 But maybe Naoki Tanaka has a little bit of salt for us to offer here, because you wrote a book about the great stagnation of China. Now we're talking about the bipolar, maybe the tripolar world, but what about the Chinese long-term perspective? What is it that gave this title to your book, The Great Stagnation of China? Mr. Okube's opinion on Chinese economy is very interesting, but I disagree with him. So at first I want to pick up the potential growth rate of China. When we measure the potential growth rate, labor input, capital input, and innovation side, three factors exist. As to labor population in China, it's decreasing, it's now decreasing. And as to capital input, I'm not so optimistic. FDI, foreign direct investment from overseas to China, increased very much. But almost 60% of FDI to China came from global Chinese diasporas. So a few years ago, a very important rank of Communist Party said that 60% came from overseas Chinese. However, as you know, in Hong Kong and Taiwan, there are a lot of people who are against communist regime. So in the case of Hong Kong, province of Canton will play a very important role. So a lot of money from overseas to China through Hong Kong. So it will be stopped, such kind of possibility exists. And as to Taiwanese people, the same mentality is now penetrating. So from southern parts of China, there will be some kind of structuring problems, restructuring problems. A lot of employment may be before us. So as to capital input, we are not so optimistic about that. As to innovation side, the coupling of the economy is now being observed by Trump administration's challenges for China. So according to our forecasting, potential growth rate in China is around 2%. So in the very near future, China will not pass that of the United States. This will have the influence upon the development course of African countries, two aspects. One is export of deflation. In China, there are a lot of capabilities as to heavy chemical industries, iron, steel, cement, aluminum, petrochemical industry, et cetera. Almost half of the world capability belong to China. But demand side in China is now having a problem. And a lot of these industries were done by state-owned enterprises in China. SOE is very difficult to distract themselves because communist regime intervenes the state owned enterprises. So restructuring process is very difficult as to the excess capacity of the industries in China. That means the deflationary expectation on the global context. So they want to introduce the method for industrialization. But as to the price of their products, it will not increase in the meantime. That's a problem. Second problem exists as to dead-ridden type of countries may occur as to the involvement of China. As to Belt Road initiatives, President Xi Jinping mentioned public-private partnership. So two years ago he mentioned in the annual meeting of Belt Road initiatives. So Belt Road initiatives or involvement from China is not that of the Marshall Plan. Marshall Plan was done by the United States in order to rehabilitate the capabilities in Europe by U.S. money. But in the case of Chinese involvement, public-private partnership through PPP. That means involvement from neighboring countries will be necessary. So I'm picking up one example, China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. That is building the tramways from Indian Ocean to China through permeable heights. What kind of techniques, what kind of infrastructure building will be done in permeable heights? This kind of discussion was done even in mainland China. A lot of economists said China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, it's very difficult to build. And the debt problem may be left for Pakistan side. So such kind of discussion was being done. So it's very difficult to describe the future course of Chinese economy and its influence upon the world order. Thank you very much for this more skeptical view. Raises two questions, I guess. What does this mean for global aggregate demand if China is slowing down in that sense? And also raises maybe a question for Japan. Does this not mean that if China is not moving that fast, there's more space for Japan as a regional power in the Pacific economies?