 Of men we fought. November 8th, 1942, the Mediterranean. 11 months after Pearl Harbor, more than 800 ships engaged in Operation Torch, the invasion of North Africa. The plan called for tactical air support for the ground forces. Some of the air units were ferried from England in the states by carriers. We had 70 warhawks and a US flat top, 25 more on a British carrier. We liked this plane. The Curtis P-40 could carry a 500-pound bomb as easily as the belly gas tank. It was both a fighter and a bomber. Now inspired by Doolittle's Tokyo raid, land-trained fighter pilots, because their planes were urgently needed, were risking carrier takeoffs to get to Morocco. At two and three-minute intervals, we raced down the short deck and grabbed for air. It felt like someone pulled a runway out from under us awful fast. We cleared the decks and buzzed the carriers for luck. Then the entire group, led by Colonel Bill Moemeyer, headed for the already battle-scarred landing fields of French Morocco. General Eisenhower came up for a look, see at our forward command post. Allied forces had rolled over the opposition and moved halfway across North Africa, only to grind to a halt because of weather and the lack of supplies. We were almost within sight of the enemy's big supply ports in Tunisia. However, logistics and mud dictated the decision. On General Eisenhower's order, positions were consolidated, and the attack was postponed indefinitely. The mountains, the roads, even the air seemed to ooze with six weeks of steady rain. No motor transportation. Wheels went no place. Only a few meager supplies got through. For once, like the foot soldier, air support, the umbrella for our ground forces was stuck in the mud. The enemy was in much better shape. They had hundreds of planes operating from permanent all-weather fields. Their veteran battle-trained Luftwaffe was sure of easy victory over inexperienced American air units. Allied harbors and airfields were primary targets. Air defenses were weak, open for stuka dive bombing and strafing. After plastering Allied supply harbors, they attacked airfields. Air units doggedly held on while even the ground seemed to rise and burn under repeated attacks. The Allies suffered losses. And even as they rescued their wounded, new and faster ways were improvised to carry casualties to safety. The planes which had brought in the high priority supplies took out higher priority men. They were attended by flight nurses. With their evacuation, casualties were only hours from hospitals, even home. But wounded men and planes had to be repaired. American ingenuity went to work. Salvaged parts and new ideas made crude gasoline fire bombs. The Allies rebuilt their strength. General Eich had planned strategy with his air, ground, and naval officers. We worked out the best ways of using our combined forces. General Spotz was named CO of the Northwest African Air Force. Generals Arnold, Royce, and Brayerton visited our outfit, the 12th Air Force Fighter Command, run by General Pete Cassata. The brass were helping us get on even terms with a Luftwaffe. Army transport boys tripled railway capacity. A while back, we'd nearly run out of 500 pounders, but now we had plenty. Gasoline rationed at home, meant life or death in the desert. A battle for supply was being won. We were getting ready. Suddenly, on February 14th, Rommel's Africa Corps attacked, and Casserine Pass Allied Line stiffened. After eight days of attack, the Axis Initiative was exhausted. It was at this point that Rommel quipped his African command. For the enemy, the situation worsened. Gasoline shortages reduced air operations. Squeezed into a steadily smaller pocket, they prepared to evacuate planes and key personnel to Sicily. About 20 men could escape in a Junker 52. High above them, the Allies watched and waited. Something big was coming. The German escape plan was put in motion. Near Tunis rose a group of more than 30 heavily armored ME-109 fighters. They were to escort a large fleet of slow-flying 52. Perhaps Sicily was a shuttle run of about 100 miles, less than an hour. 100 strong that transport stretched in a long line on the deck, headed for their Sicilian sanctuary. They didn't get very far. As soon as our 57th fighter group spotted them, Captain Jimmy Curl's squad of 13 P-40s dove on the enemy to split them up, missing Germans since July 1942. But we never had a chance like this famous afternoon. Below the transports droned on. If they're luck held, the Germans might make a getaway. Their luck ran out. Took their chances on getting back to their capable and air droves. When the attack was over, we had destroyed 58 transports and 18 fighters. Lieutenant's Duffy, Powers in Cleveland, each clobbered five transports. From then on, we sat over German air droves and dared the Luftwaffe to come up. But the Axis still had a trunk car. The Africa Corps locked the way to Tunis. The Allies drove, seeking weak spots. Binding some, they shifted forces, building for a breakthrough. Montgomery's Army hammered the Africa Corps from the south. Allied artillery tried to give the ground forces a toehold on the corridor to Tunis. But Monty's 8th Army was effectively pinned down by the Africa Corps. On the morning of May 6th, they called for tactical air support. Weather was good. We had gasoline and bombs, planes and men. We were ready. The Northwest African Tactical Air Force drew up a schedule for an unprecedented weight of air attack. The heavies were first to give depth to the artillery barrage. They ordered us to concentrate on an area four miles long by 3 and 1 half miles wide. We had 12 Air Force bomber boys who had started in the muddy fields of Algeria. They were teamed up with night Air Force men who had eaten sand all the way from Egypt. 1,500 miles. Before 9 o'clock, we had planned to fly more than 1,000 sorties. Anything that could take off went up to the corridor. Our fighter bomber boys, including the 57th group of Cape Bone fame, were about to sweep a road to Tunis. We were using the experience gained in Egypt, smashing Rommel at El Alamein. Then we were only a few. Now we were hundreds, all grouped in a powerful package. General Alexander's armies were anxious for the air attack, which would mean a breakthrough. They didn't have long to wait. From Medjazalb, about two hours, tanks and infantry had advanced as much as a mile. Resistance began to crack. The situation retreated to make a last ditch stand. Finally, the Allied armies broke through. From here on, Alexander mopped up with fire as the Allies could see Tunis. This was the first flush of victory, a year and a half after Pearl Harbor, only six months after the landing. Allied soldiers, tankmen, and airmen were liberators, like the American Marines who had brought peace to North Africa more than a century before. So its delivery as tyranny disappeared. The citizens of Tunis chaired the Crusade for freedom, but now had a new champion, Allied air power. Indian prisoners proved that not the invincibility was a myth. In the German defeat, we learned the strength of joint unified command. Allied air power had destroyed enemy planes, guns, and ships, which paved the way for the final destruction of Hitler's once proud and powerful Africa Corps. As designer of the Tunisian victory, General Eisenhower reviewed the United Allies who were at last upon the march, scale application of complete air supremacy. We had battle tested and developed tactical air support for our ground forces. Later chapters will show the lessons of North African air warfare applied on a global scale with the steadily increasing manpower, plane power, and firepower of the United States Air Force.