been the neutralizing of civilian politics. At the same time, the increasing role of Egypt's military has been driven by a lack of trust in non-military alternatives, but also by the administrative ease and achievement of military-led projects, an immediate focus on job creation and an affinity for mega-projects – the Suez Canal, the New Capital, solar energy, infrastructure, etc. As for civil society, it is under relentless pressure and its activities have been severely curtailed. Today, rethinking is taking place among existential fears, both among regime supporters and a broad cross-section of the population, focusing on the rising threat of radicalization, anti-state violence and terrorism, fears that have gripped the political calculation of the regime, but also the non-Islamist opposition and much of the general public. As a result, non-Islamists have come to see the military and the institutions of the state as the primary defense against Islamic ambitions to remake the state and redefine Egyptian identity. These tendencies fostered support for military intervention and paved the way for the second uprising in 2013. Needless to say, this confluence of events was not conducive to producing an open and pluralistic style of politics. Egyptian society was also presented with a sense of existential struggle, namely the fears of anti-regime violence, of state collapse as in the neighboring countries. All this has created political caution and an aversion to political tumult, and it also became a key source of legitimacy. The radicalization of certain Islamic groups, particularly in the Sinai, and their brutal attacks against Christian citizens and their churches with their threat of continued violence and terrorism became a first-order priority and emboldened the security establishment that made for a situation that inhibits politics and risk-taking. In other words, regional insecurity limits the possibility for genuine political openings. The generals and their supporters believe that they must destroy the brotherhood or risk the brotherhood, remobilizing and returning to power and seeking vengeance for the overthrow of Mr. Morsi. However, this alliance of civilians with the army against the brotherhood will postpone full democracy and civilian control for some years and will let many of the economic beneficiaries of the Mubarak regime keep their position. However, it may well be the fastest possible path towards sustainable democracy if certain requirements are met. For the past four decades, Egypt has lacked any national project or serious attempt at confronting contradictions in its social fabrics. Two factors could have made a difference this time. The first is demographic. There is a peril in having millions of undereducated, underemployed young women and men with very little to lose, living very difficult lives amid a lack of basic services. The current transition that started with January uprising was started by neither the military nor the Islamists, but by secular young Egyptians, young women at the forefront. Women have taken an extraordinary position after the two revolutions, participating in every election, in every referendum, et cetera, something they have not done for about 50 years. However, the polarization Egypt has been experiencing in the past four years has marginalized these forces, the young people. The promise of a young generation advancing a national project at a moment of national unity as witnessed in January 2011 is postponed, unfortunately, for another day. Many demographic experts have underlined the enormous impact of those between 20 and 30 years on the Arab Spring. However, they have noticed something very, a new phenomenon of the revolutionary moment with an unexpected phenomena, which is the return to high natality, which severely handicaps the economy. Egypt has become a demographic bomb, and insecurity and poverty have become instigators of immigration. The second factor is economics. Egypt confronts acute challenges relating to its fiscal structures, competitiveness, and poor educational system. Lately, the government has cut down food and fuel subsidies, which have caused price hikes and rampant inflation. The economic shock therapy coupled with a steep currency devaluation has rocked the country. Fuel prices went up 50 percent, and gas prices have doubled. As savings erode and consumer buying power shrinks, the president is betting that the expected payoff, which is new jobs, foreign investment, and growth will arrive before the economic pain risks another social explosion. On the foreign policy front, President Sisi has made significant steps. With Africa visiting most of the countries, Sheikh Tidian was just telling me that he was there last week in Senegal before this in Gabon, visiting Asia, Vietnam, Thailand, China, Europe with particularly friendly relations with Mr. Macron, who has declared that he will not interfere in Egyptian domestic politics, whereas the media wanted him to, excellent relations with Germany and, of course, Russia and China, and a particularly relationship with President Trump, whom the Egyptians see as a good president for Egypt. Analysts have stated that the chemistry between them, between President Sisi and President Trump, is working, for the time being at least. The reconciliation between Hamas and Fatah, with Egypt's strong mediation, gives hope and opportunity. If Mr. Netanyahu realizes that this is a historic opportunity today to have a two-state solution. In conclusion, in the years since being elected, Mr. Sisi has consolidated a ruling coalition, restored economic growth, and brought back considerable stability to the country after six years of turmoil. Of course, this has come with a harsh crackdown on dissent and abuses by the police and judiciary. In the short term, the combination of nationalism, modest economic growth, and highlighting the war on terror is politically sustainable among a broad cross-section of the population frustrated by years of uncertainty and economic decline. But unless a more comprehensive set of economic and political reforms is put in place over time, the long prospect for stability in Egypt will be in jeopardy. On the economy, indicators are pointing in a positive direction with GDP growth projected at 5% in 2017 and international investors showing a renewed interest in Egypt, especially after the Charmes-Sheikh economic conference in March. We invite the World Policy Conference to come to Charmes-Sheikh next year. Sisi took the long overdue step, as I said, to cut fuel subsidies and so on. However, this economic stabilization and progress, however, is being achieved with exceptional and massive financial support from the Gulf countries. And the push for growth and investment is necessary, but it's not trickling down sufficiently to lower income groups. Unemployment is still high at around 13%. And this combination should be able to sustain modest growth rates of around 4 to 6, but this is not enough. They say Egypt is too big to fall. And Egypt is looking for a new savior. This time, waiting for Godot, this time it might be called Trump. We don't know. To create 10 millions of jobs over the next decades, Egypt needs to employ its youth. This will require aiming for the growth rates of the Asian Tigers, not the modest growth of the Mubarak time. And this will require a much bold revamp of the civil service, a scaling back of the public sector, a reduction in the role of the military industrial complex, reform of the judiciary and legal environment, and serious modernization of the education system. Politically, Sisi wrote a wave of popular support, as many Egyptians desperately sought an alternative to the alarming rule of the Muslim brothers, and yearned for the stability of strong leadership after years of turmoil, particularly as other Arab states and societies have crumbled around them. Coming to the end of his third year in office, the president is still in a strong political position. He is likely to finish his first four-year term and might be in a position to win a second term until 2022. Beyond the initial goals of restoring stability, resuming economic growth, and fighting terror, Sisi must ponder what his long-term goals and legacy will be. In addition to strong economy, which he clearly wants, stability and security, does he want, does he wish to hand over power or have power rested from him to another military leader when his term is ended, or can he use his current popularity and external support to define bolder economic and political goals to encourage the growth of a viable non-Islamist political alternative, a model of China, and to bequeath a country that hopefully is not only economically viable, but also politically healthy. Thank you for your attention.