 I welcome you to this lecture forum. Our honored guest this afternoon is the author of so many books and articles that we have to devote another lecture just to their admiration, but by way of introduction. Man, economy, and state, power, and market. What has government done to our money for new liberty? America's Great Depression, the Panic of 1819. And he's presently completing the fifth volume of his five volume work on American colonial and revolutionary periods conceived in liberty. He's without a doubt a great historian, political scientist, and an economist extra ordinary. But when people read Professor Rothbard's works, especially his historical works, they get very disturbed. And there's a lot of disagreement among them, among other reasons, because they can't quite place them in any established school of historical interpretation. Some people think that he's part of this breed of new right historians. Well, others think he's closer to new left revisionists. But then of course they know he's in the great tradition of the Austrian School of Economics that he is in fact a free market anarchist, the so-called guru of the strange libertarian movement. But I think that there is no disagreement over the fact that our honored guest is truly a unique scholar. On behalf of the Undergraduate History Society and the NYU History Department, it is my distinct honor and pleasure to introduce to you Professor Marni and Rothbard. Thank you very much. It's true I do see a lot of disturb a lot of people, right? I think it was Karl Weigler who told me a new left historian. He studied on the left. And Robert Ziegler, an overview of Hoover's scholarship a few years ago, mentioned me along with others simply as a soldier in the ranks of Hoover revisionism. And he singled me out of a very disturbing book. And he kept going on like that, as if he sort of had a fit. I'm reading it. So I guess it must be something in your statement. I don't know exactly what it is. I should know if I can bottle it. And anyway, this is going to be a very bold talk. And since I'm roaming over and trying to roam more of an old American history in a half, think it was a half hour. And presenting a new paradigm, many of you think I have interpreted American history, obviously I can't prove it in 45 minutes. Even in longer times, it's going to be difficult to prove. There's a lot of evidence, obviously, piling up as a way of looking at different aspects of American history. The basic view of history in general, my basic view of history in general, not just American history, is the general contest between liberty and power. The thing is, this is what, being interested in the question of liberty and power, I singled this out as a problem. They're not saying they're not other aspects. They're not saying they're not other aspects of history than our course. Certainly, these are the aspects that I focus on. I think that being the most interesting was important. And in this contest between liberty and power, which ranges over all of history, European, Asian, or whatever, there's a, I find it very fruitful to consider Albert J. Knox as a libertarian theorist, social theorist historian in the 1920s and 30s, the distinction he made between what he called social power and state power. But he called social power, what he defined as social power, was simply the results of voluntary social interaction among people. And the market economy, these results are free exchange, free market exchanges. And the capital equipment and prosperity of Israel's tip. And in non-market sense, it gives rise to civilization, art, science, friendship, all sorts of cultural expressions, all of which are voluntary interactions between people, which he defines as society. Society being a label for an array of social and voluntary human interactions. So social powers might cause the resultableness of power over nature, civilization, culture, economic prosperity. In contrast to that, there's state power, which is power over people, force, coercion, the monopoly, the attempt of monopoly of violence in the territorial area. Albert J. Knox took the basic, the very definition of government as the state. As an institution trying to obtain a monopoly of violence in a given territorial area, he changed it slightly with some significant impact. Namely, he said, the state of that institution which tries to obtain a monopoly of crime is a territorial area. Since it's revenue, and first of all, it's rooted in taxation and organized theft. And it's what it does with it, is generally also pushing people around in various ways. Now, you don't have to be libertarian to have to, well, as you said, complete that thought. Not then, so history, all of human history is essentially a race between social power and state power. In other words, social power creates creative industry. Social power is constantly, is creating prosperity, capital equipment, civilization, culture, and so forth. State power is parasitic and moves up to take charge of it, exploit it, control it, regulate it, repress it. So we have these two forces, basically, in world history, social power and state power. And the progressive periods in history of those were social power that was spurred ahead of state power, such as the 18th and 19th centuries. The regressive periods in history where the state is able to catch up at the state of the social power and cripple it. And such as most of the 20th century. OK, so that's a very brief overview. The very specific, it comes out in American history, and happily turns out that this analysis of liberty versus power is not only, it should be important for almost everybody who's a historian, because in fact, it provides a key to most of American political development. The matter of fact, and again, this is tough to pigeonhole me in a different school of historical thought, you're looking for three important paradigms in the last 20 years, which I think any historian, not just libertarian historian, should use to explain American history, the names of very disparate names of Balon, Kleppner, and Koka, Kameleon, and Mon. All of whom are very different, but all of whom seems to me add to this particular libertarian paradigm. Now, in order to adopt libertarian paradigm in my way, you don't have to be libertarian. That's, I think, should be an important point out. You can either be in favor of power against liberty, or you can be indifferent to it. This is not the point. The point is that it seems to me this paradigm stands by itself as an explanatory device to explain what's going on in American history. OK, to get to the start-off list in colonial history, the liberty versus power theme becomes very important from the very beginning. The first place, many of the, first place we have a great disparate group of colonists coming out, obviously. Some of them come out to achieve liberty, or to find liberty in various ways. Others come out for very different purposes. But since they come out in a great, just a few people in a large continent, there's a little bit of this as a regular diversity, in regular areas where libertarianism takes hold, even without the theory to expound liberty. I think, for example, it's pretty clear to me anyway that the main coast, the main coast for about 100 years or so, and the North Carolina coast for about 30 or 40 years, an albomoral, there's an anarchist situation in which there's a lot of people around and no government. At least that's the way it appears. North Carolina fishermen and farmers basically fleeing from what they consider Virginia despots of liberty. And the main fishermen sort of, either we find out sure if they're fleeing or not, I don't think there's too much of a matter that they were there, especially when they didn't have any governmental institutions. And as I say, they haven't been studying much. I don't even know if they can be studying much, they bothered about leaving documents, which was one of the problems of social histories that not everybody, especially if they don't have intellectuals, churches amongst them, bothers with documents. At any rate, it appears that they were going, they got along pretty well and they were fairly prosperous. They had no governmental institutions. There did not seem to be any energy advance ramping amongst them. More specifically, we know more about Rhode Island. The Rhode Island colonies were specifically founded as refugees from Massachusetts Bay, that's with us. We know a lot more about them. It has been, I'm sure that I know it would be something that's going on in historiography. I recognize that the attacks on Massachusetts Bay are no longer fashionable, that with after World War II became the ruling trend of Perry Miller and others to say that the Puritan of the Long Island Massachusetts Bay were really great people largely because they were quite learned in the Greek and Latin and Hebrew and so forth. I admit they're quite learned. I can see that at the very beginning. I really don't care. It's a question of what your basic interests are. I still think they were tyrants and best bots. And generally, it's conjured up in the word Puritan emerges. I think that they pioneered, certainly in Morocco, they pioneered on the Chinese communist block, you know, a block tearing path and point each block, awarding for each block, spying on the neighbors or import back to the church and things of that nature. Any rate, so you have different religious revolutions or revotes from, since they're revolutions. This dissent from Massachusetts Bay and the ejection of these people from the colony, starting with Roger Williams and Hutchinson and others. In the course of their, expressing their dissent, was a theory of practice. Both Roger Williams and Hutchinson arrived at very libertarian expression theories and also libertarian institutions when they got the Rhode Island. So we have at least quasi-anarchistic colonies in the Rhode Island. The Roger Williams was the most radical and the most libertarian in the period, in his early period when he was also custom-touched with his leveler and sword at that point, winning in the English Civil War. And it's one thing that we have to remember is that they, even though it took a long time to go back and forth across the ocean, mostly people traveled quite a bit. And so Williams made several trips to England and he made a trip where he, when the levelers were almost winning, right at the dominant point, they greatly influenced his libertarian direction. That's no accident I take when Williams got more conservative and more statist, to put it later on. It was also during the period when Cromwell had already taken over and wiped out the levelers and it stole his own particular despotism. So then in theory and practice, Williams then gets either pragmatic reason just because he was giving up, because more and more statists starts talking about the ship of state has to have a Humsman and all that stuff. He begins to violate his own religious living principles. But anyway, certainly the first religious, he certainly applied, took quite late in his life, he applied religious libertarianism quite thoroughly. He got pretty aggravated and the Quakers came in because he thought they were going too far and made this respectful of authority. But by that time, the same is getting older and more conservative. And Anne Hutchinson was the second major dissenter. He was also kicked out of Massachusetts Bay and both of them, by the way, separately both Williams and Anderson walked all the way from Massachusetts to Rhode Island, in the middle of the winters. And he's still, I can't understand how they did it. And we must be much more hearty than I am. Looking, there were no roads, don't forget, a lot of planes, highways, buses. And they walked to, I don't set up their own colony. And I'm right, Anne Hutchinson, on the course of also coming out with a religious position of religious liberty, also, and when she got to, when she set up her own colony, she had this illusion of her own, her own ally, William Connick, who was sort of the head of the colony, because he was going to despot it too. And she then concluded that, not only is it illegitimate for the magistrate to intervene in religion, the magistrate being in the general term for government, it's also illegitimate for the magistrate to do anything at all, so intervene with anybody in any area. In other words, she was, I think, fair to say she's the first American anarchist. And so there was, and after she left for New York and was killed in the midst of an Indian uprising, so to speak, her tradition was carried on by her sister, Mrs. Catherine Scott, and I don't understand why the feminist historians haven't resurrected the people. There were extremely heroic people, as well as the Italian. Her sister, Mrs. Catherine Scott, went carrying on, carrying on. She and others found the first Baptist church in America, the old anarchists. They were known as the backward anarchists. Again, not very long as known about their ideological views, one thing has been practicable to study. So I'm not sure if anybody, if you did study them, what we'd find. But anyway, it seems to be fairly clear. And also Roger Williams' own brother became fairly anarchist and Robert Williams, and he engaged her rebellion against Rogers, and Roger was beginning to abandon the libertarian doctrine. Rebellion, of course, was put down. But anyway, there was a constant firmament, libertarian, firmament, both in theory and practice. The most charming example, the mean most charming example, an anarchistic institution in colonial America was in Pennsylvania, the Evelyn Bronner book. God's only experiment, I think, it was in some detail. And basically what it is that, for that period, Pennsylvania was quite populous, about 10,000 more people. And largely Quaker, and William Penn, after having set up the institution, went back to England, expected to collect his quick rides on his taxis. Since he kind of owned the whole territory, and also was the head of the colony, and it turned out that he wasn't getting them. And so the Bronner goes and hosts a charming story about Penn telling the death, and well, where are my taxis, where are my quick rides, when they're coming out? So that the, turns out that Pennsylvania was more or less pretty anarchistic, I'll say, very close to anarchism, for about 30 years altogether. A couple of carriage hiatus. There were no taxes being collected. The, I think it was Lloyd, William Lloyd, he was the keeper of the Great Seal, and part of the Pennsylvania charter was no legislative action, any action at all could be done without the Great Seal being stamped on the proceeding. He refused to use the stamp of the Great Seal. And so this effectively brought the government of Pennsylvania to a halt. No taxes were collected, very few local taxes, and local justice had only met a couple of weeks a year. So in effect, there was virtually no government for quite a while. And again, there was no report of rapine looting or anything of that sort. Everybody seemed to be quite peaceful and in fact happy in the situation. And so when Penn tried to restore the taxes in the government, that success then finally set John Blackwell a tough, pure, which was a rough, difficult thing for Penn to do. So he was violating his own quicker principles and putting it in pure, trying to collect taxes and re-impose government. And so the charming story, I think I can go on and on, I don't want to take too much time, but the great story, I think one of the great stories in American history is when Blackwell arrives in New York from England, he sends a message to Philadelphia that he's gonna arrive with a new governor of Pennsylvania. Everybody's gonna have to street to meet him with brass bands and whatever. And he arrives, there's nobody there. And there's only a few small boys to throw pebbles at him. So, it's a great way to celebrate that the military and the court in the state should always be treated. So Blackwell's getting increasingly insensitive and he goes to the city hall, he finds out it's all locked, there's cobwebs there, records of government that haven't been used for many years. And nobody's fucking taxing, he starts issuing orders and nobody obeys them. Generally, it's totally frustrating to finally have to go home. It's one of the great anarchistic victories. Eventually, of course, the crown re-imposes the parole after the 60s and 90s and so on, but for a while after about, I'd say 20, 30 years it was essentially an anarchistic situation. And I'd say this didn't seem to be anybody, everybody seems to enjoy a great deal. It didn't seem anybody's really in favor of ending it. There's also an enormous number of tax revenues going on all over the place. And almost every colony, another very charming thing which hasn't been studied much. I try to do as much as I can find in my own work, but it's just scratching the surface. The paradigmatic case, and there's a lot of New Jersey, I remember, for example, paradigmatic cases, somebody gets fused to pay his local taxes to some former, then the sheriff goes out and confiscates his cow in a little payment. He gets together with his brother or whatever and goes and liberates the cow from the local pokey. Using whatever necessary violences and tail liberating your cow. Then the local government gets sore, they mobilize the posse and so forth, go out and get the guy and arrest him. He then mobilizes and they do arrest him. His neighbors now are going to either free him, liberate him. This is constantly going on all the time. It's magnificent, just a great tradition of local tax rebellion moving in place. Okay, so after having sort of an anarch, excuse me, a very anarchistic kind of heritage in 1770, it doesn't mean all the colonies obviously are that way, but a lot of enough to make an imprint. Then after the weak settlement imposed around 1700, 1710, we have much more uniform kind of political system of the colonies. We then have a great new institution coming in, a very interesting new interplay of theory and institution. The first place, give me another remarkable kind of situation. We have the weak settlement, the weak party in England, essentially dominated by magnates, big landlords and big monopoly merchants. Try to impose mercantilism throughout through the empire. We have at the head of the weak party, a master politician, brilliant politician, one of the brilliant politicians of Robert Walpole, was the assistant, the Duke of Newcastle and his brother Henry Pellop. So these three guys, essentially the laissez-faire people, completely opposed the mercantilism in favor of minimal government, free trade, minimal taxes, and international peace, which is a very difficult to maintain is one of the big big programs is to crush the French mess, the crush frauds forever and grab the thumb far. So Walpole is kind of a custom pressure, of course, by the pro-war and mercantilist crap. We're gonna wigs to get moving. I'll impose the mercantilist legislation and declare and make war upon France. So he's able, however, to keep them in bay, I start with mechanisms, Walpole. They will run this whole thing sitting on top of, I like an assistant who's sitting on a volcano for about 20, 30 years, where he's finally kicked out. He's able to do it by running problems with system corruption through creating phony places, so to speak, rotten boroughs, contracts, phony, the equivalent blocks of pun-hole inspectors, you know, the king of the system, pun-hole inspectors of 10,000 a year or something, essentially doing nothing. And having a buying law from a large chunk of parliament in that way is able to keep things running. He's also, but he doesn't, American front, he passes all this mercantilist legislation with respect to American navigation, respect to manufacturing and trade and all the rest of it. He just doesn't enforce it. So the waves are happy with the castle legislation and the Americans are happy, they're not enforcing it. He did the Newcastle Charming figure. This is a major camp of this, who I really want to sleep most of the time. This is a conceptual wolf that's supposed to hire your relatives and go and snooze doing nothing. And it also leaves a fair person. So there's a great alliance, a color-blind alliance. Essentially, obviously, a long run couldn't work because it had no mass base, but it worked for a couple of generations. So this kind of mastered political strategy. So we have, then, this mercantilist legislation which wasn't being enforced. Then, as Alon pointed out in detail, in the internal situation, in each colony, even though it's supposed to be a royal governor, the royal point of governor, upper council, the assembly, the elected assembly, were able to take the power away from the governors. Largely by the charming advice of not paying the salaries when the governor shapes up, the salaries are being paid for by the colonial assemblies, let alone the internal taxes that do it. So this power, of course, is threatened not to pay salaries. Gradually brought the governors to heel and made the assembly dumb. So we then had, by the middle of the 18th century, that they factored independent America, not they jurors, certainly, and they factored a large court. The Americans enjoyed the situation enormously. In the meantime, we had, as again, Baylon has pointed out, we have Americans become increasingly influenced by a whole bunch of radical theorists. And here, again, this is, to me, one of the most interesting things Baylon has achieved is to show that sort of the actual mechanism, so to speak, by which American ideology was formed. In the old days, we thought that Americans, the older historians, early 19th century, thought that Americans all read John Locke, or they were steep in a nice view of constitutional law. It didn't sound right. It didn't sound right to everybody sitting around reading John Locke. I mean, it just doesn't square of our knowledge of human nature. So there seemed to be something missing in there. And what Baylon accomplished, to me, essentially is to put in a missing turn only that something that the masses read John Locke is that a lot of radical writers read John Locke and they, the masses read them, the intellectuals radicalized John Locke and put them in, put Locke in less abstract, more concrete, and more hopped up language. And they were read Kato's letters in the dominant, well, these are a whole bunch of others. Now it seems to me, again, that with Kato's letters were Commonwealth men or the radical opposition in the 18th century, anyone, read very heavily by Americans, reprinted all of the place in newspaper form and pamphlets. Plus the tradition not only of Locke, but also of Angela Sidney, the Republican martyr was executed by Charles II, he restored a little throne and gave one of these great speech, one of the great deathbeds, not death of the execution bed, it was termed speeches. You don't know exactly how they did that either. It was a great tradition, apparently to give you a great speech just for your, that is chocolate, I wouldn't be able to do it. So anyway, Sidney gets a great speech to the Sanctuary of the Blood, and became a Republican, a martyr of the Republicanist. The case we had, it seems to me, again, trying to interpret the American Revolutionaries and bribed Kato's letters in Sidney and all the other people in the Commonwealth men, that it seems to me that libertarians are positioned in the sense that they understand them better than other people, because many other historians can get confused about these people, about the American Revolutionaries. Were they interested in political rights, were they interested in personal freedom, were they interested in constitutional rights, or were they interested in economics, private property? Were they against taxes, or were they in favor of liberty? Most historians, most historians and by whatever, you know, the culture they grow up in, most historians, and I can't see the two, these things were all integrated in the thought of least of these 18th century revolutionaries. It's not integrated in their thought, it's a lot of the historians, most of whom either choose liberty or property or neither, but it was integrated in the thought of these American Revolutionaries because indeed they were largely libertarian, and in other words, they thought to them, economic liberty, property, liberty, personal liberty, constitutional attack on imperialism, all these things were integrated, they were all part of the same libertarian doctrine. Life, liberty, and property was not a sort of a vague term, it was a concrete ideologies and actions in their port. So whether they're right or not, whether they agree with them or not, the point is they believe these things are conjoint, at least there was no difference between a tax rebellion and a rebellion for liberty against the crown, a rebellion for liberty against despotism. Then it's all part of the same framework. Taxes are the spotting act, and I don't want to talk about liberty at the same time. Okay, I want to read too much, I love Cato's Laird, I want to read a little bit of it because it shows I think the flavor of the sort of stuff that Americans were imbibing at the time throughout the 18th century. Cato's Laird's written by John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon in the early 1720s, it seems pretty clear about why the Trenchard was the important guy there, because after he died, Gordon sort of changes his position, seems to indicate that Trenchard was a major person here. They by the way, they had a very interesting position, they were radical libertarians, opposing Walpole's regime, but they didn't like the corruption. They read Walpole's policies of laissez-faire peace and so forth, but they didn't like the whole engine of parliamentary corruption, it was taking place, so they tackled from the so-called left, because those days met more libertarian. Okay, this is just the real, just to show the flavor of the sort of things Americans were imbibing, Cato's letters. All men are born free. Liberty is a gift which they receive from God himself, nor can the alienate the same by consent, although possibly they may forfeit it by crimes. The right of the magistrate arises only from the right of private men who defend themselves to repel injuries and to punish those who commit them. That right being conveyed by society to the public representative, he can execute the same no further than the benefit of security of that society when far as he should. When he exceeds his commission, and when the government goes beyond, it's a very narrow area of self-defense, his acts are as extrajudicial as are those of any private officer usurping unlawful authority. That is, they are void. Every man is asked to vote for the one which he does. It's fantastic. The power to do good can never become a warrant for doing evil. In other words, you're part of the government the same role in law as you're part of everybody else. This is basically, by the way, sums up a libertarian position, contrasts other people. We believe that government should be accountable in the same way as other institutions or people. Okay, then Cato goes on to talk about the blessings of liberty, from liberty flows of happiness, security, harmony, prosperity, and so forth. And then, in this idol of liberty, however, there's always a threat of encroachments of power as government. And here, by the way, the difference between Cato and the radical libertarians, in one hand, and Locke on the other, and Locke is talking abstractly. Locke says, whenever the government goes beyond these bounds of defensive, laissez-faire, personal property, then it's legitimate to overthrow it. Then it's evil to be overthrown. The Cato people said the same thing, and then they go on to say, government is always trying to encroach on liberty. This encroachment is always there. The inherent tendency of power is constantly encroaching on liberty and rights. And therefore, government should always be treated with enormous hostility and eternal vigilance, because the government is always ready, sort of like a cancer. They don't use the analogy. Basically, absolutely. There's another term there in the Locke and Syllige, and the government is always trying to encroach on liberty. It's a more radical position than Locke and Syllige itself. Okay, to continue on here, there's always a threat of government and this idol of liberty. Quote, only the checks put upon magistrates make nations free, and only the one of such checks makes them slaves. They are free where their magistrates are confined within certain bounds set them by the people. And they're slaves where the magistrates choose their own rules and follow their lust and humors, in which a more virtual curse can reform no people. And therefore, most nations of the world are undone and those nations only bridle their governors and not wear chains. And he goes on about rulers, a magnificent attack on power and rulers. We know by infinite examples and experience, the men possess the power of all of them part with it, will do anything, even the worst than the blackest to keep it, and scarce ever any man upon earth went out of it as long as he could carry everything along the way in it. This seems certain that the good of the world or of the people is not one of their motives, either for continuing in power or for quitting. It is the nature of power to be ever encroaching and converting every extraordinary power, granted at particular times and upon particular occasions into an ordinary power to be used at all times and when there is no occasion, nor does it ever part willingly within the advantage of Madison's most originative thing about extraordinary power, obviously not. Part of the political culture of the time. And goes on about tyrants reduce mankind with a condition of brutes and make that reason which God gave them useless to them. They deprive them even of the blessings of nature, starve them and miss the planet and frustrate the natural body of the earth to men. So the nature smiles in vain where tyranny frowns. On and off, some magnificent declamation. And finally they say, last power approaches daily upon liberty with success too evident, the balance between them is almost lost. Tyranny is engrossed almost the whole earth and striking at mankind, Ruben Branch makes the world a slaughterhouse. Well, certainly go on to destroy until it is either destroyed itself or most likely there's nothing else to destroy. This is powerful stuff in the state of America that are vibing at the great enthusiasm. I think I want to apply it with Britain of their day, the British government of their day. Americans love that also, maybe even more. It's like, okay, so the Americans then imbibe and they fact go free and they imbibe this not only as libertarian position but also as constant hatred of government, constant suspicion or as they allow themselves to say paranoia. I don't agree with that in criminology. The point is the paranoia is obviously justifying those cases. So then, as Nolan Berg has pointed out, other historians, when the British then start, after the war pause kicked out, Newcastle's are kicked out, who's got poems are kicked out, and the British conquer the French Empire and the seven years war is over and the British turn around and say, where's our land empire? Why aren't the Americans paying taxes? Why are they snuckling under? And the British then begin there and ran the line to reduce America but that's with step by step. They have an army to impose taxes to reimpose the mercantilist acts to station an army here to enforce it and all the rest of them. They do it step by step. They don't want to alarm the Americans. And because the Americans were affected with so-called paranoia, in other words because they have healthy suspicion of the aims of state power, they immediately came to the conclusion that there was a plot here at work as a grand design, therefore we have to battle it after it resisted to any extent necessary and you stand back as a result of that. As Nolan Berg points out, we now know that the paranoia was correct. Now the archives are open. We now know the British officials were writing to each other saying, okay, here's what I'm gonna do. We gotta lose A, B, C in order to oppose our empire in America. But the Americans, of course, at the time they couldn't, the archives weren't open. The archives are never open, immediately on the spot. So you have to act on your best knowledge. The Americans acted on their best knowledge because they were libertarian. There's deep suspicions of the state of state power in general and British particular. So all right, so then we have, as a result of this, we have the long-run revolutionary movement in the end of our general detail, except to say again, liberty and property. To them, the attack on taxes, the attack on the state of horizon and monopoly was part of the same approach. The attack on the dumping of tea in Boston Harbor was the attack of the same time in government monopoly privilege, which was the published East India Company and on taxes. And then they were all one thing. Okay, I'm coming to the next, I think, important point to the fact that it was a libertarian revolution. If it was a libertarian revolution, what went wrong? Did it go wrong? Obviously something went wrong somewhere. And it seems to me the seeds of what went wrong happened during the war itself. Here again, we have an enormous amount of new historical information brought about because of the success of guerrilla warfare in the last 15, 20 years or so. So the people like Shy and Higginbaum and so forth now have then reassessed the military aspect of the American Revolution in completely different eyes as realizing something more at work and ragged militia and all that sort of thing. And so here I think we have to again build on the insights of this, of the guerrilla question of the American Revolution. It seems to me I'm looking at the Revolutionary War that is a one-to-one correlation, almost without exception, between victory by American forces in battle and the use of guerrilla warfare and tactics and strategy. And on the other hand, not using guerrilla warfare and being smashed. The, Charles Lee was a libertarian, I think any historian, Charles Lee is a fascinating figure. The unsung hero of the American Revolution does not get monuments raised to him. Again, a fascinating figure. He was a British radical. He was a military genius. You don't question my bad. He's a British radical. He was hip-deep in radical, criticism of George III during a radical wave position before the war. And he wandered around Europe fighting and participating in different warfare. And it came to the very important guerrilla kind of conclusion. He was the first great purest guerrilla warfare. As far as I can see, he was the founder of, for example, a concept of people's war. Not, I'll say tongue, Castro or Che, but Charles Lee. And wrote many tracks, wrote several important pamphlets of expelling his doctrines. When he found out that the, and one great moment again, one great thing happened. He was, George III passed him over for promotion. You know what I mean? He got an audience with George III. Marshall was, Wolfess, Marshall was chambers, and denounced them. Said he was the white guard or whatever, to trade his tracks and walked out. This is not something one did. Don't forget to know the First Amendment, too. And then, well, that period is a rather courageous thing to do. Anyway, it's typical of Charles Lee. When he finds out about the Boston Tea Party coming up, the revolutionary format, he immediately rushes to America to participate in it. It was a sense of the world's first professional revolutionary. And he impresses everybody tremendously when American revolutionary leadership tremendously was acclaimed. We get to, without getting to the details of the battle's running. The most important, the best generals in America were essentially Lee's disciples. Horatio Gates was a friend of Lee in England also came over, emigrated here before the war. Nathaniel Green was essentially a Lee disciple and then Nathaniel Morgan and the rest of the, the two basic ways to fight the war which became politically important and militarily important. One was to the side of the guerrilla warfare and some of the natural method which was one of the battle that I've seen that account for. Spontaneous uprising like in the American militia, in the formers. Finding a people's war, finding on the spot, finding close to their homes, finding a night, stressing mobility, popping an officer behind trees and rocks. It's not the same ability you're supposed to march out and open the field with your firepower, kneel down with muskets and that the officer's getting fine. I'm just supposed to shoot the officer because that is the only thing to do. So, using the new rifle as an instrument which is good for firepower and very good for aiming, so you can aim at the officers. This kind of guerrilla warfare required very little the way of taxation or inflation or government finance. You just go out and you have your rifle anyway. You go out there and do your thing going home and you're out on the roads at night. It's the usual, essentially the principle of guerrilla kind of actually captured roads at night. Mobile, the terrain, have the people with you. So you're not turned in. In fact, the position of the British army is turned into you. That's all that was expounded. Okay, so the, and then there was the other concept of warfare which was the Orthodox 18th century warfare. Bill and army have taxes. You get the guys in there from long enlistments. Keep them there for a couple of years. You drill them, you go out there on the field and you're popped up by the muskets. The usual traditional 18th century manner. This was the George Washington tactic. The barons went straight from the phony German adventure to drill the troops. And Washington hated the idea of being a bandit chief, as you can recall. He wanted a real army out there. The real state apparatus running. So you have these two conflicting ways of running an army. What we did, of course, was both. We lost a little bit of Orthodox battles. We won all the guerrilla battles, which is the reason why Washington lost every battle he was engaged in, except for Trenton and Princeton. The only time he adopted a group of tactics. He was surprised with Hessian and the Brunkin-Hessian and the Prismas. And that was it. And then Yorktown, he was finally persuaded to go down to York. I didn't even want to go there. He called me to the town of New York instead. At any rate, we're not going into details on that. The point is that Washington was a total dodo. It must be interesting building up a state apparatus. So at the end of the war, we emerged from the war. These two strains, the two motifs, emerged from the decentralized militia. We also emerged from the national state army. And we emerged from a group of nationalists trying desperately to reimpose the British system without Britain, which becomes the nationalist program, which later becomes called the federalist program. We then launched a series of titanic political struggles, which really continued from that moment, between the so-called anti-federalists, which were essentially the libertarian heirs of the original revolutionary theory, and the centralist or nationalists who wanted to build up a strong state, build up a strong state in order to have strong public debt, to pay off the public debt, which exists, to have high taxes, big army, big navy, open up markets abroad, high tariffs, to subsidize manufacturers, and a large public works, a central bank to organize inflation, and a mo-cheek credit to the political friends of the centralists, the nationalists. It was a total mercantilist program, and I'd say it was a program without England. I think it's pretty clear these guys are a minority nationalists. They were able to put through a constitution, which was essentially a nationalist coup d'état, largely because, well, from a very sweet point, I think they were able to get an alliance with the urban craftsmen, the urban self-employed urban artisans at the time, because they would become inefficient during the war. They were sheltered from English, accomplished from English manufactured products. So when the war was over, imports came in, they began to be out-competed, began to go to the war. So they sort of protect their power to preserve their inefficient production. So we have, these urban artisans provided sort of a mass base, the urban mass base for the constitution. There was almost no mass base outside of urban areas. There was farmers on river banks, and here I think Jack Main's, Brooklyn Anti-Federalist is an excellent place. It really indicates who was for the constitution and why and who was against it and why, and the tactics that the pro-constitution people used to put it through. It was essentially a blitzkrieg tactics that was down in the middle of the winter. No roads, I forget, there are no roads now. It's very difficult to communicate. They had to control the monopoly post office, they inherited it from Britain, federalists did, and they pushed through their letters and held up the letters of the opposition. And these all sorts of tactics, this is where they bought people out, there's a whole bunch of tactics that sort. We wind up with a nationalist program, nationalist winning out with this blitzkrieg effort. And then, and by the way, I commend your attention tremendously, some of the speeches against the constitution, such as Patrick Henry's and the Virginia Convention, or the Foreign Convention, bitterly magnificent attack by Patrick Henry on the constitution saying if you adopt this, you'll lose liberty, you'll adopt, you'll lose the republic, you'll have power and empire. He's setting forth the power versus liberty to the empire versus the public thing. This will bring you, you know, big government bringing empire and bringing power to give up the republic. And other people said similar things, George Mason, the founder of the concept of the villa rights, in fact, the villa rights period. And a whole bunch of other libertarian heroes, Abraham Yates and Dork and George Clinton and many others. Jefferson is sort of a tremor on the constitution, which he's gonna continue to be from then on. It's very difficult because those of us who are Jeffersonians or interested in Jeffersonians are gonna have to deal with Jefferson himself. And by the way, this is another, I think another important point historical analysis, namely that historians of thought or even historians in general tend to be on the big shots, you know, Jefferson versus Hamilton or Machiavelli or whatever. Usually the second rank people are pure, the top people, the top people are usually selling out and all the others. So they, the Jefferson, to understand the Jeffersonian movement and dealing only with Jefferson distorts the thing. The Jeffersonians themselves are the second rank people, especially Macon, Randall and Taylor, much pure, much more Jeffersonian than Jefferson. It's constantly compromising selling out and so forth. It's important to deal with second rank people. And there's some historians doing that now. The temptation is always to have the easy, a quick fix, you know, Jefferson, Hamilton, that's it, you wrap it up. So anyway, the, the, the anti-Federalists then try to push through a second constitutional convention. Their program was, look, this constitutional convention is a phony, it's coup d'etat. Let's scrap it and have a second convention which will simply fix up the order of the federation, prevent the, you know, your intrastate tariffs, salary fee states, whatever. The threat of a second constitutional convention was very real in the national, they're very worried about this. And so Madison, widely opportunist, I don't know if it was one size, okay, we'll give them their Dan Billard rights, something which he was hated like blazes to do. So that was essentially the deal which then fixed American history from there and on. The anti-Federalists got their Billard rights and limited, it was a libertarian document from where, from where it go. And the national's got their constitution, the text of the constitution, which is an anti-Federalist document. If you read the text of the constitution and you read the 10 amendments, it read as if they were written by two different sets of people, which indeed they were. The text of the constitution says, Congress will have a power to X, Y, Z. Interstate commerce, clause, general welfare, all these things, by the way, were put in the liberate light, expand state power, not loopholes, this government laid it on. And the Billard rights saying, Congress may not do such and such, the government may not do such, may not interfere with rights. They're written by two different sets of people. And this sets up, then, the tension from American history and American history from there on, the tension between the nationalists and one-handed libertarians on the other. And both sides are stuck with this constitution, so to speak. And actually, in a sense, the anti-Federalists give up, I think, strategically, turned out to be wrong by giving up, by adopting a constitution and then trying to limit it. And saying, okay, you have to strict construction with power and work construction with little rights. But eventually, they lost that. Now, unfortunately, we're getting to be five o'clock and we're only up to the constitution. But what then happens, I think to me, is that the Federalist Christian International Program, Jeffersonians attack it, and say, Jefferson himself is great when he was out of power. As soon as he got into power, he used to adopt the monuments of power, temptations of power. At any rate, the War of 1812 is something that's very important, which is, again, sort of over the look by the story. We'll kind of rush into the Jackson era very quickly. The War of 1812 essentially, so the Protective Tariff, a small army and navy, the Central Bank, public works, even paper money, all of these come in, put in by the Jeffersonians themselves. They adopt virtually the entire Federalist program. The Federalists themselves die out because of their abolition of the war. So we end up, the War of 1812, we have a very peculiar situation in America. We have a one-party system, a very dangerous situation, with any one-party system. With the Federalists essentially having one out, even though they themselves are the person that disappeared. At this point, it seems to me that another very charming situation involves, Jefferson himself, aging figure of Monticello, getting pretty bitter. It looks at what's happening, feels like the spirit of 76, what's called, the spirit of 98, the Turkish-Virginia resolutions threatening to nullify the Alien and Sedition Acts. The spirit had been dissipated, and we'd adopt the federalism and the guise of Republicanism. He didn't, I don't think he blamed himself for this. I don't think he understood his own role in this specific human nature. He certainly didn't like the result of this whole action. But he starts complaining about this, that it's the people who visit him for weekends. It became a tradition for young aspiring politicians to visit him for weekends and involve the spirit of the revolution. And if two conversions took place, an extremely important American history, people would visit him on different weekends in Monticello. One was Martin Van Buren, and the other was Thomas Hart Benton in Missouri, both of whom came away with a real conversion experience this weekend saying, my God, I didn't realize we had to take back America from the federalist week. It lost the spirit of the revolution. And so Van Buren in particular is one of my, I think, heroic figure in America, I'd say, starts using all of his political wiles, which were considerable, starts to create a new party in the state, which is a great, difficult thing to do, whether or not to take back America from the sensual federalism. And he gets, it makes an alliance with the old Jeffersonians, an alliance with Benton in Missouri, and finds a charismatic leader for Andrew Jackson, and then he essentially launched the Jacksonian era. Now, the Jacksonian era was another point which is difficult for non-libertarians to understand. I'm not saying it's impossible, it's just more difficult. Again, historians in the Jacksonian period have been arguing for a long time of what essentially were the Jacksonians. Were they hard-money people? Were they agrarian radicals? Were they rising entrepreneurs? And all that. But they are essentially the oil of this, because they were essentially the deterrent. They believed their favorite entrepreneurship so long as it wasn't connected to the state. They were against special privilege and monopoly privilege in government. Their favorite was free market. They read, by the way, mostly Jacksonian theorists, but they read the world of classical economics very, very closely. And they're believers in laissez-faire and hard-money, which is in separation of money from the state, the nightly from the state. These are not contradictory notions. They might not be fashionable nowadays, but they were quite strong on those days. And again, it was an integrated both economic and political system that the Jacksonians offered. Essentially, they were Jeffersonians brought up to date. Okay, I don't wanna leave the 19th century. I can deal with the Kluppner thesis. I think it's very important, because from the Kluppner thesis in the new political history, it's just come out in the last nine years or so, they understand the mass base of political parties in the United States. One of the things which always puzzled me as an economist is, looking at 19th century history, either the Jackson period or the Bryan fights later on, how come so many Americans were interested in passionately interested in economic issues? Power off in banking and gold and silver. I mean, I can't get my own students interested in that. There are a capital of audience, and they have to sit there and get marks. And yet you have a mass of the public who are really interested in stuff, running pathos and new people who are literate people are running campaigns. And burning interest in this, how did this happen? I've never seen me only in the Kluppner thesis revise a solution of this puzzle. Essentially, the Kluppner thesis, and we'll boil it down again, where we read over simplifications of this, that it's something in a sense it's like the mainland explaining, it's not that they read John Locke at the American Revolutionary Prayer, they read the intermediate people, they read the potato's letters. Similarly, we had, it's not that they started, not that the Democrats or Republicans were wigs before the Republicans, it's not that they started a deep interest in banking. They started the gut issue interest, they started interest in their local religious questions. They got most of their maddie's from certainly originally from religious position, religious ethic, religious opposition. And so you have throughout the entire 19th century, from the 1820s on, certainly from the revival, evangelical movement on, up until, I'm sure through the 1920s and even now, certainly through approximately the 1920s, you have two fundamental political, religio-political groups in the United States. You have what Kluppner calls the piousness, and his new book, which I've been, took me about three months to get a whole lot now from the publisher. The Columbia libraries, it's out, so the Columbia libraries, this is actually ripped off by its inhabitants. But anyway, the current book now expands on this in some detail, as more sophisticated or subtle analysis. But anyway, the basic point, we have two basic ethno-religious groups in the United States, ethno-political groups, which get politically oriented. One is what he calls the piousness, and essentially the piousness framework means something like this, that each person is responsible for his own salvation, and in order to achieve salvation, it also has to achieve the good of the salvation of other people, especially in the way one might apply. It has to achieve the good of other souls. That in order to do that, society has to minimize the conditions of temptation, try to maximize salvation. Everybody, since everybody's supposed to be responsible with salvation is brother or sister, it should minimize the conditions of temptation by outlawing, and the use of the state that is the arm of society, by outlawing conditions of temptation. Specifically, demon rum, the attack on alcohol was chronic, constant, and it never ended, on a local level, a state level, throughout the 19th century. Apparently, Kettner's later book points out that it's connected with some kind of theory of free will, that the demon rum, when people drink liquor, that the free will is taken from them, and therefore they have to look at the outlaw, so they can save their free will. It's kind of an odd thesis for a libertarian to try to understand what apparently that's it. Then you had, so that's the liquor, it was a constant attempt to outlaw liquor by the pietist. Secondly, an attempt to crush anything on Sunday, which is not going to church and praying, any non-church praying till it should be outlawed. Now, especially of course, wrecking liquor, so wrecking liquor on Sunday, till it applied to the height of evil, right? And third, since the, if you can't save the heathens, these heathens are coming in, immigrants are coming in, or not pietists, you can't save the adults, get the kids. So it's important to crush parochial schools and get these kids in the public school system so they can become good pietists, pietists, pietists. Okay, in those days, the public schools was essentially a politicizing advice. Okay, that was essentially the pietist mess, the pietist doctrine. On the other side of the liturgicals, I mean, the public liturgical, were basically Catholics and also high Lutherans, and it was fascinating, I think the couple of themselves used to be a Lutheran seminarian, they were fascinating tables of voting records in the middle left of showing different sects of Lutherans, who was more conservative and such a moral liturgical, who was more pietist, different degrees of pietism, it shows a one-to-one correlation between the degrees of pietism and the Republican percentage of the Republican votes as compared to the Democratic votes. It's really fascinating stuff. Any rate, the liturgicals, meaning Catholics and high Lutherans, took a very different position. Their position was salvation comes from the church, through obeying liturgy, or in case of Wolfgang's Calvinists, obeying the creed. And that's about it. Churches represented, you know, as responsible for salvation. And so if you wanna be saved and join the Catholic Church, the Lutheran Church, otherwise, you know, that's the year that they didn't put in the terms. There's no responsibility that for society to go out and save all these people, I guess they will, for the state to come out with a lot of things. So essentially, the Catholics and Lutherans leave them a personal laissez-faire approach. On liquor, they're quite modern. America enjoyed drinking liquor, basically, into moderation, so for them. The German Lutherans, particularly the German Catholics, great tradition for them to drink beer on Sundays and beer gardens, so then outlawing liquor, and also outlawing liquor on Sundays, it's a real pain in the neck, to say the least. So we have a situation in which Latin America, rightly, and applied as a period, for 8,800 years, constantly attached by the fight of outlaw liquor, Sunday rule laws, and outlaw parochial schools. Again, the Catholics and Lutherans are favoring past-mitting their culture and values to their children before they were part of the school system. So, now, essentially, what then happens is that the way this gets transmitted to the national economic issues was this, both the leadership of both parties, and again, it's pretty clear the Whigs were the piousest party, and then the Republicans were the piousest party, and the Democrats were the liturgical parties. They transmitted to their rank and file the following message, they said, look, the piousest, essentially, is following. Look, we need big government at home in order to save everybody and eliminate the Senate. The same way we need big government, the national level, keep out foreign, cheap foreigners. The attack on immigration equipment shows pretty well. It's not really an attack on a whole immigration. The quietest, love-no-legion immigrants, for example. They hated those Catholic immigrants, and Lutheran immigrants. An important point, it wasn't just nativists. It was nativists with a certain touch to it. And to keep out these cheap foreign people keep out cheap foreign labor, and keep out products of cheap foreign labor, in the sense of cheap imports. And also, the government should have public works and have cheap credit, and expand people's purchasing power, and so forth. In other words, the Whig Republican Economic Program was translated from the consciousness of the people of the quietest and religious local level. The same way the Democratic leadership told their people, look, the same SOB wasps, who were trying to take away your liquor, trying to take away your parochial schools, trying to take away your somebody and join them. These same people are also using big government and paternalism on a national level to take away your cheap imports, to destroy the value of your savings through inflation, and through bank credit expansion, and through, and to protect its power. And so they made their point, so the passion of the people comes originally from their local religious issues, and then gets expanded about political leadership to national economic questions. I think that's a fascinating point, just when it's soft. Okay, so then you have essentially with the exception of slavery, quite the whole other question, too late to go into this point. After the Civil War, this structure would become even clearer, Libertarian, laissez-faire Democrats, versus the statist, quietest Republicans. What happens to change this? And again, as Kluppner points out, by the 1890s, the Democrats were winning out. For one thing, they're getting more, the turtles getting, and more people. More babies than the quietest. So you had, just even just by demographics, you had an increase in democratic strength. The Democrats were becoming a majority party in the 1830s and 40s also, and were split by slavery, a slavery questioner, Van Buren of Jackson split a question of many Texans in the slave state of the Union. After the Civil War, there was no slavery problem, and so this became much clearer. By the early 1890s, the Democrats were winning out. What then happened? What then destroyed the Libertarian ideal? What basically happens is the panic of 1893, politically destroyed the Cleveland leadership, and they've been in the center of this laissez-faire, part of the democratic party, destroys their leadership temporarily, leaves a power vacuum within the democratic party, be filled by the evil Brian, because Brian, he could concentrate, concentrate on the Milton's very personally, he had to possess everything of the Libertarian, and he had to possess everything of the pietist. And interestingly enough, historians tend to think of a good Brian, who represented the people against the interests, and paper-free silver and all that, and a bad Brian is a paper outlawing everything, including liquor and teachings of evolution. It's the same Brian, it's the same pile, just Brian. It's always the same, and he always had the same views. He was a pro-victious from the very beginning. Anyway, Brian is able to take over the democratic party in a fateful convention of 1886. How did he do it? Well, he did it basically by Southwest Alliance. South was always the anomalies, and South, of course, was a little pietist. So you had a pietist fraction of the democratic party, and then you had a mountain stage, these coming new states which came in with no people, which were deliberately put in by the Republicans in order to expand the number of their free silver supporters of the Senate. And by this pietist alliance of South and the mountain states, Brian was able to take over the convention of the party. And can you imagine what happened in English? Can you imagine English? Well, liturgicals were finally taken away from it. It was real, the real trauma. Cleveland said a few years later, our party of our father's art is gone, okay? This was the general theme of the democratic party. Liturgicals have lost their laissez-faire party. So what are they gonna do? Well, some of them dropped out. From then off, 1896, the president was gonna study the client voting rates, turnout rates of voters, because people just became apathetic. The other shifted the Republican party, voter Republican, the first time in their lives. They were able to vote the Republicans. The Republicans were also experiencing interesting change at the same time. Mark Hannah McKinley's forces, McKinley's very true politicians that they're giving us do. The changed Republican party older in the 1890s make it much more moderate and much more centrist. They kicked out the prohibitionists. They became sort of blah, something like the current Republican Democratic Party. First blah party. And they also, another thing is, they gave up on the goal question. Republican has always been a pro-silver inflationary forces. They decided to adopt the gold standard in 1896, and with a deal they made with the Morgan forces, and this then made them a reporting, it's actually a reporting since then. And so the Democrats would say, okay, at least they're pro-goal, you know, they haven't given up on the tariff, at least they're the favorite gold standard. And so at any rate, we then have Democrats collapsing in the laissez-faire party, and this means the institutionalization of laissez-faire becomes obsolete. So you have a, this leaves a power vacuum. Again, as Cutler points out in our recent article, there's a power vacuum which enables a progressive period to come out, in other words, enables the technocrats to take over. Because the political parties no longer become very important, people don't care about them anymore, there's not much of a choice anymore, as Brian finally loses, Wilson takes over, there's almost, the two parties become indistinguishable in a way we know and love today. And so, as a result of this, political parties become less and less important in a progressive period, and how we bring in our cocoa analysis here in Weinstein, as other people, progressive period is able to take over with technocracy and statism through administrative agencies, with Congress and a political party, how much less important. And so this brings in a whole cocoa Weinstein analysis, which essentially, and I have to stop very soon, is essentially, let's put it this way, the reason I prefer cocoa to all the Williams peoples is simply this, the cocoa that contrasts with Marxist realizes that it shows, I mean, apparently, America is not becoming more monopolistic, American economy is not becoming more monopolistic in the late 19th century, contrary to what's happening, it was that various business, I mean, in the early 19th century, I mean, in the early 19th century, I mean, in the early 19th century, I mean, in the early 19th century, I mean, in the early 19th century, that various business interests, especially headed by the Morgans, were trying to achieve monopoly and couldn't do it in the free market. Even with the protective tariff put in by the Republicans to make their job easier for them, they couldn't do it. They tried through pulses of cartels, they tried through mergers, tried to have one firm in each industry, and a case application, each case, it flopped. It was really heroic, I mean, it was a beautiful testament to the free market of how these things flopped. He constantly tried to organize railroad cartels over in 1867, and it kept flopping, six months after they were destroyed, because of competition, the secret price cutting, the new railroads coming in, all these cartels failed, and so, and so what? And so then, the big railroad, it first turned to the federal government to try to create the cartels for them, resulting in the Interstate Commerce Commission. And this is sort of the, this is the whole marketing of the later progressive regulation. The big business forces who were seeking monopoly in the late 19th century in the market and couldn't find it, turned the government to impose it, were often against an ideological or PR problem. Namely, the United States was built an anti-monopoly. There were many state constitutions which said monopolies outlawed what they meant by, of course, was grants of monopoly privilege for the state. They didn't mean large firms, they didn't know in tradition how then are these big business groups going to impose monopoly and cartel kinds of institutions. How can they get away with it? They got away with it by claiming that they were anti-monopolistic. They did in the name of anti-monopoly, a great show again. To do this, they had to have intellectuals spinning out there for apologetics. The ICC was supposed to be put in the curb business for the big railroad monopoly for the benefit of the people in the masses. This is what was, this of course, appeared until about 15 years ago. You read in one of your high school textbooks. The rest of regulation came in because the people rose up, the workers and farmers and the rest of intellectuals and social workers and whatever, economists rose up. The curb business monopoly used government to do this. This is the old shuck. And we see, I think, not just with COCO, but a huge amount of literature and scholarship since then. It's just another reversible thing of this law that will happen. A big business trying to achieve monopoly on free market and failing turned to the government to impose it. In the name of anti-monopoly. And the ICC as a macro boy, I think, it was looking it out. The first thing the ICC did when they came as to, first of all, the outlaw secret price cutting, which is the way the quartiles are broken from then. The second rule to impose the high freight rates which the railroads were trying to get on the free market, which the Morgans tried to get and couldn't achieve using them to government the ICC would impose it. So, we see then the railroads or the government regulation in general is the cartilizing of life. Insurance regulation is the cartilizing of life to keep at low rate, low premium firms and on and on in every aspect of American life. Now, in order to do this, as I say, it had to about, as Weinstein points out, how the big business opinion is expressed through the National Civic Federation in this, and interestingly enough, National Civic Federation people said we have two basic enemies. The socialists on our left, the Marxists on our left and what they call the anarchists, the NAM, the National Association of Manufacturers on their right. The NAM wouldn't have called themselves anarchists, but this is an expression of the of the old laissez-faire viewpoint to a large extent. But we see at that point the laissez-faire people have no institutional expression. There's no party left, there's no democratic party. There's no ideologist, no party ideologist. And also, of course, laissez-faire intellectuals were dying out and literally dying out. The last great expression of laissez-faire intellectuals, something many of you might not know was the anti-imperialist league formed in the 1898 and 1900 to oppose America, the Spanish-American war, particularly our war with the the Philippines, the first great anti-Gorilla war which we engaged in. The anti-imperialist league was almost all elderly laissez-faire abolitionists in the 1780s, headed by Edward Atkinson, of Boston, and they were very extremely gutsy. Atkinson, for example, wrote a pamphlet to our soldiers in the Philippines urging them to mutinate. It was pretty gutsy stuff, even for the anti-German war expression. And this pamphlet is confiscated by the Post Office, one of the great expressions of efficiency in carrying a male. They were talking about trying I guess for sedition or fees or whatever, they didn't do it because he was a very well-known figure, an important political figure. Essentially, that was the last expression of laissez-faire intellectual opinion. We then have a growing group of intellectuals, technocrats, PhDs, PhDs and new things coming into Germany. Economists, social workers, sociologists, historians, engineers, all this tremendous growth of professionalization and organization in America. All of whom wanted a piece of the pie. If you read some of this stuff, it's really interesting to read some of these guys the head of the National Association of Civic Engineers, the name was. We are engineers and we have a complex economy and therefore engineers should run the country. They're quite blatant about it. Science and public relations hadn't really been invented yet, and so they were pretty forthright. One of the fascinating things about progressive period is the forthrightness of these people. Physicians were coming to organize medicine. I'm an endless, I'm trying to write a book after that period. I look each receding into the future as I find new horrors. I mean, the physicians, psychiatrists, everybody's in there trying to get grabbed power and wealth. To keep back, first of all, to monopolize their profession, to keep back, you know, Andrew Lumpers, to raise their income and then to achieve political power. Physicians through the deflection report, state monopolization medicine, psychiatrists, their ideology and as a whole, I'm just saying, just endless. And most of it hasn't been studied until very recently except the Hagiographical Purpose, how great these guys were. Real studies have come in the last few years. A friend of mine written a definitive article on psychiatric views on anti-sex laws. By the way, anti-sex laws, before he wrote his article, it was assumed by a story that anti-sex laws continued from Puritan period until now, until the 1920s. There were almost no anti-sex law before about the 1880s for the onset of progressivism. The age of consent was 10. The old common law age of consent. And from one thing, there's almost nothing, almost nothing was illegal. And then the progressives come in, the doctors, psychiatrists, the health authority, caring professions, in their pool. They come and start outlawing everybody. And the name of hygiene, the name of morality, is what you essentially have as a matter of fact, is a professionalization of the pious impulse. In other words, instead of becoming less fashionable, talking about outlawing everything in the name of religion, became more fashionable outlawing in the name of science, health, hygiene, etc. But especially the same people doing the same things. The paradigmatic case, usually these doctors and psychiatrists were born as pious and then went to college and dropped their faith and became the gooders and power lusters. So it's sort of a secularization of the old client as impulse. It's very interesting. I have a a little paper here on Harvey Wiley, which I was going to read when I was getting kind of late, but the Harvey Wiley that they found were pure food and drug. It's fascinating to show what he was about. I got this purely from a hagiographical biography of Wiley, the only one in existence. It's pretty clear that there's a secularized pious in the sugar interests. Half of his life as a wooded outlawing the propulsory purity and a very peculiar definition of purity, the other half of his life and conjoined with it was the subsidization of sugar and the keeping out of all foreign sugar. So it's kind of fascinating a paradigmatic case of modern power seeking intellectuals. Anyway, so you have that and it's true through history, by the way. If you have a problem through history, state is always run by a minority ruling class, minority ruling class. How are they going to get the public to go along with us? This is true of Oriental Despotism, this is true of the Incas, whatever. Absolute monarchs. How are they going to get the public to swallow all this stuff there that's coming down their pike? The taxes and the wars and the conscription and all that? How are they going to get them to obey? Jim Burnham called the mystery of civil obedience. Now why do people obey the state? Because we have to obey. Because it's there. If you don't have a mystical view of the state the answer might be a little bit different. But the kings found from early on the way to get the public to swallow that power and prove it is to align themselves with the intellectuals. This is the great concept of the court and the electoral. Before the 18th century, so the electoral was always priests and ministers. So the alliance of church and state was an important one because it meant both filling certain important functions politically. The church told the people you have to obey the state. The state is divine. The state has divine sanction. You must obey the state. The state collected taxes to support the church. So it was a beautiful alliance. It was a very cozy situation the way people suffered most of the general public. What we essentially have coming in a progressive period was a new form of the state church alliance. A new marriage of throne and altar. Except now the throne wasn't a king. It's now the president and congressman and bureaucrats. And the church includes ministers and so forth. The social gospel is essentially doing the same thing. It's still a favorite prohibition except now saying it's socially important. It's fundamentally important. But also mostly secularized forms, as I say, engineers, physicians, economists and whatever. All looking for power and all using the common good as the excuse. Some of these guys are the best. Jim Gilbert is an excellent book about designing industrial state. He deals with what he calls the collectivist intellectuals in this period. And one of the chapters on Charles Steinmetz is a fascinating figure. He's a brilliant inventor. He was a major theoretician for general electric. He was a major inventor. He was also a socialist. And his form of socialism is what Gilbert called general electric socialist. Especially what he advocated was one company ruling the world was essentially general electric. But he's Steinmetz obviously sort of at least being the theoretician for general electric. So I would say people are spiky in those days about the roles in which they saw it. And I think it's also no coincidence that the progressives were extremely racist in this period. In a sense everybody was racist in this period. The progressives were particularly racist and believed in compulsory racism between the government. The period of foreign policy comes in with progressives also. They were just a great deal of work. They were more of a integral doctrine which they pursued. When Teddy Roosevelt and the Progressive Party was founded in 1912 Teddy Roosevelt a convention, a family convention New York Times reporter said it seems like a religious camp revival and it was singing hymns all the time breaking into speeches of hymns shouting amen and he had this great marriage such of these people were either social workers economists, progressives and extremely religious client is oriented. Teddy Roosevelt at their home. And as a matter of fact Teddy Roosevelt on his own person almost embodied in the whole progressive spirit almost every aspect. I'm going to review an inquiry magazine of a new book on Teddy Roosevelt by Morris. The more beautiful written review I commend your attention. The first paragraph something like theater was about Shadow of Joy when he killed his first buffalo Shadow of Joy when he killed his first Indian goes on and on and on every sentence is kill Shadow of Joy when he killed his first Spaniard and so the greatest of litany I'm going to sum it up the other way kill kill kill anyway okay it's going to be very late I think I've succeeded in limiting at least the little paramount in American history the Balan main Kleptner and Coco will loathe into this picture I mean anybody who wants to ask a question I'm happy to sorry folks I'm alone difficult, there's not a whole parallel in American history and less than this Do you think you could perhaps carry it briefly to the 20th century well this is alright I'll continue on interestingly enough I gave this similar address University of Oregon for historians graduate students they're pretty unsympathetic about all of this stuff it's not like I have a current career we're cheering on much more the one thing that you take so-called conspiracy analysis about Carter for example Teddy Roosevelt you might say something well I should okay if you don't care I should say something about them if people really want me to I should say something about the Morgan-Mackerel connections extremely important Democratic Party from that 1870s on the early 20s and 30s it was essentially a Morgan-dominated party and this found a sort of baffle military importance because they were originally fairly military but on the other hand they started shifting by late 19th century and I think Mr. Medlin I don't think it's an excellent example the rest of the party was the national chairman the rest of the party was certainly his leading figure with George W. Perkins who was a Morgan partner part of the House of Morgan as a matter of fact we find Morgan partners strategically located positions it's really amazing Cleveland cabinet and a lot of Morgan partners and Cleveland himself became a Morgan lawyer after he became after he left the presidency he was one before that so now the Morgan connection is constantly going on Morgan and Henry Campbell Lodge the Dutch family always wrapped up in the Morgan and essentially the Lodge the Lodge McKinley Daytona in 1896 was essentially a Morgan-Mackerel the same company the when Teddy Roosevelt I think it's pretty clear Teddy Roosevelt was essentially a Morgan person famous northern security case seems like an exception to that but I think Hoka was shown pretty well it really wasn't because you wind up with a whole national security suit and then they're taken you wind up with Morgan's really winning out over the Haramans and they're supposed to analyze and build a security holding company at any rate the Morgan's a powerful, of course, financial group the and they were the driving element behind the national civic federation and the progressivization of business leadership not only was Perkins Morgan's partner chairman of the wrestling party, also the New Republic to me the New Republic symbolizes the business big business the status and electoral alliance almost from the perception of the present day as a matter of fact, in front of the inception the New Republic is founded by three brilliant progressive intellectuals Walter Lippmann and Walter Wilder Crowley to me is a personification of evil I shouldn't say evil but I have to add to a word and how libertarian was every aspect of life Crowley and Wilde was much better now the interesting thing, so we know about Crowley and Lippmann and Wilde and the study that I almost had to see on my story but what hasn't been studied so much is who found the New Republic who set it up, that was the straight Morgan party now even you have to say Morgan and Morgan are over the place it's a pushing and progressive thing they don't only see me in two explanations one that they had a self-destructive impulse and just wanted to cut them on the throat or else it seems to me a fairly implausible explanation or else they're really trying to try to accomplish something on their own and this is why pushing and progressive is a much more likely scenario as I say, Teddy Roosevelt was almost completely Morgan from the very inception he was married, his first wife was related to the habits and roles and Morgan oriented and so forth and so on and on and the other thing he had the Republican Party which was essentially dominated by the Rockefeller family making 70 on if you look at the number of presidents, the presidential candidates for example, the Republican Party at least half of them in this period from all the time a whole group of Hayes and Garfield and McKinley and Taft Harding, only a few people from Ohio and why is Ohio some of the big state why does the Republican candidate only know that he's got from Ohio the usual explanation is that it was an important state of course it was an important state lots of other important states, why didn't they get their share of a part there was a lot of life, this is Lincoln the hypothesis here here is it seems to me that Ohio was a dominant and Republican Party a Rockefeller Party a Rockefeller Station most of his life, certainly his early years in Cleveland his refineries in Cleveland his pipe lines from West Pennsylvania his base was in Cleveland and essentially he dominated the Republican Party of Ohio he was also a planetist Mark Hanna the head of the Republican Party of Ohio for many years was an industrialist a co-industrialist who was economically business with a Rockefeller as well as being an old friend of his from high school he might have had a lot of high school chums with a Rockefeller something pop-up and important to him he could say it's a coincidence he could say, well no it's just a coincidence that all these guys were high school chums with a Rockefeller on the other hand, I wasn't I mean, my grandfather wasn't a high school chum with a Rockefeller but he didn't have any position of power so in other words, sometimes you look at all this stuff and you get the feeling everybody related to the organs of the Rockefeller but everybody isn't anyway so we have them and we know that Mark Hanna was Rockefeller's big mentor I mean McKinley's big mentor McKinley was bailout bankruptcy by Hanna and so the Hanna Rockefeller direction McKinley direction was essentially a Rockefeller direction okay, 1900 the Rockefeller was essentially dominant for the Cleveland administration 1900, shortly after the McKinley election a lone nut appears in the American scene and McKinley is bumped off fortuitously bringing to power the organs of Teddy Roosevelt one of the first things Teddy Roosevelt does he starts using an instrument which had been totally dead up to the land, Sherman anti-trust act now nothing has been done so far no revisionist work has been done on the originally Sherman anti-trust act he cocoa has nothing on it none of the cocoa people know it's a virgin territory to look at so anyway it was a dead letter, it hadn't been used and mergers would be formed older in the late 1890s with no thought whatsoever about corporate lawyers no worry about the Sherman act all of a sudden Teddy Roosevelt takes this rusted weapon out of his arsenal and starts using it for the vengeance against whom? he used it against the state of the world he's not against the old trust, he's against only the bad trust the bad trust somehow all happened to be Rockefeller and the good trust were Morgan there was a good trust for a U.S. steel and international forecluster so now the interesting thing here I get from the realm of pure speculation much more speculative than I've been saying up to now why did Teddy Roosevelt, why was this essential harmony between Rockefeller and Morgan that they were quarreling about the tariff essentially it wasn't this bitter you didn't use the anti-trust weapon that's not playing a game by the rules that's really getting dirty why did Teddy Roosevelt break the rules why did he suddenly do this this is pure speculation, it seems to me it might be connection between that the fact that two or three years previously they launched the big international oil war the world that shelled ranging all over the world looking for oil resources oil that shelled was essentially Rothschild oriented an organization of Rothschild and Morgan's had different connections so is it possible that the savage attack on standard oil was launched because as an aid to try to cripple the standard oil on behalf of the Morgan and their Rothschild allies I said this is pure speculation it's never been invested this line of thought has never been even raised see it's a little put down on some of the nutty aspects of Roosevelt's psyche I mean I'll be the first one to grant it nutty aspects of his psyche but it's just an explanation anyway Teddy Roosevelt succeeded by TAS a higher Republican and therefore an ally with Rockefellers TAS is even more so-called conservative even more antitrust oriented usually the antitrust weapons are fairly well particularly against who against the US Steel and the National Harvester in other words against the Morgan companies which have been presumably launched by the attack on standard oil so we have then it seems easy to interpret the TAS administration essentially Rockefeller's revenge on the Morgans and the Morgans got really hot they're not used to the sonic treatment and they launched a progressive party and just purely, it seems pretty clearly to smash TAS make sure he's not re-elected and Teddy Roosevelt was the presidential candidate so we have a Morgan TAS a Morgan attempted to smash TAS and one of the big business groups John D. Rockefeller was almost the only one to support TAS re-election 1912 everybody else at this time the Morgan camp Woodrow Wilson had ties with the Morgan camp also and so this seems to be pretty much of a setup pretty clear the direction in which this was going we come now to the World War I which is as Weinstein says with a culmination of the rest of the impulse because World War I you can't imagine how they loved World War I they loved it, why do they love it by that I mean that people died I mean the big business big unions are now coming in fostered by government so-called responsible unions that is and intellectuals running the economy and society why do they love it can't imagine that the joy of World War I was something in the whole part of the economy historians out there telling lies about Germany, German culture and they will participate in the war after one way or the other and they loved it and big business finally found but monopoly really works cartelization works and cartelizes every part of the economy every aspect of it it's very cozy for them to have a steel industry section and the steel section would be headed by steel industrialists so when they would be negotiating the steel industry they would also be steel industrialists using insane firms very cozy conclusions fixing prices, fixing production and why do they love it they want to continue this after the war peace time mode and indeed after that all the politicians for one thing for some reason they're all very young period, periods of radical change youth comes to the fore all these guys are pretty young they stayed and played us for about 50 years Bernard Baruch, Franklin Roosevelt all these people originated in World War I basically they started out initially Herbert Hoover all these people were mostly old friends mostly old friends later in the day we didn't realize it was fairly late as a whole marathon it just doesn't have all the advice and they were a self-conscious team their idea was to bring back to American society the joy that we had in World War I the same sort of institutions the same sort of collectivized society the same sort of militarism another aspect of this was militarism World War and global rule stating all this of course is tied in together and they basically succeeded in the billion and when a new deal comes in, first in the Hoover and then in the Rosa administration the same institution got re-resurrected for example the War Finance Corporation which was at the end of World War I to try to bail out bankrupt businesses headed by Eugene Meyer is also connected with Morgan's personally when Hoover comes in and puts in the Reconstruction Finance Corporation back in 32 and then Hoover changed from Reconstruction from War to Reconstruction because the same Eugene Meyer was heading at the same office as being used in Washington because the organization continued on even 12 years after the war because no government agency ever really died never died on its own the same offices, the same secretaries and people, the same staff used as a nucleus for expansion and then World War II the same thing happened again a much greater scale almost the same people were being used in World War I the they say there's an attempt by most of these guys to continue the war, collectivize war effort war production, more in the industry permanent part of the peace structure was beaten largely because of Senator Newton Baker the Secretary of War, I mean Secretary Newton Baker was a sort of semi-alaysay affair type what was going too far persuaded Wilson to scuttle up but ever since then people Hoover, Baruch, Roosevelt looked back to World War I in sort of a great paradigm Rex Tugwell, a famous Rangefuster, Roosevelt Rangefuster wrote during the 1920s disbelieve about World War I he said if only the war could continue a couple more years we could have had full socials in the United States instead of socials we were talking about the war of socialism what are we going to use for it anyway that sort of brings me up to date we have about 15 minutes for the question thank you does this imply in with the recent research is attempting to link rock, bell and rock particularly the rock and bellers with with the Marx historian of socialism I don't think so I think that's pretty bizarre see for one thing it's true the various Wall Street bankers loan money to the Bolsheviks they have their own money everybody the fact that you lend money to somebody doesn't necessarily mean you're tied in with them politically so most of the evidence is very flimsy it's that sort of very slight evidence it's a conjecture it doesn't make too much sense one of the things which give a conspiracy analysis is a bad name because the fact that it's used with the meat cleaver and the scalpel the tendency is to lump all the bad guys together in one big group that's the bad conspiracy analysis you don't like a whole bunch of people you see a bunch of people competing for power you don't like them there must be some sort of organization somewhere which pushes a button and say okay you pretend to fight him because I would confuse everybody actually it doesn't work that way one thing just logistically doesn't work because if you tell they need to fight you and pretend to do what you usually find out and you usually want to build it for real and the so-called manipula doesn't know whether it's for real or not so for various reasons the world doesn't work that way I'm really happy there's a whole bunch of competing whole different power sources people want to cheat a whole bunch of different groups and sometimes there are coalitions and sometimes there's competing so the idea is one group there's a total guy somewhere pushing all the buttons it's really pretty weird well I haven't done any real words of wisdom I just don't want to see a war launched the thing that really worries me is the general attitude of the American public like the college students probably in general Newcombe camel jockeys go home and this is one of the more obscene expressions of attacks on Iranians per se the moves of the B-quarter range of students that's a pretty ugly situation it also indicates not all wars in the war I think it's a call for Newcombe it's an important fact the war is war I'm sorry? the thing about this even a friend of mine is very nice one of the theoreticians of non-inventionism he says that the the embassy of the American soil that's kind of a very legalistic way of looking at it it's a legal fiction of the American soil really of course that's sort of kind of bizarre I don't know it seems to me that the embassy at least in hostages is a sort of anti-carder I'm afraid it will be pushed into by the public it's kind of worrying me of course bombing is going to be clear another problem is that looking at the wars most of the American public say they're evil and therefore they should be punished as if you're dealing with people down on block somebody sees the building it's not the same situation even when you have people see the building you don't punish them those people are killed at the same time you know some guys that come up they're still on the bank you see them running down the street you don't take a machine and spray the street with other people walking so it's very important not to kill innocent people and you're doing your so-called punishment in an international situation you're punishing Iranians or anybody else you'll always be killing innocent people lots of people that's why other parents tend to be very non-invention one of them basically yeah, on your point about when the bill of rights speaks of who they're trying to grant the constitution I find that interesting most people usually think of Hamilton as being the admiral Hamilton's pure evil, my question about that he's so far out, he can't have none of them stop I'm wondering is there any case for giving a benefit of the doubt in the or was he given the game away when he wrote his paper about why we didn't need a bill of rights because the curious thing can happen what he predicted more or less did come down to court decisions we say for instance the freedom of the press should not be a bridge some day someone will argue with the supplements of reason that the government was supposed to decide what freedom of the press is and whether it should be a bridge or not and as a matter of fact black handed out a decision like that and one of them gets very upset now that was a shock on his part he's given the game away the thing is the anti-federalist not just against the bill of rights or against any kind of monopoly supreme court the concept of a monopoly supreme court doing the ultimate interpretation really comes from the Marshall Marshall is a lame duck supreme court justice who comes in as a point of the last day or whatever it is Adams's reign and lives unfortunately about 80 years it seems to rewite the whole constitution originally there's nothing in the constitution that says supreme court is the ultimate power to sign anything so it doesn't even mention supreme court for that to remember so that's really a sort of a second career talk it's Calhoun pointing out a great state I recommend everybody a great book by Calhoun called Disquisition on Government came out in 1831 a marvelous little book where he says if you have a constitution and then you have a monopoly government institution with the power to interpret the constitution you've had it because it's going to happen inevitably the majority of the guys in power the actual supreme court is part of the government the guys in power are going to expand the power they're going to have broad construction the guys out of power pull for strict construction they're going to lose because they're going to be out of power eventually they're going to have a general tranqord total despotism putting checks in my power question was so old uh invited that Nils enjoyed so much of their constitution separation of powers constitutional checks and balances would you agree that overall it's morose yeah that's the separation of powers the Montesquieu shuck Montesquieu is the other conservatives which I mean statists in the 18th century Montesquieu was the model of a lock or Kato's letters it's alright you have the executive arm and the judicial arm and the legislative arm they all check and balance each other it's a very minor extent usually it's a scam because it's all the government a real check and balance would be the 1898 the principles of 1898 would say if New York had nullified federal law that would be a check and balance or if you turn to some other government within the United States to say that's the U.S. government I support the Metropolitan Protection Agency that would be a real check and balance but the other stuff is a little funny that's pretty clear what you mentioned that after providing the candidates to say that after the rise of progressivism the rising fair of the individual's position became totally paralyzed became dramatically conservative rearguard, faction the preserves they already had what prevented the aggressive counter-attack like I mentioned Edward Atkins we grouping into a new party a constitutional party a lice fair party a libertarian party you're holding a new one Van Buren manager Jackson in the 20th century or was it just that they were holding you didn't have that much new blood coming in at that point? that's probably it I imagine the trend was against them they were dying out don't forget the Van Buren that most of the Americans probably really believed in the ideology by the early 1900s and then see the other way maybe they could have pulled it off but nobody thought on it it goes back to the very beginning of your speech and also your recent viewpoint article in recent magazine where you talked about libertarianism being a purely political philosophy you mentioned that the two liberty vs. power means social power vs. state power and the fact that you brought up such a strong leader of the politics in the 19th century it seems to me that there was a strong cultural stream that was directing political thought there seemed to be a strong relationship between libertarianism non-literarianism from a cultural point of view and not just a political point of view there's no question about having a culture influenced by politics and not at all just that libertarianism per se is a political philosophy there are also some influences on it the question of that most of those are social philosophies that people can have that make them more libertarian that tend to make them more libertarian the actual technical doctrine so to speak is purely political so you can have different moral views or no views at all and still be libertarian and not be libertarian it's true that sociologically so to speak you have different there might be specific cultural aspects that tend to make people more libertarian what they are I don't really know I know about the 19th century and it's something you really investigate why do you send this into this question the last 30 years if I'm not mistaken I've seen the lies like here I've disjointed conflicts of sympathies with so called liberals or progressives supporting a certain the pietist you refer to supporting a considerable range in the area of civil liberties while being dramatically antagonistic on freedom of action in the economic in the economic area well the advocates of greater freedom of action in the economy being similarly fanatical fanatical and puritanical just plain what a fascistic civil liberties area do you have any idea of how this I'm not sure the thing is you don't have to be if you're a pietist you don't have to be a pietist just the historic ways I don't know how to say the puny association you can take a view such as the southern pietist tender to take that each individual has his own salvation period not for other peoples they'll tend to make you more individualistic this is a Kletner Hazard's new book I don't know if you can please me yet but I don't know it's interesting to say the liturgicals were laissez-faire in economics and in personal values totaling to my time under this yeah the liturgicals now still tend to be a little bit more civil liberties oriented a little bit and a pietist tend to be a little bit more free market but I don't know how it grows it's a good question in front of him himself I don't know if the post-1900s period there's stuff on there that's a very good question let's try in with the kind of war-climbing society envisioned in the New Republic with different factions of welfare socialism even that even that little dance I think I'll have to pass this off on very soon I'd like to thank Professor Rothbard