 So bear in mind that I have a somewhat different view than the current administration and this will be taken from that particular perspective. I do think it's useful though to think about what the climate agenda looks like in the context of this administration and where they are. And what I'd like to do in this talk briefly is to walk through a bit about what the science says which is being disputed. I think that's inappropriate but nonetheless it's being disputed. A bit about the international process and a bit about what might come next in terms of the system. So here's what we know and this is actually a recent set of data on the left side. That's the trend in global emissions. Jim put the US ones up. This is a global number through 2010. And then the most recent information we've got at the international level which states back to 2014 which has some comprehensive information. And you can kind of see which sectors are principally responsible for the total. In the blue what you've got in the blue here is electricity that obviously is a significant piece. What you've got further up to that is transportation. So these are all the energy components in the greens. Those are things like agriculture and land use. And what you can see is how significant that share is in the global total. So one of the things that I think we have to be aware of is that while we are often working in the energy space globally that's only about 65 or so percent of global emissions. The other third is in the other parts of the system. And that's going to matter a fair amount as we move forward. This is what you get if you break it down in a different way. This is the countries and these are the gases. What you can see on the left side in the blue that's carbon dioxide. And I've split out the carbon dioxide from the energy sector and you can see how large that is. And the carbon dioxide that comes from land use and forests. And that's still a significant share. The next largest one after that is methane again heavily weighted by the energy sector emissions. It's also agriculture a principal component rice wet farming of rice really quite substantial and then some of the natural causes. And on the right side what you see is the countries who in our most recent database have the principal responsibilities. And there are lots of ways to have looked at this. This is where the United Nations looks at it. They basically say one country one vote and therefore your emissions as a nation matter. If you look at it in a per capita basis get a very different number. China which here is the single largest player at just shy of 30% of the total has a per capita emissions that are only about half of those of the United States. So how do you think about that India which you can see on this list a little further around the wheel India per capita emissions only one tenth of those United States. So even though they're in the top mix you get a very different vision. But all of these emissions have been leading to this kind of trend and this is not particularly uncertain either. The data on the top comes in a governmental panel on climate change. You can see the trajectory over a period of time rising very sharply at the end and I've expanded that piece at the end so you can see it in more detail. But what you're getting is thousands of years of more or less flat and then a hundred years post industrial revolution where it climbs exponentially. That's what we know this is not really disputed among the scientific community. And in fact while there's some question is whether or not the temperatures affiliated with these are in all cases even and that's where the argument has been. There's very little dispute about the basic trends here. And this is what we understand about those temperature shifts on the upper left hand curve graph what you've got is 1912 so essentially a century. As you look at that number the darker the color the more the temperature change and we're seeing significant temperature change. Now you could take statistically any individual point and say that point from last year to this year that didn't warm and therefore the whole temperature series is wrong but you don't do statistics that way. All of us know that who've been trained in statistics so it's a bit of a spurious analysis when you get that alternative suggestion. This is a pretty robust and comprehensive database on the right side what you see is what you see in the upper of the upper oceans. You're seeing significant absorption in the oceans of heat. So it's not just a function of the land which is certainly getting hotter those temperature changes you're seeing a long term secular trend and that's in part a function of the increases in temperatures in the oceans. On the bottom left that's Arctic sea ice. So those of you who are looking to buy access land this is a good time to buy it. It's not a socked in but don't worry in about 10 years you probably have year round access and that will be pretty nice for those of you who want to do this. I would note that there's an enormous effort being mounted by Russia in development of its ice breaking fleet because they see this coming soon. United States has got one ice breaker. It's kind of stunning when you think about it. Secretary Kerry for whom I was working in the State Department we had the Arctic Council meeting he was trying to drive this agenda forward we couldn't get this through Congress. When you think about this agenda and where it is some people are looking forward to this happening others perhaps not quite as prepared. And on the right side on the bottom that sea level rise and what you're seeing is the secular trend in sea level rise over the same period 1900 to the most recent data this report came out in 2013 and you get that kind of a trend on the sea level side. And if we look at those kinds of questions we end up with impacts. So let's put this one up first. This is a picture of the South Street ferry the South Ferry sea station in the subway in New York right after Hurricane Sandy. It was inundated with about 60 feet of water. So what's the correlation with climate change sea level rise since this station was built has been on the order of 15 inches. The barrier protecting that particular station was about one foot above the old sea level. It's now about three inches below that sea level. So the water floods in it cost about two billion dollars to repair that and you think that was bad. We did not raise the barrier when we rebuilt the station. Here's another one. This is the Louisiana State University campus after the flooding that we had there. And what's the deal there the odds of flooding have increased by about 40 percent over expected in the past 100 years. So this campus mostly built during that period not really prepared. Some of you have been fortunate enough to go and see the Great Barrier Reef in Australia. The most recent numbers that we have suggested about 2,000 miles of this 3,000 mile reef are now dead. First they were bleached. You can recover from a bleaching that's when the small polyps leave the organ of the reef itself. They've now first bleached and then they've died. We look at about 2,000 miles of this now being dead. What's that? The hot marches which have led to this kind of a change 175 times more likely because of the change in climate. These are the kinds of impacts that you look at. And if you don't like those, here's a disaster trend. And we can see these come from the insurance industry. And what you can see here is the trend in disasters. Every unit on this is a disaster of one billion dollars or more. So it's an incremental number. It lays them out not in terms of the absolute magnitude of the price that you spent, but just in terms of the number of events in any given year that cost more than one billion dollars. And these are all lined up in terms of climate-related events. This isn't earthquakes. This is floods. This is droughts. This is massive storms. And you see a secular trend that moves there as well. So we knew these things. And we began a negotiation. And we had the negotiation that ran over a period of years. And it starts off in 1990 when the science was somewhat less certain. And we developed by 1992 something called the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Interestingly enough, a relatively bipartisan exercise. President Bush, the first President Bush, decided that we would host the first meeting in the United States. How far we have come. We did it in a little small hotel just outside of Dulles Airport in Washington, D.C. He goes to the meeting in 1990 to the U.N. and says, I think it's a problem. We have to do something. I volunteered to host it. I was working at the State Department at the time. And he comes back. And so we're going to host this thing. And we said that we didn't know about this. So I guess that's not unusual for some presidents to kind of do things without informing folks. But he didn't have a place. We didn't have a venue. And there was a small hotel being built just outside of the airport, a five-star luxury hotel. Hadn't opened yet. We persuaded them to open a couple of weeks in advance and host our conference at this first meeting. But it is a very upscale hotel. We're talking about climate change. The first day we arrive, there's a magnificent ice carving in the middle of the foyer. It is melting like crazy. So in some ways, I think the issues of climate change really kind of are kind of manifest in curious fashions. The agreement entered into force remarkably quickly. Bill Riley at that point, the environmental EPA administrator was the person who testified in front of the Senate. And it went right through. The convention was not really opposed. It was 95 to nothing. There were no votes in opposition. There were a couple of people who were not there. But it was essentially a unanimous agreement that we should adopt and be party to this agreement. Republican Congress, Republican president, Republican EPA head, it moves forward. Fast forward. But as much as people wanted. And so they were looking for more. And they went forward then and did the Kyoto Protocol. We did that under Clinton administration. Pretty active engagement on that front. That was not accepted by the new president when he came in. So President Bush decided not to be party to that agreement. In that sense, there are very clear parallels. Because what happened when he decided not to do it was the world was up in arms. And in some ways, in spite of, or perhaps to say, to spite the United States, they adopted the agreement anyway. They had a level of global agreement that was startling. To the point that Prime Minister Blair, who was at that point the head of the United Kingdom, decided he would do a side agreement with Russia in order to get Russia to sign on to the Kyoto Protocol. That side agreement, it was accession to the World Trade Organization. That's a remarkably high level course of engagement when you think about the process that the head of the UK would decide this warranted engagement by Russia, but not entirely a market economy in the structure of the WTO. That was the trade off. That was the level. And it's only really gone up since then. But we didn't do it. The United States didn't become party. Fast forward, the Obama administration comes in. We have a meeting in Copenhagen. We decide to re-engage. We start our new round of negotiation that leads first to the Copenhagen Accords in 2009 at the end of our first year, and then ultimately in 2015 to the Paris Agreement. It's usually just to have a couple of points because we did not withdraw from the Framework Convention on Climate Change. We're still in. We've agreed to stay in this structure. So the ultimate objective of that agreement is to essentially avoid dangerous anthropogenic or human interference with the climate system. That's where we are. That's the ongoing commitment. That's what Congress ratified. And let's be clear, there is no prohibition against the President's withdrawing from a treaty. It takes two-thirds of Congress of the Senate to ratify, but the President unilaterally can withdraw. So there is no constraint, and he chose not to do that. So we are still bound by this language. We are still obligated to work on the policies and measures to avoid dangerous anthropogenic emissions. Fast forward, the Paris Agreement. We didn't have to go back to the Senate for this agreement because the structure of what we are doing is an elaboration of the agreement in the Convention. It's not fundamentally different. What we decided to do was to continue the reporting obligations. Congress had passed in 1990 the Climate Change Act, which required EPA, working with the Department of Energy, to report on our greenhouse gas emissions on an annual basis. We continued that. We had domestic legislation, in some cases the Clean Air Act, approved by Congress through which executive orders could enable implementation. We put that forward as what we intended to do at home, and that had standing because the obligation was to act the latitude given to each country as to how and what commitments and what standards. So an extraordinarily flexible agreement and one that did not require going back to Congress because Congress had already agreed to its elements. And the agreement is to seek peaking of global emissions on this bottom-up basis. All countries should get together. They should say what they intend to do at home. Those numbers should be added up and aggregated over a period of time, and we should seek to peak, and we are seeking collectively to stay below two degrees of warming since the pre-industrial period to try to avoid some future damages. Recall that all the ones that I put up, those are already historic. We already have those. Going forward, we want to avoid two degrees. All of those come from about one degree. We're trying to avoid two degrees. That's what it called for, but it wasn't binding. It didn't say, you must or there are penalties. It said, we're going to try to get together, and then we will iterate over time and add additional numbers and see what we can all do and see where it comes out. It was designed explicitly to speak to the concerns that had been raised during the Republican administration that said that China wasn't acting. China has obligations. But India wasn't acting. India has obligations. It was done in the way that said the United States should avoid damages to its economy, so we took things that we were doing at home and applied them to the international process. So in some ways what's kind of startling is what did the Republicans want? Why did they pull back? Well, countries are really acting. Here's a picture of the countries that are acting. There are four so far that have decided not yet to submit things. They were in pretty good odor when we decided to withdraw from the agreement. It includes Syria, it includes Libya, it includes Uzbekistan, it includes Nicaragua. Those are great neighbors to have in this particular process. Everybody else is in. And what are they doing? They're doing really pretty significant things. So the objection that we hear from the community that says, well, China will do nothing until the year 2030 is patently false. That's not what they're doing. They have to fundamentally reconfigure the structure of their energy system and they have begun that exercise. They've talked about having 20% of all of their electricity coming from non-emitting sources. If they succeed in that, they will build a grid about the size of the current American grid by the year 2030 in clean energy. That's a stunning thing to think about. It is impossible to put that against the notion that says they're not acting. And in fact, they're slightly ahead of the pace that we thought they have to be on to meet that trajectory. And you thought that India wasn't going to act? Well, Prime Minister Modi has done two interesting things. One, he basically said, we're going to put in 100 gigawatts of solar. The second one is he said we'll be out of the internal combustion engine in India for light duty vehicles by the year 2040. This is not a hallmark of countries that are not acting. These are fundamental changes that people are thinking about for their energy systems and for the structure of their greenhouse gas emissions. What's the administration done since it came in? Well, the first thing it did, it said, well, we'd like to roll back the climate programs. We don't believe them. They're bad for our economy. We don't think they're going in the right direction. They're constraining the growth of coal, which we think should be coming back. Not clear quite why, given the economics don't work too well. But we'd like to do that. So what we're going to do is roll back the clean power plan. We're going to eliminate the tracking of federal greenhouse gas emissions. We're going to rescind restrictions on coal leasing on federal land. We're even going to rescind the orders that would move us down the road of preparing for climate impacts, including the ones that we are already seeing. It's a startling framework. We've also decided to think about rolling back the light duty vehicle standards because after all, who'd like to have more efficient cars? We'd like to reconsider the climate change sites in their EPA. We've fired a whole group of our climate scientists. We've taken down the information. If you go to the EPA website, a lot of that's no longer available. It's archived, so you can get it, but it's not available on the EPA website anymore. We've decided that we're going to do the same thing in other websites. The NOAA website has been fundamentally altered. The Interior website has been fundamentally altered. The U.S. Department of Agriculture has been fundamentally altered. We've decided not to put any more limits or constraints on the gas pipelines whether or not you believe those are the right choices. They had moved forward and people had kind of planned around them, but we're going to revisit all those questions. We've even done things like eliminate the budget for the Climate Data Center at NOAA. And we did a lot more in the budget. Here's some data around the budget numbers to things that are related to the climate change conversation which this administration has decided to do. EPA, a 31% cut that includes discontinuing the entire international climate program as well as a 50% cut in the R&D agenda. It eliminates about 3,000 jobs. The Department of Energy, where I had the privilege of working with Secretary Munez and Deputy Secretary Sherwood Randall, we've got here a huge cut. 69% proposed cut in the energy efficiency and renewable energy program from $2 billion to only $630 million, kind of a startling number. Cuts $900 million from the Office of Science, which is one of our primary supporters in the science agenda, Lynn Orr, who'll speak later, is involved deeply in establishing and making that money work to our benefit. USDA, you saw that about a third of our emissions are on the land use and forestry sector. USDA, $700 million goes away from the science research budget, including substantial reductions in the firefighting capacity. We should be very clear, one of the things that we've now had every year for the last 10 years because of climate change is an increase in wildfires in the American West. Those wildfires have to require supplemental budgets every single year because we've exceeded the budget that the Forest Service has to fight them. We've just cut the Forest Service budget. So don't think that these things are there with by accident. This is an intentional exercise to say, I don't think the problem is real. I'm moving away. And what does that then mean? So some analysis has been done looking at the consequences of some of these activities. The green line at the top is where we thought we'd be under the Obama administration with the policies. The blue line is where we think we'll be under the Trump administration's policies. These done by a group here in California, the Rhodium Group. Many of you may have worked with them, some quite sophisticated analysis, using the Department of Energy's modeling technologies to run these assessments. And there's uncertainty as well. It could be much worse. That's the lower figure on the graph. And then Mr. Trump said, having done this, there's no way I can meet my commitments. I'm going to withdraw from Paris. And so he did that. There are people who clearly support this agenda. It's not like it's a unique story where no one's on site. It's got a lot of people who support it. So Scott Pruitt, who's the current head of the Environmental Protection Agency, said it doesn't mean disengagement. It means you're going to find a new way to act. That's one particular model. We have Republicans in the Senate, although I'm struck by the fact that only fewer than half of them signed on to this letter. Republicans in the Senate said it's clear that advocating for greenhouse gas regulations is a legal defense to keep us in a clean power plan. We hate the clean power plan. And in order to assure that we can get rid of the clean power plan, we have to withdraw from Paris. There was nothing in the Paris Agreement that said that. And in fact, if you look at Jim's trajectories, we were on a pretty good pathway with or without the clean power plan to meet our objectives. So again, in my mind, not a particularly cogent argument. There were a series of about 40 free market groups that basically said it is inappropriate for the United States to be bound by a global community's dictum. What we really should do is make our own choices. There shouldn't be these kinds of constraints on our economy. It's not good for energy to drive those prices up. And low-cost energy is the harbinger of good things to come. We don't want to go there. And they signed a letter saying we should get out. Interestingly enough, some of the people involved in that was led by a man named Myron Ebel. Myron was the person who led the transition team for EPA, urging that we remove ourselves from the agreement. He said we could renegotiate. This complicated slide is the coalitions of players that we negotiated with the first time around. And the quote at the bottom comes from the current executive secretary of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, and she basically says it cannot be based on the request of a single party. So sorry we're not going there. And we've seen significant increases in the level of attention being paid to this agenda since then. So we have an international reaction. This from the G7. They issued a communique, and the communique did not have U.S. concurrence. This is an extraordinary thing. Historically in almost every other circumstance, and I've been working in and out of the foreign ministry since 1989, since then I cannot remember a single communique in which if the U.S. didn't concur, the communique wasn't revised. They issued one anyway. This is a stunning setback in my mind for American diplomacy and for the American position in the international process. And what does it says? We recommit ourselves to Paris. The reaction goes further than that. You've got major players around the world explicitly speaking up, unheard of. The United States wants to go this way. We do not agree. Angela Merkel, Germany, Justin Trudeau, Canada, and we should be clear about Canada, 85% of Canadian exports come from the United States. And Canada still said this. China, same kind of model. We will honor our obligations 100%. So that's the framework at the international side. On the domestic side, 305 mayors decided the day afterwards that they were going to jointly sign a letter repudiating this. Here's the map of where they come from. Here's one example quote from Pittsburgh. This is by no means just mayors on the coasts and just in California, just on those liberal bastions. This is across the country. I can assure you we'll follow the guideline to the agreement for our people, our economy, and our future. Governors got together. They put together a thing called the Governors Climate Alliance. And you can see 12 states signed on on June 5th when it was first announced, the day the president did his Paris statement. And you can see there we only had two Republicans, Massachusetts and Vermont, but 10 more, including D.C., have since joined them. As of the week later, they had an additional host, Maryland, North Carolina, Ohio, New Mexico, Iowa, Illinois, Maine, all Republicans. So it's not partisan in the same sense. It's disagreeing fundamentally with where it is. And I love the quote from John Hickenlooper, who is the governor of Colorado. A ban on the climate change deal is like ripping off your parachute when you should be pulling the ripcord. Business, similar kind of reactions. Bob Iger, who's at Disney, says I'm not going to participate any longer in the President's Advisory Council. Same thing from Elon Musk at Tesla. Tim Cook from Apple says we're not going to waver on this agenda. John Zimmer, who's the CEO at Lyft, a similar kind of a model, we're going to continue to take our own actions to address this particular problem. And they've created a series of new coalitions. Something called We're Still In has 125 cities, nine states, 900 businesses, 183 colleges and universities, in the absence of leadership by Washington, we're going to step up. Or the Wean Mean Business Coalition has 575 companies, $8 trillion in assets in those companies, and 183 investors who themselves managed $20.7 trillion in assets across the board. So again, this is not a fly-by-night operation. These are the major economic players, the major economic engines across the country and around the world. And civil society isn't much different. We had the march on climate, we had the march for science. Is climate change happening? 65% of Americans say yes. Your view on Trump's handling of climate change? 64% say they disapprove. Should we stay in Paris? 46% say that we should support staying in Paris. That's not a huge number. It's a balance that doesn't go the whole way. So how do we treat that and where do we take it? That's going to have to be the discussion so let's look briefly at going forward. This is the trajectories that we might be on in the presence or the absence of greenhouse gas emissions reduction policy. Across the top, that slide at the top comes from the IPCC, the whole thing from the IPCC. That's essentially a business as usual trajectory. We're supposed to try to stay below 2 degrees. This suggests we'll be on the order of 6 to 8 degrees. So a pretty significant warming. And you can see there what the temperature change would be, what the sea level rise would be, and one that I haven't really talked about, the pH of the oceans, we're seeing a considerable acidity, acidification in the oceans, which means at the bottom of the food chain those micro-celled organisms which have calcium carbonate in their shells, they basically start dissolving before they can form and we're already seeing that happen. If we take all of these national determined contributions, all of these commitments, including the one the US has got, and met them, we'd be in that middle line. That's pretty good. Before we had it, the agreement before we were there, we were at the top line. We were rising up on that trajectory towards 5, 6, 7 degrees. The middle line is where we are. But to be at 2 degrees, we have to be down at the bottom line, and you can see some probabilities attached to that in this particular graphic. So what you've got here on this is the probability of staying below 2 degrees. There is a 0% probability of staying below 2 on the trend we were on. There is now, however, a 10% probability of staying below 2 on the current level of effort. So we've got some, but imagine if you only had a 10% chance of going to the doctor and having a successful outcome, you'd either look for another doctor or at least another round of medication. 10% is not very good. You've got to be on one of these lower trajectories if you want to even get to a 50% number. But there's enormous advances in technology. This is some work that was done by the Department of Energy looking at the reductions in prices, partly from DOE work, a lot of it from private sector investment, and you can see the trends that are here and they're remarkably robust and really, really very significant. At the bottom, a 90% reduction in the cost of an LED. These are extraordinary advances, but wind, solar, all of these moving down the cost curve with 50% or more reductions across the board, and this is only from 2008 to 2014. The same kind of notes that Jim was getting. We did just before we left the administration a view of how we could get there. What kinds of worlds would we be looking at by the year 2050 if we were to deeply decarbonize? And we did an analysis and looked through the various sectors and this particular graphic reflects the energy side and where we'd have to be. We'd see a radical increase in electricity. Lots of things would be electrified. We'd electrified a share of transportation. We'd electrified a substantial part of heat. We'd look at things like arc furnaces from electricity as opposed to gas-fired furnaces in industry. We'd commonly see a significant reduction in transportation because as the electricity gets greener and cleaner and transport moves to electricity, certainly for light-duty vehicles, oil goes down as do the emissions. We'd see buildings going down, partly electrification but also partly a level of increased efficiency in the buildings themselves. And we'd see a significant improvement, a lot of it in the efficiency space, a significant reduction in substitution in industry. There are pathways to get there. Those of you thinking about the investments you might want to make could be thinking about pathways like this. We've done this particular item. It's been removed from the website but we actually sent it to the UNFCCC so it's on the UN website. So you can look at it, you can read it, take a look at what you think we would do. We were not the only country to submit one. Germany submitted one as well. China is currently working on theirs. Brazil is committed to working on one around the world. It's a question that people are having. And the markets and finance base is following suit because to a certain extent, if there's a vision of how you get there, the second part of the vision is how do you get paid for it? What are the frameworks for the investment world? What we've seen about a month and a half ago, a little more than that now, was the release of the draft report from the Financial Stability Board, led by Mark Carney. Mark is the head of the Bank of England and the chair of the board. So what he did was to start reporting on your risks. You, companies, it's not required but you really should do this because it's coming. How do you think about the risks that you have as corporate entities, both from climate change but also from the policies that'll mitigate climate change? And if you do that, you'll end up in a significant way reassessing your assets. And it's not as if major companies aren't doing this. ExxonMobil had a shareholder vote May 31st in which the shareholders, 62% of them, So it passed, required and asked of Exxon to start reporting on their risks. What were their assets at risk? How are they preparing for those? How are they managing that particular future? And the opportunities are staggering, and I'll close with this. This is a slide that's drawn from the International Energy Agency. We've over the course of the last four years or so, invested just about a trillion dollars in the energy space. Over the course of the time we'd need to get to 2050, we need another 13 trillion dollars. It's about a trillion dollars a year, if you ever take some, 20, 40. If you wanted to increase that and get to two degrees, you'd need 16 trillion dollars. It's about a four-fold increase over where we are now on an annual basis. That's the difference. We've got to increase financing and investment in the clean tech space by about four-fold. It's by no means implausible. If I take a look at where we were 10 years ago and where we are today, that's about where we have to go. We have to replicate that. We have to scale that. So opportunities clearly abound, and there's clearly a severe problem with which those opportunities can be put to work and an agenda that we really have to follow. So let me stop with that and take some questions. I have to make a quick announcement. Before we go to questions, just one announcement. There's a very energy efficient silver Prius that is parked at the service entrance and it's blocking golf carts. It's either now or in the break, you're gonna need to move it because we've asked the people to not tow it yet. Give people time to move it, but one of our participants probably has a silver Prius that will be towed if it's not moved. Fairly soon, it's by the service entrance of this building. Anyway, four, but I really appreciate the energy efficiency of it. Unfortunately, it may get more energy efficient if you can't drive it. We can now, that gave you a moment to think about your questions and I will be sitting down and Jonathan will be calling on people. And we have about 25 minutes for questions. Great, thanks very much. And I think there's microphones coming around. So if you stand up and raise your hand, we can get a microphone to you. So we'll start over here in the middle. And why don't you just give us your name first so we know who you are. So thanks, the question for those who couldn't hear it was about carbon taxes and whether or not they're either likely or would have a significant impact. In my mind, the answer is they're not immediately likely as a cross-border tax structure. I think people will wait a little while before they put those into place. We are seeing a number of countries that have imposed carbon taxes internally, although at relatively low prices. Interestingly enough, Japan's got one on coal, it's a fairly low price. It's about $10 a ton, so it doesn't really have a whole lot of an effect, although it's a revenue razor. Others have got somewhat higher prices. Norway's had a carbon tax for quite some time now and it's at a much higher level and we've seen substantial changes there. Although it's almost certainly overwhelmed by other policies they've got. Mostly the tax on vehicles, which make the oil price modest in the context of the overall vehicle ownership structure. On the other hand, Tesla for a long time had its largest fleet in Norway because of the preferential treatment and the subsidies of electric vehicles there. They got to take the ferry for free, they could drive in bus lanes and didn't have to pay for parking. So kind of an interesting model that overwhelmed the benefits of the price. With that in mind, there is an extended discussion in the literature and I believe globally that if you don't have a price, you'll probably have a less efficient model of achieving the outcomes that you want. And there's another discussion in the literature around whether or not and what form the rebates of those prices would take. What do you do with the revenue? Do you put it back into R&D? Do you put it into an economically efficient structure of reducing the deficit? Those debates are underway. I am struck that it's coming back around again in a way that I hadn't really anticipated but at the moment I can't really see that taking effect in the United States or in too many other places. Thank you very much for your presentation and for all of your great service to the country and the planet. So first I want to thank you for mentioning the role of natural and working lands and the land base and the importance that it has globally in the US and here in California. And we are blessed here in California with a history of bipartisan leadership on climate change and as you know with a functioning climate regulatory program with a carbon price and a very aggressive governor right now. And you mentioned the US Climate Alliance with now I guess 22 members and there is the Under 2 MOU, Under 2 coalition with 173 jurisdictions. So there's a lot of emphasis on subnational action. And most recently about 10 days ago Governor Brown was appointed as a special envoy on subnational climate action to the UNFCCC by the Prime Minister of Fiji I believe. So my question to you is if you were advising the Prime Minister of Fiji or the secretariat what would you, what mechanisms either exist today or could exist within the UN framework for subnational actors like California to report and do an end run around the Trump administration. Thank you. So the answer to that question is not straightforward. I have in fact talked to the Prime Minister of Fiji and to Governor Brown about this option. They're both interested in finding ways to do this. The legal structure of the United Nations process is that nations, not subnational entities, are the representatives to the UN bodies. And so there isn't a formal mechanism through which they could assume the both responsibilities and the privileges of such party agreements. Having said that, there have been for a number of years efforts to elevate the role of subnational entities and by that I include states, I include counties, I include cities and to elevate the role of NGOs and of business communities in the exercise. And there are a lot of ways to do that and increasingly a number of ways with the implementation agenda can be forwarded including through the international exercise of those bodies. So ideas that are being floated now include having a separate side discussion, a separate series of side meetings at every future meeting of the conference or the parties to the climate negotiations. At those meetings countries not just would meet on their own but subnational entities would also convene and have a discussion about what they intended to do to bring their bottom up targets forward and to use the forum as a mechanism for exchange of information and detail. Now it gets complicated very quickly. Well you've got 195 give or take some countries, you have literally thousands and thousands of cities. So a mechanism to manage cities is a very complicated task. You actually have not quite so many but literally thousands of states and subnational bodies if you count counties in there, again a very complicated process. What we're seeing is instead things like the under 2MOU which is a coalition originally established by Governor Brown trying to pull some pieces together. He worked originally with Baden-Württemberg which is one of the major industrial centers in Germany. He's had a significant interaction with a number of the Canadian provinces and the Mexican states to drive that forward. We're seeing institutions like that try to support through secretariats and through regular convenings opportunities to elevate and exchange information about the policies and the programs that they are taking. But it doesn't substitute for international process. One of the things that we've been looking at now is whether or not we just took the US states that are proposed to act and added up their total commitments, how far would you get? You don't get far enough to go to 2050 even though by 2050 some states like Hawaii are talking about being entirely non-fossil based. It's still not enough. Even though it's beyond what we think we might have to do as a nation it doesn't compensate for the fact that the federal government has authorities and some states are not currently acting. We can't get there at that stage. So we should need to do both. At some level you want to bring those together. There are certain authorities that they possess. For example, you want to do transportation. That's often local. Certainly building codes are local. Certainly things like urban development and planning is local. Those kinds of areas in any event would have been part of the dynamic for a successful outcome and we'll see those moving forward. Yeah, please. How do you reach the dedicated readership of Fox News and talk shows and the deniers in Congress and reach them, educate them, and convince them that they're killing us? So listen, this is always the question that you ask yourself. And I've been working on this for a long time. I'm struck by how rapidly it's changed. When I began working on this, which was admittedly almost 30 years ago now, it was not as partisan as structure. We had Democrats and Republicans who both saw the problem and wanted to address it. I'm struck by a relatively narrow cohort of people who seem, at least from the literature, to be responsible for a great deal of the objection. And much of it grounded not in what I consider good science and my PhD is in geophysics. I don't see it from that perspective. I see it from a very political perspective. That means you need a different kind of political argument. I am struck, however, at the other end by a number of Republicans who are not so much arguing about climate change because they don't think that's currently a particularly workable solution. But they're arguing about a whole lot of other things which, in essence, are about the problems and the solutions to the problems. So, for example, we actually do have people in Florida worried about sea level rise. You have people worried about what you do in order to manage coastal protections in areas that are going to be subject to storm surge. You do have people like Albert Kasek in Ohio who's pushed back on his state legislature which said, we're going to remove our renewable portfolio standard. And he said, actually, that's a really bad idea. Let's not do that because there are a lot of jobs attached to this. There are a lot of new developments attached to this. There's an economic pathway forward for the steel workers who could be manufacturing trusses and girders and structures for our manufacturing industrial sector in the production of panels. Let's not do this. So, you get people at all sides of the equation worrying but arguing from a different place. In my mind, once we have the solutions that are laid out and compared to how to get there and see an economy that drives in that direction, the debate over climate change will be less polarizing because the polarization is in no small measure a function of those who stand to lose and don't see a path forward. If I can get an Exxon to begin to invest in a very different way and for full disclosure, I actually worked for ARCO as an oil geologist in the 1980s in Alaska. The time that I worked for ARCO, they owned part of Anaconda and they were the single largest solar panel manufacturer and producer in the world. It was huge. They sold it all off in the late 1970s, early 1980s because it was just not very profitable. Interestingly enough, they thought of themselves then as an energy company, not as an oil company. BP was the exact same trajectory. They thought of themselves as an energy company beyond petroleum. That was the big logo back in the 1990s when John Brown was the head of BP. They moved back away from that because the market wasn't there yet. They're again reconsidering what they are and what kind of a structure they have. If companies like that find alternative pathways, I bet we see a very different political outcome. Please, I'm glad you're here. Germany led the world in physics and after Hitler came to power, Jewish physicists emigrated, including Albert Einstein and many others in the United States. Many of the employees who will be laid off are in mid-career, fully qualified to emigrate to other countries or to work in private industry or academia. What do you think will happen to the best and brightest current federal employees from the affected departments? So maybe I have some of that conversation this afternoon. There's a group of people of which I am one at this front table. All of us worked in the government. I've been talking to my friends there. The morale is very low, as you might be not unsurprised to hear. And of course, my career is largely in the climate space. There are other parts of the government which are not doing quite as badly. That doesn't include the R&D side. It doesn't include a lot of the energy side, at least in the innovative new areas of energy. I am struck by an announcement that was made and many of you may have seen it. Macron, who is the new Prime Minister of France, had a fabulous, fabulous YouTube invitation in which he said, we invite you, scientists of America, we invite you to France. We would like to have you. We want your entrepreneurial ideas. We want your skills. We believe in climate. Come here and play with us. It's kind of an amazing thing. It was very short. It's about three minutes long. Take a look at it on YouTube. His English is accented, but very good. He's quite persuasive in the way he frames it, and he's done it twice. He didn't just do it once. He reiterated the offer after Trump pulled back. He had done it earlier on his campaign. He reiterated it now that he's now Prime Minister. I'm struck by the fact that China gets more students from Africa now than the United States does. That's not good for us. I think it's, one of the things that I'm struck by is the benefit the United States has accrued by having students from around the world come to all of our schools, not just our most top-rated elite schools like Stanford, but all of them, the state schools. The number of people that I negotiated with during the 25 years, 30 years I've been doing this, that came through American school systems was on the order of 50 to 60%. You know how much easier that made my life? They're now all going to China. They're going to Europe. 20 years from now, they won't be people who've gone through those American systems. Back to the question about what you do with those employees. Some of them move, some of them stay. Some of them try to do things that are constructive in light of what the new administration wants. They look for interesting, clever ways to go. It's a remarkably dedicated workforce. It was a privilege for me, and I've worked on both sides, both as a civil servant and as a political appointee. It was a privilege to work with them. It's an extraordinary community of people, and my heart goes out to them because I think there's an uncertainty, but they're all good enough to find other things, and they will, and we will lose. This? Jonathan, thank you for your leadership. It's wonderful to see you here. I'm Ms. Sherwood Randall, and I was interested in one of your slides which showed current emissions, and wanted to ask you to speak about projected admissions because, for example, India showed up on the slide as a very small part of the pie, but if we project out India's development path, we see the risks associated with the need India has to electrify 300 million people or more, and what the consequences would be for the planet, which drove much of the energy behind the work that you did over many years in the administration and prior to that. Do you have a slide that looks at projected emissions around the world, and why our withdrawal from leadership leads to a huge risk for all of us in the future? So the answer is, I didn't bring one here, there are some slides that look at that, and there are scenarios as opposed to projections because there's all kinds of questions around, what are you assuming? A lot of them are about two or three years old, they were done in the run up to Paris, which is a 2015 meeting, and themselves drew on data that was a year or two before that. So often they're 2013 or 2014 data for a 2015 report. Since then, some interesting things have happened. So Modi's announcement on renewables was done in Paris, and has now been really clearly provided with some impetus and domestic capacity. But there's another one which is perhaps somewhat less well known. There was a statement made by Priyash Goyal, who's the Minister of Energy for India right now, serving in Modi's cabinet, and he said that he thought they may not need to build any new coal after 2020. That's a startling statement. I don't know if it's possible or not, but it's a remarkable statement, and they've begun to taper off. If you look at the trends most recently in India, in particular, you'd seen this rapid increase, and it's now begun to tail off. And part of it is that when they made their original statements about their growth trajectory, they'd assumed that there were no lower cost options, that the solution set was gonna be on the least cost option, because the priority was not climate change, the priority was access to electricity. And as Liz has said, there were 300 million people today who don't have it, probably it's closer to 400 million. It's a remarkable number. And if you add those who have intermittent access, it's more than 500 million. So it's a stunning number. We think we did a fabulous job, and we did with rural electrification in the 1930s, we provided electricity for 30 million people. They're looking at 10 times that number to try to move into a world of access. It's a startling figure. But the other side of the coin is as interesting. We've had a series of auctions that have been done in the renewable energy space globally over the course of the last two, three years. The least cost number right now comes from the Arab Emirates. They're looking at 2.3 cents for solar. That's compared to close to five cents for gas, and on the order of five cents for coal. That's a very, very different figure than what you would have had when you thought that coal was the cheapest way to go. It's also interesting that Indian coal is remarkably dirty. It's a lot of its brown coal. The brown coal emissions in particulates are startling. We all see the pictures from China of the quality of the air in the Chinese cities. The Indian cities are now worse, worse than the Chinese cities. They're stunning. Now, part of it's the three-wheelers and the really bad quality of the catalytic converters and the absence of them in many cases. A lot of it's heavy duty vehicles, and a lot of it is brown coal. So there are a lot of reasons when they'll be pushing back on this particular agenda, but the fact of the price suggests there may be options for them they couldn't have pursued earlier. My current best guess, India won't peak by 2020, but it might by 2025, and the growth will be heavily not in coal. It'll be used a bit as a backstop. They won't really switch to gas so much because that's a straight import problem for them. They don't really have gas access at home and the imports there aren't too attractive, but they're likely to build up a pretty robust, particularly solar industry, which is likely to play out. How that works for the grid, I couldn't tell you. It's a mess in India. Very, very difficult. How does it work for things like tariff structures? Mostly don't exist. Numbers suggest that almost 40% of Indian tariffs are not paid. That's a real problem for anyone going in to make an investment there. So these kinds of questions, the ones they're gonna have to grapple with, and it's by no means a straightforward issue, but the trajectory looks very different than it did even a few years ago. I'm gonna come back to you on this, and I think there's a story to be told about how far India was moved over the last few years through intensive engagement by those who traveled repeatedly to India, including you, to help understand what they were facing and offer them a path forward in terms of how they identify solutions. So if we withdraw from that space, if we look globally at the challenges we see, that means that there is a big gap. Those countries that may need to be moved similarly would not have any partner to work with in the way that we have led. And that's clearly the case. If you take a look at what people are currently doing, we're not on a bad trajectory for 2020 or 2025. That's kind of inertia in the system, driven in no small measure the last eight years of work. What we saw from that one graph that I put up, where we're kind of at a flat line, we've gotta start radically reducing the trajectory. We're not on that line. The reason we got from the top line to the middle was essentially this last administration. Others were not too keen. Europe was pushing what was a little bit internally riven. Canada was interested but too small. Japan was going down a completely different route. China's not a global player in the same way. It might wanna step up at some point but it's not there yet. That was in no small measure a function of the administration and frankly Obama himself who leaned in. In the absence of that, the question I think that Liz is asking is who comes next? Who steps into that? There is still no obvious candidate. One argument is that we'd end up doing it through a coalition of Europeans. They would all band together and collectively they'd move forward. And we are seeing some indications this might happen. A new axis emerging between France and Germany, Merkel looks like it'd be reelected, Macron's just come in. They're both European focused people, not just nationalists thinking about the organization. There's some possibility there but they are completely absorbed with the exit of the UK from the European Union. They've got a massive problem on the Eastern front not just with the Eastern countries but also with Russia. How do they play in that dynamic? They just don't have the bandwidth or the capacity to extend themselves that far. Although climate change is one of the unifying forces for them and so they're gonna try. Brazil, busy with Tamer and a new election. India, stuck currently in a model of development which will move it forward but inwardly focused. China, stepping up its interest but its interests are at some point fundamentally at odds with those it is working with. You take a look and I spent a fair amount of time in Africa over the course of the last number of years and as you look at the African model the single largest investor in Africa is China. It is twice as big as the next two combined which are ourselves and Germany. Twice as much as the two of us combined is Chinese but the Chinese aren't exactly happy the Africans aren't exactly happy with Chinese investment because the Chinese often bring in their own workers. They go away when they're done and there's no training that's been provided. There may be economic output but it's often thought strings attached where those export values go back to China for a supply chain so the benefits don't accrue so neatly. So people are willing to take the money but they're really looking under the rug about is this really a good answer? We'll try to be a leader in that same sense. Very, very hard to see who steps up. So the gap is palpable. Well now that I've warned you a lot, we've got one back here. Thanks for a wonderful presentation. Real quickly, what I didn't see was a modeling of the impact of 2% C increase and how that would also compare with the flat line that you had mentioned that we're currently on with our current trajectory. You mean the two degree number against that? Yeah, so in other words, what's the impact of two degrees and what's the impact on our current trajectory in terms of the actual, you know, what's the world look like? Could you just give us a snapshot on that? So the majority of the two degree numbers that we've got, I think I may have put this up a little bit here. So these trajectories here, the upper trajectory is more like four to five degrees. The lower trajectory is more, give or take some about one and a half to two degrees. So you can see in the blue lines there, you mostly get rid of some of the sea level rise. You mostly get rid of some of the temperatures in the oceans. You still probably lose almost all your Arctic ice, but you may not lose the Antarctic ice. At least in 2013, that was our view. I would note that things are changing more quickly at one degree than we thought. So for example, many of you may have been reading the New York Times and picked up in other journals, this large crack that's coming through Antarctica just off of something called the Thwaiti's Ice Sheet and the Ross Ice Shelf. So it turns out that that crack is propagating pretty quickly. It's an iceberg, essentially the size of the state of Delaware. So it's a pretty big iceberg. It's currently all floating. So when it breaks off, it won't raise sea level very much. But it is also serving essentially like a cork in a bottle for a series of glaciers that are coming into the ice shelf from the interior of Antarctica. And if those glaciers start to move, they were present on the order of 10 to 15 feet of sea level rise. So the open question is we never thought the crack was gonna happen. It seemed completely unexpected. The most recent geophysical surveys that have been run there suggest that warm ocean water is getting underneath the ice shelf and floating it off and those are actually creating channels and carving out the subsurface of the glaciers coming off the continent. So things like that seem to be happening now at one degree. Two degrees, we have an inflection point. Almost all the numbers suggest that at about two degrees you start seeing a more rapid increase in damages. It doesn't mean there are none before that, we're seeing them now. It doesn't mean there aren't a lot worse after that but it's a point at where things seem to accelerate more quickly. And that's in the absence of having any real insight about tipping points. Places where from one point in time and temperature to another, massive changes could happen. So I sat next to a colleague when I was doing my PhD work who was involved in some large scale analysis of glaciation in the United States. And this guy had done all kinds of interesting work and he was looking at the Great Lakes and at one point in time, many of you may be aware there was a massive ice sheet that covered most of North America. Kinda came through Wisconsin all the way down into Iowa. Massive, the terminal moraine on the east coast was Long Island, the entirety of Long Island was all the edge of this ice sheet. It turns out that it melted pretty quickly and we had huge floods that came through the St. Lawrence Seaway, essentially carving that channel and you can see the results of those floods because there are boulders bigger than this room buried underneath the sediment that came out in those floods. That's the kind of model if you start melting things at great, great rate and you had on that at that point in time about 140 feet of sea level rise. So these kinds of things are tipping points. We don't know where they are. We're not known or knowable really at what particular temperature in what constellation of events do they happen. All the things that we tend to put out there are the slow, steady, incremental changes. Somewhere in there, something else probably happens. About a possible carbon tax against the U.S. Could you see that happening and also based on your experience, could you see any backlash against U.S. companies wanting to sell clean energy products overseas? All things being equal, you guys aren't part of the accord, we'll go with the company from another country. So the answer is not yet, but we're also not yet seeing the scale of the economy having developed in which that might occur. It's for still, let's be very clear, it's moving very quickly, but in many cases the clean energy space is a niche technology. It's moving, but it's moving through a series of small players. I'm struck in some ways by the model that I've seen in the last 20 odd years. So the technology comes from here. People at Stanford and Silicon Valley, we kind of invent it, it's very cold, DOE provides support and assistance, comes from here. Germany, in this particular case for solar panels, ends up subsidizing the hell out of it. It's fabulous, they put in enormous sums of money. It's a very expensive electricity system, but they have paid for it. China then goes and manufactures them at really low cost. They're doing it to sell it to the German market, but once they have that German market, they then expand the market, it's now Chinese, it's now American, it's now European. That's kind of an interesting trajectory for where things go. So at that point the question really is, how do we sustain an economic development pathway for ourselves in that model? So one of the questions is, well you have your own domestic rules that give you a marketplace and you can then sell into your own market. It's often easier, you understand the rules, you understand the process, easier to raise financing. If that doesn't happen, where is our stuff gonna go? A plausible scenario is you do a joint venture and that joint venture is ultimately taken over by your partner and it moves someplace else. I think that's what's happened in many of the other technologies that we've seen, not least with China, but also increasingly in places like India, which is nationalized in certain ways, lots of the technologies that we've produced here. So how do you think about that? What do we have to do? The flip side is what you've asked about. Will there be an effort to penalize the United States? I think to a certain extent there'll be pressure on that and it will depend in part about how stringent the price increment is in countries as they move their own agendas forward. So I have a differential in my goods versus your goods of 10%, I might swallow it. 30%, I'm not gonna swallow it. I'm gonna push back and I will either push back against my own domestic policy or I'll push back for equilibration in the trade regime and ask your policy to be modified when your products enter my lands. So that discussion is gonna be underway. The person who pushed it pretty hard was Francois Hollande who was the former Prime Minister of France. It's been suggested by a number of others, economics, theory people, talk about it on a regular basis. I don't think it's immediate, but stay tuned. As people move further and further into the more difficult strategies to achieve these goals, more and more likely we'll have that kind of an outcome. I think we're out of time, so thank you all very much. Jim. Thank you.