 Okay, thank you very much. I don't think I'm alone in sometimes asking myself why on earth I continue to sit at my desk or in my armchair trying to make sense of Jane logic and epistemology. Even Jane philosophers themselves must have shared entertain similar doubts while at the same time formulating doctrines which legitimize the study of their philosophical thinking. One of those thinkers was certainly Haribah Drasuri. According to this most prolific exponent of Jane epistemology and logic, there are two kinds of benefits to be derived from the study of philosophical textbooks. First, our faith in Dharma is strengthened as we recognize that there is a consensus or some stity of all chastras that temple happiness is the outcome of virtuous conduct. Second, when we study the basic principles of various philosophical systems in the light of the Jaina Anakantavada, we learn that all of them in one way or other impart true insight. As our knowledge increases and gradually destroys the karmic obstacles, it serves to bring us closer to Moksha, the state in which the liberty self is pure vision, knowledge, power and bliss. Thus in order to facilitate philosophical studies, Haribah Drasura then composed a variety of texts with the logic, epistemology, and metaphysics and ethics of a variety of philosophical systems were summarized and discussed. We might agree or disagree with Haribah Drasuri. Nonetheless, philosophical studies brings joy to most of us and we can all agree that different systems of thought share common features. In any case, an open and broad minded attitude towards one's rivals, such as that of Haribah Drasuri, seemed to have been more common among Jain thinkers than Buddhists. After all, the Jains not only indulged in philosophical debates, they also served as transmitters of other non-Jain philosophies. Medieval Jain monks educated themselves far beyond their own specialty into new areas of thought to an extent unparalleled in Indian, in classical India. One of the systems that Haribah Drasuri portrayed and discussed was Sankhya. He was certainly not the only Jain philosopher to do so. Prior to Haribah Drasuri and his colleague Vidyanandin, the Dva Trimchika ascribed to Sirasena Divakara, devoted an entire chapter to Sankhya, and subsequent to Haribah Dara, the examination of Sankhya philosophy was continued by Abhaya Deva, Prabhachandra, Vali Deva, Malishena and so on. One of the reasons for Haribah Drasuri, as well as Buddhist colleagues, to indulge in a debate with Sankhya was a prevalent debate on epistemology and more specifically on the process of knowledge and how the self comes to know. In doing so, several points of divergence as well as of convergence between these systems of thought were highlighted. Needless to say, the result of these debates were of utmost importance to the involved disputants, the omniscient status of their respective founders being at stake. This is made plain by the implication of the following statement by the Jain philosopher Vidyanandin. If the self is intrinsically devoid of knowledge, Kapala would have nothing to say about the nature of reality. The young Sankhya from its own particular philosophical vantage point, the Jain critique naturally differed from that level by the Buddhists, although there is ample evidence that these Jain scholars, were nonetheless well acquainted with the early Buddhist critique of the Sankhya tradition. For example, the Shatushataka by Aryadeva was studied by Jain philosophers such as Haribath Rasuri and Malavadin. While the Jains shared with Sankhya belief in the existence of a self, the general did not agree that the self was a non-active principle. Although in the 1960s, this latter notion did exert some influence on Jain thought. A. M. Patel, the founder of the modern Jain movement, for example, maintained that all forms of action, mental, verbal and physical, are strictly material and thus entirely unconnected to the self, which from an ultimate non-conventional point of view is conceived as a mere passive observer. Such a conclusion clear deviates from mainstream Jain philosophy and its doctrine of a transforming self and indicates that Patel was influenced by the Sankhya notion of the absolute separation of self and matter. Haribath Rasuri's Jain critique of Sankhya rests upon his belief in the fundamental existence of a self, although he differs from Sankhya with regard to how that self should be characterized. In the Yoga Bindu, Haribath Rasuri presents a hypothetical debate between the Jain and Sankhya philosophies beginning with the critique of the Sankhya notion that the self knows an object only after the intellect or body has ascertained it. In contrast, Haribath Rasuri maintains that consciousness is identical to knowledge. Thus at the time of liberation, when the pure self is no longer covered and or conditioned by veiling factors, it nonetheless remains capable of directly perceiving and thus knowing the object without the medium of the material mind and senses. In retribution, the Sankhya are said to state that in their view, consciousness is not at all identical with knowledge. Thus at the time of liberation, when the self is in a state of separation from matter or freedom from material influence, no knowledge that can exist on its part. Knowledge according to Sankhya belongs to the intellect which in turn is a product of primordial matter or property. Haribath Rasuri then returns to the initial critique concerning the locus and process of knowledge and asks what it means to say that the self comprehends the object only after the body or intellect has apprehended it. The following two quotations, the first is described to Vin Yavasin and the second to Rasuri, constitute the Sankhya response to this concern. Sankhya states, by means of sheer proximity, the self, the essence of which is unchanging consciousness makes the mind which is devoid of consciousness a reflection of itself. Just as an adjunct, for example, a flower makes a crystal a reflection of itself. Sankhya further states, it is said by Rasuri and others that the highest pleasure of the self arises when the intellect has undergone such a change whereby it has become separated from the self and whereby the self is reflected in the intellect just like the appearance of the reflection of the moon in clear water. While these quotations do not directly answer the question posed by Haribat Rasuri, they do outline their prerequisites that are necessary for the buddhi or manas used synonymously in this context to acquire knowledge. Purushal consciousness being reflected in the buddhi or manas and buddhi or manas being transformed. In the state of liberation, Sankhya goes on, the object is correctly apprehended by the intellect because of a transformation that allows consciousness to be fully reflected within it. When an opaque stone has transformed to crystal, it is then able to fully reflect the color imposed by the proximity of a substance. Encountering this explanation, Haribat Rasuri maintains that the self is fully reflected in the buddhi not through a transformation of buddhi but through a transformation of the self's consciousness. He further maintains that knowledge must consist of this transformation of consciousness. The Jains share with classical Sankhya the notion of an individual self, adding that this individual self is transformative as well. Thus they did not oppose this feature of Sankhya's explanation of the process of knowledge. Moreover, whereas the Sankhya's believe that the self's knowledge was dependent on the proximity of an object, the Jains maintain instead that having knowledge was one among the self's intrinsic qualities. In the Shastravarta Samasaya and his allied or to commentary the Dik Prada, the Sankhya's argue that it's possible for the self to experience an object, in this case the body, without being in connection with it. In the liberated state, the self's enjoyment is not factually an enjoyment of the body, but rather arises as a reflection as explained by individuals such as Vindhya Vasin and Asuri. After quoting the already quoted verses, Stanzas Haribadrasura responds by pointing to the Sankhya's notion of non-material and intrinsic nature of the self. The argument that the reflection of the self appears in the body is incompatible with the view that the self is non-material. Furthermore, since it would have too many illogical implications, the liberated self can never enjoy an object reflected in the body. Haribadrasura goes on to note that if for the sake of argument one were to admit the notion that in the state of liberation the self attains some sort of different or new nature that enables it to reflect in the body, this will lead to the equally illogical conclusion that the eternally unchanging and permanent self has somehow or other transformed contradiction in terms. In the period between the sixth and eighth century AD, one of the prime areas of controversy between Sankhya philosophers on the one side and Jain philosophers verse on the other involved the Jain versus the Sankhya understanding of how and where knowledge arises and how the self is able to experience knowledge without undergoing change. The controversy thus dealt with epistemological as well as ontological problems. This focus shifted from the ninth century onwards, most notably among Jain philosophers who borrowed arguments from the Buddhists in order to criticize Sankhya theories of causality. Many of the arguments directed to a Sankhya philosopher by Jain thinkers from the ninth century onwards were borrowed from Buddhism, notably the Tattva Sangraha by Shanta Rakshita. The process as described by Phyllis Granov went something like this. The Jain authors allowed one party in error, that is the Buddhist, to refute another party in error, that is the Sankhyaites. Over the course of time, all reference to Buddhism were dropped. The same arguments were presented as if they had been Jain arguments all along. Phyllis Granov's has referred to this period characterized by the influence of Buddhist arguments and the focus on theories of causality as the time in which Jain arguments against Sankhya philosophers standardized. The Yoga, Bindu and Shastravartya Samochaya of Hare Bhadrasuri document a version of the Pratibim Bhavada, the doctrine of reflection, according to which the self or Purusha is reflected in the Buddha. Such a theory appears in the Yoga Sutra Bhashya, the Yukti Deepika, and in fragments attributed by various Jain authors to either Vindyavassin or the mythical Asuri, is therefore reasonable to assume that Vindyavassin formulated the earliest known version of the doctrine of reflection within the classical Sankhya tradition in order to defend the position that the self retains its unchanging status while simultaneously experiencing knowledge. According to Gerald Larson and others, Vindyavassin's philosophy is closely related to Patanjali Yoga Shastra of the Yoga Sutra and the Yoga Sutra Bhashya, and thus it may be that Vindyavassin and Vyasa are one and the same person. If true, the theory of reflection advocated by Vindyavassin likely competed with the theory of knowledge of the old Sankhya school of Varshaganya Shastitantra, and with the theory of knowledge of Ishvalakrishna was familiar with Vindyavassin. Over the course of time, the theory of the old Sankhya school was gradually replaced by a different version of this Pratibim Bhavada, which then is transmitted by Hare Bhadrasuri, most notably those documented by Shantarakshita Kamalashila Hare Bhadrasuri. Hare Bhadrasuri claimed as we heard that philosophical study results in temporal happiness and true insights. So I therefore hope that this paper has made you happier and more insides filled. If not, we have at least in good Jain spirit passed on an important intellectual heritage for posterity. Thank you.