 Thank you. I'm very happy and honoured to have been invited to give this lecture, now a little less than six months before Paris. And I thank you all, in particular Bo Kiellen, who has asked an insistence that I could come. And it's a pleasure just to stop from this very, very demanding process, not always rewarding process, to be here with having a more peaceful and thoughtful I'm sure interaction than one I normally do these days. I wanted to share with you some elements of how we see and based on what kind of expectation the Paris Agreement could look and why we are trying to develop a vision of a more global outcomes and the agreement itself. And that's why I wanted to explain you today. Just to come back to the idea that this process is a, as we said this morning, is a complex process because he's trying to solve and to respond to an extraordinary challenging issue, which is a product of a billion of people activities, the Second Industrial Revolution's outcomes, and in a way the core itself of the development pathway for the past century. So it's not simple and most of the time, of course, people don't understand why we are so long to create a framework to address that, but just I think it's good to remind us that it is very difficult. I have sometimes a comparison in time. When you look at the trade negotiation, it took more, it took since 1948 until 1994 that 50 years to agree on something which is far more simple than addressing the issue of climate change. Discussing about the trade liberalization, meaning to lower the barriers to trade, and even not all, but some of them only, and just to have just a reform of the border tax is something normally much easier. But it still took 50 years to have a broader agreement. So when we started this in 1992 only, and of course we are already not totally, of course, going at full speed, I must say, but still we have to understand that it is a very complex. And that's why this convention of 1992, this climate regime, has been trying to respond to a number of difficulties and failures and has proved an enormous dynamism. The lens of the process of difficulties is, in a way, hiding whatever the deep changes and the deep process of essays and errors that has characterized this regime. And it is a profoundly evolving regime over time. And when we see all the sort of the main mind stones since Kyoto in 1997 where Kyoto was all about timetables and targets, sometimes described as a totally top-down exercise, which was not really the case, but nevertheless it was portrayed like that. And when you see the different, of course, the difficulties of Kyoto to have everybody on board and the attempt in Copenhagen later, and the different aspects that were finally finalized in Kankun, in particular this notion that the developing countries could put Namas nationally appropriate measures on the table, transform and in Kankun again the prospect of having a legally binding agreement was absolutely out of the table. And then came back even in Kankun as an attempt and finally took part in Durban platform with this idea we need one. We need not only a commitment from countries on a voluntary basis, we need more than that. We need a framework. We need a more centralized framework to achieve that. And that's what, in a way, has led to Paris. So anyway we are constantly adjusting this process to try to respond to the challenges to encompass the complexity. And in a way where we are there is to try to go from a deep and narrow agreement, which was supposedly, again it's a simplification to be the Kyoto style, to a shallow and large one which is trying to of course have less of a profound commitments in particular in the legally binding form of these commitments, but have everybody on board. And so we had finally a very classical evolution of many treaties with the views that because it's climate change and because greenhouse gases are a global problem, a common pool resource problem, we have to have of course at least a base of a very large agreement, even if we can go on certain aspect in certain sector, probably sort of a more narrow and more deep one. This figure is what has been in a Q&A and David Victor paper I think in 2009 representing I think something which was very useful for me when we decided to design the strategy for the Paris Agreement. And in particular when you look at of course what is if we think that finally addressing climate change is a product of many, many actions and many, many elements, the notion that we have a regime complex more than an agreement which is only as a central mechanism that can really modify whole behaviors. I think this notion that finally the regime is complex and is constituted by different elements and you have to work on all these elements. Of course these figures of 2009 should be now different because we have many more element in there, but the interest was just to show that not only UNFCCC which is in the upper right, but as well IPCC is embedded in the regime. There are of course the action of agencies, but the action of local authorities, military development banks etc. And that even there you can find that is a club of countries who are doing and now more and more it's a club of companies or club of cities. So this notion that the regime is complex again was very useful for me to design what could be the outcome of Paris. If we don't believe in miracles which will not happen in climate change and of course I will make this available for everybody in the famous paper of Victor and QN which quite at least the figure is very useful, the paper is good but the figure is particularly useful. And if we don't believe in miracles and one text, one legal text can do everything which is not the case. There is no the evidence that the legal agreement and internal treaty will modify behaviors of billions of people. So we have to understand the result the outcome of Paris as something if we want to be serious in really to produce a shift in the expectation in the for the future. So we have to work at these different levels and the concept of Paris outcome is exactly based on that. So the rationale behind the Paris agreement is clearly building on the theory of rational expectation which is in this house would not be surprising. Swedish economists have been really active on this front and so the idea is to think about that how we can modify the expectation so to modify behaviors and these are different behaviors investors behaviors don't obey to the same incentive and and don't respond the same than I don't know developers in in urban planning or whatever. So the notion that we have to work on this and we have to work on all the elements of the climate regime having a broad conception of this regime and to try in all of these elements to make the expectation of every of these opinion leaders or actors or principles if we reduce this sort of this concept borrowed from economics all these principles have to share the same expectations that the way we think the change can happen not because a legal treaty will decide it because everybody would think that this will happen. So it is very much relying on the fact that a self-fulfilling prophecy will make the job. So how you create this of course is another story but that's behind the Paris outcome that has I try I propose to the French government and apparently they just accept that. So what is that stake in 2015 it's simple in a way it's about changing economic and political signals in favor of the low carbon economy and it's about the alignment of expectation of government local authorities businesses consumers and citizens. So on 12 of December the formula of the success of Paris could be this one expectation of change most of people 50 I don't know what the threshold should be believe that this this will happen. So of course this doesn't mean that it is simple to do and sometimes I use a metaphor it is like a sheepdog in a way it's like to push people and countries and everybody from from behind to say that's the direction you have to go to or at the same time like is a magic float that how you attract people to go in that direction but the notion but basically because we lost we don't have we never had by the way the notion of a central large emission of the signal have disappeared together with the timetable and targets in particular including a global carbon price I put that in black because I feel that in many of my colleagues in universities believe that we should go back to this this is so much cleaner simpler and more and more nice in a way if we could have one central signal and everything would align around this signal that would be so good it cannot happen once because many countries don't want that and many many many other reasons I would not deny but so as we don't have this we have to produce the signals in different areas and with and attracting different actors which don't respond again to the same incentives so that's why we describe the Paris alliance for climate action around based on this looking for converging expectation and making this signal appear in different areas of the complex climate regime that we should have a legally binding agreement by the way that the mandate France are received from the Durban platform so we have to deliver that that's what we are in a way paid for or we pay for depending on the way you see that it's quite expensive by the way I should not recommend any country to do that again we we of course we have and and for me it's separate because at the the group of what the countries are decided to put forward for this first phase for 2015 which we call the intense intended nationally determined contributions we have to have a financial signal which is both respond to the commitment of 100 billion per year in 2020 by 2020 that was promised in Cancun but moreover to look for a post 2020 vision which is how the financial system respond to the financial necessity of the transition to this local economy and we added another area which we call now the Lima Paris action agenda or solution agenda which is a capacity to capture the commitments meaning the plans and the expectation of a number of non-state actors non-parties to the agreement but will make a big difference for the agreement itself and these four elements of course is a simplification from the complex climate regime I presented to you will be in a way the outcome of Paris so four elements to simplify again what we are looking for and there are of course these four elements and they are of course a huge linkage depending on the rule we decide on the legally binding agreement the contribution would be rather different you may know that we have had in Lima a long discussion about the inclusion of adaptation of what we call in our drug on the mean of implementation meaning finance in particular and technology in the contribution of the countries whereas some countries were insisting on the mitigation aspect of this INDCs so there are of course linkages between finance and INDCs between the rules in the legally binding agreement and this contribution and of course on the capacity of government to be more optimistic about their capacity to deliver and this is very much related to the Lima Paris action agenda itself meaning the capacity of businesses and local authorities to engage and to demonstrate they believe that this will happen and not relatively with reasonable cost so if we just think that all this we have to think broadly but then we have to find something in common between all these elements and in a way like for every type of institutional arrangement and in particular international institutional arrangement we are in a way looking to these six points which are classical in environment governance we should find that in each of these elements you have a consistent consistency coherence and that we don't have trade-offs and contradiction between all the elements or at least diminish these trade-offs accountability if we again work on the global climate regime concept government are not the only ones who should be accountable so we have to find some way a way to create this accountability for in particular for non-governmental organization and publics we have to look for effectiveness is it's not worth working to a very complex agreement if it doesn't deliver so it has to really be useful and limited to what is useful and not just for the sake of having an agreement it has of course a huge element of reduced uncertainty which is basically the reason why many actors are doubting on their capacity to deliver climate action sustainability which is I think something that is coming on and and it's good that you don't you cannot think the transformation of societies through climate lens you have to think more broadly to what sustainability is about which is the way of development and in a way an epistemic quality meaning that you cannot just ignore science and that's a very important element because many times in this process we have had of course a strong contribution of IPCC that will be the case in every step and every step forward from this process is linked to in way in a way on another to IPCC report but then we have to look for in this particular important on this long-term goal which I will come back immediately in a minute what is consistent with scientific knowledge we just cannot ignore this and many times of course in the process we have the scientific knowledge on the side and just proceed without referring to it so that in a way the elements we are looking for in each of the component of the climate regime we are trying to put forward I just want to characterize what we think should be and somebody I think the journalist asked me earlier on what is really important for you in the Paris Agreement and I could describe that this is four elements of a five elements in the legal binding agreement we are looking for rules or commitments but we are really it is a process to build rules that are here to stay so the idea that this agreement is not for 10 years but he has to define the rules for on the longer term and that's rules are to be the binding element are to be the rules the commitments themselves is that the numbers that countries are putting forward should not probably be the embedded in the agreement but he has the rules and the commitment to implement so I think that is a very important element of the bindingness in a way this agreement has to refer to a long-term goal and to move from a timetable and targets we had in the Kyoto thinking to something that it is more a decarbonization pathways and you saw that progressively we try to adapt this language in the discussion since Konkun by the way we try to adapt this language of the low carbon economy pathways now we are just trying to look at it in a different way to try to characterize what it is about decarbonization in particular the energy system and we got in the G7 some kind of recognition that we have this long-term goal is not about an abstract figure of temperature is about doing something effectively about energy in particular so the long-term goal in the pathways notion more than the timetable and targets is of course a very important element then in this agreement we have to have some kind of revision mechanisms because that we know that the contribution is the initial contribution would not make it and we have to upgrade and update this contribution over time we have to have somehow the relation between science and the delivery of the contributions and to have a review of adequacy at least an adequacy of commitment for the next phase if we cannot for political reason produce a review on adequacy of achieved performance and then we have to have as well transparency systems that create confidence that nobody is cheating or not cheating too much so that that are really the I don't see the minimum because I don't I don't know what it will be the minimum hopefully but I think that the central the core that makes sense for the agreement in Paris and I'm certainly forgetting very important element I haven't just point on mitigation adaptation on finance or technology to try in a way the concrete expression but this should be the core of the system to last of course on the contribution side we would like to have them as many as possible and I didn't copy the good formula that I didn't got to write example of my pvp but I could come back to that later so the the idea on the contribution is really to shift from a logic of targets to a logic of pathways and in this aspect we try to accommodate the notion that and the logic of pathways countries have to think to their long-term pathways and and they have to be of course combined with multi-time frame target packages as well with operational multi-sector but these ideas that you have to think about the long-term and not only on the first period which is what what is now on the table for 2025 or 2030 that is the way I think we should in a way change the narrative and it's coming I think to come I now see countries like US or China happy to go with this pathway discussion and surprisingly enough the Chinese leaders of the negotiation can say this agreement is there to support and develop the low-carbon pathway for all the economies at world level so this notion of pathways of transition is now coming in in the process I wanted just to revise with you where we are in geopolitical terms and this is borrowed from a presentation from a EU commission on the way they stated the state of the play if I may say so of the different countries and the different group of negotiation the first element on the legal form and the firewall mean the firewall for those who are not fortunately for them in this discussion since many many years meaning there is a difference a structural difference between the commitments of developed countries and developing countries that's why we that's that we call the firewall and and in of course it's normally take its major expression in the legal form and so you see that on the legal form the one who won the lesser legally binding elements in the agreement you see that US and China and some are on this side or NMDCs I think yes yes and Arab countries in particular would like really to have a very soft agreement with mainly voluntary commitments and no more than that whereas EU less developed countries houses I like that is Latin some a group of Latin American countries Alba which is another group of a Latin American countries want a strong legally binding rules on this differentiation between developing countries and developed countries of course the weak the weak differentiation with not so much surprise comes on the US and EU sign and I like and China are really in in in the middle in between whereas NMDCs which regroup a number of developing countries middle-income developing countries mostly there are some less developing countries in the group but more sort of there that is their key points that difference between developing and develop and they want to keep the firewall intact but Africa houses in less developing countries are still very akin to this differentiation on the mitigation element you see that of course a strong participation to reduce emission comes from the developed countryside mainly EU US Singapore are on this on this element China and NMDCs of course would like to take the less possible even if China is sometimes the middle and our this and less developing countries are the middle meaning not because anybody asked to less developed countries to take any any strong commitments but because they insist probably sometime more on adaptations and on mitigation for in a way something some somehow surprising as a result on the ambition cycle China is certainly the more hostile to have a revision and of mechanism whereas the other ones are much more in favor of having a very strong regular every five years ratcheting up mechanism and on transparency and rules finally of course you see that there is a big group in the middle and and quite different of LMDCs US LDCs and OZ small island whereas the one who are for stronger rules South Africa Brazil EU and OZs are really on that side whereas China and and others are really wanting to have a lesser the more the weaker rules in terms of transparency because of the issues about sovereignty and on adaptation you see that finally there is a majority of countries now that are in favor of having a strong dimension of adaptation in the agreement Africa OZs LMDCs China are all in favor whether US and EU are more careful because they would like nevertheless to have the agreement focusing on mitigation first where loss and damages which is this not liability but the problem of solidarity with victims of impact of climate change US and EU are more doesn't want to have this strong in the agreement they would like to have a separate point for the core whereas LDCs and OZs of course these are strong points so that are the main elements and on climate finance the the group of developing countries is in majority is insisting on public finance on the level of finance whereas US and EU being in the middle whereas markets finance finance markets EU and China being the more advanced I think US doesn't have a strong position on that for evident reasons because they are not prepared to buy anything outside whereas EU is prepared and China wants markets to be there OZs and LDCs and LDCs are not very they are in the middle they are not particularly against not particularly for whereas a group of countries Alba is definitely against having market anything about markets in the agreement so we add to all this a pillar we call the solution action agenda which require of course a little bit of thinking because it's a type of one together with some other institution of the climate regime that doesn't will not be part of the agreement per se they will not be part of the MRV cycle they will not make commitments officially within the agreement but still we would like to to have this non-state non-party actors accountable effective and developing in a way a big support for the agreement itself its long-term goal and and the shift this agreement is representing so we first try to establish for to convince parties that there was there was a value of having an action agenda as a common outcome one because it facilitates implementation of the existing INDC why why this it's quite evident that many countries were concerned about the that this action agenda was a way for developed countries in particular to escape their obligation so there is of course a lot of tension there if we count or if we consider action from local authorities from financial institution from businesses this is not the way to escape from formal obligation of governments so that's why we insisted on showing that this is a way to facilitate the implementation potentially to increase over time the ambition of future INDCs because it will lower the cost of technologies just because take the very simple example of the green procurement policies of many cities at world level now that are putting in place these great markets this of course increase the technology supply and demand and supply and of course lower the cost of technology that will lower the cost of capital and will of course generate higher political pressure meaning it's more facilitative from the government action at domestic level the second element was to send strong signals that the transition to a low carbon economy is feasible profitable inevitable in a way that the self-fulfilling prophecy argument is in the underway and in a nutshell shaping expectation of all these actors and that will of course contribute in a in a very high way to this to this element who are the actors we are trying to mobilize and to try to make a template of all to record and to register all this all this action the subnational authorities which have been very very active the more active certainly since well before before Copenhagen the businesses which are now coming in much more forcefully but not for example avoiding totally greenwashing far from it investors and in particular that they really is a new one they're in the banks the institutional investors the credit rating agencies the insurance companies are coming now and and now I would say the multilateral development banks largely because we asked them to come forward and and they are coming forward in particular by october they will come with their plan to increase climate finance there was a launch in september as you know in new york based on a long-term action of many actors on some companies and some local authorities to develop multi-stakeholder initiatives international public private partnership and NGO which really has been quite active in pushing or supporting some of this in particular to try to make accountable this engagement of non-state actors and to review and you see now these days they for some moments they lack a lot of quality of scientific quality but a number of reports you see to try to evaluate what is a real contribution of these actors so the NGOs are already playing a third-party role that I think is a good thing for the future with of course the condition that there is really a rigor in the analysis and the evaluation so there is a political rationale to encourage national state to do more that's what's sort of modifying the political economy that of course behind this is the main rationale to do that and and the substantive rationale is to catalyze concrete action on the ground which I think will give many there is a learning process out there and of course this has to be developed so and I can take example I don't have so much time but we then develop a template for business to really to explain that and and that of course are the key messages we wanted to have out of this action agenda that it is not the site show which still was a case probably in New York we want to create a virtual circle of increased ambition with these are the financial with other philanthropies have a strong will to play to support leaders of different initiative and the road to Paris is not so much important but the road from Paris of course is even more important and we need to be well prepared now of course the question will be how we inscribe this commitment in the when I go back to the climate regime figure I had in the beginning and I will end there how we inscribe this in the agreement do we make a formal relation between all these elements and the agreement and it is very important how we for example capture what the MD MD bees thank you what the MD bees would do can we have a registry where the local authority or the region of the businesses will put their commitments should we have a body that revise these commitments can we ask them to sign up the agreement to the object the general objective of these agreements can we have a I take the example for example the aviation issue we still we try to regulate it you know to try to put a carbon price on the emission we fail on the EU level but they take then a voluntary commitment of halving by 50 percent their emission by 2050 meaning what where do we put these commitments who is controlling it and do we ask the aviation company to sign up to the agreement should we ask the companies to display a long-term pathway of emission reduction to have their low carbon economy pathways should we create club of countries that can for example try to discuss between them over carbon price or to develop technologies together or to develop deep decarbonization pathways that's something that on the base on the minimum which will be the agreement will try to produce or to foster this club of front runners just to try to see that over time we can do much more than we believe nowadays and technology of course a key element of this but not only that just projecting every type of actor has to project itself in its own capacity to what is the future and what a low carbon future represent for him in terms of the change in the activity in the business model in the way to behave etc etc that's the type of thinking of course I know we cannot develop all this by Paris but we could at least create the framework where these behavior thinking scenario backcasting activities could take place in the future and news and that would be my final word and sorry to have been so long that these 15 these five years between the 2015 and 2020 between the entry and to force of the agreement would be should be taken as a fantastic opportunity to accelerate action and to put all this in place so ideally we will have this big picture in Paris ideally we'll have the main rules ideally we'll have this framework to have these new actors and this global vision to be inscribed in Paris and of course develop all the concrete elements afterwards thank you