 I can see the future of the European Union, it's a little bit depopulated this morning. But I'm hoping everyone has been properly caffeinated and is ready to go for a very busy day. My name is Stephen Erlanger, I'm the New York Times Bureau Chief in London. Formerly at different times in my life in Berlin and in Paris and in other places too. But it's a great pleasure to be here with a very good panel to talk about something, I think that's preoccupying all of us, which is the shock of Brexit and Trump and low growth and migration to the European Union, to its solidarity, to its sense of the future, to its sense of possibility to European sense that they are part of a project that's taking them forward rather than ceaselessly back into the past. So we have a very fine panel with Elizabeth Guigou, a former French minister and Norbert Rutkin who's head of the Foreign Policy Committee of the Bundestag. And I'm just going to ask them to pick out a couple things that interest them to get us going and then we'll have the conversation and have some questions from you. So Elizabeth, si vous plaît. Well, thank you very much, good morning. We're happy to be here. We congratulate you again for this very interesting organization. I'm very happy to be here with Norbert again. We meet very often, as you know, and we even have some Weimar trips and we were in Kiev together and in Berlin very, not long ago and I will go back to Berlin next week. So I hope we have some controversy anyway. Well, you always have Tia. Well, Europe, what's next? I think the main challenge has been for many years now to rebuild the link between the European Union and the European people. And this is all the more important now after the Brexit and after the election of Donald Trump. But my opinion is that those two recent events, although they were a shock, maybe also a earthquake, might very well be an opportunity to strengthen Europe, provided European leaders have the courage and sufficient political will. As far as Brexit is concerned, well, first we have to respect the vote, of course. It's for the British people to decide, although we deplore it and regret it profoundly. But what I think is that, despite the enormous lies of Brexiters and the fact that they did not assume the responsibilities, I think the only thing we have to do now is to have as quickly as possible the exit negotiations started, certainly not later than by the end of March next year. Why? Because it has to be, those negotiations will have to be completed before the European elections in June 2019. Secondly, I think that I hope that these discussions and negotiations will reach the best cooperation possible, provided we stick to the principles of the Union, which are, of course, the single market, the four freedoms, including freedom of movement, and that we do not cave any of the fundamentals of the Union. And having said that, we can very well imagine specific status for the UK, since the UK government said that they didn't fit with either the Norwegian model or the Swiss model, but of course, with the idea not at the expense of the Union. And up to now, the 27 have kept together on such a line, and of course, it is very important to say that among those principles, the financial passport goes along with the financial, with the single market. I was in London, well, last Sunday and Monday, and we had to throw discussions on that. It's obvious that it will be a very difficult discussion, but it's for the British to decide. If they want to have some access and access to the single market, then it is for them, like the Swiss and the Norwegian to accept some of the rules. And finally, on the Brexit, I would say that France will be very keen in enhancing its bilateral cooperation, certainly on defence, on migration, and of course, on the status of the British citizens in France and the French citizens in the UK. As far as the US elections are concerned, of course, the US is a major partner of France and of Europe, and we have to work with Mr Trump whatever the uncertainty is, and we have to work together because we have links on the economy, on security, on the Middle East, in Africa, on the fight against terrorism, and of course, last but not least, on the climate issue. But on all these issues, we're expecting to know what Mr Trump is effectively going to do, and of course, we have some worries, especially on the climate change. I was in Marrakech last, when was that? Tuesday. I could see, even in hearing John Kerry, how concerned and worried he was. So, we'll have to discuss with Mr Trump what nuclear deal with Iran, what future for transatlantic negotiations, and what will be the US policy towards Russia and towards China, whether there are lots of threats, you know, especially in the China Sea, and some of the words during the campaign we're not reassuring on that. So, I think on those two events, compel the Europeans really to do what they should have done for many years, which is to strengthen their policies, not on all subjects, of course. Europe has not to deal with everything, but on subjects where transnational challenges are there, we need to have a stronger Europe, and I hope that the time has come, especially for Europe to have an external policy, because one of the main flaws, we have strengthened our internal policies. I think the Economic and Monetary Union is well on the good path in strengthening itself. We have common policies, which, you know, are okay, but we have never had a common external policy, and we need that not only on a foreign affairs policy, not only to fight terrorism, but for migration and for the development of our neighbors, either in the East or in the South. So, I think we have no other choice than to unite ourselves, and I hope it will be possible. Let me ask you one question here. I mean, Brexit was kind of a shock, and it seems to have led to lots of other shocks, and these things have a momentum. But do you think for the European Union, this is a prise de conscience, a sort of wake-up call, do you think it will sober people about the future of the European Union and bind it more, or will it begin to spin it apart, do you think? Well, I don't know, I hope it will be, as Thierry said, a wake-up call, of course. I'm not sure. It depends on the common will of the leaders, which is rather weak and has weakened. It depends on their ability to explain to the European people that going inward, building walls is not a solution, that since when we have transnational challenges, we are bound to cooperate together and to deal in a transnational way, and to explain that in a global world, which is a more and more uncertain world, and more unstable, the only solutions are in cooperation between the Europeans and to explain maybe that, to give answers to the fears of the Europeans. If you think what are those fears today, they express fears from the outside, and therefore we've got to explain, to make understand that the only answer is to cooperate to give a positive response to that. So I hope, but I'm not sure. That's right, it just seems to me, it's really where you started, which is the reconnection of the European Union to Europeans themselves, and part of it's about listening, and bureaucrats aren't always very good at listening, Norbert, you're a politician to the other part of the French-German couple here, and over to you please. Okay, yes, good morning everybody. What next in and for Europe is the question? Before I try to elaborate a little bit on this question, just let me perhaps briefly summarize where we are and from that point we can ask, how will it go on? I think where we are is a point and situation we have not seen since World War II. There have not been so many crises at the same time from abroad and internally in Europe and confronting Europe. Externally we have fundamental new posturing of Russia as everybody knows. This has shattered the European peace order. We considered to be eternal after the coming down of the Berlin Wall and the Iron Curtain. Everybody thought and considered this European peace order to be the consequence, the historic consequence of the bloodshed of the 20th century, and we were absolutely sure not that Russia is a democracy like the Western European style of democracy, but that Russia was absolutely determined to remain a part of that political order and we had to see that Russia violated not only a border, not only about Ukraine, but it is about the persistence of the peace order in Europe, what we are dealing with Russia when we talk about Ukraine. And then we have seen the increased turmoil, the territorial extension of the conflicts from Northern Africa over the Middle East, Iraq, Syria to Afghanistan and an increase of complexity, which also seems to be persistent. It's not going away anytime soon. And we see a mixture between the Russian posture in Europe and the military encroachment and activity in Syria by waging a war and committing war crimes. And what we see as Europeans for the first time, of course the geography has not changed, but the politics have changed. What we see is a fundamentally new quality of mobility of crisis. The consequences of crisis now are spilling over to Europe and we can't say any longer we have domestic politics and policies which can be separated from foreign policy crises. They are there, they always have been there, but they are far away. No, they are not any longer far away, but they are coming and entering Europe and having a huge impact on the stability of our societies. So problems which emerge to be and evolve to be foreign policy problems have roots in social, societal problems within foreign countries, spilling over to Europe as foreign policy problems and affecting the stability of our societies. So we have not any longer the separation between foreign policy and domestic policy, but we do not also have any longer only interstate problems, but we have a mixture of social and foreign policy problems. And now, and then I will of course end with that, description of the external challenges, we have a new president-elect in the United States and for the first time perhaps in the history of American foreign policy at least for the last 100 years, nobody in the world knows what foreign policy can we expect. At least nobody knows it. There have been some comments on foreign policy, but I think that they were not so much comments on foreign policy, but they were addressed exclusively to the domestic voter and Trump did not care so much about that there were perhaps some foreign listeners when he talked about NATO and so on. So we have now even coming from the United States a new portion, a new quality of insecurity which the United States now injects to the global insecurity we have. At this time, at this critical juncture of foreign policy surrounding Europe, we have unfortunately to state that Europe internally is in the worst shape since the Roman treatise and it is the worst shape because it is not as it was and has been in the past that you have a crisis, a challenge and then you adapt and after all Europe emerged to be stronger than when we entered the crisis. It is a crisis of mentality, perhaps of political culture. It is the reemergence of state egotism and partly nationalism not seen in the decades before which fundamentally weakens us. So this may be perhaps an insufficient description of where we are. So how to respond to that? Of course it is so complex and complicated it's not easily to be answered, but a few elements of how to proceed in the interests of Europe and the West may be said. My first assumption is that in this ever deeper globalizing world without developing an international order, perhaps international order even in retreat, the West as a political concept is indispensable. Either we persist to assert a Western concept of politics which consists of fundamental principles and values like the rule of law, like the dignity of man, like democracy. Either these values are asserted by the West or these minority values of the minority population, the West, will diminish and will not be asserted and remain strong. So the West is indispensable. Secondly, when it comes to a possible retreat and perhaps a new isolationism of the United States, I do not predict because I remain to my point we do not know what the American foreign policy is about. But America first sounds a little bit like that. But I don't know, I don't assert to know anything about the future cause. In any case, in any case what happens, the United States is irreplaceable for the West. Some say yes to the United States, my backtrack, then we have to come in as Europeans. Given the political, economic, technological, military power of the United States, there is no substitute for the United States within the concept of the West. Thirdly, if we want to activate the West, perceive, preserve the West, the EU as one pillar, the second pillar in this concept is insufficient, particularly on foreign policy. We have to evolve as an actor on foreign and security policy because even if Hillary Clinton had been elected as president of the United States, she would have been forced to focus on domestic challenges, on creating jobs, on bridging the societal and social gap in the society. And so any current and future president will have to work on a very much domestic agenda. So in our national interest as European nation states, we have to do more and we have to accept and face the reality that we are not any longer living in the Cold War where we had the security umbrella of the United States, but we have to do more for our own security. And my last remark is in order to enable us to do that, to overcome our internal dividing differences, is pivotal and prerequisite that we get able to forge a kind of a common foreign policy on the European level. What do I mean with that? I think we have three dividing issues in Europe, the refugees, the economy, austerity and Russia. And as a German politician, I want to make clear that I see that Germany with regard to these three issues has to shift from a partisan participant in the struggles into a new position as a provider for solution. We do not strive for the leading role. We haven't strived for that and it's not something we want to have and I would not assume to be a healthy situation, but we have a political weight we can't ignore and we have to put in this weight for solution. We have to increase the legitimacy of result. This is a prerequisite for our overarching goal to unify Europe, to make Europe work again in order to develop a European voice in the field of foreign policy to serve our own fundamental interests. I think we have to start. Thank you for that very much. I'm always intrigued. I think of Germany as they say about people, they may not seek greatness, but sometimes they have greatness thrust upon them. You may not want to lead, but there's no one else. So if someone's going to do it, you'd better do it. This notion, which I think has some value, that Germany just wants to be a big Switzerland, just to kind of get under the Eiderdown and do trade and not think about the world, is becoming more hollow, because as you've said very much, both of you, the crises of the rest of the world are coming home. They're unavoidable. Now maybe the Middle East, you can blame Obama, you can blame everyone, but given where we are, and we've talked about refugees, but we haven't talked about terrorism and Islam, one tends to be a function of the other plus post-colonialism. And I'm curious how Elizabeth and then Norbert feel that European Union is dealing with these two associated problems. They're domestic problems of integration and identity in France, but they're also domestic problems of integration for Germany, as well as being security issues about external borders and screening and how one copes with the other. And also in a third sphere, talking about EU foreign policy, everyone, you know, it's easy to blame the Syrian Civil War and the atrocities on many people, but I haven't seen the European Union doing much to help solve it myself. So if you might sort of talk a bit about these related issues, that would be great. Well, first I must say that because we've had those discussions with Norbert all along those past years, I have observed especially since the Munich conference was it in 2014 maybe or maybe the year before that there was a will expressed by German officials that they should assume their international responsibilities not only on economics, but also on politics. Now, there have been progress on that. If you, the last meeting of our defence ministers and Foreign Affairs Minister last Monday, we have filmed the common world to build a real Europe of defence, which is of course complementary to NATO. I have no question about that. And this is the main challenge. What will Mr. Trump do towards NATO? But we have to, and of course, the summit that took place in Berlin between Mr. Obama and four or five leaders have reasserted that. So this is one main focus. But it is true as well that there is still a long way to go for Germany in this objective of having more contribution to a foreign policy and defence policy. It's, I see no other way than working at more, you know, more coherent policies between France and Germany because when you add the economic strength of Germany and of course the political and military influence of France, then you have something that counts in the United Nations, of course. But also, as we see now, although it's only a part of a coalition in the Middle East, so it seems to me that we are somehow on the way and I want to stress that the help of Germany in Malin, for example, because we have not said a word about Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, is one main challenge as far as fight against terrorism is concerned. And I will say that since these questions are related to memories of colonialism and of course in our internal societies, that it seems to me that we have no choice as Europeans to take care of Africa, not in a colonial spirit, of course, but to help investment and to do that, and it has begun, especially with Qatar. You go to Morocco, it's very obvious, for example, but we have to help investment so that we help create jobs for all these youngsters who don't have any jobs, even those who have been to university. This is one main challenge everywhere in Africa, in North Africa and in Sub-Saharan Africa. And what, you know, of course, we tend to see all the threats and they are enormous, of course, as Norbert said. We have never had such a cluster of crises, but I am not over pessimistic because I have been chairing the Annaline Foundation for Cultural Dialogue for more than a year now, and it's a foundation that gathers 5,000 NGOs all between Europe and the south border of the Mediterranean from Morocco to Turkey included. And we work with youngsters, mainly. And what they tell us in all our works and inquiries is that those, not only a huge majority, but there is a unanimous will to share the values of humanity, which are not, of course, I will not say that there is a common, that we have the same way in looking at democracy, but they want the state of law and they want those values of humanity to be respected and we have measured that since we have existed the last 10 years. And if we need to address the youngsters of all countries to say to our youngsters who come from the south Mediterranean and from Africa and from Turkey, you have a specific, you have something that we do not have because you have some kind of culture in your family history and there's a lot you can bring to humanity and on the reverse. And one of the main challenges since we are bound to strengthen the control of our borders for security reasons, we are bound to do that and we must do more about that. It's underway, of course, still a long way, but one of the main challenges is that at the same time we must find legal ways and legal path for mobility because if Europe becomes a kind of fortress with walls everywhere inside and towards our neighbours in the south and there is, of course, then it's not Europe anymore. Part of the problem of being an attractive soft power is people want to come. The power of attraction is very strong and so there's this kind of schizophrenia which you've just described, which is both Europe wants to be open to the world but it also wants to screen the world. That's the nicest way of putting it and only let in the bits of the world that Europe wants to let in and that's going to be a very fascinating thing to watch because there are a lot of challenges and too many challenges at once tire people. They tire them out. So Norbert, Angela Merkel has just said she's going to run again for the fourth term. People describe her to me as tired already as being more isolated than she's been. She's obviously been wounded by her decision which you in your rather elegant way criticised parts of, which was to have this welcoming culture without a lot of controls to start. Germany's clearly done a pretty good job since then of re-establishing a sense of Ordnum but does she have the domestic political space going into an election and the energy do you think to take this leadership role particularly on issues of Islam and terrorism? If she could promise to come back to your earlier question if she could promise the German electorate to be a big Switzerland then the CDU would gain an absolute majority but unfortunately we have been forced to make the experience that it is a contradiction in itself to be Switzerland and big at the same time. So there is no big Switzerland and Germany does not have the option to transmogrify into Switzerland. So we have made and were forced to open up our eyes because also Germany turned a blind eye to the neighbourhood and we could have seen more but we were forced to open up our eyes to a new reality we are facing and it happened not when the refugees entered Italy then nobody else including Germany identified this refugee problem and crisis as a European crisis and we did not wake up when there were terrorist attacks something else in Europe or in the United States but the last years and the last year starting in 2015 with the refugees entering Germany one million we took and have offered shelter and protection to them at the same time realizing that there are not only those who want to share our way of life who want to share western values but at the same time perhaps coming with them and among them there are people who hate our values who hate our way of life and want to destroy and kill us. This is a new reality we have to face and it goes to the foundations of our societies I am not absolutely sure but I think there is some reason to say that that was what once was the social question in its implication for society and state building and political landscape in Europe in the 19th century will become the global question in the 21st century and we will have debates and fights between those who say no there is an opportunity to be Switzerland there is an opportunity to be an island to cut off, to seek your lot by cutting off this reality we do not have any responsibility for and the others who say we have no option then but to shape globalization we have to face that and for Germany and I would perhaps say yes at least for Germany the decision to face this new reality to take in refugees who are at our borders to improve our border management to go to the region to visit Africa because the new source of immigration of course is not the Middle East but Africa so face this reality as a European reality not as a specific German reality French reality I think this is what really has been fundamentally decided and this is the very nature of the Chancellor to see that and in that she is determined to pursue this course and she is absolutely convinced that it only can be a success if it turns to be a European position in facing a new reality not a German position alone and so she will seek for partners in shaping globalization as far as Europe is affected by globalization and of course as open societies we are affected on the end on all of the big range of globalization challenges and opportunities trade, migration, climate change terrorism we have to face it all and to give comprehensive unified answers and I think she will play a significant she will remain to play a significant co-leading role in tackling these issues I think everyone understands that we don't know what an American foreign policy is going to be because the President-elect doesn't know what it's going to be he doesn't have a foreign policy because he has never had a foreign policy doesn't really know how to make one and one thing though is persistent through his career which is a sense that America's allies are not paying their fair share this is consistent and I suspect something he believes deeply not just in Europe but in Asia also and you look at the wealth of the European Union 500 million until Britain leaves people and one wonders if he has a case Germany I think I may be wrong spends about 1.2%, 1.3% of GDP on defense 1.2 which is quite low in terms of NATO's ambitions and this is Germany prepared actually in response partly to Trump but also in response to NATO's urging to spend more and can it spend more on equipment that could be collectively used like air transport planes refueling or is this too politically difficult do you think right now? I'm biased because I consider this to be a fair point that Germany and others has to contribute more to collective security we have been a beneficiary particularly of American protection all over the decades of the Cold War now we have a different geopolitical situation and then it is fair that Germany as a economically successful nation bears its fair share and our fair share not to mention our political obligation out of NATO for more than 14 years now 2002 we promised to deliver on the two point GDP contribution to defense we have to raise to rise our level of responsibility we have and this is one element the second element is I think we will only do it in an effective way if we start to deliver on the second promise and this is to bring together European capacities so it does not make any sense that every European nation state starts to enhance contributions to defense but doing it in a very economically ineffective way by multiplying our capacities and not pooling capacities so we have also to start with that both challenges we have to start the Chancellor has started and this is a change in her language and rhetoric has started to identify herself with the obligation to rise our level of engagement including the financial contribution to defense it is not really reflected in our budget planning we will have an increase in numbers but we are also expecting an increase in our GDP so that the increase in numbers does not lead to an increase in the percentage share of defense spending so we will give some additional billions but it will remain 1.2% of GDP so this is not an honest deliverance on what we have promised on both sides I think it's a test case it's a test case if we as Europeans really get serious on security and on defense that we prove to be ready to pour money into that which is the fundamental essence of state and this is providing security for our citizens and the Chancellor has clearly been outspoken now for some time on that and I think she does not want to backtrack but she is preparing that it's now getting serious on that as you know France is as far as the defense budget is concerned is nearing the 2% not quite the French President and the French Prime Minister have committed themselves to get to the 2% next year in 2018 we've been increasing our budget for obvious reasons because we have to face more and more threats of course and so we'll see what happens after the French election but as far as we are concerned we are committed to that and we have taken decisions now it's not and the Americans are right that we have not taken our parts of the burden and they have been saying that for years and years whatever the President was speaking the second thing is of course what Nobel said about pulling the capacities is absolutely essential because there is a lot of waste but there are two other main challenges for Europe first is to develop a strategic autonomy on the future technologies and we have to invest on that and there is a very precise decision to take is whether we allow the European institution to invest on those future technologies what we call dual technologies both civil and military or not this is for the European Parliament to vote immediately and for the next financial plurianual budget and the second challenge is the one of strategic autonomy of our defence industry because if we don't have a European defence industry we won't have a European defence we will always be dependent on other states and especially the United States and therefore this is something we can't take our part of the burden having so much finance going to our defence and say well we are dependent on what is decided elsewhere and especially in the United States because we might very well be there the choices especially of Mr Trump one thing that threads there is a lot of conversations now is the new Russia I think we can overestimate the power of Russia we can overestimate the long term strategy of Vladimir Putin we might even overestimate the term in office of Vladimir Putin the country has issues of oligarchy and corruption and the economy is sinking one can't hide these things forever but I'm very struck Elizabeth there was the surprise perhaps not due of the fiat victory in the first round of the centre-right primaries and one doesn't want to assume because lots can happen between now and then but it feels as if a centre-right candidate is going to get into the second round it's probably going to be fiat and people talk about fiat and Putin having some kind of sympathy on values on conservative values and in Germany of course we had a long discussion of Putin-Wersteher and the strains among the German industrial sector but also in politics of how to approach this newly aggressive Russia I remember in the Cold War days talking to a consul general of the American government in East Berlin at the East German Embassy Hauptstadt der DDR and he said you know the problem is Germans keep telling me we understand the Russians and you Americans don't and I always said to them yes you understand them so well that's why they're on the goddamn Elba now those days are past but maybe they're coming back again at least in terms of this anxiety people have in the face of a Russia that is not happy with what you considered a permanent post Cold War order at which clearly is not so I wanted to ask you both you know the future of Europe to some degree is about how it relates at least to Russia some people want a new relationship some people want to reset some people say oh he can have Crimea it doesn't matter some people say we need their energy anyway some people say the Americans are too far away to understand you know there's lots of views but it actually matters again so this is what I wanted to ask both of you in whatever order you feel like speaking yes absolutely I I consider Russia to be the number one issue for European foreign policy it's absolutely number one and what we see is to our surprise that the concept of Europe Poland free is challenged and violated by President Putin and I think we have to be clear particularly on that dimension of the challenge coming from Putin I don't consider him to pursue a policy out of strategy or strength right the opposite it's in my view a policy out of weakness and he has now tapped into a new source of strength which is popularity and this popularity of his new aggressive policy outside he has managed to turn the public mood stemming from the collapse of the Soviet Union for which Gorbachev is blamed in Russia and then even being topped by Yeltsin these figures and since time had emerged a public mood of decline and humiliation and Putin has managed to turn this mood into the re-emergence of a new collective feeling of Russian greatness we are back again we are there and we force the Americans to acknowledge that we are back on the global stage and we give evidence that there is no single international crisis which can be solved without Russian contribution I think this is the core reason for his military intervention in Syria to create this crisis in order to prove even this crisis in that region can't be resolved by American strength alone you are dependent on Russian contribution so this concept if we accept fundamentally to that then we will this would entail an agreement that within Europe there is a kind of Russian influence zone and the countries within this influence zone do not have the sovereign right to decide upon the cause of their country if Ukraine decides normatively to join the west not to join the EU not to join NATO of course but to decide in favor of democracy, rule of law and market driven economy and Russia sees that this would encroach into Russia and by that challenge Putin's power and then he decides not to allow this way and if we accept that Russia has the final say about the political cause of the countries within the influence zone then we would have a new divide of the continent in the 21st century and this would of course spread across Europe into other regions it would be an example of the power of right the rule of law but the power of might will be the ruling principle in the 21st century and so this is a very very fundamental question about European and international order and the main spoiling factor in this in our time and for some years ahead is Russia under the reign of Vladimir Putin he does not have a sustainable strategy for that there is only one area where Russia is internationally competitive this is the military of course not the attractiveness not the economy it's rather the opposite because I think at least because Putin has come to the conclusion that Russia is compatible with his aim to stay in power absolutely the opposite to the Chinese way of combining modernization and stay in power he has chosen another way and we have to see this fundamental dimension and Western and European but also Western unity in our position to fundamentally not accept that is our strongest and most important asset thank you with your permission I will shift to French you have these d'abord je crois en effet l'immense popularité de Monsieur Poutine vient du fait qu'il a eu comme objectif de réinsérer de redonner la fierté de surmonter l'humiliation terrible complètement sous-estimée par les Européens et les Américains l'humiliation terrible qui a été l'effondrement et nous avons une grosse responsabilité là-dedans nos Européens parce que quand l'Ukraine a fait sa révolution quand il y a eu la guerre en Géorgie il y a eu un sommet de l'OTAN en 2008 dans lequel, en avril 2008 dans lesquels nous avons dit oui, l'Ukraine et la Géorgie ancienne République de l'Union soviétique à ne pas confondre évidemment avec les États d'Europe centrale ou avec les pays des Balkans où la Russie veut encore Jeterne-Albanie il y a quelques jours veut encore avoir une influence ça n'a rien à voir donc quand on a dit l'Ukraine et la Géorgie ont vocation et nous les acceptons dans l'Alliance Atlantique ce qui est très différent de les accepter dans l'Union Européenne à ce moment-là nous avons offert un prétexte en or à Monsieur Poutine de justement développer une attitude agressive évidemment on peut dire oui mais l'Ukraine et la Géorgie ont le droit de vouloir adhérer à l'Alliance Atlantique certainement mais les membres de l'Alliance ont le droit et même le devoir de dire attention nous sommes quand même sur un sujet géopolitique absolument crucial maintenant on ne dit plus ça alors qu'est-ce que nous devons faire vis-à-vis de la Russie d'abord Monsieur Poutine est là peut-être pour des années encore et la Russie est notre grand voisin donc nous devons absolument avoir un dialogue intense et approfondi ce qui me semble-t-il est le cas par exemple ce que nous avons fait dans ce qu'on appelle le format Normandie de la Chancelière avec Monsieur Poutine et Monsieur Poroshenko sur l'Ukraine ça reste aujourd'hui les accords de Minsk le seul espoir pour la paix en Ukraine évidemment c'est très fragile évidemment c'est pas respecté mais malgré tout ça existe et ni Monsieur Poroshenko ni Monsieur Poutine ne conteste formellement cette idée que c'est le seul espoir pour la paix il faut être à la fois il faut dialoguer mais il faut être extrêmement ferme sur l'Ukraine il peut pas être question par exemple, puisque vous aviez ocué Monsieur Fillon moi je ne veux pas parler pour lui je le connais assez bien parce qu'il est membre de la commission des affaires étrangères que je préside à Paris mais je connais ces idées mais il faut bien entendu parler à la Russie mais en même temps sur l'Ukraine ne pas imaginer qu'il n'y a pas d'élection qui ont été établies après l'invasion de la crimée si nous on ça nous avons un problème majeur mondial c'est-à-dire qu'on ouvre la porte l'autorisation à n'importe quel état de modifier ses frontières au détriment naturellement de n'importe lequel de ses voisins et j'ajoute que c'est aussi un défi le Moyen-Orient parce que vous voyez bien les tentations ici ou là de diviser la Syrie donc nous avons un problème de principe là qui est absolument fondamental ce qui veut pas dire qu'on n'est pas pour objectif de lever les autres sanctions celles qui ont été établies après les problèmes graves dans le Dombas et nous avons raison de dire à Monsieur Poutine il y aura un espace pour lever ces sanctions ayant dit ça je pense que nous avons une responsabilité importante nous Européens d'avoir enfin une politique vis-à-vis de la Russie nous n'avons pas ça touche évidemment à l'énergie à l'économie et naturellement ça se battira pas du jour au lendemain mais tout reste à faire chose de le dire c'est que Monsieur Poutine s'est réinséré dans le jeu international partage l'analyse de Norbert avec son intervention en Syrie là nous avons il faut compter avec ce partenaire naturellement mais je veux dire aussi que Monsieur Poutine qui a un sens aigu des rapports de force et bien il s'est aussi engouffré en Syrie quand il a compris que Monsieur Obama ne voulait pas intervenir contre l'utilisation d'armes chimiques évidemment à l'évidence utilisée par le régime contre son propre peuple à partir de ce moment-là il y a un vide qui s'est créé et donc ça c'est une question pour les Etats-Unis le sentiment de vouloir être plus interventionniste au contraire alors voilà je ne pense pas que les Européens puissent avoir la capacité de faire tout seul donc c'est un problème est-ce que nous laissons faire avec le risque immense immense de voir dans cette partie du proche et du moyen orient des Etats qui malgré tout maintenait une forme d'unité qui malgré tout protégait des minorités complètement implosées et je pense que si Monsieur Poutine a de ses ressorts fondamentaux pour intervenir c'est qu'il se sent très menacé en Russie par le terrorisme islamiste radical et donc nous avons là aussi incorporé mais il n'y a pas d'autre voie qu'un dialogue extrêmement ferme avec lui mais un dialogue quand même de la réponse I think it's going to always be difficult to balance satisfying Russia's need to have its dignity restored without giving away too much influence and territory and that's going to be the dilemma to take it seriously but not take it so seriously that you surrender that's the problem always the last topic before we go to some questions the euro crisis isn't over if you look at Portugal their credit rating is really iffy there's people talking about a new bailout of Portugal growth is weak in the Arizona we finished it's not a very good time in Germany to start talking again about euro bonds and things like that and in France obviously there's a big challenge from the from Nassinale which is very anti-European partly on the basis of the money of days about the money now about migrants are you worried that there could be a new eurozone crisis in the middle of all this it worries me I'm just curious very briefly if it concerns you and if you expect one or will it be suppressed as usual obviously another crisis is always possible of course especially because as you mentioned we have a slow world growth we've been asking China for a long time to slow down this growth now that we've done it it's more likely to slow down but it's true it's true everywhere especially the European Union has a growth so we have an internal major issue which is to reinforce the monetary union it's not completely over since we haven't finished the banking union and although we're well advanced on this path there's still a lot to do on the banking union we still don't have any guarantees and we know very well that in a few years we've been asking for very good principles we started to mutualise a certain amount of risk but not quite but above all we've built a real economic union and now it's true that we say each of us has to learn his part of responsibility for France, obviously we have to continue because normally we should be in the 3% of deficits next year maybe a little bit above but we've still made a considerable decrease we're not establishing the social balance we've managed to stabilize the debt not yet to reduce it but already to stabilize it compared to the trends of the last few years so that we have structural reforms for example the reform of the labor market with the very controversial El Comry law but on which the government is good so that's an achievement for the future, I hope that it won't be put back if the majority changes I hear concerns including from someone like Mr Juppé who didn't give me the habit so that's it we'll have to see because if again we take the cycle where the French right lets the deficit and then it's the left that's decreased you can look at it for 20 years so there's still a subject for the future electoral campaign but outside of that we need more dynamism for growth but it's still the German that it also looks at when we have an excess of money in the European Union of 350 billion euros and an excess of external balance that holds the commercial balance of the German so much better, bravo it's great we're in an economy in a basic economic union so we can't neglect that so it's not about giving money like that so all the European states respect the discipline but we also need more investment in Germany more investment in Europe for in areas of general interest otherwise we'll stay in extremely vulnerable and I must also say that we'll be vulnerable financially and socially because it's one of the great the European adversaries today what is this Europe that gives us an excess of austerity so we have to show that in this cooperation with a good balance between the responsibility of one and the solidarity of the others that will advance and that remains to be done and we have on that with Norbert discussions very quick so once the euro crisis has remained to be fundamentally unresolved we have not achieved a sufficient degree of and we are not even going in that direction so the Eurozone has not achieved a sufficient degree of crisis resilience the next crisis will come but we don't know when if it is in the foreseeable future the coincidence of crisis and the lack of crisis resilience will cause a not only cause a Euro crisis but a European crisis and at the centre of this of course will be Germany to take a tough decision and you ask for Italy or for imminent crisis of the possibilities we have the referendum at 4th of December in Italy polls hint to expect a no and this will inject insecurity political insecurity ensuring economic insecurity it will perhaps reveal the partly bad shape of some Italian banks and this will be the third disruptive element in the year 2016 and I don't know anything about the future but I think the present is so clear to analyse that you have to be worried about the outcome of a no and the intuing consequences both politically and economically thank you for that we do have not much time which is my fault but I'd love to take a few questions from the audience like one good round of questions and then we'll come back to the panel Madame Nadon is this working I'll in French or English in French you didn't talk during your exposition of the agreement which was in negotiations between the United States and Europe the TTIP did this treaty die after the request of France for negotiations after the election of Mr Trump and what does this mean on the concept of free trade does Europe turn the back on this concept or can we wait for it thank you thank you I'd like to ask a question and make an approach between two phenomena which seems to me totally separate but that we could approach the debate since yesterday that there is a certain fragmentation of societies on the last elections but above all of the political thought it is no longer produced by the partisan space and we ask ourselves if the partisan spaces are always able to frame the opinions and so it's clear on the other hand and apparently it has absolutely no relation but I still ask the question in front of the neighboring space there is a fragmentation of societies due to open crises I'm talking about Libya, I'm talking about Sudan, I'm talking about all these spaces there and so the first question is whether these two fragmentation should not raise a certain number of questions and this could mean that our political thought at my European friends develops certain incapacities to enhance the integrity of the space the second aspect yes it's the same question is that by chance the development policies that support the minority and not the reduction of the big social fractures when we know that all the open crises in Libya these are the territorial fractures in Benghazi, in Iraq is that Europe that only gives 2% to its strategic depth and the African investment when the United States gives 25% and that Japan gives 26.7% there is not a question of funds I will continue French thank you very much congratulations to you we are at the time of the truth of Europe, a long time to show Europe has been aimed at its structure of principles of reality whether it be economic tools all the financial economic crisis the elements of freedom of movement with refugees immigration finally trade agreements with this negotiation with Canada Brexit I know that as an old diplomat I always like historical references and next year we will have the 60th anniversary of the Treaty of Rome the European countries serious are preparing a response are the two foreign affairs French and German are you preparing a document to see which Europe where we are going that is my question because we would like to participate yes thank you you mentioned that Trump's foreign policy is uncertain and as you can see Trump wants to improve the relations with Russia so how do you see a strong American-Russian relationship as an effect on America's relationship with the European Union in the future thank you that is a very good question I will go away in the back and then go back to the panel for brief responses thank you I have a question concerning the German defence figures 2% should be the level that is needed for European defence concerning Germany but behind the 2% there is some reality Germany already spends about $34 billion a year more than France with 2% it would go up to $60 billion a year so the consequence Germany would dominate militarily in the European Union and the German export rate would also be much higher than it is already now so would Europe could support it this kind of situation is this a good reality that is thank you just to go back and answer what you like and Elizabeth do you want to begin the question on free trade in France in France we are for free trade for example we have approved the agreement with Canada although in France we think it is a good agreement a balanced agreement in particular because Canada accepts an instance of international justice public and not private arbitration not the only subject but it is an important subject however it seems to us that what I can see is the majority on the left and on the right however we consider that the way we have been discussed with the United States on the transatlantic treaty goes in the wrong direction because the European Union negotiated for us red lines with defensive interests for example not on our health standards on the prohibition of washing chicken on our requirements in terms of health security but also on offensive interests which are obviously to have a wider access to the public market in the United States both at the federal level and at the local level as nothing moved from our point of view on these elements we considered in these conditions in the void but it is not at all on the contrary a restriction of principle when the agreements are good we approve them on the issue of very important space are the parties passed in a certain measure and that is why it is very important in our public actions us politicians party members much more to associate civil society and to be in touch with civil society I still have nothing to do with society on the side I talked to you about the analysis foundation for the dialogue of cultures earlier it is absolutely essential because there are ideas in civil society because there are expressions because it is important that the people feel independent decisions taken so I share your remark on the need to review our policy of development and the partnership that we have in Europe for example with Africa or with North Africa and you have just mentioned the importance of investments that the United States make in their south and that Japan or China more and more in the south to see that this creates North-South solidarity and we need Europeans to go in this way but in a completely different spirit of what was the colonialism that is to say that we must accept a real partnership equal to equal that is to say to transfer added value transfer investments it is better to create jobs on site not to continue to demand in the south to simply consume what we produce this is what Germany has done with the Central and Eastern European countries and it is very very good so I am just there Miguel Moratinos the C the risk that we fight together in the same 5 times for this idea of a vertical European Mediterranean I think it is very complementary of this Miguel, do our two commissions of foreign as well as foreign documents excellent question we often express ourselves with Norbert but I think we could try to gather our positions in something written it would be very good with brief remarks to the question with regard to TTIP my personal view is that international trade and the trade agreement between Europe and the United States is a major part of our effort to forge and develop rules based systems it is not only about economy it is about geopolitics who sets the rules and standards for a global order and for that TTIP would be absolutely important but I have to admit of course that TTIP is a kind of this has become a kind of this symbol of all the anti-movements it is anti-Americanism and we have not only the traditional left wing but also right wing anti-Americanism it is anti-globalization it is anti-capitalism so it really attracts all the anti-movements in the west and so we are on the defensive but I think we have to fight for it because it is to develop rules for a world which is otherwise out rules and chaotic or China is emerging as the rule setter and this is not our interest the fragmentation of societies in Europe and the fragmentation and disintegration of countries in the Middle East or in Northern Africa like Libya Iraq, Syria and so on at first glance there seems to be no no no common there seems to be nothing in common with these phenomena of disintegration and fragmentation I would only identify one perhaps important linking element and this is the emergence of identity policy everywhere in the Middle East and in Europe we have identity policy as a new tool perhaps also of power policy and so we have to be very aware of this element of the desire and the yearning for identity in a globalized world is very very important the Rome Treaty and the anniversary next year I think we should make use of this anniversary not only by not only celebrating the past but having the view on what Europe has to do in our time to serve the interests of its peoples and of its citizens and this is what European governments and politicians now really have to do to in a way relaunch the European project for the decades before and take a measure on our predecessors that's probably a good place just because we've sort of run over time if it's about identity politics building a European identity would be a great thing I apologize for not managing my time very well but I was enjoying myself to me a wonderful conversation I thank the panelists and hope you will all do the same oops a minute