 CHAPTER 10 OF BOOK 2 OF REDERICK Let us now show what pity is, how men that commiserate others are affected, and what things and persons are the objects of pity. But let pity be a certain pain arising from an apparent destructive and dolorific evil which befalls someone undeservedly, and which he who feels this pain or someone belonging to him may expect to suffer, and this when the evil is seen to be near. For it is evident that he who will commiserate another person must necessarily be one who will think that either himself or someone belonging to him may suffer a certain evil, and such an evil as we have mentioned in the definition of pity, or an evil similar or allied to it. Hence, neither do those who consider themselves as utterly lost feel pity, bracket, for they do not think they shall suffer anything further than what they have suffered, close bracket, nor those who fancy themselves exceedingly happy, for they insult those that are in calamity. For if they fancy that every kind of good is present with them, it is evident that they must also fancy they cannot suffer any evil, since a security from evil is among the number of goods. Those however who are compassionate are such as think they may suffer, and such as have suffered evils, and have escaped them, likewise elderly men on account of their prudence and experience, those that are feeble, and those that are more timid. Also those that are erudite, for they accurately consider the mutability of human affairs, and those that have parents, or children, or wives, for they consider their evils to be their own. Those likewise are compassionate who are not overpowered with anger or confidence, for those that are pay no attention to futurity, and also those who are not insolently disposed, for those that are do not think they shall suffer any evil, but those are compassionate who exist between these. Nor again are those compassionate who are very timid, for those who are terrified feel no pity, because they are occupied with their own passion. Those likewise are compassionate who think that there are some worthy persons, for he who thinks that no one is worthy will fancy that all men deserve to suffer evil, and in short, a man is compassionate when he is so disposed as to remember that such like evils have happened either to him or to those belonging to him, and thus we have shown how those who compassionate others are affected. What the things are, however, which they compassionate is evident from the definition, for all such painful and lamentable circumstances as are of a destructive nature are subjects of commissuration, and likewise such evils as fortune is the cause of if they are great. But evils which are lamentable and destructive are death, stripes, and maladies of the body, old age, disease, and the want of nutriment, and the evils of which fortune is the cause are the privation of friends, opacity of friends, on which account also it is lamentable to be torn from friends and familiars, deformity of body, imbecility, and mutilation. It is also a subject of commissuration for some evil to happen there, where it was fit some good should have been done, and for a thing of this kind to happen frequently. Likewise for some good to be present, when no advantage can be derived from it. As was the case with the gifts which were sent to Diopithus from the king of Persia, for they were sent to him when he was dead. It is also a subject of commissuration when no good happens to anyone, or if it does happen it cannot be enjoyed. These therefore, in things of this kind, are subjects of commissuration. But men compassionate those they are well acquainted with, unless they are very much allied to them. For towards these, when they are about to suffer any evil, they are affected in the same manner as towards themselves. Hence Amesis, when his son was led to death, did not as they say, weep, but he wept when he saw his friend beg. For this indeed was an object of commissuration, but the former was a dreadful circumstance. For that which is dreadful is different from that which is commissurable, and has the power of expelling pity. It is also frequently useful to the contrary indignation. Men likewise feel compassion for their familiars when some evil is near them. They also commiserate those who are similar to themselves in age, in manners, in habits, in dignities, and in birth. For in all these it is more apparent that they may suffer the like evils. For in short, it is here also necessary to assume that men feel pity for the evils of others, if they are such as they are fearful may be fall themselves. Since however, calamities which appear to be near are the subjects of compassion, but such as happened ten thousand years ago, or which will happen ten thousand years hence, as they are neither the objects of expectation nor remembrance, are either not at all the subjects of compassion, or not in a similar degree. Hence, those things which are represented by the same gestures, voices and apparel, and in short by the same action, as those who were in some calamity adopted, are necessarily more pitiable. For they cause the evil which we commiserate to appear nearer, placing it before our eyes, either as that which will be, or which has been. Calamities likewise, which have recently happened, or which will shortly happen, are for the same reason more pitiable. Science also, and the actions which have been employed by miserable men, are pitiable, such as the garments which they have worn, and other things of the like kind. The species likewise, and whatever else is of a similar nature, of those in calamity, as for instance, of those who are dying, are subjects of commiseration, and especially of those who in such circumstances are worthy men. For all these things, because they seem near, produce greater commiseration, because he who suffers appears not to deserve these evils, and because the calamity is before our eyes. To piti, however, that passion is especially opposed, which they call indignation. For, to the pain arising from adverse circumstances, in which someone is undeservedly involved, the pain is after a certain manner opposed, which arises from the same manners, on account of the prosperity which someone unworthily obtains. And, both these passions are the offspring of worthy manners, for it is necessary to condole and compassionate those who are undeservedly unfortunate in their affairs, and to be indignant with those who are undeservedly prosperous, for that which happens to anyone contrary to his dessert is unjust. Hence also, we attribute indignation to the gods. Envy likewise, may appear to be after the same manner opposed to piti, as being proximate to, and the same with indignation. It is, however, different from it, for envy also is a turbulent pain arising from the prosperity of another person, but is not a pain arising from undeserved prosperity, but from the prosperity of one who is equal and similar to him who is envious. Both these passions, however, agree in this, that each is pained for the prosperity of another because he is prosperous and not because any evil arises from thins to the subject of these passions. For, if this were not the case, one of these passions would no longer be envy, and the other indignation, but each would be fear, if pain and perturbation were produced, because some evil would befall the subject of these passions from the prosperity of another. It is, however, evident that contrary passions are consequent to these perturbations, for he who is pained on account of the unmerited prosperity of others will rejoice, or at least will be without pain, on account of the contraries to these, vis those who are deservedly unfortunate. Thus for instance, no worthy person will be pained when parasites and murderers are punished, for it is necessary to rejoice in the misfortunes of such persons. After the same manner also, it is proper to rejoice in the prosperity of those who are deservedly fortunate. For both these are just, and cause a worthy man to rejoice, since it is necessary he should hope the same prosperity will also befall him, which befell one who resembles him. And all these passions belong to the same manners, but the contraries to these belong to contrary manners. For it is the same person who rejoices in the evils of another, and who is envious, since he who is pained at that which befalls, and is present with someone, must necessarily rejoice at the privation and destruction of that thing. Hence all these passions are impediments to pity, but they differ from the above mentioned causes, so that all of them are similarly useful for the prevention of pity. In the first place therefore, let us speak concerning indignation, and show with what persons, and on account of what circumstances we are indignant, and how those who are indignant are affected. And afterwards, let us speak concerning the other passions. But from what has been said it is evident with what persons men are indignant. For if to be indignant is to be pained on account of someone who appears to be undeservedly prosperous. In the first place it is evident that we cannot be indignant on account of every good. For if a man is just, or brave, or has any virtue, no one can be indignant with him, nor are those the objects of pity who are contrary to these. But men are indignant at riches and power in things of this kind, of which in short, good men are worthy. Nor are men indignant with those who possess anything which is naturally good, such as nobility, beauty, and the like. Since however, that which is ancient appears to be something proximate to what is naturally possessed, it necessarily follows that men are more indignant with those who possess the same good, if they have recently possessed it. And on account of this are in prosperous circumstances. For those who have recently become rich are the cause of greater molestation to others than those whose wealth is ancient and by descent. In a similar manner also rulers, powerful men, those who have numerous friends, and an excellent progeny, and whatever else is of the like kind, occasion greater molestation to others. And this is also the case if any other good befalls them on account of these things. For we are more indignant with those who are recently rich when they become rulers through their riches, than with those who have been for a long time in possession of wealth, and in a similar manner in other things. The cause, however, of this is that those who have for a long time possessed wealth appear to possess what is their own, and this is not the case with those who have recently become rich. For that which appears to have always been possessed appears to be truly possessed, so that persons of the latter description do not seem to possess what is their own, because likewise any casual person is not worthy of every good. But there is a certain analogy and fitness. Bracket, since for instance, the beauty of arms is not adapted to a just, but to a brave man. And illustrious marriages are not adapted to those who have recently become rich, but to those of noble birth. Close bracket. Hence, if a man is a worthy character, and does not obtain that which is adapted to him, so far as he is worthy, we are indignant. We are likewise indignant when an inferior contends with his superior, and especially when he contends with him in that in which he is inferior. On this account it is said by Homer, Quote, Hence did Zebriones in combat shun to engage the valiant son of Telemann, for his presuming pride offended Jove, that with a better man he durst his courage prove. Close quote. And we are also indignant if he contends with him in anything else, and not only in that in which he is inferior, as if, for instance, a musician should contend with a just man, for justice is a thing more excellent than music. From these things therefore it is evident what are the objects of indignation, and why they are so, for they are these, and things of a like nature. But men are disposed to be indignant if being worthy to obtain the greatest goods, they do not obtain them. For it is not just to think those persons worthy to obtain a similar good, who are not similarly worthy, and when men of this description become the possessors of similar good, worthy men are indignant. In the second place, good and worthy men are prone to be indignant, for they judge well, and hate what is unjust. Those likewise are indignant, who are ambitious, and who aspire after certain actions, and especially when they are ambitious about those things which others obtain that are unworthy to obtain them. And in short, those who think themselves deserving of that good, which other persons think them not to deserve, are indignant with such persons, and especially when they obtain this good. Hence men of a servile disposition, bad men, and those who are not ambitious are not prone to indignation, for there is nothing of this kind of which they think themselves worthy. From these things, however, it is manifest what kind of persons those are, for whose misfortunes and evils, or the frustration of their wishes, we ought to rejoice, or feel no pain. For, from what has been said, the opposites are apparent. Hence, unless the oration so prepares the judges when their compassion is solicited, as to convince them that those who implore their pity are unworthy to receive it, and that those who do not implore it are worthy to receive it, it is impossible to excite pity in the judges. Chapter 12 It is likewise evident what the things and persons are, which occasion envy, and how those are affected that are envious, if envy is a certain pain arising from apparent prosperity in the above-mentioned goods, when it happens to persons of a similar condition, not because this prosperity does not befall him who is envious, but because it falls to the lot of those who are the objects of envy. For those that envy are such as to whom certain persons are similar, or appear to be so. I mean who are similar in birth, in alliance, in habit, in reputation, and external abundance. Men likewise envy who want but little of possessing every good. Hence, those who perform great actions and are prosperous are envious, for they fancy that whatever assedes to others is taken from themselves. Those also are envious that are remarkably honored for a certain thing, and especially when they are honored for wisdom, or felicity. Likewise, those who are ambitious are more envious than those who are unambitious. Those also are envious who wish to seem to be wise, but are not so in reality, for they are ambitious of the honor which is attendant on wisdom. And in short, those are envious who are lovers of renown in any pursuit, for in this pursuit they are envious. The pusillanimous also are envious, for all things appear to them to be great. Hence therefore it is evident what the goods are which are the objects of envy, for envy is excited by those actions through which men pursue glory, content for honor, and aspire after the good opinion of others, and nearly in all such things as are the effects of good fortune there is envy. But this is especially the case in those things which men either desire themselves or fancy they ought to possess, or in those things in the possession of which they are a little superior or a little inferior to others. It is likewise evident who the persons are that are the objects of envy, for this was at the same time shown from what has been said about those who are envious, for men envy those who are near to them in time, in place, in age, and in renown, whence it is said, quote, that which is kindred knows how to envy, close quote. Men also envy those with whom they contend for honor, for they contend for honor with the persons above mentioned, but no one contends with those who lived 10,000 years ago, or with those who will exist 10,000 years hence, or with those who are dead, nor yet with those who dwell at the pillars of Hercules, nor with those to whom, in their own opinion, or in the opinion of others, they are far inferior, nor in like manner do they contend with those to whom they are much superior. Since, however, men contend for honor with their antagonists and rivals, and in short, with those who aspire after the same things, it is necessary that they should especially envy those persons. Hence it is said, by Hesiod, the potter envies the potter. Those also who have scarcely obtained, or who have not at all obtained a thing, envy those who have rapidly obtained it. Men likewise envy those who, by obtaining or acting rightly in anything, are a disgrace to them. But these are near and similar, for it is evident in this case that those who envy did not obtain the good, which those whom they envy obtained, through their own fault, so that this being painful produces envy. They also envy those who either have possessed these things, or who have obtained what it is fit for them to possess, or which they once possessed, and on this account, the more elderly envy the younger. Those likewise who have spent much on the same thing envy those who have spent little on it. It is also evident what the things and persons are in which men of this description rejoice, and in what manner they are affected. For as those who are not less affected are pained, so those who are so affected are delighted with contrary circumstances. I.e. they rejoice when they possess the good, which those are deprived of, who resemble themselves. Hence, if the orator disposes the judges to be affected in the same manner as those who are envious, and if he shows that those who implore pity, or desire to obtain a certain good, are such as we have said those are who are envied, it is evident that they will not obtain pity from their masters. CHAPTER 13 It is likewise from hence evident how they are affected, who are emulous, and of what kind of things and persons they are emulous. For emulation is a certain pain, arising from the apparent presence of honorable goods, and which he who emulates may possess, as falling to the lot of those who naturally resemble him, so that he who is emulous is not pained that these goods are possessed by another, but that they are not possessed by himself. Hence emulation is equitable, and is possessed by equitable men. But envy is a depraved thing, and is possessed by depraved men. For he who emulates prepares himself through emulation for the attainment of good, but he who envies endeavors through envy that his neighbor may not obtain some good. It is necessary therefore that those should be emulous who think themselves deserving of the good which they do not possess, for no one thinks himself deserving of things which appear impossible to be obtained. Hence young men, and those who are magnanimous, are emulous. Those likewise are emulous who possess such goods as deserve to be possessed by illustrious men. For these are riches, numerous friends, dominion, and the like. For as they think it fit that they should be worthy men, they emulate the worthy who possess similar goods. Men also emulate those whom others think deserving of good, and likewise those whose ancestors, or kindred, or domestics, or nation, or city are famous, are in these things emulous. For they think them to be appropriate to themselves, and that they are worthy of these. If, however, honorable goods are the subjects of emulation, it is necessary that the virtues should be things of this kind, and likewise such things as are useful and beneficial to others. For benefactors and good men are honored. Those goods also, which are enjoyed by those who are approximate to us, are the subjects of emulation, such as riches and beauty, which are enjoyed more than health. It is evident therefore who those persons are that are the subjects of emulation. For those who possess these and such like things are emulated. But these are the above mentioned particulars, such as fortitude, wisdom, and dominion. For rulers have the power of benefiting many. Generals likewise, rhetoricians, and all who are able to affect things of this kind are objects of emulation. This also is the case with those whom many wish to resemble, or of whom many wish to be the familiars, or friends, or whom many admire, or whom they themselves admire. And likewise with those whose praises and encomiums are celebrated by poets, or the writers of orations. Men, however, despise those who are deprived of these goods, and who are defiled with the contrary vices. For contempt is contrary to emulation, and emulating to despising. But it is necessary that those who are so affected as to emulate certain persons, or be emulated, should despise those who have the evils opposite to the goods which produce emulation. Hence, they frequently despise, such as are fortunate, when fortune is present with them without honourable goods. And thus we have shown, through what particulars, the passions are ingenerated and dissolved, from which credibility is derived. Chapter 14 In the next place, let us show what the manners of men are according to their passions, habits, ages, and fortunes. And the passions indeed, I denominate, anger, desire, and the like, concerning which we have spoken before. But habits are the virtues and vices, and of these also we have spoken before. And have also shown what the objects are which everyone deliberately chooses, and with the actions which he performs. The ages are youth, the acme of life and old age. But I call fortune, nobility, wealth, power, and the contraries to these, and in short, prosperous and adverse fortune. Young men therefore are prone to desire, and prepared to accomplish what they desire. Of all the desires pertaining to the body likewise, they are especially addicted to venereal pleasures, and are intemperate in these. But they are mutable, and rapidly become vestidious in their desires. They also desire vehemently, and quickly cease to desire, for their wishes are acute, and not great, so that they resemble the hunger and thirst of those that are sick. For they are likewise prone to anger, are precipitately angry, are prepared to follow the impulse of passion, and are vanquished by anger. For in consequence of their ambition, they cannot endure to be neglected, but are indignant if they conceive that they are injured. And they are indeed ambitious, but they are more desirous of victory. For youth aspires after transcendency, but victory is a certain transcendency. They are also more desirous of both these, i.e. honor and victory, than of riches. But they are, in the smallest degree, anxious about wealth, because they have not yet experienced the want of it, as it is said in an apathym of Pidicus on Amphiraeus. Young men likewise are not malevolent, but ingenuous, because they have not yet beheld much depravity. They are also credulous, because they have not yet been deceived in many things. And they are full of good hope. For in the same manner as men are heated, who are intoxicated with wine, so young men are naturally hot. And at the same time, they are full of good hope, because they have not yet been frequently frustrated of their wishes. They also live for the most part from hope. For hope indeed is of the future, but memory of the past. But with young men, the future is long, and the past short. For in the morning of life, they do not think that they should remember anything, but hope all things. They are likewise easily deceived, for the cause already assigned, for they easily hope. They are also more brave, for they are irascible, and full of good hope, of which the former causes them to be fearless, and the latter confident. For no one who is angry is afraid, and to hope for some good produces confidence. They are likewise bashful, for they do not as yet apprehend other things to be beautiful in conduct than those in which they were instructed by law alone. And they are magnanimous, for they are not yet rendered abject by life, but are unexperienced in its necessities, and magnanimity consists in a man believing himself to deserve great things. And this is the province of one who entertains good hope. They likewise prefer beautiful to profitable conduct, for they live more from moral precepts than from reasoning. But reasoning is directed to that which is profitable, and virtue to that which is beautiful. Youth also is a lover of friends and associates more than the other ages, because it rejoices in society, and does not yet judge of anything by its utility, so that neither does it seek for advantage in friendship. Youth likewise err in everything in a greater degree and more vehemently, contrary to the precept of Kylo, for they do all things too much, since they love and hate too much, and in a similar manner with respect to everything else. For they fancy and strenuously contend that they know all things, and this is the reason why they exceed in all their actions. They also injure others from insolence, and not malevolently. And they are compassionate, because they apprehend all men to be worthy, and better than they are. For by their own innocence they measure others, so that they are of opinion they suffer undeservedly. They are likewise addicted to laughter, on which account also they are facetious. For facetiousness is learned contumally, such therefore are the manners of youth. Chapter 15 Elderly men, however, and those who have lost the vigor of age, are nearly, for the most part, endued with manners, contrary to those of youth. For because they have lived many years, have been deceived in many things, and have erred. And because the greater part of human affairs is bad, hence they do not firmly assert anything, and estimate all things less than is proper. They likewise opine, but know nothing, and, being involved in doubt, they always add perhaps, and it may be, and in this manner they speak on every subject, but they assert nothing stably. They are also ill-natured, for ill-nature consists in putting the worst construction on everything. Further still, they are suspicious from their incredulity, but they are incredulous from their experience. On this account, likewise, they neither love nor hate vehemently, but, according to the precept of bias, they love as if they should some time or other hate, and they hate as if they should some time or other love. They are also pusillanimous, because they have become abject through length of years, for they desire nothing great or illustrious, but those things only which are necessary to the support of life. They are likewise ill-liberal, for one of the necessaries of life is property. But, at the same time, from experience, they know how difficult the acquisition of wealth is, and how easily it is lost. They are also timid, and are afraid of everything beforehand, for they are affected in a manner contrary to youth, since they are frigid, but youth is hot, so that old age prepares the way for timidity. For fear is a certain refrigeration. They are likewise lovers of life, and especially at the close of life, because desire is directed to that which is absent, and that which is wanted is especially the object of desire. They are also lovers of themselves, more than is proper, for this also is a certain pusillanimity, and they live with a view to what is advantageous, and not with a view to what is beautiful in conduct, more than is proper, because they are lovers of themselves. For what is advantageous is good to an individual, but that which is beautiful in conduct is simply good. They are likewise more impudent than modest, for, because they do not similarly pay attention to the beautiful in conduct, and the advantageous, they neglect the opinion of others, as to their own actions. They are also despondent on account of their experience of human affairs, for the greater part of human concerns are bad, and therefore most of them tend to a worse condition, and also on account of their timidity. And they live more for memory than from hope, for the remainder of their life is but little, but that which is past is much, and hope indeed is of the future, but memory is of the past. This likewise is the cause of their gorulity, for they dwell on the narration of past events, because they are delighted with the recollection of them. Their anger also is sharp, but imbecile, and their desires partly fail, and partly are weak, so that they are neither prone to desire, nor disposed to act according to its impulse, but they act with a view to gain. Hence those who are so far advanced in age appear to be temperate, for their desires become remiss, and they are subservient to gain. They likewise live more from reasoning than from manners, for reasoning is directed to that which is advantageous, but manners are directed to virtue. They injure others also from malevolence, and not from insolence. Old men likewise are compassionate as well as young men, but not from the same cause. For young men are compassionate from philanthropy, but old men from imbecility, for they fancy that all evils are near them, and this was the definition of a compassionate man. Hence also they are quarrelous, and are neither facetious nor lovers of laughter, for the quarrelous disposition is contrary to that which is addicted to laughter. Such therefore are the manners of young and elderly men. Hence too, since everyone willingly admits orations adapted to his manners, and which exhibit similar manners in the orator, it is not immanifest what the manners are, which an orator ought to express in his oration, so that they may be readily heard by the young or the old. Chapter 16 With respect to those, however, who are in the acme of life, it is evident that their manners will be between those of youth and old men, so as to take away the excess of each, and they are neither very confident, for audacity is a thing of such a kind as confidence, nor very timid, but are disposed in a becoming manner with respect to both these, nor do they confide in all men, nor disbelieve all men, but are more disposed to judge according to truth, and neither do they alone live with a view to what is beautiful in conduct, nor with a view to what is advantageous, but with a view to both, nor are they inclined to parsimony, nor yet to luxury, but to that mode of life which is appropriate and fit. They are also disposed in a similar manner with respect to anger and desire, and they are temperate in conjunction with fortitude and brave in conjunction with temperance, for these virtues are distributed in the young and the old, since young men indeed are brave and intemperate, but elderly men temperate and timid. In short, the advantages which are distributed among the young and the old subsist in conjunction in those who are in the acme of life, but such things as exceed or are deficient in the young and the old of these that which is moderate and fit is possessed by men in the vigor of their age. But the body indeed is in its acme from 30 to 5 and 30 years of age, but the soul about the 49th year and thus much concerning the manners of youth and old age and those who are in the acme of life. Chapter 17 Let us in the next place speak concerning the goods derived from fortune, through which it happens that the manners of men become such as they are. The manners therefore of nobility are indeed such as render him who possesses it more ambitious. For all men when any good is present with them are accustomed to accumulate it, but nobility is a certain dignity of ancestors. But it is peculiar to those of noble birth to despise those who resemble their ancestors, i.e. who have recently obtained those goods which their ancestors formerly possessed. Because remote renown is more honorable than that which is recently obtained and is attended with greater glory. A man, however, is noble from the virtue of lineage, but he is generous through not degenerating from the nature of his ancestors, which for the most part is not the case with men of noble birth, since many of them are abject. For there is a fertility in the progenies of men in the same manner as in the productions of the earth, and sometimes if the stock is good, illustrious men are for a time produced, but afterwards there is again a remission of fecundity. The progeny also, which possessed an excellent disposition, degenerates into more insane manners, as was the case with the offspring of Alcibiades and the elder Dionysius. But progeny of a stable disposition degenerate into stupidity and sloth, as was the case with the descendants of Simon, Pericles, and Socrates. Chapter 18 But the manners which are consequent to wealth may be easily seen by all men, for rich men are insolent and proud, and these manners they derive from the possession of wealth, since they are affected in the same manner as if they possessed every good. For wealth is, as it were, by which the worth of other things is estimated, on which account it appears that all things may be purchased by it. Rich men also are luxurious and boastful, luxurious indeed from their delicate mode of living, and the ostentation of their felicity. But they are boastful and of barbarous manners, because all men are accustomed to dwell upon that which is beloved and admired by them, and because they fancy that others are emulous of that which is the object of their emulation. At the same time, however, they are deservedly thus affected, for many are in want of the riches which they possess, whence also that saying of Simonides, respecting wise and rich men, in answer to the wife of King Hyrule, who asked him whether it was better to become a rich than a wise man. For he replied that it was better to be a rich man, because wise men, said he, are seen waiting at the doors of the rich. They are also thus affected, because they fancy themselves worthy to govern, for they fancy they possess those things for the sake of which government is thought worthy of being obtained. And in short, the manners of the rich are the manners of one who is stupidly happy. The manners of the wealthy, however, who have recently become rich, differ from the manners of those who have derived their wealth from their ancestors in this. That the former have all vices in a greater degree, and with more depravity. For wealth recently acquired is, as it were, a certain inerudition of riches. Rich men also injure others, not from malevolence, but partly from insolence, and partly from intemperance, because when from the former they strike others, and from the latter commit adultery. Chapter 19 Thus too, most of the manners pertaining to power are nearly evident, for power has partly the same, and partly better manners than wealth. For men in power are as to their manners more ambitious and more virile than rich men, because they aspire after those employments, which they are capable of performing through their power. They are likewise more diligent, as being compelled to direct their attention to things pertaining to power. They are also more venerable than severe, for dignity renders them more conspicuous, on which account they are moderate in their conduct. But venerableness is a mild and decorous gravity, and if they act unjustly, it is not in small affairs, but in things of great consequence. Prosperity likewise, as to its parts, has the manners of the above-mentioned characters, fizz of the noble, the rich, and the powerful. For those prosperity which appear to be the greatest tend to these, and farther still, prosperity prepares us to abound in a good offspring, and in the goods pertaining to the body. Powerful men, therefore, are more proud and inconsiderate on account of their prosperity. Among the manners, however, which are attendant on good fortune, there is one which is most excellent, and it is this, that the fortunate are lovers of divinity, and are well-disposed towards a divine nature, for they believe in it in a becoming manner, in consequence of the goods proceeding from fortune. And thus much concerning the manners of men according to age and fortune, for the manners which are contrary to the before-mentioned are evident from contrary fortunes, fizz from the fortunes of the poor, the unfortunate and the powerless. The use, however, of persuasive orations pertains to judgment, for we no longer require arguments about things which we know, and of which we have formed a judgment, and though it be but one person alone whom the orator endeavors to exhort or dissuade, as is the case with those who admonish or persuade, yet that one person is a judge, for he whom it is necessary to persuade is, in short, a judge. And the like takes place, whether the oration is directed against the litigant or against the hypothesis, for it is necessary that an oration should be employed and that the contrary arguments should be subverted, against which, as against a litigant, the oration is made. A similar method must also be adopted in demonstrative orations, for in these the speech is directed to the spectators as to judges. In short, he alone is, simply speaking, a judge who, in political contests, judges the subjects of investigation. For, in such contests, the manner in which things of a dubious nature subsist is investigated, and also those which are the subjects of consultation. Concerning the manners of politics, however, we have already spoken in what we have said about deliberative affairs, so that it is there explained in the manner and through what particulars we may produce ethical orations. But since about every kind of oration there is a certain different end, and about all of them, opinions and propositions are assumed, from which those who consult, demonstrate and dispute, derive credibility, and farther still, since we have also discussed those particulars, from which it is possible to compose ethical orations, it remains that we should discuss such things as are common. For, it is necessary that all rhetoricians in orations of every kind should employ what pertains to the possible and impossible, and should endeavor to show that some things will be, and that others have been. The consideration likewise of magnitude is common to all orations. For, all orations, whether they persuade or dissuade, whether they praise or blame, accuse or defend, employ diminution and amplification. But these things being determined, let us endeavor to discuss in common what pertains to enthamemes, and examples, in order that, by adding what remains, we may bring to an end what we proposed from the first. Of things however which are common, amplification is most adapted to demonstrative orations. As we have before observed, but that which has been done is more adapted to judicial orations. Bracket, for judgment, is employed about these, close bracket, and the possible, and what will be done are most adapted to deliberative orations. In the first place, therefore, let us speak concerning things possible and impossible. If then it is possible for one contrary to be, or to be affected, it would seem to be possible that the other contrary also may be. Thus for instance, if it is possible that a man may be restored to health, it is also possible that he may be diseased. For there is the same power of contraries, so far as they are contraries. And if one similar is possible, another similar likewise is possible. And if that which is more difficult is possible, which is more easy is possible. If likewise it is possible for a thing to be rendered good or beautiful, it is possible in short for that thing to be produced. For it is more difficult for a beautiful house, than for a house simply to exist. That also of which the beginning is possible, the end is possible. For nothing is affected, nor begins to be affected of things which are impossible. Thus for instance, it will never begin to be possible, nor will it ever be possible that the diagonal of a square should be commensurable with the side of the square. That of which the end likewise is possible, the beginning is possible. For all things are produced from the beginning or principle. If that also which is a posterior in essence or in generation is possible to be affected, this is likewise the case that which is prior. As if it is possible for a man, it is also possible for a child to be generated. For the latter is prior to the former. And if it is possible for a child to be generated, it is likewise possible for a man. For a child is the beginning, but man is the end of this generation. Those things also, of which the love or desire is from nature, are possible. No one for the most part loves or desires things impossible. And it is possible for those things to be and to be affected of which there are sciences and arts. Those things likewise are possible. The principle of the generation of which is in those things which we can compel or persuade. And these are things then which we are more powerful or of which we are the masters of those things of which the parts are possible. The whole is possible. And of those things of which the whole, the parts also are, for the most part, possible. For it is possible for the ornaments of the head and a garment to be made. It is also possible for a peril to be made. And if a peril, it is likewise possible for the ornaments of the head and a garment to be made. If likewise the whole genus is among the number of things possible to be affected, this is also the case with the species. And if with the species, likewise with the genus. Thus, for instance, if it is possible for a ship, it is also possible for a three-banked galley to be constructed. And if a three-banked galley, a ship likewise may be constructed. And if one of those things which are naturally related to each other is possible, the other also is possible, as if the double is possible. This is also the case with the half. And if the half, the double also. If likewise it is possible for anything to be affected without art or preparation, it is much more possible for it to be affected through art and diligent attention. Hence also, it is said by Agatha, quote, some things by fortune may affected be and some by art we do and from necessity. Close quote. And if a thing may be affected by worse or inferior or more imprudent persons, it may also be much more affected by persons of a contrary description. As likewise, Isocrates said, that it would be a dreadful thing if Euthenas should have learned that which he himself was unable to discover. But with respect to things impossible, it is evident that they may be obtained from the contrary to the above mentioned particulars. Whether a thing however has been done or has not been done, must be considered from what follows. For in the first place, if that has been done, which is less naturally adapted to have been done, that will have been affected, which is more naturally adapted to have been done. And if that which was want to be done, afterwards has been done, that also has been done, which was usually done before. As if a man has forgotten anything, he has once learned, that which he has forgotten. And if a man is able and willing to do a thing, he has done it. For all men act when they are willing and able since there is no impediment to their acting. Further still, if a man is willing to do a thing, and nothing external impedes him, he does it. And if he is able to affect anything, and is angry, he affects it. And this is likewise the case if he is able and is under the influence of desire. For men for the most part do those things which they desire and are able to affect. Depraved men indeed from intemperance, but worthy men because they desire what is equitable. If also anyone intended to do a thing, it is probable that he did it. And if such things are done as are naturally adapted to be done prior to a certain thing or for the sake of it, that thing has been done. Thus, if it has lightened, it has also thundered. And if anyone has endeavored to do a certain thing, he has also done it. And if such things as are naturally adapted to have been done afterwards, or if that for the sake of which they are done has been affected, that also which is done prior to them, and for the sake of which they are done has been affected. Thus, if it has thundered, it has lightened. And if a thing has been done, there has likewise been an endeavor to do it. With respect however to all these things some of them are from necessity but others for the most part subsist after this manner. And as to that which has not been done, it is evident that it may be shown not to have been done from places contrary to the before mentioned. Evidence likewise with respect to what will be done may be derived from the same things. For that which it is in the power and will of anyone to do will be done. This is also the case with things which anyone is impelled to do from desire and anger, and reasoning in conjunction with power. Hence, if anyone is impelled or meditates to do a thing it will be done. Since for the most part, things which are intended to be done are affected rather than those which are not. If also those things are done which ought to have been done first, that likewise will be done, which ought to have been done afterwards. Thus, because before it rains, the clouds ought to be collected. If the clouds are collected, it is probable it will rain. And, if a thing has been done, which is for the sake of something else, it is probable that the thing will be done for the sake of which the other was done. As if the foundation is laid, it is probable the host will be built. With respect, however, to the magnitude and parvitude of things, the greater and the less, and in short, things which are great and small, these will be evident to us from what has been said before. For, in the discussion of the deliberative genus, we have spoken concerning the magnitude of what is good, and in short, concerning the greater and the less. Hence, since in every oration the proposed end is good, as for instance, the useful, the beautiful, and the just, it is evident that through these amplifications must be assumed in all orations. But, besides these, to investigate anything concerning magnitude simply and excess is a vain discussion. For, particulars are more useful in the composition of orations than universals, and thus much concerning the possible and impossible, and whether a thing has been done or has not been done, and will be or will not be. And, further still, concerning the greatness and littleness of things. Chapter 21 It now remains to speak about the credibility which is common to all orations, since we have already spoken about the credibility which is peculiar. But, there are two kinds of the credibility which is common, viz, example, and enthamim. For, a sentence is a part of an enthamim. In the first place, therefore, let us speak concerning example. For example is similar to induction, but induction is a principle. But, of examples, there are two species. For one species indeed, of example, is to speak of things that are past. But, the other is, when we ourselves feign something similar for the purpose of showing that which we wish to show. And, of this, one species is a parable, but the other fables like those of Asop and the Africans. Example, however, is indeed a thing of the following kind, as if someone should say, quote, that it is necessary to make preparations against the Persian king and not suffer him to subjugate Egypt. For to him, Therias could not pass over the helispond till he had captured Egypt. But, when he had captured it, he passed into Greece. Close quote. And again, quote, Xerxes did not attack Greece till he had captured Egypt. But, when he had captured it, he passed over into Greece so that this king of Persia, also, if he should take Egypt, will pass into Greece. Hence, he must not be suffered to do this. Close quote. But, a parable is a Socratic similitude, as if someone should say, quote, that it is not proper magistrates should be chosen by lot. For, this is just as if someone should choose athletee by lot. So as not to select those who are able to contend, but those on whom the lot falls. Or, as if someone should choose by lot from a number of sailors, him who ought to be the pilot of a ship. As if it were proper that he should be chosen on whom the lot falls, and not he who is skilled in steering a ship. Close quote. But, a fable is such as that of Stesichorus against Philaris and of Aesop, for a certain demagogue. For, when the Hemerians had chosen Philaris for their general with absolute authority and were about to give him a guard for his body, Stesichorus, after other things which he had said, addressed this fable to them. Quote, that a horse once had sole possession of a meadow, but that a stag coming into it and destroying the pasture, the horse, wishing to be revenged of the stag, asked a man if he should be able in conjunction with him to punish the stag. But the man answered that he should be able if he would suffer himself to be bridled and let him get on his back armed with darts. The horse, therefore, having consented, the man, having got on his back instead of taking vengeance on the stag, made the horse his slave. In length manner, he said, do you Hemerians, take care, lest, wishing to be revenged of your enemies, you suffer as the horse. For now you have received a bridle in having chosen a general with absolute authority, but if you allow him a guard and suffer him to get on your backs you will immediately be enslaved by Phylaris. Quote, but Esop, when pleading in Samos for a demagogue who was in danger of losing his life, said, Quote, that a fox in passing over a river fell into a whirlpool, and not being able to get out of it was for a long time in a miserable condition, and many canine flies adhered to his skin. But a hedgehog wandering along as soon as he saw him, commiserating his condition, asked him whether he should drive away the canine flies from him. The fox, however, would not give his permission and being asked by the hedgehog why he would not reply, because these indeed are now full of me, and draw but little blood. But if you drive these away, others will come who are hungry and will drink up the rest of my blood. Thus O man of Samos said he this man will no longer hurt you for he is rich, but if you put him to death other persons who are poor will succeed him, and by thieving the public property will consume your wealth. Close quote. Fables, however, are adapted to popular harangues and they have this good that it is difficult to find things which have been similarly transacted. But it is easy to find fables. For it is necessary that he who is able to perceive similitude in things should compose fables in the same manner as parables, which it is easy to do from philosophy. It is easy therefore to introduce fables. But examples derived from history are more useful for the purpose of consultation. For future, for the most part, resembles past events. But it is necessary that the orator should use examples as demonstrations when he has not enthamemes. For credibility is obtained through these. And when he has enthamemes he should use them as testimonies and should employ examples in the epilogues of the enthamemes. For examples, when they are proposed by themselves ought to be similar to inductions. But induction is not adapted to rhetorical compositions except in a few instances. And examples when induced in confirmation of conclusions are equivalent to testimonies. But a witness is everywhere adapted to persuade. Hence he who introduces examples prior to enthamemes must necessarily adduce many examples. But one example is sufficient for the purpose of confirming what has been proved by enthamemes. For a credible witness, though but one is useful. And thus we have shown how many species there are of examples and how and when they are to be used. End of Chapter 21 of Book 2 Recording in memory of Mitchell Edwards