 And now we'll proceed with Ramona and our presentation. Ramon is professor of contemporary history at the University of Robert E. Virgili in Tarragona, and also member of the research group ISOCAC, which means Ideologies and Society in Contemporary Catalonia. He's also the director of the Center for Interpretation of the Republic and Aviation and Air War, Siarga, which we invite you to visit if you come to Catalonia soon. And he has been leading also several research projects related to the Spanish Civil War, area bombardments, and defense systems. So please, Ramon, gracias. Bien, muchas gracias. Thank you very much indeed for having invited me to participate and share my perspective on the bombings in Catalonia. Well, there are some points that I would like to touch before starting talking about the bombings themselves. The first element is that the Spanish Civil War was an international conflict. It was an international conflict due to mainly two reasons. First of all, because there was a fight between democracy and fascism. And also because the participation, the international participation was key in order to keep the balance, as you said, as you know, the Nazi Germany and the fascist Italy supported Franco, whereas Stalin, the USSR, supported the Republican government. This international context was also determined by two elements. After the First World War, and especially during the 20th decade, two new key elements appeared. And they were implemented for the first time in the Spanish Civil War. One of these concepts is total war, implemented by a German general who thought that front line wars were over, and that now total war was the case, let's say. And on the other hand, Doe, an Italian general, thought about the idea of war or air war, and how this would be key after the Second, the First World War. Both theories were implemented for the first time in the Spanish Civil War. And this was due to the fact that, well, the developments in the technology allowed to develop a new weapon, which is aviation bombarders that somehow have been key in all wars ever since. The key element today to win a battle has to do with owning decent planes, modern planes, and control the air space. OK, all these elements, all these ideas were implemented for the first time during the Spanish Civil War when the Franco troops had two different sorts of aviation, one based in the peninsula with the main task of giving support to the front line, and another aviation stationed in the Balearic Islands with the target of hitting the rear guard, whereas the Republican government had only one aviation that was all the time devoted to the front line and not to attacking the Franco rear guard. And that's how we find ourselves in a tricky situation. After a certain time of balance, the whole thing tipped on the side of the fascist or Franco supporters. The first aviation that was set up in Spain for welfare purposes, let's say, after the first dotations of the Condor League with troops coming from Africa to the peninsula, was the Saboya S-81 that supported Franco in keeping Majorca at the hands of the fascists. And from there on, the aviation stationed in Majorca became the aviation that somehow would hit and attack systematically Catalonia and all the Mediterranean coastline. And when it comes to carrying out a balance, and here are the figures, the last figures that we have at hand, we realize that even if both sides had some international support, the unbalance is clear. Italy and Germany contributed with more than 1,500 planes to Franco, whereas the Soviet government supplied 1,000 planes. So the total amount of aircrafts available for Franco was 1,590 aircrafts provided by Italy and Germany, as I said before. Whereas the Republican government, well, yeah, they did assemble some planes, some aircrafts, but they only had 1,117 planes. That's how the international support was key in order to win this air battle, which, at the same time, is key to win the Spanish Civil War. The first proof of force, the first demonstration, happened in the Basque country when, by implementing the threat of General Mola saying, well, we will demolish any possible resistance, the Italian aviation and the German aviation bombed Durango and Garnica, the well-known Garnica bombing. But in fact, the first city to be raided was Durango. So having said that, what about Catalonia? Catalonia was 250 kilometers from Mallorca, one hour, one hour and a half flight maximum. So not only Catalonia, but also all the Mediterranean coast was under the threat of the fascist aviation stationed in the Balearic Islands, which, in fact, was a massive aircraft carrier from where all the aircraft that had to attack the rear guard would take off, targeting Almeria, Valencia, Tarragona, Barcelona, all the coastal cities. And this made defense tasks extremely difficult. 360 kilometers from north to south were difficult to protect. And that involved a very important effort from the side of the Catalan authorities to try and deploy the first anti-air raid defense mechanisms, which mainly tried and spot or track these enemy aircraft, considering that there were no raiders back then. And it was not an easy task. But in any case, Catalonia deployed a very efficient system, a double anti-air raid defense system based on active defense and passive defense. Active defense was at hand of the troops, which in fact had to try and avoid for enemy aircraft to bomb the rear guard. And the passive defense mechanism aimed at protecting the citizens of these bombarded cities. So it was a double line of defense that at the end of the day targeted at protecting the Republican rear guard. In this environment, Barcelona soon became the true capital of the Spanish Republic. It was the industrial spot of the Republic, especially after the collapse of the Basque country. It was the only place where some international support arrived through France and through the Catalan harbors. And as of November 1937 in Catalonia, well, the three legitimate governments seated in Barcelona. So Barcelona and Catalonia became a key target of the Franco aviation. The first bombings against Catalonia were not carried out by the aviation. These were sea bombings launched from vessels or Italian submarine, which also threatened Catalonia. What was the main objective of these sea attacks? Well, basically it was about trying and stop navigation and thus international support and provision of food and weapons, and also blocking the normal life, let's say, of the coastal population, which was in fact very highly populated, very densely populated, and with a certain economic activity. In fact, the first attack that we have been able to assess against coastal towns was against roses in the north of the peninsula. And further on, the different harbors were hit up all the way down to Tarragona. One of the main attacks or the greatest attacks was precisely the attack on February 13, 1937 by the Italian cruiser Eugenio di Sabolla, that you can see here in this picture. And it was the first attack that actually provoked civilian victims in Barcelona and in Catalonia 18 casualties, and 18 injured in an indiscriminated attack against the civilian population of Barcelona. These were the orders that the ships of this ship received. Soon this campaign, this sea attack campaign, was replaced by airstrikes. And the first ones to be victims of airstrikes at the end of 1936. Once again, the coastal zone, culera por bol, and sa, et cetera. Harbors, train stations were destroyed. And the second major attack with casualties happened in February 1937, when the Condor Legion bombarded Flix, the electrochemical plant in Flix. But in fact, many of the bombs actually hit civilian population and not the actual power facilities. At the beginning, the important thing was the Sabolla 81, the Italian Sabolla 81. But as of May 1937, the famous aircraft and hydroplane Haeckel HE-59 arrived to Majorca. They became a nightmare for the Republican defense. They had a decisive impact. Not so much in terms of victims in Catalonia, but they had a vast impact when it comes to destroying train stations, railways, decks, et cetera. So in this sense, it should be said that together with the arrival of hydro planes, these Haeckel 59 air planes, the Sabolla S79 also arrived to Majorca. That was the most powerful bombader in Europe, available in Europe. With a high capacity to transport loads of tones, it was like a massive flying beast, very difficult to put down. So one could say that as of May 1937, Catalonia had a new war line, an undeclared war front, the East Front, in which the Conder League would fight the Republican defense of the Mediterranean region, as well as the Republican coast. As of this moment, new passive defense mechanisms were set up by the Catalan government, the Generalitat, many city councils also, such as shelters, buildings, at the hands of neighborhoods and citizens that maybe were not aware of the new dangers provoked by this new type of war, this total air war. In this sense, one could say the arrival of General Bellardi as chief of the Italian forces in the Balearic Islands was key. And what was also key was the support of the Franco-Secret Services that would inform from inside Catalonia about the targets to be hit, factories, train stations, defense mechanisms, et cetera. So these aircraft, when they took off from Majorca, they had very clear, predetermined targets. Many of these targets were placed in cities and with all the tracking mechanisms that were honestly poor, bombs tended up to heat squares, hospitals, and also beyond the military targets that were determined by the Spionage, by the fifth pillar, there were clear attacks against the civil population. We have documents that so prove it. And these were attacks aiming at damaging the civil population in order to undermine the Republican rearguard. And these were not only bombings, but also shootings, low-range scales, shootings in Barcelona, in Tarragona, in Reus, in David, in Girona, everywhere, all around the territory, all around the region. Many of the Catalan cities were also bombed and shot at. And the first case dates back from October 1937, when, after bombing the city, the airplanes shot at people in the national promenade in Barcelona and, well, killed the neighbors that were walking around there. And this very same action was replicated in Tarragona, in Reus, and also in Villanova, in La Geltro, in the south of Barcelona. In the fall of 1937, bombings started impacting hitting Tarragona and the south Ebra region up to then beyond fleaks, or had been protected until then. But now all this region started also being hit and bombarded, especially to Tarragona and Reus. And simultaneously, the bombings in the north of the country, in the coastline of Girona, kept going, and they were bombarded systematically during 1937 as a whole. In the fall of 1937, these attacks increased in intensity, maybe all the way up to 1938. But more and more, the Italian Air Force acting during the day and the Condor League, the hydroplanes, by night, started attacking not only the coastline, but even the inland, some strategic cities in the inland. In 1937, the key targets were the train railway that connected the north and the south of Catalonia and the harbors that, of course, were also in the coastline. But not only Tarragona or Barcelona were hit, also Girona and Leida, especially the city of Leida, was badly bombarded. It was close to the front line. The Franco troops were little by little approaching Catalonia. And in November of the second 1937, a brutal bombing on Leida, hitting a market, a school, took place, causing more than 250 casualties, 500 injured, with the looting of more than seven tones of bombs over Leida. It was an unprecedented attack with loads of casualties and a really bad destruction of the whole city of Leida. Nonetheless, possibly the attack that really is better known internationally, the attack that made some international powers react at the European level and that really proves that one of the objectives of the fastest aviation was Barcelona was the attack that happened in January the first 1938 on Barcelona, of course, that caused 60 casualties and 600 injured. But even more so in January the 1930, 1938, two simultaneous attacks over the Barcelona city center caused 250 casualties. 50 of them were kids that were sheltering in San Felipe in an area a religious center. That was a turning moment in this strategy to undermine the Republican rearguard. Also in January, rails was hit day after another by the Franco bombings. Before we've talked about a specific case, well, according to reports from that, from those dates, corpse were found all over the place. And on the 13th, on the 21st, on the 24th, the bombings in rails cost more than 140 casualties and thousands of injured. And this is only an example because many, many different cities in Catalonia were object of these bombings. But the tactics, this total air war tactics was implemented systematically as a result of Mussolini ruling on March the 16th in order to revenge a defeat of the Italian troops in the center of the peninsula ordered an attack over Barcelona and continued indiscriminated attacks so that the defense mechanism, the attack mechanism and the defense mechanism could not react so people would be seized. So all these attacks on the 16th, 17th, and 18th, March 1938, which were directly ordered by Mussolini while there were 14 air raids in 41 hours. And this caused a total amount of 1,000 casualties and more than 1,500 injured. This was a clear demonstration of the air raids on other cities in Spain and in Catalonia during the Spanish Civil War. In any case, when in March this air raid on Barcelona, the place Barcelona had already accumulated 1,300 casualties, fatal casualties and there was still one year to go. In the print time 1938, the bombings were still very intense and another of the bombings that hit the civil population really badly and thus having a certain international repercussion affected Granudes on May 21, 1938 when more than five tones were thrown on Granudes in theory to destroy a factory. But in fact, these bombs ended up in the city center causing more than 200 deaths, loads of injured people and thus the city accelerated the construction of shelters and defense mechanisms. The San Felipe Neri bombing, the bombing over Raus, Granudes, etc., all these somehow boosted the international debate about the bombing of cities. It had previously been debated in the League of Nations in April 1937 and in fact it had been condemned. Bombings had been condemned before they even started but with very little effect, not to say nothing, it is also true that the English government and the American government as well as the French government and the Vatican, the Holy Spirit, asked Franco after the experience of the print time 1938 to reduce the intensity of their attacks and even the German ambassador to Spain who lived in Salamanca, but who had been acquainted with the bombings in Barcelona, wrote letters saying that what was happening in Barcelona would have a very negative impact on Germany and on Italy because attacks on civil population were just inexcusable. Of course, a German was saying that those who had bombarded Guernica a month ago but they started somehow seeing the impact of these bombings in the international sphere. Claims on the international press started to be published especially in the French and in the English press and well especially on Catalonia and on Barcelona. At the beginning of the Ibro battle, the bombings somehow moved down towards the south towards the Ebra region and towards Camden, Tarragona and thus some cities in that area, especially Tartosa on August the 15th, 1938, was victim of 20 air raids in these 60 towns impacted the city on a same name and even the Italian aviation said the enemy air has become bombarded. Hemingway who testified this attack said over our heads, this blue sky has been occupied by these bombarders when they did let these bombs out, the small town near the Ibro literally disappeared in a growing amount of dust. The dust never posed because more aircrafts arrived and finally there was like a yellow fog all over the Ibro valley. So it was an unprecedented attack like the one that had happened in Barcelona but in this case in Tartosa. In fact, what are we talking about here? We are talking about a clear confrontation in the print time 1938, all the troops of the Italian and the German aviation were deployed on Catalonia and Catalonia had somehow a powerful defense system even if really with very little resources, Catalonia had two main challenges because they had a clear scarcity of raw materials of staff, of human resources, no canons because the canons were used in the front line. In fact, the only area that was protected was Reus, Tarragona and Barcelona, the rest of the city they were left at their faith and there was a minimum air protection, a very limited air protection mechanism in Saddledale, Barcelona and other little cities. So all these attacks, as we said before, became more intense during the Ibro battle where the living proof, and I'm gonna give you some figures to prove that, that this air defense, even if it has not been very well known, ended up saving loads of people, thousands of people. The attacks kept going in a strategic point such as San Vicenza Calde strain station that was hit more than 121 times, causing more than 1,000 deaths, that is an example of a strategic action to hit and destroy and demolish a communication node. The last stage of this war is related to the bombing of the Barcelona Harbor. Barcelona Harbor became little by little as the Franco troops started this Catalonia battle, this conquest of Catalonia. Well, Barcelona Harbor was systematically bombarded by the Italian aviation, by the German aviation. They incorporated a new type of planes that were grounded in the peninsula, the Henkel 51 aircrafts, bombarders. So at the end of the war, and as the troops started withdrawing, they started bombarding refugees fleeing. Here we have some images by Robert Kappa, who on January 15th, 1939, was in an attack on a refugee's bunch of people that were fleeing the region. As the front moved forward, the next city that was hit several times by bombs and destruction was Figueras. How did, we're gonna talk about that later on, so I'm just gonna give you a hint. How did the Catalan defense get organized? In fact, two pillars, as we said before, active defense through the DECA, an air defense mechanism, trying to neutralize the enemy attacks, and a passive system to protect the civil population in the case of bombing. And in this case, the Passive Defense Council of Catalonia did something amazing, and this was replicated in different towns all over the region. Regarding passive defense, well, one has to underline the rule of shelters here. We have some pictures of these amazing anti-air shelters, but at the same time, passive defense goes beyond. It's a whole system, a whole organization system that allows the civil population to know what to do in case of bombing, what shelter to head, how to coordinate, rescue, services, et cetera. Oh, only five minutes left. I will accelerate even more. In the case of Catalonia, there was a pretty decent coordination system between the efforts carried out on both sides to try and make the most of the very little resources available. And one of the key innovations that was implemented at the end of the war in Catalonia was precisely the use of night crawlers, so to speak, some very specific planes that could fly overnight to chase fascist aircraft targeting Barcelona and rail center, as a result of all this. One can expect the following. One of the main problems that we had in Barcelona and in Catalonia is that there is no such thing as information, statistics about the impact of the civil war. There is no final report, but according to the existing data, due to the bombings, more than 5,000 people died and 25,000 were injured on Catalonia, while it was in the rearguard. Millions of tons of bombs were thrown. 140 cities in Catalonia suffered the bombings, that's approximately 20% of the municipalities of Catalonia. Many more were bombed, but only 20% of them had civil casualties. Here's a map of Barcelona. Here we can see the areas of Barcelona that were more heavily bombed with more victims. In this slide, we have a distribution of the victims, men, women, locals, refugees, as well as the age range of those who were killed. As a result of these bombings, we will talk about that in more detail later on. There are two points that one needs to talk about when we talk about bombings. The victims of a bombing are not only those who actually die as a result of the attack, as a result of the bomb. Many people die out of starvation, out of not having access to medical care, because the bomb destroyed the hospital and all this needs to be taken into account. And the second element has to do with the psychological damage that bombing provokes this permanent anxiety, not knowing when the planes are gonna hit us, where's my husband gonna be, where's my wife gonna be, where's my children wanna be. So, the destruction of some Catalan cities was significant. Rail, Saravana, Tortuja, Barcelona were heavily destroyed, many, many of them. And here we have some statistics to end my presentation. In Catalonia, we have carried out loads of research regarding the victims of bombings. We've talked about Barcelona as a martyr of these bombings. The hypothesis that I would like to launch is that Barcelona was a resistant city. Yes, it was a small city, but at the same time it resisted. And thanks to that, thanks to Barcelona's resistance, there was, let's say, only 5,000 killed and 25,000 injured. And here are the figures. Look at the amount of attacks that took place in Barcelona, the amount of victims, and the amount of attacks. Take a look at the engine to this. As of the print time, 1938, the amount of attacks increased, but the amount of victims dropped. That means that the passive and active defense mechanisms worked, and this data can be confirmed in Tarragona. The same thing applies. More bombings, less victims. This proves that these active and passive defense mechanisms worked, maybe not at its best, but pretty well. So it is also said that never a plane was hit down. Yes, that's not true. Look at this Savoye 91, touched and demolished by the anti-air raid defense. Yes, they were put down. And I would like you to take this message home. London has boosted the image of a resisting city. Whereas in Barcelona and in Catalonia, we have stick to the role of martyr. And I think that's not fair, because we were also beyond being martyrs. We were also resistance. And let's all recall that even Churchill, once said to his people that he hoped that Londoners were as resisting as Barcelona. And thank you very much. Gracias, Ramon. Well, thank you to both of the speakers, and now time for questions. Mike, Chris. I'd like to ask about London in 1940. While sections of the elite could have deep shelters, private deep shelters, for instance, a Dorchester hotel was built of reinforced concrete, and the Turkish baths were converted into an air raid shelter in which World Halifax, the foreign secretary, was one of the regular visitors. Meanwhile, the underground system was stopped from being used as shelters. It took demonstrations and then eventually direct action in September 1940 for ordinary people to physically occupy the underground stations so that the underground could be used as deep shelters. So there was a slight class dynamic going on here in terms of what was going on and what was regarded as a population. We've mentioned the Anderson shelters as well. And it did take popular pressure in the end as well, I mean as well as concern of the casualties to a deep shelters to be constructed in London. Thank you. The politics of air raid protection is absolutely fascinating. I think there's a lot of work still needs to be done on organisations like the Stepney, Lieutenant's Defence League. I think it's worth noting as well, this is a period when the Communist Party is quite unpopular because of their, the complexities of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact and they are seen as being potentially on the side of the Nazis if they're officially anti-war stance wasn't believed. So the issue of providing air raid shelters in working class areas was, I think, seized upon by the Communist Party both out of principle but also as an opportunistic way of redeeming their popularities somewhat. And it worked and it was an excellent campaign including direct action in occupying some of the deep air shelters. The one under the Savoy Hotel was it that was occupied by them? Yeah, so that's a fascinating episode in history and what it reveals is a culture of government fear and mistrust of its population and unwillingness to provide it with adequate air raid protection. It was scandalous then and it's scandalous in retrospect. Any other questions? I have a question for you too. According to your work and to your experience working with, for instance, in the case of Ramon in the museum in Siarga, it's a museum dealing with the history of the bombings in Catalonia, in the Alpenades area specifically and your experience working with children, for instance, and doing archaeology work. Are you approaching the nowadays bombings in Syria, let's say, or in other parts of the world using the memory of the attacks in both in UK and Catalonia? Both of you. I'm happy to go first, yeah. Absolutely, yes. For me, this is mostly in my work looking at the way your children respond to a total war. The patterns of behaviour that I find when I study the Second World War are very common for our children in conflict zones around the world from the very early period into the present. The practice of collecting bullets and abstractional, of playing in air raid shelters or playing in bombed houses and turning them into adventure playgrounds. This is something that I have discovered talking to people who lived through the Iraq War in the 1980s, who lived in Lebanon in the Civil War, talking to people who lived in Gaza more recently. These patterns recur over and over again, and I think what we see is children struggling to cope psychologically and finding the way to turn these terrifying experiences into games, into familiar things. And it seems to be quite effective. Yes, of course. When people come to visit our centre or our shelters, the first thing we try to do for boys and girls visiting these spaces is to realise what does it mean to live under bombs? And we try to make them aware of the feelings of those people, boys and girls, who are currently under a situation of bombs falling on them. As Gabrielle was saying, in summary, children are children and they live the war in a different way. We cannot make them understand war the same way that we do. Children play war. They try to play, because if they don't play, they will be sick, psychologically sick. So although they're misery, and these many children try to play with the earth coming from these shelters, and when we see images of people and places being bombarded, we realise that the same images are happening again, like these children who are staring at the impact of a bomb in this picture. I think that what's worthwhile trying to explain our students is that this type of war, this total air war, which started to become massive with the Second World War and the India-China war, nowadays continues to be the type of war that we have. At any time, if we turn on the TV, we see that bombs have hit a hospital, school, in a neighbourhood, et cetera. So it's the type of war invented during World War II. They're not clean wars. This is another concept that we should try to transmit to our students. Nowadays, a clean war is never, it's impossible to carry out. If nobody else has a question, I have a question. Related to the question that you have formulated, I have a question for Gabriel. The British government sent, 1938, different people to study what was going on in Barcelona, how a city like Barcelona was defending itself and what were the consequences of the bombs. But apparently, they took no advantage of the experience. And I'm saying that because in the case of Barcelona, in many cases, the initiative to build a shelter came from the neighbours, who also, at the same time, needed the help of people paying for it, the mortar, the stones, et cetera. Therefore, there is a type of complicity between the administration and the city halls and the civil society. Building shelters, 1,300 shelters in Barcelona cannot be explained without this complicity. Apparently, in England, things did not go the same way. The civil initiative, was it there any civil initiative or not? Yes, there was a few cases where the projects to construct airway shelters were from the community. One example was led by a soldier called Tom Wintringham, who was in, who was first fighting in Spain with the International Brigade. And when he returned to Britain, he was wounded, I think. He returned to Britain and he founded a group called the Barnsbury Diggers. In Barnsbury in North London, they went to public parks and they started to excavate trenches for airway shelter. And this was somewhere between a protest and a performance. But it was aimed to stimulate the government to say, where are the airway shelters? Now, this was shortly before the Munich crisis, when actually, at that point, some of the local government started constructing airway shelters. Mostly again, small trenches in parks, not very well constructed, not very reinforced, only good for very temporary use. So there was a combination there. So that's one example. There was an issue of government control and the tensions between the local government and the national government. And there was an issue of where the responsibility for the construction of these shelters lies and where the money is provided. So the London district of Finsbury attempted to construct enormous underground deep shelters that would have provided protection for the entire population. But they were not allowed by the central government, the Conservative government, to spend the money on this. It became a legal problem. Some of the councillors were arrested. Really? One more question? Yes. I wanted to ask, and this is related to this idea that you mentioned towards the end of your talk, Ramon, that Barcelona had an idea about itself, of victimism. And we should reinforce the idea of resistance, resistance city. My question is the following. The idea of this conference was to share memories between two cities. So I would like you to give your opinion, Ramon and Gabriel, why this difference about two bombarded cities? London has a stronger idea about the resistance and the role it played. And Barcelona wanted or maybe kept the idea of being a victim. Why is that? It's because one country was winner after the war and the other one was a loser because many years have gone by and we could change this idea of Barcelona. I have written and made some proposals and some interventions even. The Tour de la Robira, which is the defense, anti-aerial defense of Barcelona, precisely which was completely forgotten. First policy of memory was trying to recover shelters of passive defense. I think that, how would I say it? Probably it's related to the spirit of the Catalan people. We're used to losing. So we present ourselves as victims, except for football, soccer, Spanish soccer. But what I mean is that from an international perspective, things have not been dealt enough. But March 1932, a conference took place in Paris to talk about the bombs on open cities. Jaume Miravillas presented the film on the bombs which is martyr Catalonia. And there we have the hashtag, Catalonia martyr. So we'll try to recover this and recover the history of all this. If we just pay attention to the victims, and this is one of the problems not only of the bombs, but also when we develop policies of memory, we just pay attention to the victims. Let's think from a broader perspective. Victims did exist, but some people was fighting. Or they were victims because they were fighting. One can be a victim of a car accident, but you are a victim of a repression because you were fighting. Therefore, in this sense, I think that Catalonia and the city halls made a great effort of defense, active and passive. And therefore, when we walk around London, we find monuments, plagues, reminding us of the raft. When we walk around Barcelona, the only thing that we have and recent, it's a monument in front of the Coliseum trying to remember the victims of the bombs. That's four days young. We don't have any memory for those defending Catalonia, Barcelona, the active defense of Catalonia. Here we have a picture by the board of passive defense of London. In Catalonia, we have nothing like this. And therefore, I think this is a political decision. And the United States, the city hall, the associations were based in victimism. They should say, yes, we were victims. But we resisted also. I think in London it's complicated. As I mentioned before, there was a very strong effort from the government to create a mythology of the blitz, of the public response to the blitz. And this propaganda effort began in the middle of the blitz itself. And it was incredibly powerful and incredibly effective, and it has lasted in a number of ways. I mean, the keep calm and carry on. This is a contemporary example of how this mythology has become popular, as remained incredibly popular, even though those posters were never actually used in the war, they never existed in the war. They were just stored. So that's an example. But larger than that, there is an idea that the experience of the London blitz has been turned into the national experience of air war, when in fact there was a great deal more complexity and diversity. So there were very different experience of forming in Glasgow, in Coventry, in Bristol. And responses to those were very strong as well. In London, this mythology never touches the ground. If you look for the memorial to the civilian victims of the London blitz, you find a round black stone about that high, it's big, next to St Paul's Cathedral. It's ugly. It was put there as part of a campaign by a national newspaper. No one ever really visits it. You can find memorials, small memorials here and there, to particular events, particular casualties. You have something like the, in Bethmel Green, the Stairway to Heaven Memorial Trust, which is partly a campaign to memorialise part of the blitz. It's partly an effort to stamp white working class identity onto a now very ethnically diverse part of London in a very aggressive, problematic way. So the memory of the blitz in Britain is still something you can use to make money and you can weaponise. And it's one of the most powerful mythologies that we have in British history. We are very rarely the victims and we are very rarely the good guys. So we cling on to this experience. Thank you, thank you to both of the speakers and we'll continue right now with a short explanation before screening and documentary on this topic, of course. Thank you.