 The next presentation will be a video presentation sent by Nila Martin. Her presentation, her work is based on a study in Bangladesh in the coastal community after the cyclone Ilya in 2009. Her work basically tries to cover resilient characteristics in individual and institutions and tries to expose underlying processes that may lead to transformation and more resilient. Hello, my name is Nila Martin. I'm from the York Center. I'm sorry that I could not come here in person, but I'm pleased that a video recording was possible. So here is my story. This research seeks to explore resilience primarily as a dynamic and social political process. It draws on empirical research with communities in two areas. They are located in two adjacent districts in the southwest coastal region of Bangladesh that borders the Shundurban mangrove forests. We aim to uncover the processes of resilience in individuals and institutions and ask if the changes could be framed in terms of transitions from one phase to the other in the adaptive cycle heuristic. The aim is to expose the underlying processes that may lead to adaptive cycle dynamics or to trapped dynamics. The focus is on the role of human agency and social institutions in creating conditions for transformation. We thought it would be useful to begin the analysis with historical reconstruction of the system, the events that characterize the movements of the system from one phase to the other. This would be used to define where the system is located at the present time or at a particular point in time and thus help us to devise actions that might be needed to make a transition forward. In an attempt to reconstruct the historical phases, we see that in the beginning of the 20th century, the case study areas were characterized by low population, traditional agriculture and fish production, and ready availability of common pool resources. It was adapted to natural conditions shaped by saline tidal flows and freshwater rivers. Seasonal floods were common and production was generally low. In the 60s, engineering works started to protect the coastal areas from open tides and water surge, and miles and miles of permanent dikes were built. In the 1970s, shrimp culture in Bangladesh was started in traditional fields situated by riversides and impoldered by the dikes. Generally, these fields were used to grow rice between the months of August and January and shrimp culture was practiced during the months of February to July. Controlled tidal water exchange was important for shrimp for trapping wild seeds and natural food, as well as for maintaining water quality. World market demand and high prices for shrimps in the export markets led new government policies to promote shrimp culture as a source of foreign exchange. Saline water shrimp production flourished, giving rise to a group of capitalist investors for export production. Small holders were integrated in the system through leasing of their lands, and often, if land was denied, it was forcibly occupied. The profit was demand as high from shrimps compared to paddy production alone. Since the 1980s, we enter into the conservation phase. The hydraulic structures were further consolidated. The shrimp farmers, who mostly came from outside the area, were rich, had cash to invest in aquaring land and were capable of controlling the entire chain of production to export. They assumed total control of dikes, swiss gates, pumps and other structures to the interest of shrimp cultivation. Saline water remained in the fields often throughout the year, making it unsuitable for paddy cultivation, and the small holders were interested in. The land lost fertility due to high salineization, deduction of alluvial deposits and indiscriminate use of chemicals. Number of landless pageants increased who could not compete to the capital rich shrimp farmers and were forced to migrate to other areas in search of employment. There was overall loss of common property resources and ecosystem services were reduced to critical levels. The conservation stage gradually evolved into a rigidity trap. Here, I am quoting Carpenter and Brock's 2008 paper. The institutions became highly connected, self-reinforcing and inflexible. This stage is managed by command and control that severely reduces diversity and forces of power and profit became mutually reinforcing as Gundersen and Hollings 2002 study notes. The rigidity trap in our case studies manifested in apparent high resilience of the system where highly connected individuals managed the system by ignoring social costs on people in terms of loss of livelihoods for the majority, ignoring environmental costs in terms of total loss of biodiversity and land and water degradation, using social and political influence including violence and coercion and depressing the wheel of the majority that demand a more ecosystem-based production system, a system in harmony with nature. It is indeed a textbook example of rigidity trap. Release came in both our cases more or less at the same time but in two different forms. In case A, a huge tropical storm made a landfall in 2009 that swept away the embankments and completely inundated the land with saline water, making the entire population homeless and completely destroying the shrimp and agricultural fields. The area remained underwater for more than a year, technical and financial constraints delaying the reconstruction of the hydraulic structures. Many migrated to other areas in search of livelihoods, both temporarily and permanently. The environmental disaster led to complete economic collapse. The complete inundation of land and massive damage to the hydraulic structure, however created a window of opportunity to a complete overhaul of the management system to start a process of renewal following popular demand. However, that did not take place and as the embankments were repaired, the shrimp farmers were back in control again and soon the system backslided to the conservation phase instead of transitioning to a renewal phase. In case B, 2009 was also a year of collapse though of a different nature. Here a popular movement distorts the three large shrimp farmers who were in control of most of the land in the area. A strong leadership and collective action had since led a major change in the rigidly controlled management system. The hydraulic structure reconnected the land to natural tidal flows. Land that was deeply salinized was gradually reclaimed through rainwater leaching and salinity tolerant crops were introduced in the initial periods. After three years, the land regained inner vitality to start growing paddy again. Small landholders regained ownership of the land and the management system reverted back to one that is tuned to the local ecosystem. The window of opportunity that was created by collective action was successfully seized and a clear process of renewal seems in progress. However, it is still early days to see if it would be able to sustain the adaptive trajectory or succumb to social and political pressure. Our two cases allowed us to study the nature of adaptive and trapped dynamics and the challenges to transitions between these contrasting dynamics. Once again it showed the importance of social and political drivers in defining pathways to adaptation and transformation. There is an inevitable trade-off between social goals shaped by intense intergroup conflicts and inequality of resource base. Strategic leadership and collective action may work sometime as in case B, but there are many examples of collective action in these areas that lead to violent conflicts and harm to individuals. Learnings from these outcomes remained controlled locally and powerful interests successfully blocked innovation and learning from propagating across the panarchy and registered emergence of alternative, inclusive and pro-poor pro-environment discourse. It is important that collective action leadership must secure allies from various levels and systems in the broader context. Unlocking the system from the rigidity trap as we have shown is possible though at a small scale by collective action and competent leadership, but local activism on its own may not be enough to bring about transformation across the systems that is essentially multi-scale. Challenging powerful interests at the local level also comes at a high price as it often involves violent conflicts. Seeking strategic alliance with higher policy and management levels can reduce this price and create and sustain a more desirable transformation. We hope this research will contribute in informing policy and guiding resource allocation decisions for building and maintaining individual and community resilience, unlocking the rigidity traps and ensuring sustainability. Thank you. If you have any comment, please let me know. Here is my email address and thank you again for listening. Bye.