 George Perkovich, I was hoping that if I talked it would come on, I hear something, but is the audio okay back there? Okay, I'm going to assume it is. As I said, my name is George Perkovich. I'm a vice president for studies here at the endowment. It's great to welcome you this afternoon for the second part of what's been a longer event today. Just last Friday, of course, as you all know, President Obama and Park demonstrated that the US ROK Alliance is as solid as ever, and indeed remains committed not only to countering the North Korean threat, but to cooperation on issues that extend far beyond that. We saw that in part in the agreement by the two leaders to advance their partnership into what they're now calling the new frontiers of cooperation, again, that takes it much beyond the issue of relationships on the Korean Peninsula. We're here today to discuss the summit's results and their implications and to, with our colleagues, explore future directions for the Alliance. Today's event is also an extension of a meeting among the Northeast Asian policy group led by Deon Kim here, and the whole initiative, that whole project takes a holistic multidisciplinary approach to policies in the region. We are especially grateful to the Korea Foundation for supporting this inaugural meeting of the group. We've brought together a number of mid-career practitioners in both the public and private sectors, as well as policy experts from the US and South Korea. You'll meet a few of them here this afternoon, and then I'm sure we'll hear from more in the discussion that follows the presentations. But with that, let me get out of the way and turn it over to Deon Kim, who will moderate this session. Thanks very much, Deon. Thank you all for coming. Thank you, George. Hi, I'm Deon Kim here at Carnegie. We'll just jump right into it. You do have all of our speakers' bios in your handouts and online, but I did like to welcome and introduce an excellent panel here today. My immediate right is Dr. Yang Chang-suk. He is from Seoul, Korea. He is currently the auditor for the Kesong Industrial District Foundation and former deputy minister for South North Dialogue at the South Korean Unification Ministry, among a laundry list of decorated service in the South Korean government. To his right is Bruce Klingner, who is senior research fellow at the Heritage Foundation, and he also has enjoyed decorated service in governments as well. And last but not least is Troy Stangerone. He is the senior director for, I'm sorry, I'm blinking, congressional affairs, sorry, right here, congressional affairs and trade at the Korea Economic Institute of America. And he is my partner in crime project partner for the Northeast Asia Policy Group that George has mentioned. Catherine Moon, who is the Korea Chair at the Brookings Institution, unfortunately is unable to join us today due to illness, but she is here with us in spirit and I'm hoping she's watching online throughout our webcast. So without further ado, let's just jump right into it. I'd like to just quickly go down the row and we'll have a very free flowing conversation here today. What were your impressions of last Friday's summit, specifically what went well, if you could give us some concrete suggestions, examples, and what did you find could have been done better last Friday? Dr. Yang. Well, how long? Very briefly. I think on the part of President Park Geun-hae of South Korea, I think she won first of all President Obama's strong support for her drive for unification because there was some criticism inside South Korea that she is more oriented towards unification than towards improving inter-Korean relations. And secondly, North Korea might misunderstand that she is more leaning towards unification by absorption. So in that sense, I think she can justify that she is going in the right way. I think the summit in a way was unexciting because there were no deliverables, no new grand agreement to roll out. And in that way, the partnership, the alliance, the friendship in a way is a victim of its own success and that we've already done FTA, we've already done alliance guideline revisions, et cetera. So there was no need for a new deliverable. But it was still very important to have the meeting to in a way affirm the reality as well as the image of the partnership. I've written a lot of questions about whether South Korea had slipped the moorings and was steaming full speed towards Beijing leaving the alliance in the wake. I think those concerns are stronger in South Korea than they are in the United States. But it was a way for President Park and President Obama to affirm there is no daylight between us on North Korean policy and that because that foundation is so strong, we're able to look at these non-peninsular issues such as the new frontiers. Where I perhaps didn't fulfill all my expectations is I would have liked a little more specificity on some of the affirmations. On the closeness of the alliance, we didn't see an announcement on FAD. So in that case, South Korea continues to buckle under the pressure from China. We saw in the joint statement referenced to North Korean human rights neither Seoul nor Washington have articulated any concrete steps that they've taken. And then on threatening additional sanctions, we haven't seen any new measures that either the U.S. government or Seoul has taken. I want to bring in Troy, but to ask a quick question and Troy can jump in anytime. On the point about no grand or major deliverables this time versus checking in, gardening. I think Scott Snyder recently called it gardening, intending to the alliance. As policy analysts, did you want, we knew, we expected they weren't going to come out with grand gestures and deliverables. But still, we are at the end of the park administration. This is perhaps the last bilateral summit between the two presidents. Were you hoping for something more, more concrete deliverables to some men? You mentioned that and we also expected that not to be on the agenda. Right. Well, again, sort of a deliverable can either be very large or small. Again, we've already had all these major agreements on really the diplomatic military and economic side. And also, the summit lacked the drama of the U.S.-China summit because South Korea is a friend. There's no disagreement. There's very little, if any, friction on a number of events or a number of issues. Again, I just wanted a little bit more concrete action to back up the statements or the pledges of more pressure on North Korea. The U.S. will use all necessary means to defend South Korea. We're calling on China to be more responsible stakeholder in policy towards North Korea. So I always like a little bit of specifics or actions to go beyond just the diplomatic affirmations. I think I just jumped in and say, largely what Bruce has said, this idea that there wasn't any major drama, there wasn't any major deliverable. I think it some ways shows the success of the alliance. Now we're at a point to where we've worked through a lot of the major issues and now we can take and focus on these other types of things. And I think when you look at that, I mean, let's look at the economic relationship right now. You know, we're three and a half years into the course of the implementation. You know, President Park was very specific in that she thinks Korea would be a good TPP partner. You know, I think we saw the right signals there due to the situation in terms of getting it implemented in the United States, taking and having TPP, you know, move forward. Korea can't go in right away, but we're seeing the right steps right now. So you've got, you know, what is the appropriate step right there. But unlike the new frontier initiatives, you know, things like cybersecurity talks, getting Korea to take and sign on to certain norms, in terms of, you know, that no state should support the theft of corporate secrets and things. You know, these are important steps forward. They may not be large deliverables, but they're things that take and expand the alliance into more of a broader relationship. Dr. Yang, your assessment impressions and reactions to these new frontier issues of new frontier cooperation, expanding the alliance to beyond just the peninsula into more global issues? Yes, I think, you know, it is, I think, natural and can be justified that the Obama administration needs, you know, alliance support from South Korea, which is emerging as a middle power. But the question is whether South Korea and people are ready to play a role as a global partner or regional partner. But still, you know, President Park has tried every means possible to persuade the people to come along with her with regard to NAPC or Asian Development Bank and something like more regional. But there has been also criticism in South Korea that, you know, still we must face with North Korean problems. So we need more energy, more problems. Probably if unification comes, you know, there will be huge amount of unification costs. So I think we need some kind of sort of balancing in, you know, meeting with North Korea challenges as well as regional and global agenda. But still South Korea, I think, has a lot of assets and also some know-how in terms of contributing to global agenda because we have been working for some development. So we have good experiences within growing from underdeveloped to developed countries. Based on how well you know South Korea and South Koreans and based on the summit results, is there, do you sense that there is more of a feeling that, yes, global issues are very important, but we wish the summit would have done something more concrete on North Korea, an issue that's more immediate to the Korean Peninsula rather than agreeing on specific next steps on global issues? Yes, I think, you know, the President Obama showed strong support as an ally for the South Korean government. First of all, regarding nuclear issue and also supporting inter-Korean dialogue. But there is still lacking new initiative or new incentive for North Korea. President Park and President Obama, I think, took the same position waiting for North Korean confirmation or affirmation that North Korea has a genuine willingness to give up nuclear weapons and other weapons program. And that means that still U.S. and South Korea are waiting for North Korea to show firm commitment back to, you know, 2005 September joint statement. But we need some more to get North Korea back to the table. In addition to both President's position that if North Korea gives up nuclear weapons we can provide extensive economic cooperation and etc. But for example, North Korea, you know, one day after on 17 North Korea proposed peace treaty, you know. So of course in 2005 September statement states that in due course, you know, the six parties can discuss peace treaty which North Korea strongly wants. North Korea wants first peace treaty and then denuclearization. So it is the question of a sequence. But still U.S. and South Korea and China, you know, set together to discuss peace treaty to replace Amnesty's agreement back in 1997 and 1998. So the, in my personal opinion we can discuss together denuclearization plus peace treaty. Of course, you know, there is North Korea's motivation that wants to, that is North Korea wants to be recognized as nuclear weapons state because they, in their 17 proposals a couple of days ago that they mentioned, you know, the nuclear arms reduction talks. That means that, you know, they want to be treated as a equal partner as United States as a nuclear weapons state. Let us discuss the reduction of nuclear arms. But we know about North Korea's intentions. So I think we, it could be a little bit better. We want more to show to North Korea some bigger carrots if North Korea comes to dial our table. I'd like to bring in Bruce and Troy into this conversation too. First, of course, touch upon any points that Dr. Yang has mentioned but also looking at the joint statement on North Korea that came out of the summit last Friday. Your reactions, did it go beyond just reaffirming our strong commitment to turn North Korea or did it push the ball a bit forward? There are a number of issues on the table. First of all, I think on the North Korea versus New Frontiers. I mean, I don't cover global health and climate warming so I tend not to focus on that. I'm more of a bricks and mortar, you know, North Korea person. So that's what I tend to focus on. But I think, I mean, just to affirm that we're able to discuss New Frontiers issues with South Korea and we want to because we can almost take for granted our policies commonality on North Korea. I mean, that's, we're on the same sheet of music so it's sort of, okay, you, me, same, same, let's move on. And we want to bring in South Korea because for a small nation it's frequently punched above its weight on any number of issues, economic issues, security issues, diplomatic issues. So we really are eager to have South Korea involved in any of these new issues, whether they're more global security issues, Crimea, Syria, refugee issues, South China Sea, East China Sea, but also these new non-security issues. So we welcome South Korea's involvement. Just to touch perhaps on the peace treaty, North Korea would like that very much because it would be a way of sort of eliminating, well first it would eliminate United Nations command. It would then seemingly remove the justification for having U.S. forces Korea if the war is over. And Noh Mihan when he was president was also very eager to sign a peace treaty. There are problems with that though, as the Six Party Talks is meant to address the North Korean nuclear threat to South Korea and its neighbors. A peace treaty would need to first address the conventional armed forces threat to South Korea. I was a member of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty negotiations in Vienna many years ago. And in that case what we had to do was try to reduce the overall number of conventional forces between the Warsaw Pact and NATO, as well as thin them out from the forward edge of the battlefield. So rather than being able to sign a peace treaty tomorrow with the idea that it will create a peace regime, instead I think a peace treaty could only be signed after very lengthy arduous negotiations where you first have to identify what conventional forces are on the peninsula, where they are, exchange of data, you'd have onsite inspections, etc., and then you'd have to thin them out and reduce them. Because otherwise you'd leave in place the very extensive North Korean conventional threat to the South. And we've been talking about this this morning, I want to bring in Choi too, but in terms of the sequencing and as a way to resume dialogue, the question is, we have colleagues, especially in Washington, the Washington policy community, advocating for leading with peace treaty talks so that you can open up a room for dialogue or should we continue to push for denuclearization first before we can even talk about or mention, say the first letter P in peace treaty. Whoever. Well, I'm happy to jump in on that. I think if you look at this from any negotiating perspective, you hear this a lot when you negotiate an FTA, nothing is agreed till everything is agreed, so whether we focus the talks first on the peace treaty but don't get there until we have all the other parts in place or whatnot, you can debate whether that would be a good idea to go back and forth, but I think in terms, you know, I think it's highly unlikely the United States would move forward with doing a peace treaty without things being settled on the nuclear side. So, you know, we can talk about the sequencing of talks and everything, but in terms of action and everything, I think there is a sort of a set order where you go forward. But to sort of come back to, you know, maybe this larger issue of, you know, looking at the relationship, you know, I thought, you know, on your initial question, the statement about North Korea, you know, it was significant that they chose to take and set it aside as a separate entity itself, and I thought that said a lot in itself. But, you know, we look at, for example, the new frontier issues, you know, a lot of them touch on things that also address North Korea, you know, cybersecurity. There's been studies done that, you know, most cyber attacks come from North Korea after China and Russia, and then if you look at who's attacked in South Korea. So, cybersecurity is something that, you know, is a North Korea issue to an extent. It's also a broader issue, but it touches on North Korea. You know, if you look at the discussion of things like NAPS, this idea of building greater regional cooperation, it may not directly address the North Korea issue, but it heads in that direction. So, I think whether it be development cooperation, you know, even cooperation on global health, you know, there's a tuberculosis problem in North Korea. You know, if that were to spread to South Korea, you have a health issue there. So, working on cybersecurity, health care, all these other things may not directly go towards North Korea, but indirectly it all works towards that one goal. Dr. Yang, you seem deep in thought. Yeah. Regarding sequencing peace treaty and the nuclearization talks, I think, you know, my suggestion was, what about, you know, synchronizing. But if we start with, you know, peace treaty, I think there is a risk, you know, because, you know, back in 1998, you know, North Korea wanted, you know, to set the agenda first. So, the agenda should be, as Bruce said, you know, U.S. troop usual from the Korean Peninsula should be on the agenda. And then U.S. and South Korea said, okay, we cannot agree to the agenda that can prejudge the outcome of any talks. You know, we can discuss everything, but, you know, we cannot prejudge any outcome. But finally, North Korea strongly, you know, proposed that, you know, U.S. troop withdrawal and peace treaty with the United States should be discussed first and then they didn't come back to the dialogue table. So I think if we start with peace treaty alone, then there is a, I think, possibility that North Korea can drag on in peace treaty without discussing denuclearization so they can gain time for further developing nuclear weapons and other, you know, or long-range missiles, you know. And also, I want to tell you that in North Korea's nuclear weapons development and also North Korea's hope for being recognized as a nuclear weapons state is there is some either logical motivation, domestically particularly. If you look at the history of founding North Korea, Kim Il-sung says that the DPRK's main goal is to liberate South Korean people from the U.S. colonial rule. So Kim Il-sung gave a vision for the North Korean people that DPRK is a strong, should be strong power as United States. And currently, Kim Jong-un always mentioned that North Korea is capable of countering any kind of U.S. threat or U.S. trigger war. That wants to give to the North Korean, I think it's more domestically oriented, you know. In order to give North Korean people the image that, you know, DPRK is very strong power, you know, which can compete with, you know, United States, you know. Then the, it also gives message to the South Korean people even, you know, that particularly to the liberal circle in South Korea that DPRK can only, you know, fight against United States and also fight for the interests of the people, vis-à-vis U.S. colonial or capitalism interests, you know. So in that sense, I think, you know, we need to read Kim Jong-un's intention that it is sometimes more domestically oriented. So sometimes we need to, you know, disregard whatever North Korea tells. And that could give us more leverage or that can put North Korea on more defensive rather than offensive. I'd like to ask our panelists, and starting with Dr. Yang, because you've got the South Korean perspective, how you assess the health of Kim Jong-un's regime, or Kim Jong-un and his regime? Very hard question. Nobody knows what's going on in North Korea. I think, you know, the North Korea as a regime is somewhat very resilient despite some economic problems or some kind of execution, because it is unique. North Korea, first of all, is sort of a feudalistic, dynastic state. It means that still, you know, transfer power from father to son, grandfather to father and grandson, you know. So this is just like a e-dynasties. So the North Korean Party, Workers' Party rule state that North Korea's Workers' Party is the Kim Il-sung's party. Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il's party. It means that DPRK is Kim Dynasty. And secondly, it's sort of very religious. So the Kim Il-sung is just like a religious leader. Something like Jesus Christ. More would be higher than that. Right. Kathy, thank you. Just like God. And when Kim Il-sung died, the North Korean people mourned a lot. But several years later, I think I can recall it in 1999, there was a very good novel titled The Eternal Life. Then according to that, you know, it's fiction novel, but I think it's more of non-fiction. At the end of the novel, they said just like, you know, more just, you know, transfer power to Joshua. And Kim Il-sung died, but you know, here is Kim Jong-il who, you know, take over the power. And also North Korea started to build a tower of eternal life across the country. I think at every county level, so more than 300 towns, the tower of eternal life were built saying Kim Il-sung lived eternally with us. And after Kim Jong-il died, they added Kim Jong-il's name there. So they destroyed the previous towers and they built again. Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il lived eternally with us. So I think, you know, in that sense, the feudalistic dynasty plus, you know, I think very religious, then it can sustain longer than we expect. Plus, they have very strong control and control and building mechanisms with the security agency and police agency. And so the North Korean people are under constant watch from the security agency. And also since Kim Jong-il took power, he started with, you know, replace old generals and old carters with younger generation. And it means that he wants to have more of his own people. So we tend to believe that economic collapse may lead to political collapse, but there is no party or no, you know, outside information flowing from outside into North Korean people. So I think there is lack of any kind of motivation to bring people to stand against North Korean regime both in terms of information over resistance group and civil society. It is quite different from East Germany. East German people watched Western television, including West German television every night. You know, they could travel West Germany. There was more interaction between social groups between East and West Germany. I think, you know, so we... I am very concerned about the worst scenario that Kim Jong-un is very young. If he lives until his father's age, then we will have to face with Kim Jong-un in the coming 30 years or 40 years. It is a, I think... And going back to lack of motivation, but also the lack of power to assemble the North Korean people to try to rise up against. Ms. Lee, did you know Troy had some... Well, I was just going to say, I mean, if you look at the state of North Korea right now, and I want to avoid the question of Kim Jong-un's personal health because a friend of mine is a doctor and he would tell me, you can't diagnose somebody from a TV screen, so, you know, I try to avoid that. But, you know, right now, the majority of their trade, 70, 80%, is with China. China's economy is slowing. You know, North Korea had been growing probably over the last couple of years. The economy is likely slowing down because of that. One of their primary exports to China is coal. There are two trends that are impacting that. One deals with China's own internal changes. They've passed the environmental regulations, which will limit some of the exports of North Korean coal because it's too dirty. But two, if you look at the global trend, you have a slowdown not just in China, but more broadly amongst developing countries. And what we've seen is with the shale gas revolution, selling economies, the price of fuel and the price of coal has dropped. So if you look at the coal exports, North Korea exports significantly more in terms of volume now to North Korea than it did about three or four years ago. But in terms of the revenue it receives from China, it's about the same over the last couple of years. So you have this slowdown that they're going to face economically. On the political side, we've seen a lot of change. As Dr. Yang points out, the question I think we have to ask is, given there's been talks, I think it was a few months ago where South Korea released it, they thought that 90 people had been executed or so. One, that says Kim Jong-un is in charge. But two, it raises the question of why does he feel the need that he needs to eliminate this many people in this kind of way? I think the regime has a control on things, but they have difficulties they're facing as well that are forcing them to take extreme measures. And to that last question I'd like to ask, give that to Dr. Yang, because of your deep insights in North Korea, all things North Korea, Kim Jong-un's political house cleaning that he has done and motivations and reasons for that. One, is it as is normal with any succession to bring in to have your own men in place, or is it too out of some sort of insecurity? I don't think it is due to Kim Jong-un's thinking of some possible insecurity. A totalitarian dictator tends to execute many people around him. We have seen such kind of case in the former Soviet Union under Joseph Stalin, massive execution to place. And also under Kim Il-sung in the middle of the 1950s, a lot of execution regarding pro-Chinese people or pro-Russian people. So I think we need to analyze or we need to deepen our discussion whether this is a typical phenomenon for Kim Jong-un or it is a general characteristic of a totalitarian dictator. So I tend more to think that it could be a general, we can generalize such kind of execution. But in terms of South Korean culture or tradition, it is a unique or it is a crazy thing to kill some uncle on the mother's side. We can't think of such kind of thing. It means that Kim Jong-un is very young and very bizarre and unpredictable and that's why we are very concerned about his possible, the crazy kind of decision-making or militaristic tendency. So we saw some kind of military provocation along the DNZ last August, which we couldn't even think about under Kim Jong-il. That's why I think we need to discuss more deeply, analyze and still very hard to understand. But I think that's why it is meaningful that President Obama agreed to phone high-level U.S.-Korean strategic consultation and also with regard to nuclear issue, of course he proposed U.S. and South Korea discuss with other partners including China. I think if we discuss North Korean issue with China and Japan, we need anyway some collective information and consultation. Of course the Chinese people are not better than Americans in South Korea about North Korean situation, but still I think two has better than one anyway. We've been discussing and debating regime stability for decades, which in a way shows the resilience of the regime. It always comes particularly to the fore after the death of Kim Il-sung, Kim Jong-il, or Purges, Chung-sung Tech, or some other major event. Some argue that under Kim Jong-un the regime is very unstable, very precarious hold on power, and that the Purges reflect a weak and battled leader desperately trying to fight off real or perceived contenders. I tend to see it the other way. I think the regime is quite stable. Had someone wanted to move against Kim Jong-un, I think they would have done it immediately after Kim Jong-il's death. Who knows what would have happened had Kim Jong-il died in 2008 when he had the stroke, but they had three years to put things into place. So immediately after Kim Jong-il's death we saw that Kim Jong-un was the leader, there wasn't a council or a triumvirate, and that once within six months he had acquired the six all important titles of his father giving him absolute control of the party, the military, and the government, it made it much more difficult for someone to move against him. And then with Chung Song-taek, some had said that because he was, well, the second most powerful man in North Korea, although that was his fourth time being Purge, though more permanently, Chung Song-taek's minions would rise up and storm the palace. They didn't. I think instead people would realize if he can take out Chung Song-taek or if he can take out anyone, I'm going to keep my head down. And just the way the North Korean government works under Kim Jong-il and Kim Jong-un, everyone is very count. So I think he is in control. I think the Purge show he's willing and confident enough to take out even the senior most leaders, he's replaced the minister of defense six times, what would be the equivalent of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff five times. So now that doesn't mean it's a benign regime. It's clearly a threat to its people and if I'm wrong, if it is much more unstable, then that's a whole other list of things to be concerned about. But really we just need to focus, I think on Kim Jong-un is the leader today. We need to focus on him and his policies, which have been very belligerent and very resistant to reform. So he's the leader. I think he will be for some time. That said, someone can always give him a nine millimeter headache tomorrow. There can be a change in policy from China or the international community, which can put greater strain on the regime. There can be internal actions. But I think right now it does seem like he is in control. Is current U.S. and international Chinese, South Korean policy toward North Korea working in terms of trying to change Pyongyang's strategic calculus? If not, what avenues, what options have not been tried that we should test and try? Do you want to solve North Korea? Oh, solve North Korea. It's a simple problem, right? Well, I mean, we asked the question, you know, is policy working? You know, right now we have a North Korea that still has a nuclear program that's not come back to talks. That being said, you need a willing partner and North Korea is not a willing partner. They've said as much recently after the summit, they said as much after the Randall came out that they're not interested in that kind of arrangement. So the question then becomes, how do we take and change the calculus? We've been trying this, you know, before the summit there was some speculation that you might have a series of events, you know, a test on the anniversary of the Korean Workers' Party of either an ICBM or a nuclear weapon. It didn't happen. We had the recent senior visit by China. So perhaps the Chinese have, you know, started to squeeze the levers a little there. It's opaque. We don't really know for sure. But, you know, in terms of what else can we try, you know, at the end of the day, I think it's not a question of, like, do you sanction more? Do you engage more? But you have to find the right combination of policies to take, and one show them that there really are benefits of cooperation, whether they show them that there are costs as well. Now, I'm not going to sit here and say that I have that right formula because I don't, and if I did, I would have solved the problem. But, you know, I do think, you know, if you look at where we are right now, we're at a point to where the problem is kind of stagnant. Okay. Yeah, when we say, you know, is U.S. policy working? Well, they haven't, you know, cut up their last nuclear weapon, so in a way, by definition, no. But then there tends to be that, you know, associated question of, well, what should we do differently? And it often takes the form of, well, what else can we offer them? You know, and as Troy said, there's not a, you know, a magic Rubik's Cube combination of benefits to offer North Korea where they'll say, aha, that's it. If only you had offered that 20 years ago, you know, here are the weapons. You know, it's, they've shown since the early 1960s, maybe in the late 1950s, they're pursuing a nuclear weapons program or actually two programs. So this is a long-standing quest for a number of reasons. So we've offered, South Korea, Japan, the United States, and others have offered a long, long laundry list of benefits. You know, under E. Myeong-bak and Pak-gane, they've articulated a long list of things. So, and North Korea has been resistant to all of them. You know, today when people say, well, you know, let's try engagement again. Really, anything we might want to offer them I think was offered in the Leap Day Agreement. Very quickly. By announcing they're going to violate the UN resolutions within two weeks of that agreement. So we have tried a lot of unconditional and conditional diplomacy. You know, I think you'd need a three-track policy. Conditional engagement based on principles of reciprocity, conditionality, and transparency. Punitive measures when they violate US law, international law, UN resolutions. You hope those two working together will induce them to fulfill their many, many agreements to never pursue nuclear weapons and then to give up what they promise never to pursue. And then, but since there's a lot of skepticism now that even, you know, a more power to both of those cylinders would work, your third track is having sufficient defenses for yourself and your allies against the spectrum of the military threat. So I think, you know, there are a number of measures and I've mentioned them in other forums about, you know, the things we could be doing in North Korea and targeted financial measures that we're already doing to other countries for far less egregious violations. Right now you have in both houses the US Congress, North Korea sanctions enforcement acts being teed up because of frustration with the timid incrementalism of the administration. You know, but you also have to ensure your defenses are strong. And one other thing I'd just like to add, I think the question of, you know, is the policy working? You know, I mentioned you have to have a willing partner. And if you look at the Obama administration, regardless of whether you agree with their policies or not, you know, at the end of the day they've opened relations with Cuba. They brought Myanmar back into the national community. They've negotiated the Iran deal. So if you're looking for, you know, where the issue is, it's hard to argue that it's the Obama administration. They've shown they're clearly willing to reach out and try to reach understanding with, you know, that the United States is traditionally considered, you know, less than savory perhaps. So I don't think that this problem comes down to a lack of effort, you know, on the US side. I mean, the Obama administration has tried. North Korea has said no. The other side of this coin is, you know, on the South Korean side, you know, Park Geun-hye came into office, you know, wanted to do trust politics, build trust. What happens? Well, you have a nuclear test, you have an ICBM test, you have the workers withdrawn from K-Song, all of this right now in the North Korea administration. You know, the South Korean government has tried consistently to try and find a way to start dialogue back up, to take, you know, do incremental steps, try to rebuild some kind of understanding between the two countries. And, you know, it's consistently North Korea that pulls back. So, you know, the question of whether the policy works, it really comes down to, you know, North Korea as President Obama said at the summit, has to make that strategic calculus Iran made that they want to make a change. Dr. Yang, critics in the U.S. who are frustrated with what they claim is no policy towards North Korea, that's and one that's not effective and they argue that instead because they argue that because the Obama administration is not willing to employ more of a proactive policy toward North Korea, that South Korea should take the lead on this issue. Is there a role for South Korea to take, can it take a lead on this issue and what would that look like? Of course, you know, it is South Korea that should take the lead in North Korea policy, you know, and South Korean governments, you know, so previous governments' goal in North Korea policy was to induce change in North Korea, both in North Korean regime and North Korean society. The liberal government under Kim Dae-joon and Roh Moo-hyun stressed that they in a sense they were quite successful in inducing changes in North Korean regime's behavior with regard to provocation. And also they argued that they made a big contribution to North Korean market growing thanks to engagement policy. On the other hand, you know, the conservative government under Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hae criticized the liberal governments for propping up the dictatorial regime in North Korea while they were in big difficulty, particularly in late 1990s North Korea was in big trouble with farming and serious drought coupled with, you know, the collapse of Soviet Union and European countries and Kim Il-sung's death. So the Kim Dae-joon administration came in in 1998 and then started engaging North Korea and gave a room for North Korea regime's survivor. But we don't know which is the right approach, but, you know, pressure versus engagement policy towards North Korea for either as a benefit advantage and disadvantages. But I think with regard to other options, I think, we have sanctions to punish North Korea, but, you know, sanctions has not worked efficiently. First of all, because of China. China gives room for North Korea to avoid sanctions regime particularly across the border between China and North Korea there have been a lot of activities, trade and both legal and illegal and also in the Northeast and Chinese provinces there are many North Korean entities including banks, you know, branches of North Korean banks. So as soon as the Chinese firms export goods to North Korea and then the North Korean although North Korean officers ask the Chinese firms to deposit money into North Korean branch, bank branch office in Northeast China. But the Chinese officers argue that they have done a lot to abide by sanctions by, you know, controlling technology and parts to be used for nuclear weapons weapons of mass destruction. Of course we cannot deny the fact that Chinese has been trying to do that but I think in order to make sanctions more effective we need to think about more punitive like, you know, secondary boycott including financial punishment, something like BDA kind of approach and also I think we need to press North Korean regime with some information dissemination. So we were quite surprised to see North Korean regime shocked and very worried about the South Korean loudspeaker propaganda. I think that means that North Korean regime is very concerned about outside information reaching the North Korean people because they have monopolized all kind of information by monopolizing media, you know. They only official North Korean television and outside that North Korean people have no access to outside information but they can balloon the leaflets and South Korean broadcasting towards North Korean people. And so I think we need to be more aggressive in terms of providing outside information to North Korean people and also I think we might think about from the South Korean perspective whether think about whether US can start again direct talks with North Korea. But you know, US administrations have been deceived by North Korean people many times so US administration is not willing to buy the same horse twice anymore, right? Three times. But when I talked with the Chinese officials, you know, China has got leverage over North Korea to change their behavior but Chinese officials said we do not have any kind of leverage but US has got leverage, you know. So it is the United States who take proactive gestures by starting direct talks with North Korea. Because North Korea has always claimed that nuclear issue is the issue to be resolved between United States and North Korea because United States poses threat of nuclear war to North Korea. And so they demanded US stop hostile policy towards North Korea. But this time I think it's meaningful that President Obama stated US has no intention for hostile policy towards North Korea, you know. Before we open it up to the audience for questions and please think of the questions as I asked my final question to the panelists if you had your own crystal ball and could look into the future and session tool look into the far other future but my question is more on the most immediate future or the near term future this Friday summit was probably the last bilateral meeting between but the last bilateral summit between the two leaders of the US and South Korea. Despite some criticism among pandits and others, commentators that they did not produce big deliverables they did produce deliverables that they did get a lot done and deliverables in the form of mechanisms for regional and global issues. So on that note if we look ahead and we look at the next presidential elections for both countries what happens to the good work that was done last Friday in terms of specifically in terms of North Korea and also in terms of the regional and global issues. What happens if let's say we have a progressive president in South Korea or a conservative president in the US or the other way around or we have alignment with conservative and conservative and progressive so what do you see if you could predict the future looking into your last ball? I was taking notes there were a number of things I'd agree or disagree with Dr. Young but we'll pass over that. I think if you look at the environment under at the time of the next US and South Korean presidents whoever the president is from either party the environment towards North Korea is going to be much different than when President Obama came into office. At that time you had sort of two groups saying oh it's all President Bush's fault North Korea only started building a nuclear weapon when George Bush was elected others would say Pyongyang's to blame for the North Korean nuclear problem and its attacks and threats and terrorist acts. Once President Obama came into office he tried to extend an open handed dialogue and we saw two days after his inauguration already on unclassified imagery indications of preparations for a missile launch and even on the eve of his inauguration the North Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs the supposed engagers the supposed pussycats you know in policy towards North Korea towards the US were already making new demands and saying the six party talks were dead so what you had very quickly that Pyongyang was going to act just as badly to Barack Obama as to George Bush and that led to a huge shift in view within the Obama administration they really switched to 180 degrees and then also the punditry outside sort of had a belated epiphany that North Korea is to blame for the North Korean problem so the next US President is not going to be facing a real inclination or outside pressure of going back to sunshine policy start throwing benefits to them without any requirement for North Korea making a change we saw under sunshine that North Korea did not implement political or economic change and that we still had provocations so I think on the US side whether it's you know Democrat or Republican you'll see a not a lot of optimism that engagement will work there will be I think a greater push for you know tougher measures certainly if North Korea does another missile or nuke test or another deadly attack on our South Korean ally I think on the South Korean side you could have a potential for a greater policy change the progressive opposition is in disarray I don't foresee a progressive candidate winning the next presidential election but I think if you did have a Moon Jae-in or someone like that you could have a much greater change in South Korean policy than in US policy and then you could have more cause for friction between Washington and Seoul if South Korea pursues a different policy well I guess the one thing I would say is you know having worked in politics you know six weeks as an eternity in a political lifetime so you know the South Korean election isn't for like two and a half years many things had happened we don't know what will happen there even on the US side our politics is shifting sort of rapidly that being said if you look at Democrats and Republicans in the United States be it the alliance with South Korea be it North Korea policy there's essentially agreement so I don't think you're going to see much of any shift on the US side and if you look at things that they've done and some of these go back to the Bush administration and when they first put out this idea of a global partnership and so a lot of the new frontier stuff which we're calling it today you know will stay in place I find it hard to believe that cyber security is something that the next two new administrations will say you know what it's not really an important issue we're going to like cut this off the table so I think a lot of those things you may have some change in emphasis but will stay and I think you know Bruce is right the one area for potential you know shifts might be on North Korea policy to where you won't see much change in the US but depending on how the politics works in South Korea you could see a shift there I think the one thing we've learned from you know prior experiences that it's important for the two governments to consult with each other and try to find a common ground of that policy to avoid frictions of the alliance good I think it is the US Korea summit recent summit I think is very meaning for in terms of I think China policy I think President Obama justified President Park's policy toward China I think the removing any kind of concern both in Seoul and Washington that Seoul might lean more toward China than the United States I think it means that US administration understand that South Korea needs Chinese support for North Korea policy in terms of provocation denuclearization and economic development and global issues too as I said before the Chinese support in order to make sanctions effective or in order to induce change in North Korea's behavior so if there is a US China bilateral consultation and Korea Chinese bilateral consultation and US China Korea bilateral consultation plus Japan South Korea bilateral coordination and consultation I think it could play as a very effective tool to put more pressure on North Korea I think because and secondly I think both the United States and South Korea needs to change the priority in Chinese policy towards North Korea the Chinese policy are three pillars no collapse of North Korean regime and no nuclear weapons but in terms of priority the Chinese government tends to put first priority to stability of North Korea regime before so the whether South Korea and United States can succeed in persuading President Xi Jinping to put more priority towards denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula prior to stability of North Korea regime I think it could put more pressure on North Korea to change their long term strategy and secondly having said that there is very unlikely it is very unlikely that North Korea will change their course of action in spite of outside pressure or no matter what South Korea and United States policy will be towards North Korea because North Korea as I said before is dynastic and and also very isolated they are very proud of being independent but there is a pressure from North Korean population in terms of they have more cellular phone they can communicate with others it means that the speed of within North Korean society is getting faster and faster and then the more market elements so the North Korean people depend more on market than to the state it means that state cannot afford to deliver to the people whatever they need then there could be some gap between what state can do and what people can do on their own thank you let's open up to the floor if there are any questions gentlemen up here and gentlemen in the middle please state your name, your affiliation and a quick question please thank you Dave it's Gerald retired Foreign Service now a private consultant I'd like to shift the focus of the questions to what I didn't hear in the panel discussion it was some good comments but it seemed you were all focused on Korean Peninsula issues rather myopic focus on that and not enough on the sort of regional Korea or global Korea brand the most exciting part of the summit that I heard was the press conference where President Obama responding to a question about President Park's visit to the Victory Parade in Beijing seemed to me to set down some parameters of what is acceptable South Korean behavior in dealing with China in that we welcome overtures between China and South Korea but when China starts to violate rules whether it's on security issues or on economic issues we expect South Korea to speak up as much as the US will speak up Japan would speak up Australia, India the kind of global stage in the community I didn't get a sense to me that was the most exciting thing and something we should be watching as we go forward I was wondering if the panel would like to comment on that either rejecting it or no great question so I purposely left the exciting issues to all of you on the floor that was intentional yes and the next session we'll deal with a lot of the regional and global issues but if our panelists want to comment on that the South Korean-China relationship there's a great deal of focus particularly in the Korean media and the run up to the summit President Park didn't need to explain why she went to Beijing we have a great deal of trust and respect for President Park so we don't think she's shifting the country away that said there is some basis for some concern it's not just the interpretation but when National Assembly members privately things such as because of the history issue with Japan South Korea may feel more comfortable with China than the U.S. and indeed National Assembly members saying we may need to choose between Beijing and Washington in the future so there is a little reason for concern I think the way most folks in Washington saw it it was fine and a good thing for President Park to meet with President Xi to talk about North Korea and any number of issues you know to nitpick a bit I think we thought it was not a good idea to attend the parade in Tiananmen Square and you had sort of that strange optic of a South Korean president reviewing the troops of the last country to invade South Korea the one responsible for so many South Korean deaths which it is not apologized for and the country responsible for the continued division of the Korean Peninsula and the Korean people and yet refusing to meet with I think the summit, the statements even just the optics would put a lot of the supposed concerns to rest but you do raise a very good point of the U.S. has privately asked South Korea to speak up a bit more on Chinese actions in the East China Sea and the South China Sea when China is pushing the envelope of its sovereignty far beyond its shores U.S. would like any sort of law respecting nation to comment on that's not the way to do things trying to push little nations around is not a good thing to do so I think by having the president come out and say it you can have varying levels of interpretation as whether that was a reflection of U.S. frustration or just a U.S. request the only thing else that I would add is I think because China has become such a big part of the national relations over the last 5, 10 years we sometimes maybe focus on it with great extent and if you look at a different example when back at the end of last year in November Korea and China announced the preliminary conclusion of their free trade agreement there were a bunch of comments and stories about this is a sign that China is passing the U.S. it's moving forward it's now the dominant player and everything and you know here's the thing if you look at the course FTA if you look at the E.U. Korea FTA and if you look at the Korea China FTA the E.U. and the U.S. FTA liberalize 98% or more of all goods and trade between South Korea and the U.S. and the E.U. the China FTA only gets to 90% so you know has Derek Scissor so I should give credit set at an event we held earlier you know does that mean that the U.S. should have a lesser agreement so I think sometimes we look at something that happens with China and we kind of push it to the forefront when you know if we look below at the broader trends as Bruce was talking about we can see that there is a really strong relationship between the United States and Korea next question the gentleman in the middle first and then the gentleman up here thank you my name is Shota Sato from Tokyo Broadcasting System I'm a correspondent here in Washington my question was something that I think Dr. Yang alluded to but President Obama in the joint press conference touched a little bit about the importance of Korea and Japan having a reconciliation and my question is what kind of impact do you think the outcome of this bilat that was on last Friday would have to the trilat that China, Japan and Korea are trying to hold next month thank you as far as I recall President Park stated that she is willing to have the meeting with Prime Minister Abe of course on the sidelines of trilateral meetings I think I think following the prior previous question in Seoul there was concern also that President Park has leaned toward China so the criticism that it might play into the Chinese hands that the trilateral alliance or trilateral cooperation or rock solid alliance between Seoul, Tokyo and Washington might loosen up vis-à-vis Russia, China, North Korea trilateral alliance and also the in the face of a reassertive Chinese policy US needs stronger Korea, Japan alliance support for US policy in the region I think in the sense that President Park responded by saying that there will be bilateral summit meeting between Tokyo and Seoul I think in that sense President Obama encouraged of course historical reconciliation but still within South Korea amongst the public there is the strong resentment that the Japanese government hasn't done enough to remove South Korean people's concern or South Korean people's resentment over sensitive feelings about history so I think since I lived in Germany for three and a half years if we compare the Germans' attitude with the Japanese attitude about their past wrongdoings I think there is a stark contrast the Germans always stress that they have done wrong and there will never be any kind of work started by the German people so I think why the Japanese cannot repeat of course I think the Japanese are sick and tired of repeating the same apology or regrets over their past history but in spite of that I think the Japanese should continue to do that of course Japan claim it is internationally legitimate because there was no independent South Korean people at that time because South Korea I agree to annexation into the Japanese colonial rule but that's their statement but diplomatically I think the Japanese should have them more in terms of that but having said that I think South Korea and US and Japan are moving in I think a better direction In her speech at CSIS in her prepared remarks she twice emphasized the importance of US-Japanese-Korean relations and she didn't apply any conditionality and I thought that was very striking and I was very encouraged that it was perhaps another data point in what has been a positive trend I think since in a way Prime Minister Abe visited here earlier this year where both countries seem to be making a better effort at trying to reach progress so that we can prioritize the important security issues of today over the past now then in response to a question she did raise sort of conditionality in a summit with Prime Minister Abe and I went back and reviewed the tape and it's sort of artfully vague in whether she was referring to a bilateral with Prime Minister Abe on the sideline of the trilateral or a separate bilateral to come after the trilateral and also it was vague as to whether it was for the meeting to be significant there would need to be progress on the comfort women issue it was unclear whether she meant it was still a precondition that she would continue to refuse to hold a summit because of this issue or whether it was if there was a sense that there would be progress on the issue during a separate bilateral summit with Prime Minister Abe then she would agree to it all very vague and all very much open for interpretation the US has been urging Japan to take additional measures to affirm previous measures in order to try to move the issue forward the US has also been urging South Korea to compartmentalize and prioritize its foreign policy and not hold all issues hostage to this one issue we are hoping that the recent meetings with the defense ministers the foreign ministers and the defense ministers a number of things are indicative of greater bilateral and trilateral cooperation we hope for a military intelligence sharing agreement between Japan and South Korea which would enable improved allied deterrence and defense against the North Korean threat so I think the trend has been positive but I think there are still questions as to the level of conditionality President Park will continue to have questions I am from the Indian Embassy I have just one question said that this third issue was not discussed maybe because of the Chinese pressure but is there anything like still there is lack of consensus between USA and South Korea on that issue on that deployment the the US would like to rebut many of the mischaracterizations of the THAAD system in the South Korean media and the Chinese media but I think has been deferential to South Korea which does not want to really raise the issue I think the issue should be raised South Korea's current policy is the three no's that there has been no decision made on THAAD deployment that there has been no request by the United States for deploying THAAD to better defend the US forces which are defending Korea and three there has been no official unofficial discussions indeed the word THAAD has not been mentioned in the presence of a South Korean official I think that is a bit nonsensical for that to be a policy the better response would be of course we are talking about that we are allies we talk about what kind of bullets what kind of fighter aircraft what kind of artillery systems where to deploy the forces how many forces of course when we are facing a North Korean threat a present day threat of nuclear biological and chemical warfare against South Korea and the US forces there we would be remiss in our duties as alliance managers if we weren't talking about that so I think we should be talking about it if you look at the particulars of the system it is better than anything South Korea has or will have for decades it is not a threat to China if you do all the detailed analysis of it contrary to a lot of assertions that in no way constraints China or is a threat to China it is something that the US should deploy but it can only do so with South Korea not doing so or not discussing it is I think South Korean reaction to the Chinese pressure and then one in the middle Steve Winters consultant you mentioned the executions and what they might indicate about the stability regime I was very puzzled because I heard at Korean Economic Institute a few months ago the leading Russian expert on North Korea speak and he stated that there is absolutely no evidence that the uncle was ever executed and I keep predicting he might turn up in another gear and more recently Professor Mansurov of Seiss who is probably my regard as the leading North Korean expert also stated there is no evidence that the uncle was executed he also predicted he might show it again and he went on to add in any case that particular uncle was if you want to make the Stalinist analogy the barrier of North Korea and in any case the best thing they could have done was get rid of him so how can we I'm just worried about the low level of evidence for any of these conclusions we're trying to draw isn't that a very dangerous situation that we don't really know what's going on well first I wonder if Choi should defend the KEI event that happened and then perhaps if Dr. Yang can speak you're hiding him at KEI of course well I mean the idea behind that event was to take and provide a rush of respect on this issue because Russia is becoming a more important player Putin is putting more focus on East Asia you know I think that's the beauty of these things is we can let people provide opinions and we can disagree with them I think in terms of whether Jungsun Tech was executed we haven't found Jimmy Hoffa's body yet but we're pretty sure that the mafia took him out too so I think if Jungsun Tech were in some prison somewhere the Chinese probably would have reacted differently he'd probably know so I think it's fairly safe to say that that happened you can debate the reports of whether he's executed 90 other officials since then and what happened to some of the other people who were Jungsun Tech allies some of them showed up afterwards after the reports some have not but I think with Jungsun Tech we can pretty much take that as a given I guess I'll just leave it at that Dr. Yang and Bruce what's your view on your years of decades of experience with intelligence in North Korea and North Korean intelligence if you could please educate all of us on that precise question I'm not intending to educate them I'm just a share my knowledge or common sense I think we have evidence from North Korea North Korea media reported that Jungsun Tech was put on trial for so many things and including he didn't show respect for Kim Jong-un he didn't show due respect for supreme dignity and also North Korean media reported Jungsun Tech was executed but we cannot believe in North Korean media of course the and then secondly there were successive indictment and execution of the people who worked together with Jungsun Tech and thirdly there have been several defectors who worked for Jungsun Tech who came recently to South Korea they said they were very concerned about their possible execution because they worked for Jungsun Tech and they decided to go to South Korea to save their lives and I agree with Bruce that in spite of such kind of execution and a lot of gassing game Kim Jong-un regime looks quite more stable than we expected as I said in terms of his palace orientation but you know we need to watch in the future whether Kim Jong-un can succeed in what he promised to his own people he said he would not let North Korean people tighten their belt any more and I think he is keeping more efforts to recovering North Korean economy also we see some signs of getting better in North Korea but as I said more information, more cellophones more transportation so if North Korean people feel that they are better off than under Kim Jong-un Kim Jong-il I think Kim Jong-un can claim that he is a successful leader he can justify his rule over the North Korean people we may not know whether Chung-Sung Tech was executed by a pack of hungry dogs 40mm anti-aircraft artillery fire or whether he is sleeping with the fishes with Luca Brazzi but I think the evidentiary basis is pretty strong that he was executed that said there are a number North Korea is the hardest of the hard targets that is how we refer to it as CIA I used to work Soviet Union and that in retrospect was an open book compared to North Korea so for each of the intelligence sources there are difficulties with analyzing North Korea but as I said I disagree with those who say it's a black hole we know nothing about it we've got many decades of track record of their behavior of their policies and our evidentiary knowledge varies on different things what is the North Korean leader thinking that's pretty tough to find out what is their conventional forces posture that's much more doable so the information varies just to conclude with one little anecdote I do radio interviews and other interviews and sometimes I do them at home and one time my wife sat in when I did a series of them and afterwards she looked at me and said you say I don't know a lot and yet they keep calling you and she said I work for a living I'm a teacher you just slap nouns and verbs together and I said yes I say I don't know but I say it with great authority and great conviction well on that note before we hand it over to the second panel we will have a very quick turnaround so please stay in your seats do not get up and then the second order of business after the second session we all like to invite you to a networking cocktail reception outside and finally but not least please join me in a round of applause applause