 We're going to ask for commentary across the panel. Start with Jeffrey. Great. Thank you, John. Well, as John has pointed out, the dollar maintains and has maintained its dominance in international monetary relations, international trade and payments. And there are a variety of reasons, many of which John mentioned. It's due to its historical reserve currency role. It's due to its usefulness. It's a vehicle currency for international trade and payments. It's due to network externalities so that the more people use the dollar, the greater the incentive to use the dollar and things along those lines. But I'm going to focus on a somewhat different angle, which is, perhaps I hope at least, within my comparative advantage as a political economist rather than an economist, which is that it also depends on features of America's domestic monetary and financial conditions. The expectation of monetary stability in the US, the expectation of a commitment, the expectation of financial depth that is a broad and deep financial market, and the expectation of a high level of financial and commercial openness. All of these, I think, have been important to the international role of the dollar. The expectation that the Fed and the American monetary and financial authorities would stand behind both the value of the currency and the openness of America's financial market. All of these are highly political. Dollar dominance has rested, in large part, from my view, on the expectation that the American political order would protect and defend the real value of the US currency, that it would protect and defend the stability and the openness of its financial system. And I think that theory and history both tell us that these are central to the international role of any currency, including the dollar. And I think that this focus, by the way, on the importance of domestic politics and the political support for monetary stability, for an open financial system, for financial stability, helps explain the difficulties of the euro, given the unsettled nature of the politics of money and finance within the euro zone, and the difficulties of the Chinese currency, the RMB, given the non-transparent nature of politics in China, and significant doubts about the stability of the country's financial institutions. So it is the domestic, the political will, of the American authorities that I think in many ways stands behind the willingness of people around the world to continue to use the dollar. Now, for the first time since the 1930s, as the panel earlier, the previous panel points out, for the first time since the 1930s, there are some really significant questions being raised about the extent to which the United States is in fact committed to the core principles that have underpinned the international role of the dollar. This is worrying for anyone who is concerned both about the dollar, but more generally about the international monetary and financial system. And fortunately or unfortunately, we have some historical precedent. In the 1920s and early 1930s, the US was the world's largest lender, the world's largest foreign direct investor, the world's largest trading nation. It was also deeply committed to isolationism, therefore deeply hostile to international economic cooperation to the extent that Congress prohibited any agent of the American government to participate in international economic conferences. The weakness of the international monetary, commercial, financial order of the interwar period, in my view, stems in large part from the fact that its most important player was non-involved politically and in many ways hostile to international cooperation. And I'm sorry to say, and to agree with Marcus Nolan and some of the others on the previous panel, that it looks like the US certainly has gone back in that direction and there are important indications that it may continue to move in that direction. So that leads us to your final question or one of your final questions, which is can the international monetary system go on if confidence in American political stability and American economic and financial leadership erodes and specifically to the case of sanctions if fears about the politicization of the payment system grow? My answer would be sure it can go on and we have in a very small way a bit of a precedent which is the Cold War. During the Cold War because the Soviets were concerned, Soviets and their allies were concerned about the politicization of the payment system, they began parking their dollar reserves in London banks which they felt were off limits or probably off limits to the American authorities and to protect them from potential seizure by the American authorities. The results were the Euro markets, the offshore markets, which have become the basic form of contemporary international finance. So there are workarounds that people can come up with on the payment side, but if this is going to be a longer term phenomenon that affects not just the Soviets or not just one segment of the international order and involves an American withdrawal in some sense from this leadership position or it's making its leadership contingent on playing by American rules, then it presents a problem for the other members of the OECD or the G7 or the G20. In my view, those countries could, if they wanted to, create both a financial system and a payment system that bypasses the US. It would be costly, it would be difficult, but it's doable. Is it a good thing? In my view, no. Because we lose a substantial amount of the scale and history of stability that I at least would associate with the US dollar. But we have to take stock of what has been happening in the US and some of the trends that have been talked about, for example, in the previous panel in the United States. What if reality, what if the reality of American politics continues to give us a United States that is unreliable, that is populist, that is economically nationalistic, that is geopolitically aggressive? Then I think the world has no choice to move forward without the US. And sadly, as an American, I'm very sorry to say that the probability that the US continues to move in this direction is not zero.