 Welcome to George H. Smith's Excursions into Libertarian Thought, a production of Libertarianism.org and the Cato Institute. Narrated by Daniel Highland. Thomas Hodgskin vs. Herbert Spencer, Part 3 Smith compares the positions of Hodgskin and Smith on the history of land ownership and their opposition to the political power of the landed aristocracy. In my last essay, I noted Thomas Hodgskin's agreement with John Locke's homesteading principle, which specifies the conditions for the original acquisition of property in land. As much land as a man tills, plants, improves, cultivates, and can use the product of, so much is his property. In the natural and artificial right of property contrasted, 1832, Hodgskin pointed out that this principle has been consistently violated by governments throughout history, mainly through conquest and colonization. If Hodgskin relied heavily on John Locke's moral theory of property in land, he also relied a great deal on Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations, 1776, for his understanding of the history of landed property in Europe. It is difficult to overestimate the influence of Smith's account, which was admired by Thomas Jefferson and his American contemporaries, as well as by many British and European liberals. A sketch of Smith's discussion will therefore aid our understanding of the land question throughout the late 18th and 19th centuries, especially as it was seen by those classical liberals who, unlike Herbert Spencer, defended private land ownership. In The Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith traced the current system of land-holding in Europe, and to a lesser extent in England, to incursions by German and Scythian nations into the Western Roman Empire, after which the chiefs and leaders of those nations acquired or usurped to themselves the greater part of the lands of those countries. A great part of them was uncultivated, but no part of them, whether cultivated or uncultivated, was left without a proprietor. All of them were engrossed and the greater part by a few great proprietors. This unjust acquisition of massive areas of land, according to Smith, might have been only a transitory evil if not for the customary laws of primogenitor, which decreed that an entire landed estate be bequeathed to the eldest son, and entail, which prohibited estates from being broken into smaller parcels. Such laws evolved because every great landlord was a sort of petty prince. The tenants of a landlord were also his subjects. The landlord was a judge, legislator, and leader in war. Feudal tenants depended on their lord for protection, so to divide land was akin to dividing a state. To divide it was to ruin it and to expose every part of it to be oppressed and swallowed up in the incursions of its neighbors. Thus over time the law of primogenitor came into existence for the same reason that it has generally taken place in that of monarchies. Similarly, entails, which are the natural consequences of the law of primogenitor, arose to hinder any part of the original estate from being carried out of the proposed line, either by gift or device or alienation, either by the folly or by the misfortune of any of its successive owners. Although there was some rationale for primogenitor and entail after the fall of the Western Roman Empire, their continuance in some parts of Europe and Britain during Smith's day was completely absurd. As Smith noted, laws frequently continue in force long after the circumstances which first gave occasion to them and which alone could render them reasonable are no more. Smith continued, Primogenitor and entail are founded upon the most absurd of all suppositions, the supposition that every successive generation of men have not an equal right to the earth and to all that it possesses, but that the property of the present generation should be restrained and regulated according to the fancy of those who died perhaps 500 years ago. Entails, however, are still respected through the greater part of Europe in those countries particularly in which noble birth is a necessary qualification for the enjoyment of either civil or military honors. Entails are thought necessary for maintaining this exclusive privilege of the nobility to the great offices and honors of their country, and that order having usurped one unjust advantage over the rest of their fellow citizens, lest their poverty should render it ridiculous, it is thought reasonable that they should have another. The common law of England indeed is said to abhor perpetuities, and they are accordingly more restricted there than in any other European monarchy, though even England is not altogether without them. In Scotland more than one-fifth, perhaps more than one-third part of the whole lands of the country, are at present supposed to be under strict entail. Great tracts of uncultivated land were in this manner not only engrossed by particular families, but the possibility of their being divided again was as much as possible precluded as before. Thomas Hodgeskin covered much of the same ground in his treatment of landholding, but it is in Smith's statements that the proprietors of land were anciently the legislators of every part of Europe, and that the laws relating to land were all calculated for the supposed interest of the proprietor, that we find Hodgeskin's fundamental theme. He wrote, The landed aristocracy and the government are one, the latter being nothing more than the organized means of preserving the power and privileges of the former. After securing a revenue for the government, the landed aristocracy sacrificing to this even a part of their private property, or rather taking a portion from rent, which they appropriate as taxes, transferring their cash from one hand to the other. After securing a revenue to the state, the laws have been made with a view to guarantee the possessions and the wealth of the landowners. Having laid this foundation, Hodgeskin gave a radical anarchistic twist to Smith's historical sketch. Whereas Smith believed that recent legislation had mitigated some earlier injustices as enlightened legislators pursued the public good instead of their own narrow interests, Hodgeskin believed that legislators invariably, or with rare exceptions, pursue their own interests. That their first preference is to preserve established political institutions and that they abolish unjust laws only when the pressure of public opinion leaves them little choice. The public good is a mere pretext that should not be confounded with the real objects of the legislator. The public good is not cognizable by human faculties and he who pretends that his actions are guided by a view to that is an imposter who looks only to his own interests and ambition. To make that the pretended motive for action is so obviously a mere pretext as to need no further refutation. Another common justification for legislation, whether in regard to land or any other issue, is that laws are necessary to preserve social order. This doctrinal pillar of Adam Smith and other classical liberals was rejected categorically by Hodgeskin. In a manner reminiscent of Thomas Paine's celebrated argument in part two of Rights of Man, Hodgeskin wrote, Nor is the pretext that the legislator promotes social order better founded. Social order is the mutual dependence of all those who contribute to the subsistence and welfare of society. It includes the manner in which they assist and protect each other and provide for their mutual wants by the interchange of their respective products. If by social order be meant the great scheme of social production, mutual dependence and mutual service, which grows out of the division of labor, that scheme I will boldly assert the legislator frequently contravenes but never promotes. That grows from the laws of man's being and precedes all the plans of the legislator to regulate or preserve it. In fact, his attempts to keep in one state what is continually in progress are mischievous. We must then set aside as mere pretexts the assertions of the legislator that he intends to preserve social order and promote the public welfare. And we must deal with legislation as solely intended to preserve the power and privileges of the legislator. The various abuses of land ownership in Britain, Hodgeskin argued, were owing to the statutes and the decisions of common law having the force of statutes that served the special interests of the landed aristocracy. So long as that class supported the government it was free to do whatever it liked with its land including vast tracts of idle land that had never been worked. The land owner may leave his land uncultivated or he may let it on what conditions he pleases and the law is always ready to support him with its powerful aid. His right to possess the land not to possess the produce of his own labor is as admirably protected as can be affected by the law. Another must not even walk on it and all the wild animals and fruit it bears are said by the law to be his. Nature makes it a condition of man having land that he must occupy and cultivate it or it will yield nothing. The instant he ceases his labor she decks it with flowers and stalks it with the birds and animals which she delights to clothe and feed exacting no payment but their happiness. The mere land owner is not a laborer and he never has been even fed but by violating the natural right of property. Patiently and perseveringly however has the law endeavored to maintain his privileges, power and wealth. To support the government the aristocracy has sometimes made laws trenching on its own privileges but after enforcing submission to government the next object of the law has been to preserve the dominion and power of the aristocracy over the land. It is crucial that this passage and similar statements by other classical liberals including Adam Smith are read in their full and proper context. In claiming that the mere land owner is not a laborer, Hodgkin was referring specifically to the landed aristocracy not to land owners who acquired their property by just means. Indeed the Lockean homesteading principle bestows original titles only on land that a man tills, plants, improves, cultivates and can use the product of. And this requirement severely limits the amount of land any single person may claim. It also means that the legitimate land owner is not a mere land owner. He is also a laborer because in the Lockean model a person must mix his labor with a parcel of land in order to claim original ownership of it. Of course the original owner may sell or otherwise transfer his land to another person and the new land owner may accumulate more land than would be possible in the original stage of acquisition. But as Hodgkin and other advocates of free trade in land saw the matter this competitive process will not result in vast areas of land being owned by one person. Competition in land as with other economic goods will tend to work against large monopolies. Moreover, few people would purchase land that they do not plan to use in some manner any more than they would purchase any other kind of economic good for no purpose. Hodgkin agreed with Adam Smith's claim it seldom happens that a great proprietor is a great improver of land. And both men looked to a free market in land one based on the principles of justice without special government privileges for a remedy. In this view, to nationalize land in the name of society which in practice means that a government would own all land in a country would be to grant to government the same kind of power that generated so many injustices in the first place. Thank you for listening to excursions. 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