 Well, we're going to start the next panel, which is focusing on recent developments in the South China Sea. We have a great lineup of panelists from the region who are going to talk about the developments over the past 12 months or so in the region. Just like to remind people that the following us online and those that want to Twitter, at Southeast Asia, DC, and at CSIS using hash mark CSIS live. So I'm going to briefly introduce our panelists. There's a longer bio that has been handed out. Then I'll briefly introduce them, and then they'll each make about 10 minutes of comments, and then we'll switch to Q&A, the same format we've followed this morning. Our first panelist is Dr. Hu Xikun, who is president of the National Institute, or the South China Sea Studies, and on Dr. Wu's right is Dr. Renato De Castro, who's a professor at De La Salle University in the Philippines, and on his left is Dr. Ian Hui Song, who is a research fellow in the Institute of European and American Studies, and on his left is Dr. Truong Tui, who is the director of the South China Sea Studies program in the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam. So Dr. Wu, please. Thank you, Maury. Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen, colleagues. Someone said that the panel after lunch would be a little bit sleepy, so I'm here but now a little bit sleepy. It's my pleasure to sit in this panel of recent development of the South China Sea Dispute, which have caused the general international apprehension, the friction and uncertainty of the year of 2012 and 2013 will continue to the coming years with increasing disharmony and excretion. Taking this opportunity, I would like to share with you my observation on the South China Sea Dispute, which I will illustrate from six basic concerns. One, sovereignty concerns. The climate states of the South China Sea region are taking various measures to consolidate their territorial and maritime claims. The disputes are now over actual jurisdiction rather than over the previous nominal claims. For example, unilateral drilling for resources in the disputed area by some of the claimants has become a common practice in the South China Sea. This is contrary to the practice of joint development in maritime zones, pending for delimitation. This coupled with the involvement of international oil companies has made the South China Sea Dispute more complicated and internationalized. Oil and gas exploitation in the disputed area will increase the risk of unchecked incidents or even serious conflict. Two, balanced concerns. At the moment, although the overall situation in the South China Sea remains stable and manageable, there do exist a number of destabilizing elements. It has allowed our concern to see that as the United States has begun its strategic pivot to Asia or strategy of rebalance and enhanced its presence in the Asia Pacific, some countries have taken the opportunity to pressure China by aligning themselves with non-claimant states. All these have added to the complexity and uncertainty of the South China Sea issue. These are rather overt and clumsy efforts by these states to internationalize the issue at hand. Three, legal concerns. Many climate states have recently drafted domestic legislation to bring it to line with accepted international law. In particular, they are looking to make their legislation acceptable within the scope of UNCROSS. These are purely physical attempts at legality designed in the pursuit of a narrow national self-interest. This new trend brings a new dimension to the existing disputes. Four, administrative concerns. It is realized by climate states that enhanced presence in the alias and disputes will strengthen future petitions. Bearing this in mind, all climate states have taken various dubious measures to consolidate their presence in the Nansha or Spratly Islands. Therefore, to reinforce their claims, every kind of legalistic rules has been employed. These include the building of civilian facilities such as schools, hospitals, and sending monks, government officials to the occupied features. Five, territorial concerns. The focus of the South China Sea dispute has moved away from pure interest in the sovereignty of futures towards the legal implications as presented by international laws. In other words, what deserves further consideration is that to what extent that a country might expand their maritime jurisdiction from their occupied features. Six, military concerns. It is worrying to say the least that we observe the recent arms buildup within the region. Redo of the countries bordering the South China Sea are all mounting efforts to purchase advanced weapons. This has acted as a catalyst to the practice of joint military exercises and military control exercises. The increased military activity will not in mind lead to instance arguments, reclinations, and inevitably worse. This constitutes a serious security threat to the South China Sea region. A stable and peaceful South China Sea is in the interest of all climate states and indeed of a wide international community. China plays an important dynamic and constructive role in achieving this much-desired goal. Therefore, I would like to share with you my own observation on China's policy. I will do this by explaining six key objectives of China's policies in this region. First, the peace objective. China will also follow the load of peaceful development and never-seek confrontation. China has indisputable sovereignty over the four island groups in the South China Sea and their adjacent waters, which is based first and foremost upon history. First discovery, first mapping, first naming, and first occupation. The successive administrations have kept this historic claim in accordance with the international law. Within the historical U-shaped line, or 9-dash line in west, China claims sovereignty over all land features and enjoys historic rights such as fishing, among others. China has never raised sovereignty demands over the entire South China Sea and will never make demands beyond its historical rights. The international confusion disseminated by some countries concerning China's demands in the South China Sea creates contradictions and distortions of these historical facts, which only so purposes counter those of a peaceful settlement of the issues. Second, the legal objective. I would like to emphasize China has always adopted a coherent policy on the South China Sea. China has proposed that the climate states should resolve their problems through negotiations on the basis of fully respecting history of the South China Sea in accordance with international law. Third, the security objective. As one of the countries benefiting significantly from free and safeification throughout the South China Sea, China has played and will continue to play a constructive role in maintaining peace and stability in the region. My fourth point is the diplomatic objective. China has proposed a policy of putting aside disputes and going for joint development while the climate states may maintain their own interpretations on the provisions of convention and they should discuss and reach consensus on the temporary arrangements such as joint development. Fifth, being constructive. China is playing a constructive role in maintaining peace and stability in the South China Sea in 2002. China and ASEAN countries should have consensus on the DOC which aims to enhance mutual political trust and promote cooperation through the joint efforts of China and the whole ASEAN partners. And drafting the upcoming Kudap contact, the COC is one part of this engagement. It would start sometime this year. China with ASEAN counterparts from the CHAC 1.5. Six, being constructive. China will benefit all practical cooperation in the South China Sea to achieve peace and stability in this region. This practical cooperation is cardinal. China's proposal to establish a three billion IMB fund for maritime security cooperation has been warmly welcomed by both climate states and the unclimactic states. It will serve to promote mutual dialogue between China and ASEAN partners. Time is over? Okay. Okay, I will end my presentation. I will address the concerns during the Q&A session. Thank you. Thank you, Dr. DeCastro. Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. I would like first of all to express my utmost appreciation for being given the opportunity to express my view regarding this very important issue in the South China Sea and my focus will be on what happened on Scarborough Shoal and, of course, the aftermath effects. My presentation would cover basically the general overview. I will not discuss the two-month standoff, but basically what were the key features that became very apparent during this two-month standoff. Then try to assess why it happened and, of course, looking at what are called the Ripples Effect and, of course, just going to my conclusion. Now, let me just focus on the general overview if you talk about why did you have the standoff and the simple reason is fact that you have, of course, China's approach as the biggest power in the region and, of course, having the most extensive maritime claim, nobody can deny that China has responsibility whether the issue would be resolved peacefully or will lead to dispute and basic contention there is China's approach is classic real politic. Other would say it's assertiveness or reactive assertiveness. It's classic real politic and you get it basically from the former Chinese foreign minister after the July, during the Hanoi, ASEAN regional forum, China is a big power, you are just small power and that's the reality you'll have to accept. And, of course, this real politic approach is also expressed by, of course, cynical view regarding international law and the fact that other countries, literal states, simply have no legitimate claim because China's claim is indisputable. Basically ignoring that literal coastal states might have a certain degree of legitimacy regarding their claim and, of course, historically, if you look back into Europe, a real politic approach usually would generate escalation and that's what's basically happening right now. So, let me just focus on the key points that happen during the two-month standoff. Number one, of course, you have the use of naval brinkmanship using civilian vessels. You have a situation where you have one Philippine Coast Guard vessel being confronted by four Chinese maritime surveillance vessel and, of course, in the backdrop you have the ships from the People's Liberation Army's Navy, then, of course, coercive diplomacy in terms of a number of points, like you have, of course, that the dispute has been triggered by the Philippines, that every responsibility lies on the Philippines. There's a saying, takes two to tangle. You know, you cannot just have a conflict just because of one party involved and something that really irritated us during the standoff was the fact that the Philippines is simply an extension of U.S. foreign policy, that we are standing off against China because the Philippines is simply a lapdog or a running dog, that we simply don't have any issue at stake, of course, our exclusive economic zone and what we're basically doing is because you have the strings that runs all the way from the Pacific cross-continental USA into Washington D.C. So that's really, you know, that we don't have an issue with China, then, of course, use of economic linkages like the Philippine Bananas and, of course, applying pressure, tourism, so forth and so on, which taught the current administration a lesson. It doesn't pay to be economically interdependent on China because it will be used against you. I think this also applies to other major economic partners of China and I think we could afford to irritate China every now and then because among the ASEAN countries, we are the least economically interdependent to China and we will make sure that it remains that way. Philippine economic dynamism is triggered by remittances from overseas workers and from business processing organization coming from the United States. Then, of course, the threat of force, which became very vocal. You have a lot of Chinese newspaper, basically, you have a lot of Chinese generals saying it's time that we have to teach the Philippines a lesson, you know, the lesson that they will never forget. Plus, of course, what is very interesting is what I would call a formulation of historical need to justify current claim with regards to the Scarborough Shoal. You don't have any Chinese for a presence there when it was called Bahudimansin Lok by the Spaniards. You don't have any Chinese presence there when it was being used as a target practice by the 13th Air Force and by the United States Navy. It only became a Chinese territory at the onset of dispute, waving back as far as the Yuan dynasty. Now, what's basically the factors that account for dispute? Of course, the key factor there is China's assertiveness and real politic approach. And another factor, of course, has happened in Philippine domestic politics, which we could discuss later, that you have a change in administration from the Arroyo administration to, of course, the Kino administration, which of course account for a lot of dynamics, for one thing or the other, during the time of the Arroyo administration, there was a perception that China's basically had that foothold in the Philippines, that sooner or later the Philippines would be win away from the United States. Of course, everything changed when you have a change in nutrition. We could discuss later on joint maritime seismic undertaking, what accounts for this. And of course, we cannot deny it, U.S. strategic pivot and, of course, our alliance with the United States provided Philippines a degree of confidence to stand up against China. Now, let me just proceed to the aftermath of the Scarborough Shoal standoff. Number one, it basically provided China, I would use a term, a template in pursuing it's I'd call real politic approach as you see what's happening in the Senkaku, that the same formula could be applied to Japan. And of course, you have the continuing application of coercive diplomacy to justify the facto occupation of the Scarborough Shoal. In November 2012, you have a ranking official, or used to be the ambassador in Manila Fuyi, who went to Manila and tried to basically negotiate the issue with a number of conditions. We could not consult other ASEAN countries. We could not consult the United States. We could not even come out with a media release regarding the negotiation in a way that really pushed the Philippines. If somebody will ask, you know, what pushed the Philippines to basically go to the United Nations, it's China's pressure, China's real politic approach. It's more of an act of desperation. And then, of course, and of course, I will not discuss about the Philippine filing of a claim in the arbitrage tribunal. I'll just go to my conclusion. In a way, what's happening right now is you have dramatic escalation. The Scarborough Shoal is not part of the Spratlys. It's closer to Luzon, but of course it has become a potential powder keg in the South China Sea. And of course, right now it's emboldened China to apply the same template in the AYUNING Shoal. And you know, we can discuss it further. So what's happening is you have increased intention and let me just, you know, to end my short discussion, let me just quote Mao Zedong. Hopefully, a single spark that can start a free refire would not happen in the South China Sea in the near future. Thank you very much for your attention. Thank you, Dr. DeCastro. Dr. Song. Well, thank you, Mr. Hebert, distinguished participants, ladies and gentlemen, good afternoon. I would like to begin by thanking CSIS for inviting me to attend this very important and timely South China Sea conference. And this is my first time to this very important thin tank CSIS. Thank you very much for that invitation. I believe all of you can agree with me that Taiwan is one of the climates and stakeholders in the South China Sea. Accordingly, Taiwan has a binding interest and a legitimate right to participate in the regional security dialogue mechanism that deal with the South China Sea issues. Since May 2008 until today, Taiwan's South China Sea policy has been implemented in accordance with the four basic principles, namely safeguarding sovereignty, putting aside disputes, insisting on peace and reciprocity, and promoting joint development. The Mao administration is taking a smart power approach, combining Taiwan's soft, excuse me, soft power and hard power in dealing with the South China Sea disputes. Accordingly, a decision was made to organize several visits by college students and scholars to board the Arles and Navy's warship to the Spratly Islands in July, August 2011 and 2012. This year, another visit to Taiping Island, that's Ituaba, of Taiping Islands in the Spratly, was just made last month. And on its way back, the warship was followed by a military aircraft P3C from the Taiwan spawners in the region, and I believe that's the United States. But in April and May 2012, respectively, several Taiwanese lawmakers visited Taiping Island and the Prattus Island. One of the proposals these lawmakers made of the visit is to ask President Mao to visit Taiping Island. So that's the other proposal, I don't have time to elaborate, but this is one of the proposals. Quite often, Taiwan's sovereignty and maritime claims in the South China Sea are considered identical to those claimed by China. As a result, Taiwan is not considered a major player in the South China Sea disputes. Actually, however, differences can be found in Taiwan's and China's policy and behaviors in the South China Sea. It's clear that China is taking a more assertive approach in support of sovereignty and maritime claims, which is clearly different from a rather passive, soft-power-oriented approach adopted by Taiwan. Recent development in the South China Sea have created a number of policy challenges and opportunities for the Mao administration in the South China Sea. For example, how to respond effectively to the action taken by other claimants, such as Vietnam the Philippines. How to counter increasing military spending and arms procurement of the claimants in the South China Sea. How to deal with the increasing U.S. concerns and involvement in the South China Sea's issues. In particular, the continuing implementation and possible adjustment of the American strategy of rebalancing toward Asia. So how to cope with the increasing call for cross-strait cooperation in the South China Sea. How to handle increasing possibility for the adoption of the code of conduct in the South China Sea. And to avoid Taiwan's being further excluded from the negotiation process. So last one, how to respond to the increasing international call to clarify the meaning and legal status of Taiwan's U.S. ship line. So time does not allow me to address these issues. In my view, support for Taiwan's participation in the regional security dialogue mechanism is increasing. Why so? Because first, the cross-strait relations have improved a lot over the past four to five years, which make it more likely for China to consider adopting some kinds of flexible arrangement that paid away for Taiwan to play the more important role in the process of managing potential conflict in the South China Sea. The MAH Administration is taking the position that current cross-strait engagement should be centered on trade and economic exchanges. And there will be no talks on cross-strait cooperation in the South China Sea. However, there have been seems increasing call both in Taiwan and China, that for Taiwan's participation in cross-strait cooperation in dealing with the South China Sea issue, that's one of the challenges. Four days ago in Singapore, U.S. Defense Secretary Hegel stated that the United States strongly supports the efforts made by the PRC in Taiwan in recent years to improve cross-strait relations. If that's the case, and if cooperation in the South China Sea is considered helpful to improve cross-strait relations, Beijing government needs to consider it seriously to find a way for Taiwan to participate in the negotiation process and in the regional security mechanism that discusses the South China Sea issue. On the other hand for Taiwan, this need to include the South China Sea issue in a talk between Taiwan's Strict Exchange Foundation and Mainland China's Association for the Relations Across the Taiwan Strait. Another reason for the increasing support for the United for Taiwan is the increasing support from U.S. Congress. There has been seen a number of congressional support in the United States. For example, the build Taiwan Policy Act of 2013 which was passed on April 25th this year by the House subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific. This bill, if becomes law of the United States, would authorize the sale of F-16CD aircraft, allow high-ranking Taiwanese officials to visit Washington, authorize the transfer of the commission, the missile free gaze, and to Taiwan and support Taiwan's membership of international organization. In addition, a number of bills proposed in the U.S. Congress leaves Taiwan is one of these climates in the South China Sea territorial disputes and suggests that there's a need for ASEAN to include Taiwan in a diplomatic process. Time is running out. I'm going to give you some kind of a policy recommendation from my side as academic to President Ma. There are a number. The first one I think President Ma should pay a visit to Taiping Dao, into ASEAN, and when he goes there he can say a lot of things important, most important ones, peace initiative. If China and ASEAN member country cannot work out on the adoption of recording conduct. The second one is sending a clear message to Beijing government regarding the importance and the need to include Taiwan in the track one diplomacy that deal with the South China Sea issue. And third one making more effort to seek support from the U.S. State Department, from the U.S. Obama administration to support Taiwan's efforts. And number four, to respond seriously to the international call for clarification of the meeting and the U.S. ship line and Taiwan's claim in the South China Sea. And then Taiwan has to play a more active and constructive role in the Indonesian-led South China Sea workshop. Then Taiwan needs to revisit the 1993 South China Sea guideline. I think there's a need to drop a new one, South China Sea guideline in accordance with recent development in the South China Sea. And Taiwan needs to convene more domestic international conference just like the one here, although meeting in Hanoi, meeting in Beijing in Haikou. I think it's very important for Taiwan to convene those conferences to explore the possibility for Taiwan to be included. And then the last one, the second last one, is considerably the need to include the South China Sea in the future cross-strait talk. Finally, maybe it's important to assess the possibility and utility of proposing a peace initiative in the South China Sea, which I heard that Mr. Yong said that who can oppose the peace initiative. If you cannot work on adoption of Kodokanda, maybe Taiwan should take the responsibility and propose a South China Sea peace initiative. That's the end of my presentation. Thank you very much for your attention. Thank you. Thank you, Dr. Sun. Thank you, Mude. And sorry, because of only 10 minutes, that's why I have to do presentation to show some map to shortcut my presentation. We will talk about recent developments and some of my observations on dynamism of recent development, especially between respected players in the South China Sea. And we talked about recent development in the first and second conference here. So my focus is on just last year, since 2012. And we put in the broader picture of South China Sea since 2009 and 2010, something like that. We see some incident and some friction in bilateral relations, for example between China, between China, Philippines, between China and Malaysia. For example, in June last year when Vietnam passed the law of the sea, it's an effort to convert the international law, especially the enclose into domestic legislation, bring the domestic law in conformity with international law. And China uses it as a protest to adopt multi-directional responses. For example, elevating of South South City, invitation for international bidding of nine blocks within Vietnam is easy. Deploying a large number of paramilitary vessels to patrol the South China Sea. And China for the first time putting the military force in the central city under the combat reposition is sending, is clear deterrent message. And we have some incident with fishing boats in Paracels, in northern parts of South China Sea, when China applied unilateral fishing ban. And just recently China Navy opened fires at Vietnamese fishing boats in Paracels. And we have also incident with oil and gas development. Here is a map, you can see the incident happened in the outside the mouth of Tonkin Gulf, with the cable, the third cable cutting incident relating to the Vietnamese seismic undertaking of a ship was cut by China fishing boat in this area. But significant is the area of incident on the western side of equidistant lines. So according to international law it's on Vietnamese side. Turning to China-Philippines relation, we have famous incident with Cabral confrontation when Philippine adopted a not very wise for wise tactics of using Navy ship to arrest fishing boats from China. And China applied a very well coordinated strategy including civilian paramilitary diplomatic, economic, and propaganda elements in this well coordinated strategy. And in the end Philippine initiative arbitration process and China return Philippine is not verbal. Regarding to either Clemens, we see the first time we have an incident between China and Malaysia when China's maritime surveillance ship harassed Malaysian exploration ship within Malaysian continental shelf. And Malaysia responded quietly and bilaterally. But recently when we have other kind of friction between Malaysia and China, when Chinese Navy conducted landing exercise in Zemchol area, just 50 not combined from Malaysian base life, but around 1,000 miles from Chinese highland. And if we put the incident in the picture you can see the picture here, the incident happened in last year. But if we put in the broader picture of incident happens in 2009, you can see this picture. And it's a continuing tendency of diversify of incidents, diversify of of time of incident with law enforcement, with fishing, dispute with oil and gas exploration, with landing exercise with military activity. And it's a continuing tendency and we can expect is the future also. According to some bilateral issue, we have Azure unilateral activities. For example, action taken by China, China adopted a regulation on board and ships by Hainan provinces. China issued new passport with nine dotted lines. China also conducted Navy exercises in Basis China between Philippines and Taiwan is yesterday morning somebody mentioned sending a clear message relating to issue of navigation. China conducted a tour to Paracel and continued with unilateral fishing pen. Vietnam continued with oil and gas development within 200 nautical miles. We heard professor Dr. Gu mentioned that Azure claimants are exploiting oil and gas in disputed area. But from from Vietnamese perspective, what they are doing is on continental shelf and easy according to international law. And in reality, no claimants are now developing oil and gas in spreadly. Nobody. What they are doing is just extracting oil and gas within 200 nautical miles. As China is doing within China is easy around Hainan, undisputed area. And Philippines also conducting some unilateral activity according to recent development. US, we see a comprehensive in US policy towards Asia Pacific and in particular South China Sea with diplomatic and political element with economic element US concentrating on trans-Pacific partnership agreement. It's some kind of some it contains some strategic element to move closely US and Asia countries in the region. Military aspect with rotating base in Australia plan to move military 60 and 40 percent of Navy forces to Asia Pacific. And Hillary Clinton, of course, you know declare US national interest. But the question here is about sustainability of US rebalancing regarding to British constraint over stress in other region also. And other countries, we see other countries have huge interest in issue of peace, stability, freedom of navigation, respect of international law. And they pay more attention to the South China Sea. Japan, Australia, India, Russia, EU, voice concern in recent diplomatic forums such as the ADMM plus EIS, AIF, and ASEA. And they enhance activity with relevant countries promoting maritime security cooperation, especially Japan and India. ASEAN, we see ASEAN could not conclude a joint statement in Cambodia last year, but they can reach a sick point statement. And more importantly, ASEAN could reach a consensus on basic elements of COC. And once now they try to incorporate the basic element into discussion of future COC between ASEAN and China. At the same time, we don't see any significant progress in DOC implementation despite two years in adoption of guidelines for DOC implementation. And the future of COC is the open question. So here's some of my personal observation. China are certainly made ASEAN claimants more concerned about their security and stability. So let's actually let's attractive of China's so-called soft power in the South China Sea. And many ASEAN countries change their security relationship with US and welcome quietly or openly welcome US presence in the region. And US have more excuse to engage in the region and influence on this issue. The more powerful China becomes, the larger US interest in the South China Sea will be. And US policy has spilled over efforts in the position of either major powers as I mentioned before. This major power pay more attention to the South China Sea and is the reason South China Sea become much more international issue. And China press on international oil and gas company make US express views on unimpaired commercial and more determined protecting the interests of American cooperation. And ASEAN claimants have to short to cooperate with international oil and gas company from major power. So with the eyes as China cannot threaten this company because the major power back is up. And the South China Sea become an error into twins of major power interests and the situation is more internationalized. The situation that China did not expect. And now the South China Sea become a priority in China foreign policy decision making process. You know before yet as you know before yet China concentrated only on big power relation. But now China elevated the South China Sea into higher level priority. And as a reason China approach become much more coordinated and centralized. And as a reason competition between independent players between independent interest group within China are manageable. And there was reports that China are now unifying various law enforcement agency into unique agency. And we see China approach to what the South China Sea can be flexibly adjusted when Chinese leaders consider is necessary. And China have to care about relation with ASEAN in dealing with South China Sea issue. And we can see China approach is spending but low intensified dispute with increasing presence of civilian paramilitary within the United States. And the refraining from using military but continuing to so forth. And China offering economic incentive to ASEAN countries especially to non-Klemen and prevent ASEAN from forming a common position. And acting by this way China is incrementally limiting the possibility of U.S. in engaging in the South China Sea issue. And incrementally changing the state of the world in the region. And U.S. is fishing the dilemma not ratifying unclothed is limiting U.S. legitimacy to criticize other countries of not respecting the international law. And the increasing presence of U.S. Navy forces do not have much impact on the context of control of resources which is mainly between law enforcement agency and we can see in Scarborough incident the U.S. despite U.S. effort of mitigation of issue China took control of Scarborough under the North U.S. Navy forces. And on diplomatic arena ASEAN countries now have to take more into account Chinese concerns than the U.S. concern. And on multi-lateral diplomacy the effect of Clinton remark is not as strong as it used to be since the U.S. has not expressed more viewpoint on the recent speech and we can see in the most recent speech no more point. So implication for ASEAN is international laws being ignore ASEAN centrality is undermining and the night three and four years very critical period for ASEAN because when the administration panel decided on the issue between Filipinas and ASEAN or Filipina China that will encourage other parties to go through third party a third party arbitration and they prefer this channel than the ASEAN channel. So my conclusion is that the South China Sea become unbalanced equilibrium something like China is dominating on the sea and on diplomatic arena U.S. is the seeking approach how to deal with rising China. ASEAN is being fragmented and can be hijacked by any single chair or even member each star regional powers have huge interest but limited the role to play here. So it's a long term the problem is in the long term the South China Sea has been regarded as that's good whether China rise is peaceful whether China will respect the current international law but we can see the situation is now in the diverse direction. Thank you very much. Thank you very much Dr. Tweed. Perhaps before opening the floor so that you can ask questions of our very diverse and interesting panel I might let them the panelists if they have any let's say two-minute intervention short response to any of the what the other said or questions that you'd like to ask other panelists is there anybody that would like to comment on what other said or should we open it to the floor. Okay please. Thank you my name is Nong Hong from the China National Institute for South China Sea Studies I do have a question for Professor Castro from the Philippines and Nick Astro. Nick Astro. I know my clean mistake in for Fidel. Thank you I will remember that forever. So my question is putting aside the legal merit of which country actually owns Scarborough Shoal let's consider consequences of the Scarborough Shoal standard up to April 2012. I read the media report about interview between interview about the Philippine fishermen and the Chinese fishermen the message I got from the report is actually that both countries fishermen are enjoying very harmonious relationship between each other one example is that the Philippine fishermen saying that Chinese fishermen actually is willing to share with them orders and food so versus the other situation. So my question is how do you expect Chinese law enforcement agency not to do anything in a situation where Chinese fishermen are facing the gunpoint from the Philippines Navy in Stealth Coast Guard which is a more legitimate law enforcement agencies. So in your point of view does it do any good to actually the fishermen from both countries whose lab who relies so much on the fishing in this traditional fishing ground. Thank you. That's a very good point to raise the fact that you have this sort of a term used by a Filipino fisherman that it was the sort of a mini UN where you have Vietnamese Chinese and Filipino fishermen meeting there exchanging food and water that's great but how come now China is preventing that from happening again. The fact that you have a seclusion zone 25 kilometers around the shoal. So if that's the ideal situation why not return back to that situation. You know that was the agenda you know that's the sort of the motive when we have this mutual withdrawal that we go back to the status quo where you have a mini UN instead you have now a chain tied around the shoal and you have this seclusion zone and you know you asked me a question who owns it in March 2001 you have the Philippine Navy apprehending eight Chinese fishing vessels. There was of course a reaction from the Chinese embassy saying that this is a traditional Chinese fishing ground but not Chinese territory. In fact the foreign ministry in Beijing even apologized to the Philippine government saying we will do something to prevent this from happening again. Isn't that a tacit recognition that China recognized at least the Philippines has jurisdiction over that area. Of course everything changed last year. Thank you Bonnie Glazer CSIS. I have two questions. My first question is for Wushu Tsuan. I think it was last year at the Shangri-La dialogue that you talked about the different schools of thought three different interpretations in China of the Nine Dash Line. And I think you suggested and I heard from other Chinese scholars that there was some discussion in China about further clarifying the Nine Dash Line. People suggested after the leadership transition in China that there might be some further clarification. We did hear a statement last year from the Chinese Foreign Ministry which I think you basically repeated today that the Nine Dash Line doesn't include it doesn't mean that China says that it claims sovereignty over every drop of water within the line. So China is telling us what the Nine Dash Line isn't but still is not telling us what the Nine Dash Line is. And so I wonder whether there is going to be any further clarification of that in the future because I so far you know we have not heard any any further clarification. My question for Dr. Song is about two of your recommendations which I actually see a somewhat contradictory. One is that you think that the South China Sea should be put on the table of issues with mainland China. And the other is that you think that Taiwan should further clarify this what you referred to as the U-shaped line. I wonder what you really see as the benefits of talking about this issue with mainland China because I see some risks. South China Sea has become one of the most contentious issues between China and ASEAN. And if Taiwan were in fact to take sides with Beijing on this I would think that Taiwan would also be introducing some tension in its relations with ASEAN. Potentially making it more difficult to negotiate you know bilateral free trade agreements, conduct fisheries agreements etc. Which I think is very much in Taiwan's interests. The other recommendation is what I think is really more important. This is originally the Republic of China's you know 11-dash line in 1947. So if it actually would be I think very helpful if Taiwan would clarify what this line means and it would set a model for mainland China as well. If you are defining this in terms of international law the land features that that you claim and then as Jo Yun told us over lunch defining then the maritime spaces that extend from those those land features. And so I do wonder how you view it and whether there's any discussion within Taiwan of maybe clarifying this line. Thank you. Thank you Bonnie. Yeah I think the U.S. ship line must be a big concern of disciplines here. So as I still remember that last year I just in this room I have had explained on this U.S. ship line. You might know the U.S. ship line was published by then Chinese government Republic of China in 1947. At that time there was to be honest there was no official meaning on this U.S. ship line. And it was adopted during the 1950s 1960s by some countries for instance Japan even Soviet Union France. There is there are at least four you know thoughts on this U.S. ship line but in my personal opinion this U.S. ship line if we needed to clarify the special meaning or official meaning on this ship line at least should be the line of the ownership of the all features inside U.S. ship line. So why China currently or incompetent Chinese government has not clarified the official meaning or stance on this U.S. ship line. Suppose that if China declares the official meaning of this U.S. ship line it means that the current Chinese government should take whatever to take back those islands which are currently occupied by the countries. So in my opinion maybe ambiguous stance currently is the best best choice best choice. So I think if China you know if the U.S. ship line you know declared by Chinese government as ownership line China would take whatever to take back of those islands currently occupied by a lot of countries. I don't think a lot of the countries are ready and willing for this. Thank you. Yan Hui. Well thank you Ms. Glacier for your very good questions allow me to respond. The first ones regarding U.S. ship line 11 dash line which was announced in 1947. For Taiwan it's important to clarify the meaning and legal status of that line. But do you think this will be easier and will be have more authoritative interpretation by the government of Taiwan if Taipei is invited to the negotiation process. And before that we are out we have no position and no opportunity sitting on the same table to make explanation. And if that's the case that's first note. The second one in 2010 President Ma received an interview by an associate press. He said that Taiwan were abide by the rule of international law and he was asked about the freedom navigation. He said that this freedom navigation in the South China Sea encircled by the U.S. ship line will be respected. Now some people ask me that the claim between Taiwan and China is the same identical but I will tell you no they are different. 11 dash 9 and 9 dash line. The two lines were deleted by the Chinese government in 1953. And I will tell you the different because President Ma is the international legal scholar before he became the president and he's keen to follow the rule of international law. Look at the recent dispute between the Taiwan and Philippine. Violation article 73 of 1982 law is the convention. So my understanding that is Taiwan the government is in the process to consider to make qualification of the U.S. ship line but it's low I'd agree but it's important to do that. I will urge that Taiwan to be given the opportunity to participate in the international negotiation process especially check one diplomacy based upon a number of flexible arrangement I will make it come to your second question. Yes it's indeed a challenge for Taiwan to have those kind of risks because Taiwan has to maintain very good relationship with United States. Taiwan has to maintain to promote political relationship with ASEAN member countries and so there are other issue TPP and RCEP. In that case Taiwan has to make a balanced position. In that case I think it's very important for Taiwan to find win-win-win approach to deal with situation. How to do that cross-strait cooperation will be tracked to diplomacy. For example in this coming summer I'm going to organize the students came from Taiwan's student from mainland China and Taiwan to go to go to study the South China Sea issue. In the future maybe students from America from the Vietnam from all the countries Japan can join that and we are going to turn this the South China Sea from confrontation to the sea of peace and cooperation. So thank you very much for your question. Thank you. Thank you Dr. Sun. Peter. Thank you. Three quick questions for Wuchu Sun. I was really taken by your point about the law needs to be clear about how much maritime jurisdiction can be claimed from physical features and so it may be wonder why would China not want to participate in the arbitration process. Since that seems to be one of the questions the arbitration panel has been asked to answer. So I thought that was a very good point you made but it makes me wonder why China won't participate in the arbitration to help solve that. For Dr. DeCruz, sorry Dr. DeCastro. We'll get it right eventually. So the question for you is would the Philippines be willing to engage in meaningful bilateral negotiations with China if China were to come forward and engage in meaningful bilateral negotiations and then eventually withdraw the arbitration if those can be resolved peacefully. And then for Tui you had a list of Chinese actions in the South China Sea related to what I would say some are actually coercive but others are just mere irritants and I wonder in separating the two one of the more important ones it's not you know not like a non-dash line and a passport which frankly really doesn't matter but what does matter is things like the Hainan regulations. And have you noticed whether those regulations are actually attempting to be enforced or are they more in the category of an irritant? Thanks. Thank you Peter. Before I answer your question I would like to say more of your words with regard to the U-shaped line. My institute and my counterparts were in Taiwan now conducting research project on the U-shaped line based on official archives of the IOC period. So after we completed this research project we would like to put forward suggestions to our relevant authority based on these academic outcomes with this U-shaped line. Just Peter's question why China don't want to participate in the arbitration process? As you might know the Chinese government has already rejected the arbitration proceeding initiated by the Philippines last January. So from my perspective the problem between China and the Philippines with regard to South China Sea issue is or substance is a sovereignty issue. The fact is that the Philippines illegally occupied the eight islands or islands or shores lives since 1950s or 1960s. The first one is the second biggest island in Chinese name Zhongyi Island or Situ Island. Zhongyi Island still carries the name of the warship after World War II then Japan surrounded and handed over this island to the Chinese government. So the substance real problem is a sovereignty issue rather than the status of the U-shaped line rather than the legal status of the eight locks in the statement or notification delivered by the Philippines. Another reason why China has rejected the notification of statement by the Philippines is that in 2006 China made a declaration under the article 298 of UN Clause to exclude all disputes with regard to sovereignty delimitation or military activities in its EEZ. So hence until China withdraws from this declaration and disputes with regard to sovereignty issue you know should be excluded from the compulsory settlement mechanism. My straightforward answer under this administration now we will proceed with the arbitration process. It's mentioned in the case we filed that we have engaged China in a bilateral negotiation since 1995 when you have the discovery of Chinese structure on mischief reef. Nothing happened out of how many 15 years of bilateral negotiation. So what's the point of returning back to bilateral negotiation? So I think under this administration no we won't back out from this arbitration case. Thank you Peter for the question. I listed some action not only by China but by other governments also about recent developments but significantly from Chinese side and we see some action from China was interpreted by China as reaction to other countries activity but other action is unilateral action despite any action from other countries and specifically on the regulation of Hainan on what and charged and arrest foreign vessels into Chinese quarters. There are two aspects of this regulation first maybe reaction to other as it is is written as you mentioned but when China adopted domestic legislation their authority more specifically more specifically law enforcement agency have to follow domestic law and no matter what intention of of the government when adopts the law their law enforcement have to follow this and it will create more tension more incident on the sea and in reality after adoption of this law we see new incident between Chinese law enforcement and Vietnamese version in the Paracel for example and I think this the question can be answered by professor professor Wu who will know more than me about the intention and content of this regulation. We're getting an awful lot of hands and so what I'm going to suggest to may facilitate is that we have two at a time so you're next on my list in the mic to you sorry okay actually Don it's a guy next to you didn't you had his hand up first sorry actually my I'm tongue from the Vietnam Laws Association my question is actually raised by Bonnie I already about nine dash slides so I think I give my right to okay it's fine go ahead the mic's there but I am not hijacking the microphone or ASEAN okay I have two questions I'll try to stay out of the weeds you know we we tend to get granular especially on the law of the sea my first question is to Dr. Wu as I review my notes of what you just said now maybe I'm grasping at straws and I can't resist admitting that you have just argued the utility of ambiguity right in other words by not clarifying the line you avoid forgive my vernacular pissing people off and the implication is that if you did clarify the line it would be the maximalist version we own everything at the Jakarta international defense dialogue some years ago not too many in Jakarta I asked a gentleman dressed in a PLA Navy uniform this is an authentic source and I said why doesn't China clarify the nine-dash line and he said a much shorter version of what exactly you just said namely if we did it would create widespread anger in the region so be glad that we don't okay now you can see how this actually subverts your own logic because it means that those who want to know what the line means are even more inclined to believe the worst and therefore to raise tensions okay now let me on the positive side say this as I understand what you just said a few minutes ago you did pose a distinction I'm probably naively exaggerating its importance but you did pose a distinction between the nine-dash line in relation to a historic claim and you talked about the four island groups that is the land features presumably bringing to mind un-close the settlement that would be allowable under un-close rule so basically we have two interpretations one is we own everything on the basis of historical claims which can only be settled by the court of justice the ICJ which you will not appeal to or alternative we might be nudging slowly but surely because there's internal debate inside China your colleague had an article suggesting there were four different schools inside China on the matter but we're moving slowly towards something that would be compatible with un-close that is to say eventually to say we own the land features but we don't have sovereignty over the sea which would open up the Greg polling option and would make what we saw on the screen perhaps meaningful in policy terms so tell me why I'm wrong about being optimistic in that regard okay and the other question I guess well I'm sorry pardon me yeah sorry about that first I just want to thank Dr. Twee for a very I think strategically insightful and sophisticated presentation two quick questions one for Dr. Song you carefully answered Bonnie's question by saying what Taiwan what Taipei government the Republic of China position on nine dash or 11 dash or U shaped line as a Berkeley trained lawyer I'd like your opinion of what the line means and for Dr. DeCastro I just want to clarify the Philippines claim to parts of the Spratlys is it based on Thomas Cloma's discovery in the 1950s or what is the basis for your claim to a big chunk of the Spratlys okay we'll Dr. Wu and then let me Dr. DeCastro and then make a response to Donald I would like to clarify that the ambiguity or ambiguous stance is my personal opinion it is not a Chinese official stance so I just ask you suppose if China as you might know there are at least three you know millions with this U shaped line the line of traditional maritime boundary the line of historical rights the line of historical waters and the line of the ownership of the U shaped line over all features inside this line is it acceptable for international community if China declares this line as the ownership line then China would like to discuss the you know delimitation with relevant relevant countries based on the island regime if some features you know fit the relevant criteria set out by the uncross is it possible is it acceptable uh and also I would like to make sure here there is a little room for current Chinese government to compromise with this U shaped line or in other words the current Chinese government has no right either to abandon or change this U shaped line regarding the Philippine claim in 2009 the president sign then president Arroyo sign a law which basically provides for uncross using uncross as the basis so Mr. Ben Sordo might be in a better position because he's a lawyer but the point is it's simply based on uncross regime of violence I'm not a lawyer so I cannot really explain everything I basically discuss well with regime of violence you talk in terms of regime of violence yeah so and not all the spread leaks but about some of the islands there only about six islands plus of course including Scarborough Shoal within the Philippines yeah within the Philippine exclusive economic zone well thank you thank you very much Dr. McDavid about the question from Taiwan's perspective in 1994 I wrote an article issues published in issue and studies in that article I make clear my position as a from academic Demia that is the line is indicates the ownership of those islands within the UShip line but now be honest with you I admit according to international legal practice there is a very very strong legal challenge for both Taiwan and Melanchina if you look at the Italos look at ICJ cases and it comes to question maritime delimitation maritime and then that will be the uphill challenge for for for Taiwan for Ben and China and person who mentioned that there's a need for Taiwanese scholars to conduct joint research on the legal meaning of that UShip line like this line yes it's ongoing but please take note of the diplomatic notes usually by PRC in May 2009 and April 2011 if you look at combine those two diplomatic medic notes you can find out the Chinese position is the following I think the author maybe Dr. President Wu Dr. Hong Long can clarify that first one sovereignty second one unclose the third one historic rights and you are right we cannot only focus on law policy convention but you have to deal with international law so from that in that case from for Taiwan's perspective it's very very difficult we have no seat no opportunity to submit our legal position in the UN meeting and so on so that's the challenge thank you thank you Mr. Chairman my name is Leo Bernard from Center for International Law in Singapore my question is to Dr. the Castro and Dr. Wu Dr. Castro you mentioned that with this the current administration of the Philippines you don't see the Philippines going back to the bilateral negotiation table with China how do you see the how do you see the Philippines and China relation after the conclusion of the arbitration proceeding because the arbitration would not resolve the sovereignty issue and wouldn't resolve the maritime limitation issue so even if even if the arbitrage tribunal give positive judgment to all the Philippines questions the Philippines will still have to go negotiate with China for the limitation and boundary issue and to Dr. Wu I want to ask your your personal opinion in what do you see how do you see China will react towards the possible judgment of the arbitrage tribunal as a lawyer I was actually kind of hope that China would participate because even though I agree that I understand that China challenged the jurisdiction of the arbitrage tribunal but I think that's I was wishing that was something that China would argue in front of the tribunal and to be honest I think some of the points raised by the Philippines there's a good chance in the merits China would actually have an advantage over the Philippines but that aside that aside how do you see China will react to this possible result of the arbitration do you think China would risk maintaining that balance of kind of like ignoring the because China has been ignoring the existence of the tribunal so far would China would continue to do that or do you think China will quietly take into account the points made by the tribunal and use it for negotiation with the Philippines or do you see any other possibilities of what happened afterwards thank you Andres Ovizo I'm a chief representative in Vietnam for the interstate travel company but I have another hat I want to wear to ask the question I'm also one of President Obama's presidential partners and a founding member of organizing for action so I wanted to ask I think with Dr. Tui particularly but it would also could apply to Dr. Castro but on Dr. Tui you gave the most from my standpoint most realistic hard-hitting you know description of the situation like it really is and so because I was actually in Vietnam when they cut the cable the bing bing high and just you know right into the economic zone and just cut the cable and they couldn't keep their seismic survey going so these are the realities now my question and because you outlined so brilliantly what the U.S. is doing you know what would what would you want the United States to do that it is not doing that is within the realm of possibility I mean that it's feasible for example you mentioned becoming a that we should ratify the UN convention the UN UN class and that we should do that I think so too but I've heard that debated internally within the United States government so how do you think that would be helpful and to what degree and what else I was surprised you said you don't think the big warships we're putting out there are so particularly helpful what kind of things could we do that we're not doing and remembering that we want a better relationship with China but of course everybody does but not at any price thank you yes my name is Eric Lechica I'm with the local chapter of the U.S. Filipinos for good governance many of the Filipino Americans are concerned with the recent incident when the the Chinese naval forces were about to blockade this just a few days ago where there's a dozen Philippine marines on an island or a shoal close to close to the Philippines what do you think will Dr. Dacastro Dr. Wu what would be the possible scenario that might lead to something out of hand and how can it be prevented will China attempt to blockade the Philippine marines to starve them out basically and not allow Philippine Navy folks to replenish their food supplies that seems to be a flashpoint thank you okay we have six minutes so please all the panelists keep your answers short but try to to cover the turf thank you first question in response to you my friend in my opinion with regard to the opportunity you know proceeding as we know China has rejected and returned the notification and statement submitted by the Philippines to Chinese government last January so I don't think the Chinese government will accept any awards which could be delivered by arbitration tribunal in the future because you know China has already rejected and without participation of China second question to my friend here I think it's about the second Thomas Shuo currently in the instance between China and the Philippines the fact is that since late 1990s the Philippine Marines you know has been garrisoning on this atto or leaf so now the Chinese law enforcement agency is doing is to protect this leaf from being occupied by the Philippines permanently thank you so also I would like to make a response to the scope of the show by Dr. Cassio because you talked about you know quite more I still remember that during last year Shangri-la dialogue both your defense minister Gajimin and I attended the workshop with regard to the South China Sea show we discussed the scope of the show and I asked him and I showed a map maps published by the Philippines in 2006 and 2011 I asked him you said the Philippines enjoys jurisdiction over scope of the show how it comes your maps showed that the scope of the show is situating out of out of the Western limits of the Philippine territories he made no response okay thank you just respond to your question the filing of the case is part of our diplomatic strategy of legal approach rule-based approach so and definitely we would negotiate with China you know China is a neighbor there's a time that we enjoyed very good relation with China and you know I'm not discounted fact that soon you know in the future we might again discover this good relation we would have to negotiate but I think just in case we win the case that will give us a degree of leverage if we lose that case then we will have to accept it as a law abiding nation we would abide by the decision of the tribunal now the next question regards to what do we expect from the United States Assistant Secretary June acting came out with basic principles great principles but what will happen if those principles are openly challenged you know what point there is credibility what if a state another state glaringly challenged this adopt unilateralism threatening force what then will those principles be backed by muscle or just diplomatic protests and of course the concern right now in the Philippines with the meeting with President Obama Xi Jinping is now this is of course a concern that a line might be drawn and where is the Philippines in that line or you go back to 1938 is the Philippines a far away country coating the vell chamber lane you know it's supposed to be a strategic ally but is it a far away country and of course a question regarding the Marines of course we have a standoff recently of course a supply vessel was harassed 2 a.m. in the morning but we haven't really gone into that what I would call classic Mexican standoff you're just watching each other and let's see what will happen after you have the summit in California I don't know it's a reality that small powers would have to face we could only rely on opportunity we could not create the situation Dr. Tui I think it's up to you to have the last word for 2 minutes thank you what I express US to do is not more than what US have to do to protect US national interests as the today clearly lay out by Mr. Zhou Yun we see US the policy and strategy towards this is relatively comprehensive with military diplomatically and political elements but what is lacking is paramilitary elements and economic elements of this grand strategy as you as you see in my presentation US cannot interfere or influence on the real contest of the child China's sea is between law enforcement agency and other aspect is just China now using economic incentive to divide and rule our science so just in this aspect US cannot do anything if US stay away from economic spheres in the region one more US can do according to US national interests is more asking China to clarify and even not clarifying but abandoning the nine dotted line as as today Dr. Song mentioned China already clarifies the nine dotted line according to North to CLCS to United Nations just lie is indicating sovereignty unclose and historic rise what US is to do is not asking to clarifying but asking China to abandon the line is not basic on international law but US interests is to respect your international law the current international law so we say on US interest thank you please join me in thanking all the panelists for a rather rousing discussion