 File 10 of A Treatise of Human Nature by David Hume, Volume 2 This LibriVox recording is in the public domain, recording by George Yeager, Book 2 of the Passions, Part 1 of Pride and Humility, Section 10 of Property and Riches. The relation which is esteemed the closest, and which of all others produces most commonly the passion of pride, is that of property. This relation it will be impossible for me fully to explain before I come to treat of justice and the other moral virtues. It is sufficient to observe on this occasion that property may be defined such a relation betwixt a person and an object as permits him, but forbids any other, the free use and possession of it, without violating the laws of justice and moral equity. If justice therefore be a virtue which has a natural and original influence on the human mind, property may be looked upon as a particular species of causation, whether we consider the liberty it gives the proprietor to operate as he pleases upon the object, or the advantages which he reaps from it. It is the same case if justice, according to the system of certain philosophers, should be esteemed an artificial and not a natural virtue. For then honor and custom and civil laws supply the place of natural conscience, and produce in some degree the same effects. This in the meantime is certain, that the mention of the property naturally carries our thought to the proprietor, and of the proprietor to the property, which being a proof of a perfect relation of ideas is all that is requisite to our present purpose. A relation of ideas joined to that of impressions always produces a transition of affections, and therefore whenever any pleasure or pain arises from an object connected with us by property, we may be certain that either pride or humility must arise from this conjunction of relations if the foregoing system be solid and satisfactory. And whether it be so or not, we may soon satisfy ourselves by the most cursory view of human life. Everything belonging to a vain man is the best that is anywhere to be found. His houses, equipage, furniture, clothes, horses, hounds, excel all others in his conceit, and it is easy to observe that from the least advantage in any of these he draws a new subject of pride and vanity. His wine, if you'll believe him, has a finer flavor than any other. His cookery is more exquisite. His table more orderly. His servants more expert. The air in which he lives more helpful, the soil he cultivates more fertile. His fruits ripen earlier and to greater perfection. Such a thing is remarkable for its novelty, such another for its antiquity. This is the workmanship of a famous artist that belonged once to such a prince or great man. All objects in a word that are useful, beautiful, or surprising, or are related to such may by means of property give rise to this passion. These agree in giving pleasure, and agree in nothing else. This alone is common to them, and therefore must be the quality that produces the passion which is their common effect. As every new instance is a new argument, and as the instances are here without number, I may venture to affirm that scarce any system was ever so fully proved by experience as that which I have here advanced. If the property of anything that gives pleasure either by its utility, beauty, or novelty produces also pride by a double relation of impressions and ideas, we'd need not be surprised that the power of acquiring this property should have the same effect. Now riches are to be considered as the power of acquiring the property of what pleases, and it is only in this view they have any influence on the passions. Paper will, on many occasions, be considered as riches, and that because it may convey the power of acquiring money, and money is not riches as it is a metal in doubt with certain qualities of solidity, weight, and fusibility, but only as it has a relation to the pleasures and conveniences of life. Taking then this for granted, which is in itself so evident, we may draw from it one of the strongest arguments I have yet employed to prove the influence of the double relations on pride and humility. It has been observed in treating of the understanding that the distinction which we sometimes make betwixt a power and the exercise of it is entirely frivolous, and that neither man nor any other being ought ever to be thought possessed of any ability unless it be exerted and put in action. Though this be strictly true in a just and philosophical way of thinking, it is certain it is not the philosophy of our passions, but that many things operate upon them by means of the idea and supposition of power independent of its actual exercise. We are pleased when we acquire an ability of procuring pleasure, and are displeased when another acquires a power of giving pain. This is evident from experience, but in order to give a just explication of the matter and account for this satisfaction and uneasiness, we must weigh the following reflections. It is evident the error of distinguishing power from its exercise proceeds not entirely from the scholastic doctrine of free will, which indeed enters very little into common life and has but small influence on our vulgar and popular ways of thinking. According to that doctrine motives deprive us not of free will, nor take away our power of performing or forbearing any action. But according to common notions, a man has no power where very considerable motives lie betwixt him and the satisfaction of his desires and determine him to forbear what he wishes to perform. I do not think I have fallen into my enemy's power when I see him pass me in the streets with a sword by his side while I am unprovided of any weapon. I know that the fear of the civil magistrate is as strong a restraint as any of iron, and that I am in as perfect safety as if he were chained or imprisoned. But when a person acquires such an authority over me that not only there is no external obstacle to his actions, but also that he may punish or reward me as he pleases without any dread of punishment in his turn, I then attribute a full power to him and consider myself as his subject or vassal. Now if we compare these two cases, that of a person who has very strong motives of interest or safety to forbear any action, and that of another who lies under no such obligation, we shall find, according to the philosophy explained in the foregoing book, that the only known difference betwixt them lies in this, that in the former case we conclude from past experience that the person never will perform that action, and in the latter that he possibly or probably will perform it. Nothing is more fluctuating and inconstant on many occasions than the will of man, or is there anything but strong motives which can give us an absolute certainty in pronouncing concerning any of his future actions. When we see a person free from these motives, we suppose a possibility either of his acting or forbearing, and though in general we may conclude him to be determined by motives and causes, yet this removes not the uncertainty of our judgment concerning these causes, nor the influence of that uncertainty on the passions. Since therefore we ascribe a power of performing an action to everyone who has no very powerful motive to forbear it, and refuse it to such as have, it may justly be concluded that power has always a reference to its exercise, either actual or probable, and that we consider a person as endowed with any ability when we find from past experience that it is probable or at least possible he may exert it. And indeed, as our passions always regard the real existence of objects, and we always judge of this reality from past instances, nothing can be more likely of itself without any further reasoning than that power consists in the possibility or probability of any action as discovered by experience and the practice of the world. Now it is evident that wherever a person is in such a situation with regard to me that there is no very powerful motive to deter him from injuring me, and consequently it is uncertain whether he will injure me or not, I must be uneasy in such a situation, and cannot consider the possibility or probability of that injury without a sensible concern. The passions are not only affected by such events as are certain and infallible, but also in an inferior degree by such as are possible and contingent. And though perhaps I never really feel any harm and discover by the event that philosophically speaking the person never had any power of harming me since he did not exert any, this prevents not my uneasiness from the preceding uncertainty. The agreeable passions may here operate as well as the uneasy, and convey a pleasure when I perceive a good to become either possible or probable by the possibility or probability of another's bestowing it on me upon the removal of any strong motives which might formally have hindered him. But we may further observe that this satisfaction increases when any good approaches in such a manner that it is in one's own power to take or leave it, and there neither is any physical impediment nor any very strong motive to hinder our enjoyment. As all men desire pleasure, nothing can be more probable than its existence when there is no external obstacle to the producing it, and men perceive no danger in following their inclinations. In that case, their imagination easily anticipates the satisfaction, and conveys the same joy as if they were persuaded of its real and actual existence. But this accounts not sufficiently for the satisfaction which attends riches. A miser receives delight from his money, that is, from the power it affords him of procuring all the pleasures and conveniences of life, though he knows he has enjoyed his riches for forty years without ever employing them. And consequently cannot conclude by any species of reasoning that the real existence of these pleasures is nearer than if he were entirely deprived of all his possessions. Though he cannot form any such conclusion in a way of reasoning concerning the nearer approach of the pleasure, it is certain he imagines it to approach nearer whenever all external obstacles are removed, along with the more powerful motives of interest and danger which oppose it. For further satisfaction on this head I must refer to my account of the will, where I shall, in Part 3, Section 2, explain that false sensation of liberty which makes us imagine we can perform anything that is not very dangerous or destructive. Whenever any other person is under no strong obligations of interest to forebear any pleasure, we judge from experience that the pleasure will exist and that he will probably obtain it. But when ourselves are in that situation, we judge from an illusion of the fancy that the pleasure is still closer and more immediate. The will seems to move easily every way, and casts a shadow or image of itself even to that side on which it did not settle. By means of this image the enjoyment seems to approach nearer to us, and gives us the same lively satisfaction as if it were perfectly certain and unavoidable. It will now be easy to draw this whole reasoning to a point, and to prove that when riches produce any pride or vanity in their possessors as they never fail to do, it is only by means of a double relation of impressions and ideas. The very essence of riches consists in the power of procuring the pleasures and conveniences of life. The very essence of this power consists in the probability of its exercise and in its causing us to anticipate by a true or false reasoning the real existence of the pleasure. This anticipation of pleasure is in itself a very considerable pleasure, and as its cause is some possession or property which we enjoy and which is thereby related to us, we here clearly see all the parts of the foregoing system most exactly and distinctly drawn out before us. For the same reason that riches cause pleasure and pride and poverty excites uneasiness and humility, power must produce the former emotions and slavery the latter. Power or an authority over others makes us capable of satisfying all our desires as slavery by subjecting us to the will of others exposes us to a thousand wants and mortifications. It is here worth observing that the vanity of power or shame of slavery are much augmented by the consideration of the persons over whom we exercise our authority or who exercise it over us. For supposing it possible to frame statues of such an admirable mechanism that they could move and act in obedience to the will, it is evident the possession of them would give pleasure and pride. But not to such a degree as the same authority when exerted over sensible and rational creatures whose condition being compared to our own makes it seem more agreeable and honourable. Comparison is in every case a sure method of augmenting our esteem of anything. A rich man feels the felicity of his condition better by opposing it to that of a beggar. But there is a peculiar advantage in power by the contrast which is in a manner presented to us betwixt ourselves and the person we command. The comparison is obvious and natural. The imagination finds it in the very subject. The passage of the thought to its conception is smooth and easy, and that this circumstance has a considerable effect in augmenting its influence will appear afterwards in examining the nature of malice and envy. End of File X File XI of a Treatise of Human Nature by David Hume, Volume II This LibriVox recording is in the public domain, recording by George Yeager, Book II of the Passions, Part I of Pride and Humility, Section XI of the Love of Fame. But beside these original causes of pride and humility, there is a secondary one in the opinions of others which has an equal influence on the affections. Our reputation, our character, our name, our considerations of vast weight and importance, and even the other causes of pride, virtue, beauty and riches, have little influence when not seconded by the opinions and sentiments of others. In order to account for this phenomenon, it will be necessary to take some compass and first explain the nature of sympathy. No quality of human nature is more remarkable both in itself and in its consequences than in that propensity we have to sympathize with others and to receive by communication their inclinations and sentiments, however different from or even contrary to our own. This is not only conspicuous in children who implicitly embrace every opinion proposed to them, but also in men of the greatest judgment and understanding, who find it very difficult to follow their own reason or inclination in opposition to that of their friends and daily companions. To this principle we ought to ascribe the great uniformity we may observe in the humors and turn of thinking of those of the same nation, and it is much more probable that this resemblance arises from sympathy than from any influence of the soil and climate, which, though they continue invariably the same, are not able to preserve the character of a nation the same for a century together. A good-natured man finds himself in an instant of the same humor with his company, and even the proudest and most surly take a tincture from their countrymen and acquaintance. A cheerful countenance infuses a sensible complacency and serenity into my mind, as an angry or sorrowful one throws a sudden damp upon me. Hatred, resentment, esteem, love, courage, mirth, and melancholy. All these passions I feel more from communication than from my own natural temper and disposition. So remarkable a phenomenon merits our attention and must be traced up to its first principles. When any affection is infused by sympathy it is at first known only by its effects and by those external signs in the countenance and conversation which convey an idea of it. This idea is presently converted into an impression and acquires such a degree of force and vivacity as to become the very passion itself and produce an equal emotion as any original affection. However instantaneous this change of the idea into an impression may be, it proceeds from certain views and reflections which will not escape the strict scrutiny of a philosopher, though they may the person himself who makes them. It is evident that the idea or rather impression of ourselves is always intimately present with us and that our consciousness gives us so lively a conception of our own person that it is not possible to imagine that anything can in this particular go beyond it. Whatever object therefore is related to ourselves must be conceived with a like vivacity of conception according to the foregoing principles and though this relation should not be so strong as that of causation it must still have a considerable influence. Resemblance and contiguity are relations not to be neglected especially when by an inference from cause and effect and by the observation of external signs we are informed of the real existence of the object which is resembling or contiguous. Now it is obvious that nature has preserved a great resemblance among all human creatures and that we never remark any passion or principle in others of which in some degree or other we may not find a parallel in ourselves. The case is the same with the fabric of the mind as with that of the body. However the parts may differ in shape or size, their structure and composition are in general the same. There is a very remarkable resemblance which preserves itself amidst all their variety and this resemblance must very much contribute to make us enter into the sentiments of others and embrace them with facility and pleasure. Accordingly we find that where beside the general resemblance of our natures there is any peculiar similarity in our manners or character or country or language it facilitates the sympathy. The stronger the relation is betwixt ourselves and any object the more easily does the imagination make the transition and convey to the related idea the vivacity of conception with which we always form the idea of our own person, nor is resemblance the only relation which has this effect but receives new force from other relations that may accompany it. The sentiments of others have little influence when far removed from us and require the relation of contiguity to make them communicate themselves entirely. The relations of blood, being a species of causation, may sometimes contribute to the same effect as also acquaintance which operates in the same manner with education and custom as we shall see more fully in part 2, section 4, afterwards. All these relations, when united together, convey the impression or consciousness of our own person to the idea of the sentiments or passions of others and makes us conceive them in the strongest and most lively manner. It has been remarked in the beginning of this treatise that all ideas are borrowed from impressions and that these two kinds of perceptions differ only in the degrees of force and vivacity with which they strike upon the soul. The component parts of ideas and impressions are precisely alike. The manner and order of their appearance may be the same. The different degrees of their force and vivacity are, therefore, the only particulars that distinguish them, and as this difference may be removed in some measure by a relation betwixt the impressions and ideas, it is no wonder an idea of a sentiment or passion may by this means be so enlivened as to become the very sentiment or passion. The lively idea of any object always approaches its impression, and it is certain we may feel sickness and pain from the mere force of imagination and make a malady real by often thinking of it. But this is most remarkable in the opinions and affections, and it is there principally that a lively idea is converted into an impression. Our affections depend more upon ourselves and the internal operations of the mind than any other impressions, for which reason they arise more naturally from the imagination and from every lively idea we form of them. This is the nature and cause of sympathy, and it is after this manner we enter so deep into the opinions and affections of others whenever we discover them. What is principally remarkable in this whole affair is the strong confirmation these phenomena give to the foregoing system concerning the understanding and consequently to the present one concerning the passions, since these are analogous to each other. It is indeed evident that when we sympathize with the passions and sentiments of others, these movements appear at first in our mind as mere ideas and are conceived to belong to another person as we conceive any other matter of fact. It is also evident that the ideas of the affections of others are converted into the very impressions they represent, and that the passions arise in conformity to the images we form of them. All this is an object of the plainest experience, and depends not on any hypothesis of philosophy. That science can only be admitted to explain the phenomena, though at the same time it must be confessed, they are so clear of themselves that there is but little occasion to employ it. For besides the relation of cause and effect by which we are convinced of the reality of the passion with which we sympathize, besides this, I say, we must be assisted by the relations of resemblance and contiguity in order to feel the sympathy in its full perfection. And since these relations can entirely convert an idea into an impression and convey the vivacity of the latter into the former so perfectly as to lose nothing of it in the transition, we may easily conceive how the relation of cause and effect alone may serve to strengthen and enliven an idea. In sympathy there is an evident conversion of an idea into an impression. This conversion arises from the relation of objects to our self. Our self is always intimately present to us. Let us compare all these circumstances, and we shall find that sympathy is exactly correspondent to the operations of our understanding, and even contains something more surprising and extraordinary. It is now time to turn our view from the general consideration of sympathy to its influence on pride and humility when these passions arise from praise and blame, from reputation and infamy. We may observe that no person is ever praised by another for any quality which would not, if real, produce of itself a pride in the person possessed of it. The elogiums either turn upon his power, or riches, or family, or virtue, all of which are subjects of vanity that we have already explained and accounted for. It is certain then that if a person considered himself in the same light in which he appears to his admirer, he would first receive a separate pleasure and afterwards a pride or self-satisfaction according to the hypothesis above explained. Now nothing is more natural than for us to embrace the opinions of others in this particular, both from sympathy which renders all their sentiments intimately present to us, and from reasoning which makes us regard their judgment as a kind of argument for what they affirm. These two principles of authority and sympathy influence almost all our opinions, but must have a peculiar influence when we judge of our own worth and character. Such judgments are always attended with passion. See Book 1, Part 3, Section 10. And nothing tends more to disturb our understanding and precipitate us into any opinions however unreasonable than their connection with passion, which diffuses itself over the imagination and gives an additional force to every related idea, to which we may add that being conscious of great partiality in our own favor we are peculiarly pleased with anything that confirms the good opinion we have of ourselves and are easily shocked with whatever opposes it. All this appears very probable in theory, but in order to bestow a full certainty on this reasoning we must examine the phenomena of the passions and see if they agree with it. Among these phenomena we may esteem it a very favorable one to our present purpose that though fame in general be agreeable, yet we receive a much greater satisfaction from the approbation of those whom we ourselves esteem and approve of than of those whom we hate and despise. In like manner we are principally mortified with the contempt of persons upon whose judgment we set some value and are in a great measure indifferent about the opinions of the rest of mankind. But if the mind received from any original instinct a desire of fame and aversion to infamy, fame and infamy would influence us without distinction, and every opinion, according as it were favorable or unfavorable, would equally excite that desire or aversion. The judgment of a fool is the judgment of another person as well as that of a wise man, and is only inferior in its influence on our own judgment. We are not only better pleased with the approbation of a wise man than with that of a fool, but receive an additional satisfaction from the former when it is obtained after a long and intimate acquaintance. This is accounted for after the same manner. The praises of others never give us much pleasure unless they concur with our own opinion and extol us for those qualities in which we chiefly excel. A mere soldier little values the character of eloquence, a gown man of courage, a bishop of humor, or a merchant of learning. Whatever esteem a man may have for any quality abstractedly considered, when he is conscious he is not possessed of it. The opinions of the whole world will give him little pleasure in that particular, and that because they never will be able to draw his own opinion after them. Nothing is more usual than for men of good families, but narrow circumstances, to leave their friends and country, and rather seek their livelihood by mean and mechanical employments among strangers than among those who are acquainted with their birth and education. We shall be unknown, say they, where we go. Nobody will suspect from what family we are sprung. We shall be removed from all our friends and acquaintance, and our poverty and meanness will by that means fit more easily upon us. In examining these sentiments I find they afford many very convincing arguments for my present purpose. First we may infer from them that the uneasiness of being contempt depends on sympathy, and that sympathy depends on the relation of objects to ourselves since we are most uneasy under the contempt of persons who are both related to us by blood and contiguous in place. Hence we seek to diminish this sympathy and uneasiness by separating these relations and placing ourselves in a contiguity to strangers and at a distance from relations. Secondly, we may conclude that relations are requisite to sympathy, not absolutely considered as relations, but by their influence in converting our ideas of the sentiments of others into the very sentiments by means of the association betwixt the idea of their persons and that of our own. For here the relations of kindred and contiguity both subsist, but not being united in the same persons they contribute in a less degree to the sympathy. Thirdly, this very circumstance of the diminution of sympathy by the separation of relations is worthy of our attention. Suppose I am placed in a poor condition among strangers and consequently am but lightly treated. I yet find myself easier in that situation than when I was every day exposed to the contempt of my kindred and countrymen. Here I feel a double contempt from my relations, but they are absent from those about me, but they are strangers. This double contempt is likewise strengthened by the two relations of kindred and contiguity, but as the persons are not the same who are connected with me by those two relations, this difference of ideas separates the impressions arising from the contempt and keeps them from running into each other. The contempt of my neighbors has a certain influence, as has also that of my kindred. But these influences are distinct and never unite, as when the contempt proceeds from persons who are at once both my neighbors and kindred. This phenomenon is analogous to the system of pride and humility above explained, which may seem so extraordinary to vulgar apprehensions. Fourthly, a person in these circumstances naturally conceals his birth from those among whom he lives, and is very uneasy if anyone suspects him to be of a family much superior to his present fortune and way of living. Everything in this world is judged of by comparison. What is an immense fortune for a private gentleman is beggary for a prince. A peasant would think himself happy in what cannot afford necessities for a gentleman. When a man has either been accustomed to a more splendid way of living, or thinks himself entitled to it by his birth and quality, everything below is disagreeable and even shameful, and it is with the greatest industry he conceals his pretensions to a better fortune. Here he himself knows his misfortunes, but as those with whom he lives are ignorant of them, he has the disagreeable reflection and comparison suggested only by his own thoughts, and never receives it by a sympathy with others, which must contribute very much to his ease and satisfaction. If there be any objections to this hypothesis, that the pleasure which we receive from praise arises from a communication of sentiments, we shall find upon examination that these objections, when taken in a proper light, will serve to confirm it. Popular fame may be agreeable even to a man who despises the vulgar, but it is because their multitude gives them additional weight and authority. Plagiaries are delighted with praises which they are conscious they do not deserve, but this is a kind of castle building, where the imagination amuses itself with its own fictions and strives to render them firm and stable by a sympathy with the sentiments of others. Proud men are most shocked with contempt, though they do not most readily assent to it, but it is because of the opposition betwixt the passion which is natural to them, and that received by sympathy. A violent lover, in like manner, is very much displeased when you blame and condemn his love, though it is evident your opposition can have no influence but by the hold it takes of himself and by his sympathy with you. If he despises you or perceives you are ingest, whatever you say has no effect upon him. OF THE PRIDE AND HUMILITY OF ANIMALS As in whatever light we consider this subject, we may still observe that the causes of pride and humility correspond exactly to our hypothesis, and that nothing can excite either of these passions unless it be both related to ourselves and produces a pleasure or pain independent of the passion. We have not only proved that a tendency to produce pleasure or pain is common to all the causes of pride or humility, but also that it is the only thing which is common, and consequently is the quality by which they operate. We have further proved that the most considerable causes of these passions are really nothing but the power of producing either agreeable or uneasy sensations, and therefore that all their effects, and amongst the rest, pride and humility, are derived solely from that origin. Such simple and natural principles founded on such solid proofs cannot fail to be received by philosophers unless opposed by some objections that have escaped me. It is usual with anatomists to join their observations and experiments on human bodies to those on beasts, and from the agreement of these experiments to derive an additional argument for any particular hypothesis. It is indeed certain that where the structure of parts in brutes is the same as in men, and the operation of these parts also the same, the causes of that operation cannot be different, and that whatever we discover to be true of the one species may be concluded without hesitation to be certain of the other. Thus though the mixture of humours and the composition of minute parts may justly be presumed to be somewhat different in men from what it is in mere animals, and therefore any experiment we make upon the one concerning the effects of medicines will not always apply to the other, yet as the structure of the veins and muscles, the fabric and situation of the heart, of the lungs, the stomach, the liver, and other parts are the same or nearly the same in all animals, the very same hypothesis which in one species explains muscular motion, the progress of the chile, the circulation of the blood must be applicable to everyone, and according as it agrees or disagrees with the experiments we may make in any species of creatures, we may draw a proof of its truth or falsehood on the whole. Let us therefore apply this method of inquiry which is found so just and useful in reasonings concerning the body to our present anatomy of the mind, and see what discoveries we can make by it. In order to this we must first shoe the correspondence of passions in men and animals, and afterwards compare the causes which produce these passions. It is plain that almost in every species of creatures, but especially of the nobler kind, there are many evident marks of pride and humility. The very port and gate of a swan, or turkey, or peacock, show the high idea he has entertained of himself and his contempt of all others. This is the more remarkable that in the two last species of animals the pride always attends to beauty and is discovered in the male only. The vanity and emulation of nightingales in singing have been commonly remarked as likewise that of horses in swiftness, of hounds in sagacity and smell, of the bull and cock in strength, and of every other animal in his particular excellency. Add to this that every species of creatures which approach so often to man as to familiarize themselves with him show an evident pride in his approbation and are pleased with his praises and caresses, independent of every other consideration. Nor are they the caresses of everyone without distinction which give them this vanity, but those principally of the persons they know and love in the same manner as that passion is excited in mankind. All these are evident proofs that pride and humility are not merely human passions, but extend themselves over the whole animal creation. The causes of these passions are likewise much the same in beasts as in us, making a just allowance for our superior knowledge and understanding. Thus animals have little or no sense of virtue or vice. They quickly lose sight of the relations of blood and are incapable of that of right and property. For which reason the causes of their pride and humility must lie solely in the body and can never be placed either in the mind or external objects? But so far as regards the body the same qualities cause pride in the animal as in the humankind, and it is on beauty, strength, swiftness, or some other useful or agreeable quality that this passion is always founded. The next question is whether, since those passions are the same and arise from the same causes through the whole creation, the matter in which the causes operate be also the same. According to all rules of analogy, this is justly to be expected. And if we find upon trial that the explication of these phenomena which we make use of in one species will not apply to the rest, we may presume that that explication however specious is in reality without foundation. In order to decide this question let us consider that there is evidently the same relation of ideas and derive from the same causes in the minds of animals as in those of men. A dog that has hit a bone often forgets the place, but when brought to it his thought passes easily to what he formerly concealed by means of the contiguity which produces a relation among his ideas. In like manner, when he has been heartily beat in any place, he will tremble on his approach to it, even though he discover no signs of any present danger. The effects of resemblance are not so remarkable, but as that relation makes a considerable ingredient in causation, of which all animals shoot so evident a judgment, we may conclude that the three relations of resemblance, contiguity and causation operate in the same manner upon beasts as upon human creatures. There are also instances of the relation of impressions sufficient to convince us that there is an union of certain affections with each other in the inferior species of creatures as well as in the superior, and that their minds are frequently conveyed through a series of connected emotions. A dog, when elevated with joy, runs naturally into love and kindness, whether of his master or of the sex. In like manner, when full of pain and sorrow, he becomes quarrelsome and ill-natured, and that passion which at first was grief is by the smallest occasion converted into anger. Thus all the internal principles that are necessary in us to produce either pride or humility are common to all creatures. And since the causes which excite these passions are likewise the same, we may justly conclude that these causes operate after the same manner through the whole animal creation. My hypothesis is so simple and supposes so little reflection and judgment that it is applicable to every sensible creature, which must not only be allowed to be a convincing proof of its ferocity, but I am confident will be found an objection to every other system. End of File 12, File 13 of a Treatise of Human Nature by David Hume, Volume 2 This LibriVox recording is in the public domain, recording by George Yeager, Book 2 of the Passions, Part 2 of Love and Hatred, Section 1 of the Objects and Causes of Love and Hatred. It is altogether impossible to give any definition of the passions of love and hatred, and that because they produce merely a simple impression, without any mixture or composition, it would be as unnecessary to attempt any description of them drawn from their nature, origin, causes and objects, and that both because these are the subjects of our present inquiry and because these passions of themselves are sufficiently known from our common feeling and experience. This we have already observed concerning pride and humility, and here repeat it concerning love and hatred, and indeed there is so great a resemblance betwixt these two sets of passions that we shall be obliged to begin with a kind of abridgment of our reasonings concerning the former in order to explain the latter. Because the immediate object of pride and humility is self or that identical person of whose thoughts, actions and sensations we are intimately conscious, so the object of love and hatred is some other person of whose thoughts, actions and sensations we are not conscious. This is sufficiently evident from experience. Our love and hatred are always directed to some sensible being external to us, and when we talk of self-love it is not in a proper sense, nor has the sensation it produces anything in common with that tender emotion which is excited by a friend or mistress. It is the same case with hatred. We may be mortified by our own faults and follies, but never feel any anger or hatred except from the injuries of others. But though the object of love and hatred be always some other person, it is plain that the object is not, properly speaking, the cause of these passions, or alone sufficient to excite them. For since love and hatred are directly contrary in their sensation and have the same object in common, if that object were also their cause it would produce these opposite passions in an equal degree, and as they must from the very first moment destroy each other, none of them would ever be able to make its appearance. There must therefore be some cause different from the object. If we consider the causes of love and hatred we shall find they are very much diversified and have not many things in common. The virtue, knowledge, wit, good sense, good humor of any person produce love and esteem as the opposite qualities hatred and contempt. The same passions arise from bodily accomplishments such as beauty, force, swiftness, dexterity, and from their contraries as likewise from the external advantages and disadvantages of family, possessions, clothes, nation, and climate. There is not one of these objects, but what by its different qualities may produce love and esteem, or hatred and contempt. From the view of these causes we may derive a new distinction betwixt the quality that operates and the subject on which it is placed. A prince that is possessed of a stately palace commands the esteem of the people upon that account, and that first by the beauty of the palace and secondly by the relation of property which connects it with him. The removal of either of these destroys the passion which evidently proves that the cause is a compounded one. It would be tedious to trace the passions of love and hatred through all the observations which we have formed concerning pride and humility and which are equally applicable to both sets of passions. It will be sufficient to remark in general that the object of love and hatred is evidently some thinking person, and that the sensation of the former passion is always agreeable and of the latter uneasy. We may also suppose with some shoe of probability that the cause of both these passions is always related to a thinking being, and that the cause of the former produce a separate pleasure and of the latter a separate uneasiness. One of these suppositions, that is, that the cause of love and hatred must be related to a person or thinking being in order to produce these passions, is not only probable but too evident to be contested. Virtue and vice when considered in the abstract, beauty and deformity when placed on inanimate objects, poverty and riches when belonging to a third person, excite no degree of love or hatred, esteem or contempt toward those who have no relation to them. A person looking out at a window sees me in the street and beyond me a beautiful palace with which I have no concern. I believe none will pretend that this person will pay me the same respect as if I were owner of the palace. It is not so evident at first sight that a relation of impressions is requisite to these passions, and that because in the transition the one impression is so much confounded with the other that they become in a manner undistinguishable. But as in pride and humility, we have easily been able to make the separation and to prove that every cause of these passions produces a separate pain or pleasure. I might here observe the same method with the same success in examining particularly the several causes of love and hatred. But as I hasten to a full and decisive proof of these systems, I delay this examination for a moment, and in the meantime shall endeavor to convert to my present purpose all my reasonings concerning pride and humility by an argument that is founded on unquestionable experience. There are few persons that are satisfied with their own character or genius or fortune who are not desirous of shooing themselves to the world and of acquiring the love and approbation of mankind. Now it is evident that the very same qualities and circumstances which are the causes of pride or self-esteem are also the causes of vanity or the desire of reputation, and that we always put to view those particulars with which in ourselves we are best satisfied. But if love and esteem were not produced by the same qualities as pride according as these qualities are related to ourselves or others, this method of proceeding would be very absurd, nor could men expect a correspondence in the sentiments of every other person with those themselves have entertained. It is true few can form exact systems of the passions or make reflections on their general nature and resemblances. But without such a progress in philosophy we are not subject to many mistakes in this particular, but are sufficiently guided by common experience as well as by a kind of presensation which tells us what will operate on others by what we feel immediately in ourselves. Since then the same qualities that produce pride or humility cause love or hatred, all the arguments that have been employed to prove that the causes of the former passions excite a pain or pleasure independent of the passion will be applicable with equal evidence to the causes of the latter. End of File 13 File 14 of a Treatise of Human Nature by David Hume, Volume 2 This LibriVox recording is in the public domain. Recording by George Yeager, Book 2 of the Passions, Part 2 of Love and Hatred, Section 2, Experiments to Confirm This System. On duly weighing these arguments no one will make any scruple to assent to that conclusion I draw from them concerning the transition along related impressions and ideas, especially as it is a principle in itself so easy and natural. But that we may place this system beyond doubt both with regard to love and hatred, pride and humility, it will be proper to make some new experiments upon all these passions as well as to recall a few of these observations which I have formally touched upon. In order to make these experiments let us suppose I am in company with a person whom I formally regarded without any sentiments either of friendship or enmity. Whether I have the natural and ultimate object of all these four passions placed before me, myself am the proper object of pride or humility, the other person of love or hatred. Regard now with attention the nature of these passions and their situation with respect to each other. It is evident here are four affections placed as it were in a square or regular connection with and distance from each other. The passions of pride and humility as well as those of love and hatred are connected together by the identity of their object which to the first set of passions is self to the second some other person. These two lines of communication or connection form two opposite sides of the square. Again pride and love are agreeable passions, hatred and humility uneasy. This similitude of sensation betwixt pride and love and that betwixt humility and hatred form a new connection and may be considered as the other two sides of the square. On the whole pride is connected with humility, love with hatred by their objects or ideas, pride with love, humility with hatred by their sensations or impressions. I say then that nothing can produce any of these passions without bearing it a double relation that is of ideas to the object of the passion and of sensation to the passion itself. This we must prove by our experiments. First experiment. To proceed with the greater order in these experiments let us first suppose that being placed in the situation above mentioned that is in company with some other person there is an object presented that has no relation either of impressions or ideas to any of these passions. Thus suppose we regard together an ordinary stone or other common object belonging to neither of us and causing of itself no emotion or independent pain and pleasure. It is evident such an object will produce none of these four passions. Let us try it upon each of them successively. Let us apply it to love, to hatred, to humility, to pride. None of them ever arises in the smallest degree imaginable. Let us change the object as often as we please provided still we choose one that has neither of these two relations. Let us repeat the experiment in all the dispositions of which the mind is susceptible. No object in the vast variety of nature will in any disposition produce any passion without these relations. And since an object that wants both these relations can never produce any passion let us bestow on it only one of these relations and see what will follow. Thus suppose I regard a stone or any common object that belongs either to me or my companion and by that means acquires a relation of ideas to the object of the passions. It is plain that to consider the matter a priori no emotion of any kind can reasonably be expected. For besides that a relation of ideas operates secretly and calmly on the mind it bestows an equal impulse towards the opposite passions of pride and humility, love and hatred, according as the object belongs to ourselves or others, which opposition of the passions must destroy both and leave the mind perfectly free from any affection or emotion. This reasoning a priori is confirmed by experience. No trivial or vulgar object that causes not a pain or pleasure independent of the passion will ever by its property or other relations either to ourselves or others be able to produce the affections of pride or humility, love or hatred. Third experiment. It is evident therefore that a relation of ideas is not able alone to give rise to these affections. Let us now remove this relation and in its stead place a relation of impressions by presenting an object which is agreeable or disagreeable but has no relation either to our self or companion, and let us observe the consequences. To consider the matter first a priori as in the preceding experiment we may conclude that the object will have a small but an uncertain connection with these passions. For besides that this relation is not a cold and imperceptible one it has not the inconvenience of the relation of ideas nor directs us with equal force to two contrary passions which by their opposition destroy each other. But if we consider on the other hand that this transition from the sensation to the affection is not forwarded by any principle that produces a transition of ideas but on the contrary that though the one impression be easily transfused into the other yet the change of objects is supposed contrary to all the principles that cause a transition of that kind. We may from thence infer that nothing will ever be a steady or durable cause of any passion that is connected with the passion merely by a relation of impressions. What our reason would conclude from analogy after balancing these arguments would be that an object which produces pleasure or uneasiness but has no manner of connection either with ourselves or others may give such a turn to the disposition as that it may naturally fall into pride or love, humility or hatred and search for other objects upon which by a double relation it can found these affections. But that an object which has only one of these relations though the most advantageous one can never give rise to any constant and established passion. Most fortunately all this reasoning is found to be exactly conformable to experience and the phenomena of the passions. Suppose I were traveling with a companion through a country to which we are both utter strangers. It is evident that if the prospects be beautiful the roads agreeable and the ends commodious. This may put me into good humor both with myself and fellow traveler. But as we suppose that this country has no relation either to myself or friend it can never be the immediate cause of pride or love and therefore if I found not the passion on some other object that bears either of us a closer relation my emotions are rather to be considered as the overflowing of an elevate or humane disposition than as an established passion. The case is the same where the object produces uneasiness. Fourth experiment having found that neither an object without any relation of ideas or impressions nor an object that has only one relation can ever cause pride or humility, love or hatred. Reason alone may convince us without any further experiment that whatever has a double relation must necessarily excite these passions since it is evident they must have some cause. But to leave as little room for doubt as possible. Let us renew our experiments and see whether the event in this case answers our expectation. I choose an object such as virtue that causes a separate satisfaction. On this object I bestow a relation to self and find that from this disposition of affairs there immediately arises a passion. But what passion? Very one of pride to which this object bears a double relation. Its idea is related to that of self, the object of the passion. The sensation it causes resembles the sensation of the passion. That I may be sure I am not mistaken in this experiment I remove first one relation then another and find that each removal destroys the passion and leaves the object perfectly indifferent. But I am not content with this. I make a still further trial and instead of removing the relation I only change it for one of a different kind. I suppose the virtue to belong to my companion not to myself and observe what follows from this alteration. I immediately perceive the affections to wield about and leaving pride where there is only one relation that is of impressions fall to the side of love where they are attracted by a double relation of impressions and ideas. By repeating the same experiment in changing anew the relation of ideas I bring the affections back to pride. And by a new repetition I again place them at love or kindness. Being fully convinced of the influence of this relation I try the effects of the other. And by changing virtue for vice convert the pleasant impression which arises from the former into the disagreeable one which proceeds from the latter. The effect still answers expectation. Vice when placed on another excites by means of its double relations the passion of hatred instead of love which for the same reason arises from virtue. To continue the experiment I change anew the relation of ideas and suppose the vice to belong to myself what follows what is usual a subsequent change of the passion from hatred to humility this humility I convert into pride by a new change of the impression and find after all that I have completed the round and have by these changes brought back the passion to that very situation in which I first found it. But to make the matter still more certain I alter the object and instead of vice and virtue make the trial upon beauty and deformity riches and poverty power and servitude each of these objects runs the circle of the passions in the same manner by a change of their relations and in whatever order we proceed whether through pride love hatred humility or through humility hatred love pride the experiment is not in the least diversified esteem and contempt indeed arise on some occasions instead of love and hatred but these are at the bottom the same passions only diversified by some causes which we shall explain afterwards. Fifth experiment to give greater authority to these experiments let us change the situation of affairs as much as possible and place the passions and objects in all the different positions of which they are susceptible. Let us suppose beside the relations above mentioned that the person along with whom I make all these experiments is closely connected with me either by blood or friendship he is we shall suppose my son or brother or is united to me by a long and familiar acquaintance. Let us next suppose that the cause of the passion acquires a double relation of impressions and ideas to this person and let us see what the effects are of all these complicated attractions and relations before we consider what they are in fact let us determine what they ought to be conformable to my hypothesis it is plain that according as the impression is either pleasant or uneasy the passion of love or hatred must arise towards the person who is thus connected to the cause of the impression by these double relations which I have all along required the virtue of a brother must make me love him as his vice or infamy must excite the contrary passion but to judge only from the situation of affairs I should not expect that the affections would rest there and never transfuse themselves into any other impression as there is here a person who by means of a double relation is the object of my passion the very same reasoning leads me to think the passion will be carried farther the person has a relation of ideas to myself according to this opposition the passion of which he is the object by being either agreeable or uneasy has a relation of impressions to pride or humility it is evident then that one of these passions must arise from the love or hatred this is the reasoning I form in conformity to my hypothesis and am pleased to find upon trial that everything answers exactly to my expectation the virtue or vice of a son or brother not only excites love or hatred but by a new transition from similar causes gives rise to pride or humility nothing causes greater vanity than any shining quality in our relations as nothing mortifies us more than their vice or infamy this exact conformity of experience to our reasoning is a convincing proof of the solidity of that hypothesis upon which we reason 6 experiment this evidence will be still augmented if we reverse the experiment and preserving still the same relations begin only with a different passion suppose that instead of the virtue or vice of a son or brother which causes first love or hatred and afterwards pride or humility we place these good or bad qualities on ourselves without any immediate connection with the person who is related to us experience choose us that by this change of situation the whole chain is broke and that the mind is not conveyed from one passion to another as in the preceding instance we never love or hate a son or brother for the virtue or vice we discern in ourselves though it is evident the same qualities in him give us a very sensible pride or humility the transition from pride or humility to love or hatred is not so natural as from love or hatred to pride or humility this may at first sight be esteemed contrary to my hypothesis since the relations of impressions and ideas are in both cases precisely the same pride and humility are impressions related to love and hatred myself am related to the person it should therefore be expected that like causes must produce like effects and a perfect transition arrives from the double relation as in all other cases this difficulty we may easily solve by the following reflections it is evident that as we are at all times intimately conscious of ourselves our sentiments and passions their ideas must strike upon us with greater vivacity than the ideas of the sentiments and passions of any other person but everything that strikes upon us with vivacity and appears in a full and strong light forces itself in a manner into our consideration and becomes present to the mind on the smallest hint and most trivial relation for the same reason when it is once present it engages the attention and keeps it from wandering to other objects however strong may be their relation to our first object the imagination passes easily from obscure to lively ideas but with difficulty from lively to obscure in the one case the relation is aided by another principle in the other case it is opposed by it now I have observed that those two faculties of the mind the imagination and passion assist each other in their operations when their propensities are similar and when they act upon the same object the mind has always a propensity to pass from a passion to any other related to it and this propensity is forwarded when the object of the one passion is related to that of the other the two impulses concur with each other and render the whole transition more smooth and easy but if it should happen that while the relation of ideas strictly speaking continues the same it's influence in causing a transition of the imagination should no longer take place it is evident its influence on the passions must also cease as being dependent entirely on that transition this is the reason why pride or humility is not transfused into love or hatred with the same ease that the latter passions are changed into the former if a person be my brother I am his likewise but though the relations be reciprocal they have very different effects on the imagination the passage is smooth and open from the consideration of any person related to us to that of our self of whom we are every moment conscious but when the affections are once directed to our self the fancy passes not with the same facility from that object to any other person how closely so ever connected with us this easy or difficult transition of the imagination operates upon the passions and facilitates or retards their transition which is a clear proof that these two faculties of the passions and imagination are connected together and that the relations of ideas have an influence upon the affections besides innumerable experiments that prove this we here find that even when the relation remains if by any particular circumstance it's usual effect upon the fancy and producing an association or transition of ideas is prevented its usual effect upon the passions in conveying is from one to another is in like manner prevented some may perhaps find a contradiction betwixt this phenomenon and that sympathy where the mind passes easily from the idea of ourselves to that of any other object related to us but this difficulty will vanish if we consider that in sympathy our own person is not the object of any passion nor is there anything that fixes our attention on ourselves as in the present case where we are supposed to be actuated with pride or humility our self independent of the perception of every other object is in reality nothing for which reason we must turn our view to external objects and it is natural for us to consider with most attention such as lie contiguous to us or resemble us but when self is the object of a passion it is not natural to quit the consideration of it till the passion be exhausted in which case the double relations of impressions and ideas can no longer operate seventh experiment to put this whole reasoning to a further trial let us make a new experiment and as we have already seen the effects of related passions and ideas let us here suppose an identity of passions along with a relation of ideas and let us consider the effects of this new situation it is evident a transition of the passions from the one object to the other is here in all reason to be expected since the relation of ideas is supposed still to continue and an identity of impressions must produce a stronger connection than the most perfect resemblance that can be imagined if a double relation therefore of impressions and ideas is able to produce a transition from one to the other much more an identity of impressions with a relation of ideas accordingly we find that when we either love or hate any person the passions seldom continue within their first bounds but extend themselves towards all the contiguous objects and comprehend the friends and relations of him we love or hate nothing is more natural than to bear a kindness to one brother on account of our friendship for another without any further examination of his character a quarrel with one person gives us a hatred for the whole family though entirely innocent of that which displeases us instances of this kind are everywhere to be met with there is only one difficulty in this experiment which it will be necessary to account for before we proceed any further it is evident that though all passions pass easily from one object to another related to it yet this transition is made with greater facility where the more considerable object is first presented and the lesser follows it then where this order is reversed and the lesser takes the precedence thus it is more natural for us to love the son upon account of the father than the father upon account of the son the servant for the master than the master for the servant the subject for the prince then the prince for the subject in like manner we more readily contract a hatred against a whole family where our first quarrel is with the head of it then where we are displeased with a son or servant or some inferior member in short our passions like other objects descend with greater facility than they have sent that we may comprehend wherein consists the difficulty of explaining this phenomenon we must consider that the very same reason which determines the imagination to pass from remote to contiguous objects with more facility than from contiguous to remote causes it likewise to change with more ease the less for the greater than the greater for the less whatever has the greatest influence is most taken notice of and whatever is most taken notice of presents itself most readily to the imagination we are more apt to overlook in any subject what is trivial than what appears of considerable moment but especially if the latter takes the precedence and first engages our attention thus if any accident makes us consider the satellites of Jupiter our fancy is naturally determined to form the idea of that planet but if we first reflect on the principal planet it is more natural for us to overlook its attendance the mention of the provinces of any empire conveys our thought to the seat of the empire but the fancy returns not with the same facility to the consideration of the provinces the idea of the servant makes us think of the master that of the subject carries our view to the prince but the same relation has not an equal influence in conveying us back again and on this is founded that reproach of Cornelia to her sons that they ought to be ashamed she should be more known by the title of the daughter of Scipio than by that of the mother of the grouchy this was in other words exhorting them to render themselves as illustrious and famous as their grandfather otherwise the imagination of the people passing from her who was intermediate and placed in an equal relation to both would always leave them and denominate her by what was more considerable and of greater moment on the same principle is founded that common custom of making wives bear the name of their husbands rather than husbands that of their lives as also the ceremony of giving the presidency to those whom we honor and respect we might find many other instances to confirm this principle were it not already sufficiently evident now since the fancy finds the same facility in passing from the lesser to the greater as from remote to contiguous why does not this easy transition of ideas assist the transition of passions in the former case as well as in the latter the virtues of a friend or brother produce first love and then pride because in that case the imagination passes from remote to contiguous according to its propensity our own virtues produce not first pride and then love to a friend or brother because the passage in that case would be from contiguous to remote contrary to its propensity but the love or hatred of an inferior causes not readily any passion to the superior though that be the natural propensity of the imagination while the love or hatred of a superior causes a passion to the inferior contrary to its propensity in short the same facility of transition operates not in the same manner upon superior and inferior as upon contiguous and remote these two phenomena appear contradictory and require some attention to be reconciled as the transition of ideas is here made contrary to the natural propensity of the imagination that faculty must be overpowered by some stronger principle of another kind and as there is nothing ever present to the mind but impressions and ideas this principle must necessarily lie in the impressions now it has been observed that impressions or passions are connected only by their resemblance and that where any two passions place the mind in the same or in similar dispositions it very naturally passes from the one to the other as on the contrary a repugnance in the dispositions produces a difficulty in the transition of the passions but it is observable that this repugnance may arise from a difference of degree as well as of kind nor do we experience a greater difficulty in passing suddenly from a small degree of love to a small degree of hatred then from a small to a great degree of either of these affections a man when calm or only moderately agitated is so different in every respect from himself when disturbed with a violent passion that no two persons can be more unlike nor is it easy to pass from the one extreme to the other without a considerable interval betwixt them the difficulty is not less if it be not rather greater in passing from the strong passion to the weak then in passing from the weak to the strong provided the one passion upon its appearance destroys the other and they do not both of them exist at once but the case is entirely altered when the passions unite together and actuate the mind at the same time a weak passion when added to a strong makes not so considerable change in the disposition as a strong when added to a weak for which reason there is a closer connection betwixt the great degree and the small then betwixt the small degree and the great the degree of any passion depends upon the nature of its object and an affection directed to a person who is considerable in our eyes fills and possesses the mind much more than one which has for its object a person we esteem of less consequence here then the contradiction betwixt the propensities of the imagination and passion displays itself when we turn our thought to a great and a small object the imagination finds more facility in passing from the small to the great than from the great to the small but the affections find a greater difficulty and as the affections are a more powerful principle than the imagination no wonder they prevail over it and draw the mind to their side in spite of the difficulty of passing from the idea of great to that of little a passion directed to the former produces always a similar passion towards the latter when the great and little are related together the idea of the servant conveys our thought most readily to the master but the hatred or love of the master produces with greater facility anger or goodwill to the servant the strongest passion in this case takes the precedence and the addition of the weaker making no considerable change on the disposition the passage is by that means rendered more easy and natural betwixt them as in the foregoing experiment we found that a relation of ideas which by any particular circumstance ceases to produce its usual effect of facilitating the transition of ideas ceases likewise to operate on the passions so in the present experiment we find the same property of the impressions two different degrees of the same passion are surely related together but if the smaller be first present it has little or no tendency to introduce the greater and that because the addition of the great to the little produces a more sensible alteration on the temper than the addition of the little to the great these phenomena when duly weighed will be found convincing proofs of this hypothesis and these proofs will be confirmed if we consider the manner in which the mind here reconciles the contradiction i have observed betwixt the passions and the imagination the fancy passes with more facility from the less to the greater and from the greater to the less but on the contrary a violent passion produces more easily a feeble than that does a violent in this opposition the passion in the end prevails over the imagination but it is commonly by complying with it and by seeking another quality which may counterbalance that principle from whence the opposition arises when we love the father or master of a family we little think of his children or servants but when these are present with us or when it lies any ways in our power to serve them the nearness and contiguity in this case increases their magnitude or at least removes that opposition which the fancy makes to the transition of the affections if the imagination finds a difficulty in passing from greater to less it finds an equal facility in passing from remote to contiguous which brings the matter to an equality and leaves the way open from the one passion to the other eighth experiment i have observed that the transition from love or hatred to pride or humility is more easy than from pride or humility to love or hatred and that the difficulty which the imagination finds in passing from contiguous to remote is to cause why we scarce have any instance of the latter transition of the affections i must however make one exception that is when the very cause of the pride and humility is placed in some other person for in that case the imagination is necessitated to consider the person nor can it possibly confine its view to ourselves thus nothing more readily produces kindness and affection to any person than his approbation of our conduct and character as on the other hand nothing inspires us with a stronger hatred than his blame or contempt here it is evident that the original passion is pride or humility whose object is self and that this passion is transfused into love or hatred whose object is some other person notwithstanding the rule i have already established that the imagination passes with difficulty from contiguous to remote but the transition in this case is not made merely on account of the relation betwixt ourselves and the person but because that very person is the real cause of our first passion and of consequence is intimately connected with it it is his approbation that produces pride and disapprobation humility no wonder then the imagination returns back again attended with the related passions of love and hatred this is not a contradiction but an exception to the rule and an exception that arises from the same reason with the rule itself such an exception as this is therefore rather a confirmation of the rule and indeed if we consider all the eight experiments i have explained we shall find that the same principle appears in all of them and that it is by means of a transition arising from a double relation of impressions and ideas pride and humility love and hatred are produced an object without first experiment a relation or second and third experiments with but one never produces either of these passions and it is fourth experiment found that the passion always varies in conformity to the relation nay we may observe that where the relation by any particular circumstance has not its usual effect of producing a transition either of sixth experiment ideas or of impressions it ceases to operate upon the passions and gives rise neither to pride nor love humility nor hatred this rule we find still to hold good seventh and eight experiments even under the appearance of its contrary and as relation is frequently experienced to have no effect which upon examination is found to proceed from some particular circumstance that prevents the transition so even in instances where that circumstance though present prevents not the transition it is found to arise from some other circumstance which counterbalances it thus not only the variations resolve themselves into the general principle but even the variations of these variations end of file 14 file 15 of a treatise of human nature by david hume volume two this libra vox recording is in the public domain recording by george yeager book two of the passions part two of love and hatred section three difficulties solved after so many and such undeniable proofs drawn from daily experience and observation it may seem superfluous to enter into a particular examination of all the causes of love and hatred i shall therefore employ the sequel of this part first in removing some difficulties concerning particular causes of these passions secondly in examining the compound affections which arise from the mixture of love and hatred with other emotions nothing is more evident than that any person acquires our kindness or is exposed to our ill will in proportion to the pleasure or uneasiness we receive from him and that the passions keep pace exactly with the sensations in all their changes and variations whoever can find the means either by his services his beauty or his flattery to render himself useful or agreeable to us is sure of our affections as on the other hand whoever harms or displeases us never fails to excite our anger or hatred when our own nation is at war with any other we detest them under the character of cruel perfidious unjust and violent but always esteem ourselves and allies equitable moderate and merciful if the general of our enemies be successful it is with difficulty we allow him the figure and character of a man he is a sorcerer he has a communication with demons as is reported of oliver cromwell and the duke of luxembourg he is bloody minded and takes a pleasure in death and destruction but if the success be on our side our commander has all the opposite good qualities and is a pattern of virtue as well as of courage and conduct his treachery we call policy his cruelty is an evil inseparable from war in short every one of his faults we either endeavor to extenuate or dignify it with the name of that virtue which approaches it it is evident the same method of thinking runs through common life there are some who add another condition and require not only that the pain and pleasure arise from the person but likewise that it arise knowingly and with a particular design and intention a man who wounds and harms us by accident becomes not our enemy upon that account nor do we think ourselves bound by any ties of gratitude to one who does us any service after the same manner by the intention we judge of the actions and according as that is good or bad they become causes of love or hatred but here we must make a distinction if that quality in another which pleases or displeases be constant and inherent in his person and character it will cause love or hatred independent of the intention but otherwise a knowledge and design is requisite in order to give rise to these passions one that is disagreeable by his deformity or folly is the object of our aversion though nothing be more certain than that he has not the least intention of displeasing us by these qualities but if the uneasiness proceed not from a quality but an action which is produced and annihilated in a moment it is necessary in order to produce some relation and connect this action sufficiently with the person that it be derived from a particular forethought and design it is not enough that the action arise from the person and have him for its immediate cause and author this relation alone is too feeble and inconstant to be a foundation for these passions it reaches not the sensible and thinking part and neither proceeds from anything durable in him nor leaves anything behind it but passes in a moment and is as if it had never been on the other hand an intention shoes certain qualities which remaining after the action is performed connected with the person and facilitate the transition of ideas from one to the other we can never think of him without reflecting on these qualities unless repentance and a change of life have produced an alteration in that respect in which case the passion is likewise altered this therefore is one reason why an intention is requisite to excite either love or hatred but we must further consider that an intention besides its strengthening the relation of ideas is often necessary to produce a relation of impressions and give rise to pleasure and uneasiness for it is observable that the principal part of an injury is the contempt and hatred which it shoes in the person that injures us and without that the mere harm gives us a less sensible uneasiness in like manner a good office is agreeable chiefly because it flatters our vanity and is a proof of the kindness and esteem of the person who performs it the removal of the intention removes the mortification in the one case and vanity in the other and must of course cause a remarkable diminution in the passions of love and hatred i grant that these effects of the removal of design in diminishing the relations of impressions and ideas are not entire nor able to remove every degree of these relations but then i ask if the removal of design be able entirely to remove the passion of love and hatred experience i am sure informs us of the contrary nor is there anything more certain than that men often fall into a violent anger for injuries which they themselves must own to be entirely involuntary and accidental this emotion indeed cannot be of long continuance but still is sufficient to shoe that there is a natural connection betwixt uneasiness and anger and that the relation of impressions will operate upon a very small relation of ideas but when the violence of the impression is once a little abated the defect of the relation begins to be better felt and as the character of a person is no wise interested in such injuries as are casual and involuntary it seldom happens that on their account we entertain a lasting enmity to illustrate this doctrine by a parallel instance we may observe that not only the uneasiness which proceeds from another by accident has but little force to excite our passion but also that which arises from an acknowledged necessity and duty one that has a real design of harming us proceeding not from hatred and ill will but from justice and equity draws not upon him our anger if we be in any degree reasonable not withstanding he is both the cause and the knowing cause of our sufferings let us examine a little this phenomenon it is evident in the first place that this circumstance is not decisive and though it may be able to diminish the passions it is seldom it can entirely remove them how few criminals are there who have no ill will to the person that accuses them or to the judge that condemns them even though they be conscious of their own desserts in like manner our antagonists in a lawsuit and our competitor for any office are commonly regarded as our enemies though we must acknowledge if we would but reflect a moment that their motive is entirely as justifiable as our own besides we may consider that when we receive harm from any person we are apt to imagine him criminal and it is with extreme difficulty we allow of his justice and innocence this is a clear proof that independent of the opinion of iniquity any harm or uneasiness has a natural tendency to excite our hatred and that afterwards we seek for reasons upon which we may justify and establish the passion here the idea of injury produces not the passion but arises from it nor is it any wonder that passion should produce the opinion of injury since otherwise it must suffer a considerable diminution which all the passions avoid as much as possible the removal of injury may remove the anger without proving that the anger arises only from the injury the harm and the justice are two contrary objects of which the one has a tendency to produce hatred and the other love and it is according to their different degrees and our particular turn of thinking that either of the objects prevails and excites its proper passion end of file 15