 So, as Maria had pointed out, there are some really interesting problems going on here. And I'm going to try to give you an overview on a little bit of the technical side. And so what I want to do is give you some basis to give you some quantitative analysis because eventually any cooperation is going to be required to be something that's win-win. And if we follow the hydro diplomacy of Suskind and Siddiqui who have written this book, both parties have to win for an agreement to happen. And we have to show that. And so numbers are needed because right now both sides' numbers are one is on Mars and one is on Venus. And it's part of negotiations, but they're so far apart it's leading to mistrust. And that's one of the problems that Maria has when she goes is you quote a number and they say, no, it's not that. It's a negative sign and not a positive. So international people are getting involved in that. And I'm sorry, but you're going to have to learn, and I'm going to work on that with you today, learn a little bit about hydrology and a little bit about hydropower engineering. Just enough to know it, but that's what I spend my life. I teach at the Kennedy School teaching public policy people about technology. And so we'll try to do this. So this is Maria pointed out a little bit before. This is the key aspect of the Nile. And this is the White Nile after it leads the world famous sood of South Sudan with the jungle canal was was going to be built. And that's really important, but we're not going to talk about that today. There are two issues here. We are facing a crisis because within 12 months, Ethiopia can start filling the GERD. And according to Egypt, that will violate international law and can lead to armed conflict. President Morsi before leaving threatened armed conflict that he would blow up the dam. There are many quotes and things about that. So there has been a saber rattling very loud about this. So it is a crisis because we don't know what Ethiopia, Egypt is going to do. And you'll see that. So it's happening right away. So you understand. However, hopefully wider will invite us back because we're going to use these tools to look at the long-term regional development. Since we are economic development, there are some really strong issues about what Sudan does. Because Sudan, in economics terms, is a huge free rider in this situation because the GERD is going to be built here. There is not many good sites for dams in Sudan. So the fact that GERD is going to be built is going to help Sudan in a big way that really threatens Egypt. And so that's a bigger issue right now. But for right now, it's about the filling of the GERD. So we have right here the white Nile, and the white Nile flows very evenly out of the sood. It's like a big damp, dampening agent, and it loses a lot of water. But you get here at the, at Cartoon, from the Blue Nile, you get about 26 units, which are billion kilometers cubed or billion cubic meters of water, 26 arrives from the Blue Nile. And it's pretty constant over the year. The big thing here is the source of the Blue Nile, and also the Danube is called Blue. It's something about brown rivers that they call blue. And there, there's no reason we think it was the Strauss, just thought it looked blue, from the mountaintop. But this is the way the water flows on the Blue Nile. It's basically almost zero, very, very little flow up till June, and then comes what's known as the Monsoon from the Intertropical Convergence Zone, and it rains like crazy, but only on a very small area on the Ethiopian Plateau. Very small area. This provides, right here, this little area, the entire Nile basin is 2 million square kilometers. This is about 200,000 square kilometers, maybe 10%, and it provides 80% of the flow that ends up at Cairo. So you want to get this in your head. If you are, the Egyptians say the water's all theirs, Ethiopia is saying we provide 80% of the water, falls on our land. Can we have some of it, please? So you'll notice it comes in this, so it comes gushing down the river, and without dams, you can't store it from year to year, which you'll see, and within the year. So dams are, can be very bad things environmentally and socially. They make people be displaced that can cause environmental damage, but without a dam, you cannot take, utilize this water, and we'll see that later. There is another little piece of water here, the Edbara River, that comes from the Ethiopian, and they literally, it's dry. It is dry for like eight months of the year, and then when that monsoon comes up on the plateau, it flows off this way, but it doesn't go into the Gurd. And the Gurd doesn't get any of the Dindar or the Rashid River here, but out of Lake Tana, flowing this way. And what Maria was talking about is there was a plan for four major dams on the Blue Nile called the Cascade, that the World Bank was going to fund, but it would only be funded when Egypt agreed. So I've been working for, we're working for 10 years with the World Bank, trying to get the cooperation, that was what the NBI was all about, to allow for that to happen, but Egypt continued to block it so there could be no funding, and that's why I think they were surprised when Melish, in a very strong move, said, we will fund it ourselves. So, very interesting that that happened. So here comes all of this water. So what ends up at here, this is Dangalab, which is right before entering into Egypt, is you have the base flow, we call it, from the White Nile, and that's very, from year to year, it's the same, and for month to month. And then we get this very variable part of that, which you'll see in a little while, very variable Blue Nile, and that gets put on top. Now the Gurd is going to be right here, right in the midst of affecting this flow of water. And so we're going to keep that in mind. The Gurd, which will be the eighth largest reservoir on earth, together with the Isle Has One Dam, which is the third largest, and there is no precedent whatsoever in the world, that's why it's even a bigger crisis, for two major multi-person dams operating on the same system with no agreement for coordination in place. The closest thing to this is in the Colorado River, we have the upper Colorado basin, which has Lake Powell, we have the lower Colorado, which has Lake Mead. It is run by the same organization, the Bureau of Reclamation. The two groups hate each other. I helped develop the decision support system that they use. They fight all the time, and they're from the same country, most of the time the same religion, not the same football teams they like, but that causes a problem. And they're fighting, but they have the Supreme Court of the United States, which comes in to mediate. This is disastrous. And so this is what Maria was saying. Now, let's look at this, and this is some of the things we want to point out. The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, let me just go back here to show you something that she mentioned. The blue Nile here at the source, after it floats, see the border here at Daim, doesn't show up in here, but I'll tell you. This is 48, and here it's 48. So there's actually more water coming in here, but losses. These are the natural flows without doing it. So there's about 48 units coming here, 28 units here, 12 coming here. So you have 84 here at the mouth. There's 84 units of water coming right here. The height that the water will fall at the Aswan Dam is about the same amount of water that will fall at the Gurd. I mean, the height will be the same. But there's a lot more water at the Aswan, there's at the Gurd. And they went and built a 6,000 megawatt power plant. Any analysis that was done is that will not operate full at 6,000. That will only be during that very strong peaking period. It really should have been somewhere between 2 and 3,000. Because Egypt runs their power plant at the highest, and it's only 2,000 installed capacity. So what you see is, one of the things about this dam is in its name. First, what's the first word grand? So they were making a point, we want to make something big. But economically, it doesn't make sense to be that big. That's important. Renaissance, it's a renewal of Ethiopia. And those two words have really caused a lot of problem because its design was based on grandeur and to renew Ethiopia, which that has caused a lot of problems about cooperation. There is no irrigation to take place with this. This is the biggest thing. I can get you about 30 articles that will say, they're going to use this water to irrigate. This is at the plains. The difference between here and here is almost 1,000 meters. Otis is at 8,000 feet, and this is about 4,000 feet here. You are not going to pump the water back. This is all mountains. There's no place to irrigate. So the one myth you want to take away is there is no irrigation with this dam. And this is really, it's not going to be consumptive. There will be some consumption from the evaporation off the surface, but the evaporation rates there are much less than at S1, and about 12 PhD studies have been done in master studies on how you can, if you operate them right, you can reduce the total amount of losses and maybe even get more water to Egypt. So there are some things here. But there's no irrigation here. This is really important. The reservoir is going to be 70 billion cubic meters, which will be one of the largest. The S1 dam is 162. So it's going to be about twice the size, a little more than twice the size of the S1. But it will hold 1.4 times the mean annual flow of the blue Nile, which is 75% of the water going to Egypt. It's a threat to Egypt. But it's only a threat when they fill it. And then you're going to see it's a threat. And if they want to use it, they can only use it in a bad way, which will harm Ethiopia. So the threat is filling it up. And then, but once it's full, the water's going to go somewhere and it's going to go to Egypt. So the threat is there. And according to the government, and this summer, and Maria was there in the summer, it's more than 70% complete. And you might not complete it why it fills, because you'll see in a picture later how it's built. So again, why is it a crisis? It's this location right here on the border. And Melish was really quite smart about that. One of the things happens, if anybody destroys the dam, there's only like 30 kilometers of Ethiopia it will go through, it will be a big problem for a cartoon. Not for anything in Ethiopia. The capital will be lost, but no other damages. So again, here is the issue. The blue Nile's here, and as we were showing you before, is the white, this is what arrives at Egypt. The white Nile is the base flow. This is the blue. This is the most significant part of the flow that arrives at S1. And then this is the at-barra, which gives you your peak between September and August and September. So when the gird is put in the middle between the flow of the blue, it will end up affecting this, the shape of this curve, but eventually not the volume. It will change the shape because they want to release it for hydropower. The other thing just that Maria was showing, she showed you a picture of it under construction. The plan is this is the main dam here. This is the spillway, if it ever fills up. And this is a very controversial issue here called the saddle dam. This is a dam because this is the main part, but up here this is where to build this, it's holding the last 40% of the storage. Can only be stored by building this dam over here. And this is five kilometers long at 30 meters high. It is one of the highest ever built and longest built in the world. And some engineers are worried about the integrity of that and the Sudanese work because there's only been a few that were done and the original design was very iffy. This water then flows into the famous Lake Nassar and this is the Hayaswan Dam. This is a concrete dam, very thin and high. This is one kilometer at its base. It's clay in the middle and then it's rock holding up that clay. Again, this is controversial. The World Bank and the US were gonna build it. Nassar went socialist. They said we're not gonna build it anymore. So the Russians funded it. And so you can go study how the Russians cleaned up with getting their payment in bales of cotton at the price of when they built it and then carton prices went up. So this is the Hayaswan Dam here downstream. So we're gonna do a quick primer on reservoirs in hydropower. This is the outlet of, this is the Hayaswan Dam. This is its hydropower outlet with 20 turbines. This is when they have more water than can be released to the turbine. You can see the power of that given the pressure that's on its back. And this is a satellite image which Maria alluded to before that we can now measure. And I know of about 30 papers of measuring the volume of water that is in the reservoir by using satellites and they're getting really good at doing that. So there is no need to tell us what's in it. We can guess what went out, what went in by the changes in the reservoir here. And then the other thing to see, and this is what's really important, this is Egypt's own filling. So the Hayaswan Dam was closed in 1968 and then it filled, but then all of a sudden this happened. And this isn't because Ethiopians. It isn't because of Americans. This is Allah. This is natural variability. And in 1978 was, 88 was the lowest on record and they were one meter from not being able to let water out of the dam, which we'll see in a minute. So there is this variability and in the Nile. And all of you know the story from the Bible and Exodus and also from, it's in the Quran about Joseph and the seven years of Pliny and the seven years, the seven fat cows and the seven skinny cows. And that's the periodicity of the Nile. It tends to stay high or stay low and that's natural. And so one of the things that's going on here is Egypt's crying, I have great risk caused by you. A lot of that risk is natural and we're looking at the Delta risk. So here's your water resource engineering. In a reservoir there's something known as the dead storage or inactive zone and it's the level at which water can't get out. You build it, you have an outlet, but it's not at the bottom, it's up here and all the water here cannot get out. Once it fills up and that's going to fill up and then you get here. Then you have a buffer zone where you keep water and storage just for severe droughts and then you work in what's called the conservation zone which is your active zone and then you keep some of it at the top always open to take a flood. So how you operate this? So the Egyptians have a very elaborate system where they build this dynamically depending on the inflows and other things in the state of their system. So it's all modern operations research have designed this but theirs is all based on a flow into the Aswan without the GERD. So they need to be thinking about how to operate to mitigate anything may happen. Right now they're not revealing that they are and that's gonna be a problem. So here is the issue at the GERD. The GERD's base is at 500 meters and right now water is getting out through these diversion outlets which will be blocked. Then once that's blocked we're gonna have an outlet here known as the bottom outlet capacities here. Two outlets that can release water and they're gonna be at the elevation of 542 and what's interesting it can hold 70 but going from 542 meters up is only holding 1 billion cubic meters. So if you think about it it's like a triangle in a valley. So when you go up 42 meters you still just have a small area that you're holding. So they're gonna fill this but it's not very much. Then the turbines are 18 meters higher at 560 but you don't wanna run a turbine without good pressure on it. So they can't operate the turbines until the water is at 590. So what the Ethiopians wanna do is they wanna go from 500 to 590 in the most rapid way possible and that's 15 billion cubic meters of water about one fifth of the total volume so that they can start releasing for hydropower. So this is the buffer zone is from here below this is your dead zone and then you will operate within this zone as you operate. So they wanna get here quick and then they have to work with this others and that's where the flexibility is that Kevin had been studying and Kevin has been working as part of this project as well that when she showed that study. Now your next thing mechanical engineering 101 is hydropower. Hydropower is generated so the hydropower you generate is a coefficient times the head which is the pressure on the turbine times the quantity of flow. So your head is the actually measured in feet and it's the elevation between your turbine which drives the generator and the top of the water. That causes pressure. If you ever gone swimming and you go down below you feel the pressure on your ear. There is a pressure that and that's what drives the turbine and then the amount of water that goes through. So if you could have a small amount of water but a very high head which they have in some places get a lot of hydropower or the Danube River has this in the Rhine River and others they have low head but so much water they get lots of hydropower. So it's H times Q. So what you want to do if you're trying to make money from hydropower is keep this head as high as you can. So what this means is there's not a lot of active storage. So this is saying Ethiopia in the long run wants to keep the reservoir as full as possible. So once you're full you just want to send everything through because you'll have your head. So that's really important to understand that it's in Egypt's interest for it to fill fast and then operate because Ethiopia wants a high head and they want that water through. So this is the issue. So, but if for some reason the water's down low they want to fill it back up. So assessing the impact of the GERD in light of the uncertainty of future Nile flows that we'll look at in a minute but we don't know what the flow is going to be over the five, 10, 15 years of filling. So the risk to Egypt is unknown it's an uncertain process, a stochastic process and the sequence will be uncertain and it's stochastic. We need to take a risk-based approach. So we take a modeling framework that we developed which is using Monte Carlo modeling to look at the risk generating sequences of the future which will run through the system. So we can look at this. So Paul Block who is at the University of Color, University of Nebraska, he loves Nebraska. He's from Nebraska, that Wisconsin now and he helped develop that curve that you saw before in Ethiopia. On his master's work was funded by IFBRI. We were looking at variability and risk in Ethiopian agriculture. This is for those who are really nerds this is power spectrum wavelet analysis. And what it shows is they looked at the last 100 years of precipitation over the blue Nile and you can actually see that it has different components and this is very nerdy, but there's a 35 year and a 21 year and then there are some sub components. So using that Paul was able to build the model and this is his model of the last 100 years and the model does very well in replicating the statistics of the last 100 years. So advanced stuff. So then what we've done is he went up to here and the colors come out a little bit but then to go forward, he then just used the model and generated 100 sequences for the next 20 years. Now, one of the important things here, which I'll be a little nerdy because we have economists in the room who love math, is that some people have been doing forward here just assuming that any one of these years of any period could happen and then just randomly sampling for the future. What Paul said is that there is a long-term trend and you can see it right here and this is not good. The trend is showing that for the next 20 years we're on the downward cycle. So we could have been here and been on an upward cycle, that would be good but we're relatively in the middle of normal conditions right now at the end of the, in 2015 and the model with history would suggest that we're going to as a mean be going down but then we could have events on either side. Famous paper by Mendobroth who did fractals called the NOAA and Joseph Effect in Hydrology which is right here. You can have a very high effect but then also get the periodicity. So that model was generated and we then took those, ran them through a modeling system and the modeling system we're using is the NBI's modeling system called Mike Hydro. The interesting thing now is $200 million was spent. They built the Nile Decision Support System, a modeling system built by experts from the Nile Basin for the Nile Basin and nobody uses it now. Ethiopia won't accept it, Sudan won't accept it and Egypt won't accept it but I will. And so one of my students is running this and we've worked with, it's now based in Kampala and the head quarter secretariat and they've shared this with us. So all of this work, we put it through because we believe in the NBI. We believe that is the mechanism for bringing information because it is Nile Basin experts that we would hire anywhere in the world, their world class sitting there, let's use their tool and it has been vetted and objective. So what we ran through here was a filling policy and you can have a hundred different filling policies and Kevin was looking in that report of different minimum flows. What we did, and this is with NBI what we wanted to look at is we said did we be a minimum release of 90 billion cubic meters per year? And that's the equivalent of the 95% exceedance which would be the one in 20 year drought. So we're saying that we're gonna guarantee to Egypt that they get at least the one in 20 year flow. What will happen is once it's full Ethiopia wants to send them all the water and then we're gonna look at four different filling rates one where we can fill it as fast as we can, unconstrained, the other is we can't get, we fill in three years, five years and 10 years. And this is an example of one, one three different scenarios, one in flow sequence. If you fill it slowly, and remember from my outflow hydropowers H times Q, so the head, so this is literally related to the head, you get lower and lower hydropower as you wait to do this. So you're sending your water through but you're not getting as much hydropower. So each, the lower this curve there is an economic loss to Ethiopia if they slow down here. But the key thing for Egypt is what are the impact? So is it worth it for Ethiopia to take this loss for gains at Egypt? And that's what we're trying to look at. So these are 117 year sequences going into the GERD. So we call that our spaghetti diagram. And it's hard to see what that means but I'll try for you. So actually there's a trace here of the blue that's showing, trying to mimic what we would think is happening. So where we're preserving into correlation, lag one correlation, all these nice statistical time series properties. But this is a summary of it. So at each year we have a box and whisker. This is the median. And so again you see this is the trend and it's trending to go down a little bit. That's that long-term 35 year signal that Professor Block showed. Maybe that's him calling now. And then if you're aware of box and whisker, that's the 50 percentile of that spaghetti. And then these are the extreme points. And in MATLAB their program says, if I don't believe that this extreme point I'll give you it as an outlier saying, this makes sense that they're all in here. This, so they highlight these that they could potentially be there. So what you see is the flow coming into the GERD. Remember we said 30 was the release. I mean we can get without the GERD less than 30 coming because there's no dam to store for it and we can get some high flows. And we said before about 50 is the mean and sure enough we see that over all the years it maintains that. So what does this mean for GERD storage? This is unconstrained storage. This is unconstrained. This is the filling it with 10 years. And what you see here with unconstrained it rapidly gets to about 30 in about four years. Here to get to 30 takes, this is with three year filling. And then for here to get to 30 takes almost 11 years. So there's an impact on Ethiopia because of that. But we see again there is a wide range of uncertainty because it depends on exactly which flow comes in. So if we summarize all of that and say what is the mean storage over 10 years? What we're seeing with no GERD, no storage. That's a nice easy plot. And then here is if there's no policy mean fill as fast as you can. The average storage over the first 10 years is about 38 billion. If you do it in three years, you get about 26. If you do it in five years, you get about 22. And if you take 10 years, you're down at about 20. So this is in the mean over a 10 year period you actually are bringing an impact on Ethiopia in its mean value of producing hydropower as a result of that. The interesting thing for Ethiopia is that the minimum level or the worst case situation is about the same everywhere. But in terms of what you're getting in the mean it's definitely dropping. So there is an impact in each of these techniques. If we look at the release that's going to Ethiopia, it's going to Egypt at the border of Ethiopia which is all they can control. Here is again, this is this natural inflow and this is the release for no policy. This is released with three year and this is the release with 10 year. The one thing I want you to notice is here's 30. There are about six or seven releases below 30 with natural flows. When you look at even the no policy, oh this didn't come off, there is none. There are no releases under 30. So the GERD is actually providing to Egypt more water at the low end that they would have naturally. It's cutting off some of that because the reservoir storage is letting it release when there isn't water. So it is good for Egypt for the GERD at the low end here. And so if we look at these release policies with the average release is about 52 with no policy it falls to 46 and then five years it goes up a little bit and 10 years and this is looking over that because they're releasing water rather than storing it. So what happens to Egypt? So these are the impacts of the inflows to Egypt. If you don't have the GERD, we have 74 like we showed before, we then have no policy which is bringing it down to about 67. We have our three year, our five year and our 10 year. So the interesting thing is there when you put the GERD in there is an impact significant impact of about seven or eight BCM going in and then though however you feel slow or as or fast or slow there's very little impact on the bottom and then on the medians here going into that and that's a mixture of both what's coming out of the GERD and what the at Barra and the White Nile are doing and then these are the impacts on storage which will affect hydropower and then here are the impacts on hydropower. So what we see here is here is the condition with no GERD and then with the GERD, there is a reducing of the mean annual flows here and at this point we have the standard whisker here is about the same but what we see and we'll come back to that with the GERD there are some significant extreme events that happen with a number of these by having the GERD in place. There is one that happens without the GERD but there are now two more each in this which is a 2% increase in and lower of a very bad or extreme event. So we see on average we have an impact and then here some extremes. So what we wanted to do is say there is a trade-off that how much is Ethiopia impacted by a slower filling and we see let's take the average this is with no GERD there's no hydropower. If we build the GERD with no policy we're getting about 1200, the three year filling it's about 1198, five year drops to about 10,900 and then here the 10 year drops closer to 1050. So there is an economic cost to Ethiopia to slow down the filling and still provide that. So what is the value of GERD hydropower? The average annual generation for a minimum release of 30 BCM is 11,000 gigawatt hours. If you assume one cent per gigawatt hour and this is controversial recently Kenya was buying in the East African power pool at 14 cents per kilowatt hour so it's potential if they were connected they could get it. We've seen seven mentioned so we just use 10 here because it's easier to do the math. You put a one and one and move over a couple zeros but basically you could do it. That's on average 1.1 billion. Now there are some that are trying to use this number so that's what you're getting as a revenue from the GERD if you're getting 11,000 you get a billion dollars a year. The cost of the GERD is between four and six billion. So with depending on your discount rate it's gonna have a BC ratio greater than one but it isn't a huge one. That's really expensive. Hydropower is much more expensive than thermal station about 3,000 per kilowatt hour. The previously we were looking just at engineering indicators. What if we then look at our economic indicators? So we're using a technique and a methodology developed here at wider which was headed by Channing along with James Thurlow and it's called the sacred framework where we go from climate through biophysical and engineering and infrastructure models into an economy-mide model. And so we've learned on how to link the channels of an economy to these things like how does hydropower get into the model so we can do that. We've learned, so we've had to grow in terms of how the economy looks at things but then reporting to the economic model the things that matter from these biophysical. So using this framework, we developed a model of the system. This is the schematic going into a and this is just how we operate the hydropower which goes into a computable general equilibrium model of the Egyptian economy and which has then water is involved and taking these outputs we're able to look now at the effect on GDP. So to give you a sense of Egypt in 2013 it was about 272 billion US dollars the population 82 million growth rate of about 2.1 but a GDP per capita about 3,300 in Egypt but a very poor genie factor in this. So it's grown quite a bit but maybe. So what we did is because we couldn't run a hundred of these models we sampled the 5%, the 25%, the 50%, the 75 and the 95% of this and this is this unconstrained the one that would do the best for Ethiopia and if we were to take this unconstrained version what we would get in the 5% or the worst case is about a .12 impact on the GDP and that's about 300 million dollars that's quite a bit here but the median if we look at the mean is about .04 and this is the unconstrained so if the Ethiopian says all right I'm gonna go with a three year filling we immediately drop this to about .03% these are not percentage this is .03% less than one and on average it's at about 2% of the impact of no-gird on Egypt so there is a benefit from the point of view of the economy and this is particularly got to do with the irrigation side which we didn't spend a lot of time on so we can save a lot in economic terms by going to a three year fill and we showed before there's not a big impact in there now where are these so if we look at this what you see is these impacts to the economy wide are here what's interesting is what is the impact on the ag GDP and we see here it's almost double more than double so the ag is feeling this hit because the way they're keeping the hydropower up is having an impact on the releases which are affecting the irrigation and again under the unconstrained it's very dramatic and at the mean it's at .1 and so again this is agriculture and we'll see why we're talking about that again and then here is impact on wages so if we look at this we see the effect on wages are very strong these are the rural the poorest rural are ones which are going to be irrigated that work on the farms this is our five this is the richest rural they're not quite as affected but they're usually in agro industries but more on the industry side and this is the urban impact on poor urban and impact on rich urban so the quantiles so why are we focusing so much on ag in that direct quote from the minister and I think you may concur is there is a culture and psyche of the farmers which are 60% of the employees of Egypt that the Nile is there and if you take the Nile it's going to kill them and the government is very concerned not about gross GDP but about the impact of farmers and with all the unrest that's gone on and the farmers are very strongly engaged with the Muslim Brotherhood and supported them so they are worried that any impact to Egypt that was perceived if not real but if it's felt by the farmers then that impact is going to lead to instability so they are very concerned not about just general GDP which might be small but this impact on ag and particularly the wages of the poorest which would mobilize quickly and those are the ones that are hurt the worst but again this is what I'm talking about this is the 5% amount if we're looking at the medians here it's not quite as dramatic and Ethiopia has a chance to mitigate some of this if they would go to a three year filling policy so what's the deal on the average? well on the average the loss of hydropower at the Hayas-Wandam will be about 1400 gigawatts what does that mean? well that loss turns out to be about 30 million dollars under the no constraint down to about 17 under the 7 year fill that's what we were seeing that biggest impact with no constraint in three years look what happens here the gain of bringing the GERD on you're going from 0 to 1.1 billion dollars in revenue now you got to pay back for that so the net is not quite as high but if you think of it as some cost it's kind of some cost building the GERD this is how many times? about a thousand, you know 100 times, 300 times this is the cost Egypt's losing 30 million dollars this is just an ag when you add the ag it gets bigger so it's substantially more but just in hydropower alone that if the GERD gave its loss hydropower to Egypt this amount they'd be still getting a net 90% of their output so there is a room for compensation with this because it's such a huge differential between it but there are the losses to the farmers and that gets a little bit more tricky on what you do because you can't make up water so but then what we said is if we look at this these mean values there's not a big difference and we can deal with it this is the problem here the problem is not above the problems here and we Egyptians are some of the most risk-averse people in the world we did a study on the value of the high as one dam to its economy it's about 1% GDP using risk risk assessment and risk aversion techniques the Bernoulli approach it doubles the value of the Egyptians of the dam because you've taken the variability out of the flow so Egyptian risk aversion is very very high they do not like extreme events so it's these things that are worrying them in principle this we think we could work out there are political reasons we'll get to and why this may be difficult but this is the real reason that policy makers and people are worried about it is if this happens it's disastrous for them psychologically and politically so the risk to Egypt of GERD filling loss of hydropower and irrigation flow on average these are small and are much less than the gain at the GERD so that leads us to cooperative game theory or some way of cooperating however there is significant increase in the risk of extreme impacts the Egyptian the economy impacts are minor but in what's happening is that why the economy-wide impacts are less than the pure impacts is the limited role of water in the GDP now AG is 11% of GDP and the high house 1 dam is now only 10% of total generation by 2030 it'll be 2% of total and AG GDP is going to be down to about 2% so as we move forward the Nile is less and less important in the conflict with Ethiopia is less but this is a huge bus and this is somewhat summarizing what Maria had said impacts are on low income and farmers which are a very politically vile segment of the Egyptian economy so we're seeing with our model those are where the impacts are coming the worst case for the policy makers there is a poor society-wide understanding of the greatly reduced role of the that the Nile plays the Egyptian economy you just ask them oh our economy will die if we were to shut off the Nile tomorrow it's 11% of GDP and 10% of any you could substitute it would hurt but they'd say we would all be died it would be a disaster they understood but more importantly the incredible role that the Nile plays in national identity, psyche and pride is unbelievable and that's something not easily educated and changed so is there room for cooperation in a system like that well what are the risks to Ethiopia there's loss of hydropower revenues and repayments if they change the policy a little but they're minor and it would cause somewhat of a slowing to economic growth we're not considering about not building at all it's operating to really rank down any impacts on Egypt the GERD has been significantly funded by domestic bonds and so there is a society-wide understanding of an inflated role of the GERD will play on Ethiopian economy to get people to buy the bonds they've oversold them so they think if the GERD doesn't produce that 100% of its power we're gonna hurt Ethiopian growth then so again they have again the incredible role of the GERD now plays in national identity, psyche and pride just look at the name Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Stem it's just in the name is there room for cooperation so we have a proposal and I asked Maria and then maybe you can come in could we develop a hybrid where the international community comes together to develop an insurance scheme similar to what's already in place so this is a new called the hydrologic risk fund which is on the Senegal River or crop insurances that we see now that would come into force when either Egypt or Ethiopia are put in an extreme place it may be a big cost that they're facing but because the probability is so low the premium should be low and if these premiums could be funded even by the international community to avoid conflict it would then allow that both Egypt and Ethiopia they would be insured against those losses from the extreme event and it's my theory it would allow them to develop an agreement based on the clear win-win of the mean state of the Nile the boxes of the box and whisker those boxes are doable win-win collaborations when you worry about the extremes that's when you freak out both psychologically and there's no way that Ethiopia could guarantee or Egypt can accept but if we cut those tails off with some insurance schemes then maybe we can get them to cooperate and look beyond this incredibly institutional and psychological barrier the technology is there we can get or we get the best OR people in the world to build optimization models that will link those two things make them run 10 times better than alone there's no problem there's the economics that show we can share the benefits there but can we make it institutionally that you've been fighting and what do you think of some kind of proposal like this?