 My name is Rick Ozzie Nelson. I'm director of the Homeland Security and Counterterrorism Program here at CSIS. And is that somebody's phone? Is that you, Juan? No, I'm sorry. I don't understand. So anyhow, so this is going to be a very interesting panel, very intriguing panel. Again, one that's very, very important to us. Our program, as many of you know, released a report on March on this very, very important topic. And one of the issues that we stress is a need to have to enhance communication and better understanding between some of the communities that are affected by this and the US government and the international community in general. So I have a very limited role in this, and I've already exceeded that role. So I'm going to go ahead and introduce my colleague, my friend, Juan Zarati, obviously a senior affiliate here at CSIS. But prior to that, in government service, long and very distinguished queer government. His last job, as many of you know, was my boss. But at the White House, the Deputy National Security Advisor for Combating Terrorism. Prior to that, he was Assistant Secretary at the Department of Treasury and also served at the Department of Justice. And he will get upset if I tell any more about him. So Juan, without further ado, thank you very much for bringing this event together. And I really appreciate it. Oz, thanks for the kind introduction. The reality is I worked for Ozzie. One of my first tasks at the NSC was to help get out the maritime security strategy, which was really a creation of Ozzie's great work for the US government. So I've always been a great fan of Ozzie's. And Oz, thanks for hosting this for us. Thank you all for braving the snow. Really want to welcome you as well as our panelists to, I think, what is a very timely and important discussion and a discussion that we don't do enough of, either in Washington or across the country. And that is largely what is the role of American Muslims in countering radicalization. And this is an important time for this discussion. Timely, in particular, given Dr. Miramati's important and good report, you should have seen copies out there. But I would commend it to you, a community-based approach to countering radicalization, a partnership for America. I think the report is not only timely, but critical reading for anyone who's interested in these issues. It comes at a time with rising concern about more Americans falling prey to the ideology of extremism, growing anxiety in American Muslim communities around the country, about being unfairly targeted, not being understood, or listened to, and frankly, suspicions about Muslim Americans perhaps growing in a way that we hadn't seen since 9-11. I think the debate about the New York Islamic Center is a case in point. And so I think the U.S. government, community leaders, state and local authorities are all struggling and looking for answers as to how to counter radicalization. And this report and this discussion, I think, begins to answer in part how to address these concerns. I'm personally gratified and professionally gratified with this discussion too, because I've argued for a long time, and I did so right after the Fort Hood event when I testified before the Senate, that American Muslims have to be at the center of the solution to the ideological problems and challenges we're facing, whether it's at home or abroad, that ultimately the solution to the ideological challenge from al-Qaeda and like-minded terrorists and other extremists will come from American Muslims and Muslims around the world. And so this discussion is in part intended to drive that, to talk about what that partnership looks like, to talk importantly about what empowerment and enlistment looks like, not just what a reactive partnership looks like and how that can happen organically. And again, this report that Hedya has led really talks about that. Without too much fanfare, let me introduce the speakers and panelists. I think we have some of the great minds in town here to talk about this. Obviously, Hedya Miramati has a close friend of mine, but she's the president of the World Organization for Resource Development Education, has been a voice in the American Muslim community for some time and a partner with the US government and author of this report. Kumar Alhuda, who is the senior program manager and Islamic scholar at USIP, the US Institute for Peace, an important voice on all these issues, not just domestically, but internationally. Tim Curry to his left, a senior policy advisor at the Department of Homeland Security, somebody who's been working on issues of community outreach and radicalization for some time. And for those of you who've been around town, working with government, you've seen Tim and heard him and he's an incredibly important and thoughtful voice. And finally, to his left, Dr. Peter Newman, who comes to us from King's College as the director for the International Center for the Study of Radicalization and Political Violence, we're fortunate in that he's in town as a visiting fellow at the Center for Peace and Security Studies. So the order of business will be this. We will hear from Dr. Miramati, hear a summary of her report and that will kick off then the discussion and then we'll open it up to the panelists for some short remarks and then open it up to you for questions and answers. I'll serve as the moderator. I will be gentle with you, but I will be demanding. So with that, thank you for being here and I'm really appreciative that we have the panelists with us. Dr. Miramati. Thank you all, really thank you for braving this terrible weather. Maybe we should develop a program for countering violent weather. Today we'll go with radical ideology. I'd like to thank Mr. Halsey Nelson, CSIS, Juan Zirardi, Ben and all their staff that helped so much to put this event together. I'm really grateful for you hosting us here today. So I'd like to begin my discussion with talking about a little bit of the background for why we wrote this report. And we felt that it was very important for the American public to see Muslims as active participants in this problem with radicalization. We felt that the growing divide in the American public and the religious fault lines that were being created were negatively affecting Muslims across the country and across the world and it was affecting our way our way of working together. And so the rash of cases of homegrown terror suspects and the apparent use of FBI sting operations as a primary method of intervention signals to me both the failure of the Muslim American community and the US government to tackle domestic radicalization effectively. Accusations of a trapment abound which only increased the trust deficit between Muslim Americans, the American public and the US government. The growing suspicion on all sides is creating a dangerous environment of fear, hostility and enmity. There needs to be a critical shift in how we approach the threat of terrorism. So the American public can see Muslims as part of the solution. Law enforcement, local policy makers and activists need to prevent radicalization from occurring in the first place. However, such a policy is not created on the streets of LA or New York. It must come from our national leadership. For far too long, the ideological component of violent extremism was left strictly to the purview of the Muslim community and quite frankly, the community has refused to take on the challenge. Turning a blind eye to the problem is partly the result of a lack of will but also fear of confronting the hard issues openly and honestly. But the time has come for policy makers to announce a national dialogue in partnership with the Muslim community to counter radicalization in our homes, in the community centers and online. Our report, a community-based approach to countering radicalization, lists seven sets of recommendations for both policy makers and community members but I wanted to highlight here some of the overarching themes we think are really important to developing this national strategy. First, we need to move beyond grievance-based relationships with national Muslim organizations and instead establish partnerships with local Muslim communities specifically geared towards countering radical ideologies. I don't mean those other grievance-based or civil-liberty forms should cease to exist. I mean that we need to create partnerships that focus specifically on the ideology. Focusing only on national Muslim organizations also alienates large segments of the US Muslim population and has proven deficient in tackling extremism. Policy makers and law enforcement officials should reach out to local thought leaders, teachers, businessmen and activists to establish ongoing two-way dialogues, constructive debates and brainstorming sessions that develop community-based responses to radicalism. Local leaders are best placed to intervene when someone is radicalized because they are aware of the unique dynamics within their community and can rapidly identify when someone displays disturbing behavior. As a result, they have the greatest potential to serve as intermediaries for the government. Second, we have to be smart about who we are empowering. We should be wary of the overnight moderates who openly denounce terrorism but under the surface encourage militant jihad in hotspots like Iraq, Afghanistan and Palestine. In the UK, policymakers inadvertently empowered hard-line Islamist groups because they didn't impose any benchmarks for partnerships. In the US, even though Awlaki was under investigation by the FBI, he was invited to the Pentagon as part of an outreach effort post 9-11. To avoid finding ourselves aligned to some unsavory actors, public and private partnerships in the US should be premised on a mutually agreeable set of shared values. So some examples of those shared values include the fundamental norms like supporting religious freedom of all persons including those of other Muslim denominations, respecting societal pluralism, advocating nonviolent solutions to political or social conflict and the preservation of our country's rule of law. Thought leaders, academics, organizations and activists who commit to these shared values are best positioned to exert pressure from within the Muslim community to moderate radicalized individuals and at-risk persons. One way we are encouraging Muslims to publicly commit to these values is by signing our pledge. We have these available online and we're doing an online petition as well. To begin is to sign the pledge and use it to begin a discussion in their community about how to generate their own programs to curb extremist indoctrination. Unfortunately, some large Muslim institutions have ignored this problem for far too long. Both the Christmas Tree Bomber and the Fort Hood Terrorist Nadal Hassan attended mosques led by preachers who were known to openly support militant jihad. For example, Mohamud, the Christmas Bomber, attended services at the Islamic Center of Portland where Imam Karay preached his war triumphs in Afghanistan and was known to provide money to aspiring Taliban militants. In 2002, he was arrested for having trace elements of TNT on his luggage in the Portland International Airport. Similarly, Nadal Hassan was known to attend the Dal-Hijra Mosque in Northern Virginia which is owned and operated by the North American Islamic Trust. Otherwise referred to as NAIT, it was included in the Department of Justice as one of the unindicted co-conspirators in the Holy Land Foundation Terror Financing Trial. It is the same mosque where Anwar Awlaki preached and where some of the 911 hijackers also worshiped. Community members have to hold their mosque and the community center leadership accountable for the messages they send young American Muslims. They need to undercut radical ideologies and provide their youth with access to mentors who preach a socially responsible definition of what it means to be a good Muslim. In the UK, for example, Dr. Tara Qadri holds these anti-terror camps where he debunks the radical interpretation of Islam in an authentic and cool paradigm drawing upwards of 1500 participants. Another critical component to success is mobilizing the business and philanthropy sectors to partner with Muslims who are committed to curbing religious radicalism. Many Muslim community groups lack the basic resources to build community resilience against radical preachers like Awlaki who have exploited disaffected youth with a poor understanding of Islam. US officials can encourage these sectors because as the US government we don't fund religion directly but we can use our diplomatic and political resources to encourage these sectors to fund domestic projects such as publishing pamphlets and booklets that highlight shared values of religious tolerance, pluralism and social cohesion. Two, fund websites that discredit Awlaki's idiot guided jihad and other extremist arguments. Three, fund community centers that foster constructive socialization, a sense of belonging and channel youth energy to positive outlets like sports and creative arts. And finally, workshops that teach young Muslims peaceful conflict resolution techniques and provide civic engagement opportunities. And finally, given the increased attention of these issues in the media and the misunderstandings between Muslims and non-Muslims in America, it is important to initiate a public awareness campaign to counter the perception that all Muslims are radical. We need educational forums to understand the evolving threat of radical ideologies and how that differs from mainstream Islamic tenants. Public policy makers and federal officials can organize town hall meetings or conferences and seminars where participants can discuss how to recognize the warning signs of radicalization and how to pair local communities with the resources they need to address the problem. These forums should be televised and the information disseminated through public channels. We also need hearings on the Hill to describe best practices that can be replicated across America. Similarly, public and private foundations should also look to provide resources for Muslims to convene their own organic de-radicalization efforts in their communities. Throughout the process, Muslim groups need to be developing their own public campaigns against violent extremism, issuing statements against radical ideologies that breed violence and hatred, publishing their own pamphlets, highlighting Islamic values of religious tolerance, pluralism, gender equality, and social cohesion. All of these types of public forums will demonstrate to the American public that Muslims are just as committed as non-Muslims to solving this problem. Many of the guidelines we provide in the report are designated to be a resource for policy makers to begin the conversation on countering radicalization. We hope they can use the ideas put forward and decide the next steps with their Muslim community partners. We also hope it'll be a resource for the Muslim community to design their own initiatives and demonstrate their firm commitment to solving this crisis. Most importantly, we believe a successful counter-radicalization partnership requires the top-down pressure to generate a bottom-up response for Muslim communities across America. Very few Muslim leaders would want to be excluded from such a high-profile endeavor, and as the UK model illustrates, most will sign on to participate. Recently, I heard a former director of the CIA describing the evolving threat of terrorism from al-Qaeda. He explained how our successful homeland security apparatus had forced al-Qaeda to switch its approach from the spectacular attacks to the small-scale, unsophisticated acts of violence. Well, even if today, the chance of another 9-11 is more remote than it was a decade ago, is it acceptable to us as a nation to live under a constant state of fear that a bomb is gonna go off in the shopping mall? To me, that prospect is not consoling and it's not acceptable. Our country needs to come together, pool its resources, and confront the problem courageously. Otherwise, we risk tearing the country apart along religious fault lines. Thank you. Thank you, Hedya. We'll reserve questions for the entire panel, including you, Hedya, until the end. One thing I forgot to mention is this is all on the record, and this will be available via audio and video on csis.org. So, a little plug for that website. Kumar, why don't we go to you next and then we'll go down the line. If you'd like to sit or you can stand me away. Thank you. I just have a few comments on my observations from the document. Things that may seem so obvious, but maybe not obvious to some. Two or three things, first and foremost, is that it really resonates for a lot of us who are in the policy world or in academia that such a document you think would have come out maybe a year after 9-11 because of its urgency. And I think Hedya and I and many others have been asking and have been part of conversations where many thought leaders would say, where are the Muslims? Where? How come they're not speaking out? Where are they? How come they're not present? And through frustrations, I think there's been a lot of presence, but perhaps not listening. And I think this is one document that we have to listen to because of its very concise words on a national program on de-radicalization. And it's, for too long, I think, I think the document hits it right on the nail. It's been really focused and the burden has been on the intelligence community and on the security community. Essentially counter-radicalization has been preventative but kept to traditional institutions, the institutions that some of us are very well aware of. So not that they are not supposed to be doing it, that's their job. And that's what they're responsible for. However, I think the question has been, I think we started off with how to include, how to further make this a more inclusive process to do in such a ways that you include Muslim leaders, religious leaders, thought leaders, academics, social activists, as well as other NGOs. For too long, it's only been a handful of people. The dynamics since 9-11 has been, we are the ones who can speak for the Muslim community, but we're not these ones that would speak up, these traditional 10-11 national organizations who would say we are the ones that represent the community, but then they don't go far enough, or they don't have the capacity, or they're just not really interested. Mostly they're very defensive, that this could be an Islamic problem and Muslims or American Muslims pose the threat. So there's a defensive and the conversation is driven by a defensive posturing. And then you have others who say, no, let's really move forward, but let's do it in strategic ways, that's not, it goes very slowly. I think this document says there's a need to integrate the current institutions that are within government, but also move outside to look for partnerships, and I think that's the key word. Much of it, I think when I read the document, I kept referring back to United Kingdom strategy, I think that was established four years ago or three years ago, I think it's called Prevent. And some of that, I think we could learn. Some of those strategies and how that could help us. And if you're not familiar with, I think one of our colleagues will talk more about it, but it is a preventative strategy that talks about dealing with bottom up, dealing with activists, mosque leaders, women organizations, teachers, again, schools and club organizations. Although it's driven to challenge ideology behind violent extremism, it's at the same time there to disrupt activities and intervene who want to recruit students or youth. There's also a desire to build community resilience. So we think that, at least some do that, if you just work with certain partners within a particular community, that that partnership, the fact that they're at the table, that they have the capacity, the intellectual capacity, the professional capacity, and even the capacity to carry through some of these projects, I think we need to reassess that because we don't emphasize training, I think. We, I think, are de-collectively, both in the United States and perhaps in Europe. So I would say those are some of the challenges. A preventative approach, which I think this document talks about, also needs some key frameworks. I would hesitate to rush into, and I don't think this document is talking about, rushing into certain projects or programs. First, in initiating a dialogue, a strategic dialogue. But I think we need certain frameworks that would help bring these partnerships together and be more fruitful. In the 70s, I think, just as a reference, I hope I have two minutes to refer back to this, we can build on this. And I think some of us can recall this. In the 70s, there was a lot of work done on studying, examining leftist movements and nationalist movements and so forth, and a lot of the counter-radical theories came out of studying leftist movements. And the idea was, through social movement theory, that people's grievances and ideologies and ability to mobilize and recruit come through movements. And from that, we have been building on finding Islamist or counter-radicals and Islamist groups through this particular movement theory, SMT. The problem is, some studies apply the same SMT theory to Islamist groups. That if you study their organizations, their structures and networking and grievances and recruitment, it's sort of an analysis approach, but it's not a preventative approach. From that, I would say that this document also would help us to think more about analysis of what strains people to think and become tied to religious extremism. And so many of the theories from the 70s and 80s talked about economics and talked about foreign policy and domestic policy, the sense of impotence, the sense of not feeling connected to a larger society or to networks and so forth. So this connection to a group, joining a group of social movement was to be that outlet. And I think all this sounds very basic to many of us in the room, but when you're speaking to a community leader or a religious person, an Imam, some of this doesn't apply to my mosque because there are no people here in our mosque that would even think along these lines. And so I think there's a big curve of education. And I think we should be prepared that if you have a bottom-up approach, a community-based approach in counter-radicalization, we should not assume that people are receiving all this information the first or second time. That here is the pamphlet on counter-radicalization. These are the things you should look for. These are the checklist, check these boxes, and then hopefully we'll find them. I know we don't think that way, but we should really think about the capacity of the people we're working with and not only the capacity, but the professional level. Finally, I would add that this document does make me think about the way we frame things and the way any framing of any sort of national policy on extremism or finding extremism. So I think what I'm suggesting is that any partnership with any community leader, religious leader, or institution, we have to stress on asking them to rethink about values, beliefs, exploring assumptions about the world, thinking about this basic attributes of things, and even about mechanisms of causation, and mechanisms that may or may not cause. And I just, based on my own work, religious leaders overseas, what makes sense for someone here, concept is not very rational on the other side. I think what would really be a nice conversation for all of us, or part of this particular program, is to think about what sticks. The author of the tipping point, Malcolm Gladwell, has three laws that makes things, why things really push over. Those laws are the laws of the few, stickiness factor and the power of context. And I think if we learn to sort of bring this down into very basic discussion factors, you will get very far with our discussions with imams and religious leaders and NGOs and academics, and says to ask them to rethink, and that's what we're trying to do is have as much as we're trying to have a national discussion about rethinking about our policy on extremism on the local level, you need to ask these very individuals, as part is to rethink about what are the causes, what can cause the power of the context, and how do you identify the reasons for having a person move over to more of a radical world of view. These are just a conversation starters, I hope. And I think this document really does talk about the wider grievances, not just by American Muslims, but of course by all Muslims and all Americans, about what grievances and how one can resolve that in nonviolent ways. So those are the some first impressions of the document, and I look forward to talking more about it. Sure. Thank you, Kumar. Sure. Tim? Good afternoon, I'm Timothy Curry. I just wanted to take this opportunity to thank Juan, to thank CSIS. I previously, before working at the Department of Homeland Security, had a fantastic opportunity to work here with some of the tremendous people, and it's an honor to be back in this capacity. What I'm gonna talk to you today about is what we are doing at the Department of Homeland Security to address issues of violent extremism. And I think that the report has an interesting premises, and that's that communities, specifically Muslim communities, need to be at the core of how we find our solutions. And that is very much in tune with what the secretary believes should be our answer from the department, and also the approach that we have. This brief overview that I will give you will be comprehensive in the core programs that we're doing, but it's not exhaustive. There are a lot of different departments, there are a lot of different niches at the department, that are working on multiple things on a daily basis, and that's one of the things that we're trying to do is to try to build a dynamic response. Some of the literature that people will read, and things that people have printed recently, call for that dynamic response, and as a department that is as vast and as expansive as the Department of Homeland Security, so too are our responses to all hazards and all threats, specifically those that are coming from violent extremism. We view one of the key roles of the department is countering ideologically-based extremism regardless of the ideology. That is one of the core things that we have to do. Protecting national security is to prevent against violent extremism, and we have taken some steps and we have some efforts that we try to utilize to do that. DHS has recently, I'd say in the past couple of months, assessed the breadth of its organic CVE efforts, and the organic efforts develop from our core missions and our authorities. And what we've done is we've codified those different efforts and view them in five lines of action. So there's five lines of action that multiple components, multiple efforts entail, but really kind of speak to where we can go as a department to address this issue. What I will do is basically outline kind of those lines of efforts, and I'll talk specifically about some of the programs that are entailed in them. But again, if people would like to address me in the future or later on today, I can talk a little bit more about some of the actual specifics. The first line of action that we take is promoting and enabling community-oriented policing approaches to address ideologically or politically motivated violence. That comes directly from the Homeland Security Advisory Committee recommendations. For those of you who are unaware, the secretary has the Homeland Security Advisory Council. She tasked them last year to come up with ways in which law enforcement and communities can better address the issues of violence extremism. One of the recommendations of that was community-oriented policing approaches. Some of the things that we do are looking at community-oriented policing curriculums for state and local efforts. We've partnered with the Department of Justice, specifically with their community-oriented policing services and Bureau of Justice Assistance to look at how we can leverage grants and training in state and local law enforcement offices to better inform law enforcement officers of this threat and of the variations or indicators that they may see. What we've also done is we've sharing best practices. Many of you who have followed this space would know of the tremendous work that's being done out in LA by Mike Downing. We, Mike Downing, is working with us on the H-SAC recommendations. We're borrowing things from his initiatives in LA to deal with this. We're talking with people in Minneapolis, people in New York. So we're trying to harness some of those best practices through the efforts that we have. The second line of action would be to promote efforts to understand violent extremism and methods for community prevention. Again, the two previous speakers spoke about the need to better understand the problem. And we need to do that by reaching out to communities to get their assessment of where things are in their own communities. We need to do that through academia and research. The Department of Homeland Security has Science and Technology Directorate, which funds various initiatives. It also has START, which is at the University of Maryland, which is Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. So leveraging some of those academic initiatives. We also need to look at other communities, such as the intelligence community, to give us some insights into what they view the phenomenon to be. We also, and it's great to see so many of my international colleagues here, need to work with our international partners. I've worked closely with Peter, participated in some of his forums. I have some German colleagues here. The Department of Homeland Security and German Ministry of Interior are working on putting together a conference. We've had a conference with the Canadians. We've had negotiations and discussions with the Dutch. And that's core to how we are going to understand how the US can address a phenomenon that for the most part, people would argue is recent here and that our European or other colleagues may have more insights and understanding. And we're certainly trying to look into that. The fourth, I mean, the third issue, excuse me, would be promote constructive partnerships and information sharing between DHS, local governments and diverse communities that they serve. Again, this is going to look at how we work with our communities. Our Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties has multiple round tables throughout the country. Our ICE offices have interactions with communities. And it's not just being done through the lens of civil rights and civil liberties. One of the points that was made earlier is that this has to be moved past a grievance-based discussion. And we have done that. We've recently had meetings in Detroit, LA, Chicago, and Minneapolis that were led by various parts of the Department of Homeland Security in partnership with the Department of Justice and their grant-making bodies to have discussions about some of the recommendations that the Homeland Security Advisory Council made. So we really went to these communities, had forums with them, and asked them what they wanted or what they viewed as the solutions to countering violent extremism. We also, if we go into the fourth issue, is promote DHS missions that may have an ancillary effect on countering violent extremism. There's a lot of debates on what causes radicalization, what causes violent extremism. It's very hard. A lot of the academics will tell you to pinpoint specific things that can augment or stop. But there are things that we could probably do that fall into the good governance category that may help drain the swamp, if you will, for recruiters and individuals who wanna espouse these values. And that would include the refugee resettlement program when we're resettling individuals in the U.S., our U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, providing better support, tools, resources to those individuals. So when they do settle and start new communities, that they'll have the resources to hopefully inoculate themselves and make their communities more resilient against recruitment. We also, just in general, are trying to keep our border safe and protecting from materials, goods, or things that would come into the country that could be utilized by individuals for violent extremism. And finally, one of the things that we need to do, and this is probably the toughest, is develop metrics and measures to really assess the impact. And we are working very closely with our Office of Science and Technology and their academics and their researchers to try to develop ways so that the training programs that we're bringing out, the discussions that we're having, the new initiatives that we've developed, to try to measure their effectiveness. And anything you're measuring in a social science context is difficult, but I think that it's incumbent upon us as the department to make sure that what we're doing makes sense and to also be able to measure the success of what we're doing. So again, those are some of the things that we're doing. We do that in partnership with the White House, we do that in coordination with the National Counterterrorism Center, and more importantly, in conjunction with other departments and agencies that have initiatives, the State Department, Department of Defense, we primarily focus on the domestic environment, but one of the things that we have to do, as I noted before, is learn about other countries' domestic environments so that we can make sure that we're learning together and the practices and things that we implement codify a approach that will really reduce the threat of violent extremism. Thank you. Peter. Well, thank you very much, Lauren, for the opportunity to speak. I was told I'm the fun, the guy with a funny accent, so there you go. Enjoy. First of all, I want to say that whilst I'm supposed to speak on the foreign experiences that Tim mentioned, I want to be even more basic and to talk about what counter-radicalization actually means based on the program that I know best, which is the British Prevent Program that you mentioned and others had mentioned. What I do not want to do is to say that this program that has been running in Britain for a number of years is necessarily the best program. There are a lot of very bad things about the program and I'm not representing any government here. And in fact, I'm known as one of the critics of that program. So don't take from my talk that I'm fully endorsing that program. In fact, when Tim and RFOLICON then went over to London and we hosted them there, in fact, the idea of them coming over to London was to learn from the mistakes as well as from the good things about that program in the spirit in which you talked about it, Tim. Now, what I want to do is to give you an idea of the thinking behind that program, of the basic assumptions that it is informed by and then spell out why this matters in the US context. And the important thing here is that over the years, not from the very start, but over the years, the British have developed quite a sophisticated understanding of what counter-radicalization is about and who it is aimed at. And if you want, you could imagine the idea that is underlying British counter-radicalization as in a way a sort of pyramid with different tiers. At the top of the pyramid, smallest part of it, you have committed terrorists, in fact, who are planning and supporting acts of violence. The second tier consists of people who have begun to radicalize, who are buying into the extremist narrative, who are perhaps starting to mobilize as part of organizations that are advocating violence, but who have not personally yet committed to engaging in violence. The third tier are people who are not extremists and who are not perhaps even being radicalized but who are potentially vulnerable. For example, because of the environment in which they find themselves, best example, for example, are people in prisons, which are widely believed to be a place where people are perhaps susceptible to violent narratives because of the situation that they find themselves and being deprived of social networks, being angry and needing to have some sort of new identity. The fourth tier, then, is the Muslim community at large, which is neither radicalized nor necessarily vulnerable, but which still plays an important part in counter-radicalization programs because they are a potential source of information, they are a source of resilience, and because it is they who ultimately have to lead the fight against violent extremists who are potentially emerging from within their midst. Now, you could even add a fifth layer, which is the population at large, but for the moment, let's stay with that idea of the pyramid and four layers. And just to add that as well, I'm not necessarily saying that there is a graduation from one layer into the other, but let's stay with that idea of the four layers. Now, if you have that picture in your mind, three implications are very obvious. The first one is that the further you go down the pyramid, the less important law enforcement becomes. The first tier, almost the entire response, is based on law enforcement. The second tier, the people who have begun to radicalize, there will be an important law enforcement intelligence component of the response, but there are also other things coming in, educational programs, imams, et cetera. At the bottom of the pyramid, there will be almost no law enforcement involvement at all. And that's important to remember because in the US context, my impression is that when we're talking about counter-radicalization, we're almost always exclusively talking about law enforcement. It's very important to understand that, for example, in the UK context, counter-radicalization is something that is not necessarily, or even primarily, consisting of law enforcement, but of a lot of other things. The second implication, again, going down the pyramid, you realize that the further you go down the pyramid, the less heavy the government footprint is. While it's at the top of the pyramid, which consists essentially of law enforcement, you have an entirely 100% government response. At the bottom of the pyramid, it is expected that actually the government only serves the role of facilitator, enabler, creating the conditions for others to do good things. And most importantly, of course, for the government to do no harm and not to stop the good activities that are being developed, for example, by Muslim community organizations. So the further you go down the pyramid, the less important and less visible, the less heavy the footprint of government. And third important implication of that, and it follows from the second implication, is that if you want this to work, and this is quite a complex situation, if you want this to work, you need an approach, you need a good understanding, a shared set of understandings, how different activities and how different actors relate to each other. You maybe even need a strategy, at least a framework that allows people to provide different kinds of contributions at different levels, and that allows governments not to do any harm. And those are, in a way, the three takeaways, I think, from the UK approach, that counter-adclization isn't necessarily or even primarily about law enforcement, that government is mostly actually an enabler, a facilitator, not someone who actually runs and funds programs, and thirdly, that if you want to do no harm in a complicated, complex environment, you really have to have a widely understood framework so that people know where they fit in. And that's indeed what I take away from Hediya's report. Here's an organization consisting of Muslims who want to do something, who want to play an important role, a leadership role in confronting extremism in Muslim communities, and they are saying to the government, please tell us where we fit in. What is our role? What can you do to help us? We're not expecting you to give us handouts, but we want to understand how we fit within this wider framework. And for that contribution, I think, that report needs to be applauded. And it's very important that organizations like Hediya's are being told that there is a wider framework and this is where you fit in. Thank you. Fantastic, Peter, thank you. Great contributions from each of you and I think you've hit on different points. I'm gonna take the moderator's prerogative and ask two questions. And Hediya, maybe I'll start with you with this question because you've hit on the point of a social sort of response that says, where are the Muslim voices? But the reality is that there are some Muslim voices out there speaking out against violent extremism, some that have taken up arms in parts of the world. Your word has done some work on, for example, the Sufi communities in places like Pakistan that have started to oppose violent extremists. But why hasn't there been more of a movement, a consolidation of those Muslims in the United States and outside the United States that actually counter extremism, aside from the pockets that we've seen emerge? What are the impediments to that actually happening? And I'll let you think about that for a second. Peter, let me ask you this. I think one of the criticisms of the PREVENT program and one of the things implicated by what Hediya's report says is you've got to ensure that you're empowering the right actors in the community. And I think one of the questions that I think American officials have had all along and Tim, you can correct me if I'm wrong is who are we dealing with and who are credible voices and should we, for example, in the context of countering extremism enlist Salafi voices, extremist voices who may not have consistent values with each and every part of American democracy, but certainly are credible voices encountering violent extremism. So if maybe you could address that after Hediya's done with her question. I think that's a couple of things going on which I briefly touched upon is the community. It's a very difficult issue for the community to tackle so it's been very, very lazy about it. It doesn't want to confront. And remember the mainstream Muslim majority, we've always talked about this is that you have to activate the passive. So these are people that are not naturally socially politically active people. They're going about their lives, raising their kids, earning a living and they're not interested in fighting this problem. They're not paying attention. A lot of them are not even paying attention on what their kids are looking at online. And so that's why we talked about this being a national agenda because we think, you know, I tell this joke, people know anything about the controversy with the Ramadan dinner at the White House. I mean it's like this huge thing for months Muslims are talking about who's invited and who's not invited and it becomes this big social occurrence that you're laughing because you know, right? Is that if we create that kind of momentum where everyone, where the Muslim community is kind of like, well I need to sign on, I need to be a part of this which is what happened with Prevent in England, then we can maybe galvanize and mobilize the Muslim community. And especially when it's about funding. Where, you know, if somebody in the White House goes to one of these, you know, multi-million dollar Muslim families and says, hey, we need you to fund some counter-rad initiatives. We want you to set up a foundation. Guess what, they're gonna do it to take a picture with the president. So it's just kind of like top-down pressure with a bottom-up response that we need to galvanize the community. Peter. Yeah. Juan, you're absolutely right. One of the key controversies about Prevent was precisely the idea that at least to some extent, British government worked with Salafis and continues to do that. The assumption here is that if you do that, if you want to reach people who are highly radicalized and who are on the verge of engaging in violent extremism, you need to have people who are almost as extremist but who have knackered on it yet in order to reach these people because they have the credibility and authority. I would not want to say whether that approach is necessarily right or wrong. I have seen some of these initiatives and they seem to have pulled people back from the brink. Arguably, Hedia would say that, you know, other people could play the same role and do so even better. I'm sort of kind of on the undecided, on the undecided, I'm sitting on the fence here. But what I can say for sure is that the mistake, one of the key mistakes that British government made was not just to work with these people in a quiet law enforcement intelligence type way, but to actually turn these people into political representatives of the Muslim community, which definitely they are not. And that was the conflation that happened that did a lot of damage and actually undermined generally moderate Muslims. If you believe this kind of operation is effective, then definitely do it, but do it in a quiet way. Do not conflate or mistake these people for representatives of the Muslim community. And here comes the key analogy that I developed for myself as an occasional smoker. Salafis are like nicotine gum. If you're a smoker, if you're addicted to nicotine, the nicotine gum will make you stop smoking or at least it will help you somewhere. However, if you've never smoked in your life, you start taking nicotine gum, you will become addicted to nicotine and you probably will end up smoking. So nicotine gum, Salafis, should only be used for people who are way down the track, if at all. So there you go. I like your visuals, Peter. He's full of visuals. I've got the nicotine gum in my head, the pyramids, it's all very good. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, very good. Now let's open it up to questions. I've got lots more, but I want to hear from you all. Right here in front. We have mics, Mohammed. Think right here. Thank you. And if you can identify yourself. Sure, Harold Road, retired from the Pentagon after 28 years and worked for Hudson Institute in New York. For years, Hadea, you've been doing marvelous things and you hit the nail as far as I'm concerned, right on the head. But my question isn't for you, it's really for Mr. Curry. And the problem is as follows. That in our government, it seems like an order, that there's this belief that in order to be an authentic Muslim, you have to hate America. You have to be extremist. And over the years, people like Hadea, who obviously don't have that view, have been pushed aside very often as, oh, they couldn't be authentic, because they believe in exactly the things that Hadea talked about here. Why is this the case? And you gave a marvelous discussion or description of what the DHH says, how it's set up and how it's trying to do this. But why is it that people like Hadea and their many like her are pushed aside as not authentic? I'll say from the answer. I don't know that I agree with your characterization of Muslims or how the government views them. I think that what you're trying to get at is, how do individuals who have views that may not always be interpreted as mainstream or may not have the same megaphone that others do? One of Hadea's points is you have these national groups, but you really need to get to the lower smaller groups. How do those people work and interact with the government to build these solutions? And I think that one of the things that we're trying to do is to identify those people through organic efforts in a variety of different areas throughout the country. The Homeland Security Advisory Council is made up of Muslims. The secretary, when she launched the initiative, called in a group of different Muslims. Individuals, representatives from various parts of the country, representatives from various organizations. And sure, I think that people may characterize that as well as the same faces and the same things, but we are trying to expand our engagement in particular to the Muslim community. We're trying to get outside of the Beltway. One of the secretary's favorite points is that Homeland Security begins with hometown security. And the more that you have a relationship with local communities and what they're doing and the people that represent them, the better you will understand the problem. So I think that what we're trying to do through a lot of these efforts, particularly the Homeland Security Advisory Council recommendations, is to try to identify individuals who may not always be invited to the big events in Washington. Let's go with this gentleman here. Yes, my name is Greg Afthandili and I'm an independent consultant. My question is for anybody on the podium there, but it deals with the question of the internet. Many sort of academic studies have shown that radicalization sometimes begins with young, disaffected people sort of trolling the internet, coming across these radical videos and through a process becoming radicalized. Obviously, as a government, we can't censure the internet, even though some people want to. But what can be done to counter those radical videos? Can other types of messages be brought on to the internet to help these young people who are very vulnerable? Thank you. First of all, I think it's, I don't think it's a, it's accurate to say that that is, and you didn't say this, I'm just saying in general, because I hear this everywhere, that first we didn't have a radicalization problem and now we have a radicalization problem that's incurring entirely on the internet. So I don't believe either of those two descriptions are accurate. So I think there is a socialization. There is recruitment and indoctrination going on in this country. It's human contact. There is a social factor involved. And so if, take the example of bullying. When they talk about bullying in school, this big campaign against bullying or kids, sexual predators online, it's also the community that gets involved. It's not just addressing what's happening on the internet or what's happening in the schools. It has to be a community-wide approach. And so radicalization is the same thing. It's not just they're learning some idea on the internet and then they're packing a suitcase and going for jihad. There are other messages that those people, those young people are internalizing that we need to respond to. And that's why it's a community-wide approach that needs to be implemented. I think you're right in the sense that the internet has become more important and that a number of cases that we've seen of the past few months show that the internet was in some cases actually critical, even though I also agree with Hediyat that usually there's also a real-world component. It's the most difficult environment to deal with without wanting to plug our own things. But we did a report, my center ICSR did a report called countering online radicalization a year ago. One of the things that we suggested in that report was not only that mainstream platforms, and this is happening to some extent, mainstream platforms like Facebook and YouTube should be encouraged and to some extent should be pressured into cleaning up the act to some extent, but also that, for example, this government should set up a startup fund that encourages people who want to actually go out there and counter some of these messages to start their own initiatives. Again, learning from the part failure of the British approach, which gave out two or three grants, very large grants to organizations that started their websites and the websites didn't end up being very popular, so that money was wasted. To instead set up a startup fund with the United States Institute for Peace or another non-governmental organization that allows people to get five or $10,000 that enables them to actually put on a website. If they have enthusiasm, if they have motivation, that will be sufficient money. And then to see every six months how successful these websites have been and to continue funding or not depending on how successful they have been. This is about letting 1,000 flowers bloom and letting ideas coming from the bottom up rather than giving huge grants to two or three organizations. Let's go right here to the center and then we'll go over here. My name is Yad Aladad, former director of operations at the World Bank and I'm also privileged to assist Miram Hedi to word on the advisory council. I'd like to ask a question which has been asked many times before, but unless we get some clear answers, I'll keep asking this, I guess. Somebody mentioned, I think a couple of people, where are the moderate Muslims? Let me turn that around and say, where is the media when it comes to whatever the moderate Muslims may be doing, even though it may be small. And I'll preface that by saying that, quite recently, I think three or four weeks ago, Thairul Qadri, which Hediya mentioned in her talk, was in town, how many of us know that? He was hosted by Kamar, by other agencies, the Georgetown University and so forth, and gives some tremendous presentations and since he has produced a fatwa of 600 pages, denouncing radicalism, this should be appeared somewhere. Now I do understand that the media does, by choice everywhere in the world, there is a sensational element to it and this perhaps is not that sensational. However, the almost complete absence is something which worries me. So I would really like to ask Hediya that her recommendations, to what extent do they go towards addressing this issue and any others who may have any, any other of the panelists who may have any ideas on how to address this, thank you. I mean, I think it's a huge problem. I'll tell you personally, even getting out publicity for the report, getting journalists to write a story about it, it's impossible. It's impossible and it's, that's my response often when people say where are the moderates, they're speaking but nobody's listening, it's just impossible to get the message out. So I'd also like to hear from Tim or the rest of you who you think how we could, I also think that's part of a national agenda. I think if it came from the White House going to the major news outlets and say, you know what, can you start covering these events? Can you televised some of these town hall meetings that are countering radicalization? Then maybe, I mean, they can't force them but maybe we'll get some momentum but I actually am stumped on how we can get the media more involved. Well, let me speak in slight defensive CBS news with which I work. The first story I worked with 60 Minutes on was precisely on this. It was entitled The Narrative. It was a focus on Majid Nawaz and the work of the Quilliam Foundation in both the UK and in Pakistan. So I'm quite proud of that and I think it was an important piece that highlighted exactly this, that there are voices out there. Majid presents quite a telegenic character and his own personal story, I think was easy for people to grasp onto and I think it made it attractive. I think part of the problem too is not just the media's propensity to liking conflict and drama but it also looks for critical mass. Whether it's the Tea Party or other activities, it's when they start to see multiple flickers, multiple flowers blooming at the same time that then it starts to draw their attention and then there's a feeding frenzy. If there's coverage by one network on a major issue, the others will follow. And so I think part of the challenge is how do you give a sense of critical mass to the voices speaking out? And I would say there's a little bit of a missed opportunity in the wake of the New York Islamic Center controversy because I think the debate got skewed on all sides and so I don't know quite how you capture that but there needs to be a sense of critical mass and maybe it starts online, maybe it starts with a report like this but you have to get the media's attention and you can only do it in so many ways. That's why I answered that question. Can I just say one sentence? Being a former journalist myself, I think the 600 page fatbar should be cut down to one page. I think journalists are not very prone to reading 600 pages. And the other thing is that, I mean of course, U.S. government will never be able to go as far as British government which essentially allows Muslim organization or pays for PR consultants for Muslim organizations. And that may not be possible in this country but what I think can be done and this is again banking on something that is uniquely American which is this philanthropic streak is for perhaps the government to bring together leading moderate Muslim organizations and leading PR companies and to facilitate that contact and tell the PR companies here's something good you can do, professionalize them, build that capacity and enable them to be more professional in their presentation and communication. Come on, yeah. That I think as much as what is covered and what's not covered by the media, I'm not an expert in that field but I'm surprised what is covered in the American press and sometimes gets lost in here or it's presented overseas. But I do remember sometimes that Ted Koppel and other folks in the 80s would have these town hall meetings. And so just a half an hour town hall meeting that addressed one issue on Nightline or other shows or 60 minutes it just seemed like there was some sort of discourse that were ongoing and even though you're not involved with it, it existed. I don't see that as often and if I'm missing it then it's, I just don't think but I think that could be rejuvenated and somehow that should be part of so many other public meetings. I think the global Clinton, the Clinton global initiative, I think does that but if you're not watching it, you don't know it exists and there are many conversations like that that could happen. Kumar, is it okay if I take the idea to Katie Kirk and see if we can handle it? Let's just do it. Let's go here, here, and then center. Mohamed Elabieri from Dallas, Texas and for full disclosure, I advise a number of government agencies including DHS, I'm on that Homeland Security Advisory Council and helped in drafting that recommendations that were mentioned earlier. I'm a very big proponent of going to the grassroots. I'm not ready to throw all the national organizations here in DC and say they're not doing anything constructive but I really do believe that you're part of the report talking about the importance of reaching out at the local levels is really, really important. I congratulate you on the report. I do have one question for you, it's kind of two parts. At the beginning of your presentation you made a fairly declarative statement that you felt that the community had not tackled or wanted to tackle the ideological components. So why do you believe that first of all? And second, what do you need to see to feel like it has? And just might have come to a different conclusion afterwards about how to tackle it. Whether they bought into, for example, the nicotine model that was given earlier that was pretty creative or a different one. Thank you very much. There's so many layers. I think that the community has failed to address the ideological component because some people in the community they actually don't know what the ideological component is meaning they aren't educated enough in Islam to understand what Islam is and what Islam is not. So whether it's the concepts of non-Muslims, Muslims in a non-Muslim society, the rules of secular law, the rules that you had, all of these theological principles that they're unfamiliar with so that they don't recognize what is, quote, radical. So when their kids are talking about something that's radical, they don't understand the difference. I think that's one component of the problem. And two, there's this, I mean, I've been a member of the Muslim community. I grew up in a very secular household but I've been very, very intimately connected to the community for 20 years now and it seems like there's this putting our heads in the sand kind of behavior when it comes to radicalization. It's this unspoken problem that most people don't want to confront and it's just, it gets worse and worse and worse and nobody addresses it. So it's one ignorance, two fear, and three, which is you're probably not gonna be too happy about, but it's been peddled by a lot of groups in this country. So there has been a very large national movement towards peddling some pretty radical ideologies and so it's indoctrinated our youth and it's a reality that we have to come to terms with. Over here. German Embassy, Stephan Russam, the law enforcement at a shave from the German federal criminal police. I got a question from a law enforcement standpoint and I read a couple of lines in your paper here and we had it the other day in the Washington Post tensions in, I think it was the case in California between the FBI and some Muslim communities saying, with your sting operation, with your undercover work, with your connection to informants, with your undermining the bond of trust you try to build from a law enforcement point of cans. It's a pretty successful strategy and it's a necessary strategy, but on the other hand it's always conflicting and building tensions with this bond of trust and this basis of communication trust you need to have with the communities from the government. How do you see this conflict arising? How do you see a possibility to work around this? Thank you very much. It's, I actually did an NPR spot on Monday with Salam Mariadi from MPAC and I explained that it was a failure on the communities part and he agreed with me. So we're usually at odds about these kinds of things, but he agreed that it's because the community has failed to tackle radicalization directly so the primary mode of intervention is sting operations and using informants. I mean, if the community, like I mean there's faults in the channel project, it's an initiative of England that I'm sure you're familiar with, but lessons learned if we could do it right here, if there's more of a two-way dialogue about radicalization, not about getting frisked at the airport, that's a whole separate issue, but the issue of radicalization where community members can report suspicious behavior and basically there's a tiered system in England where they could report suspicious activity but then say, look, we're gonna handle it, we're gonna try to cancel that individual and there's this like red, green, yellow staging where they say, okay, this kid's gone too far as the law enforcement matter, but there's a constant communication between law enforcement and the community so the community's given the chance to try to reform an individual and then hands it over to law enforcement when they feel they can't. That dialogue's not going on here in this country. I mean, maybe in some particular mosque somewhere that I don't know about, but for the most part, that conversation's not occurring. I think that one of the things that the secretary focused on when she posed the initial question was how can law enforcement and communities work better to counter violent extremism is trying to figure out that question because obviously there are tensions that develop. But at the same time, there aren't ready made solutions that we can implement that can alleviate them immediately. So the dialogues that we're having with law enforcement and with communities on how they can better interact, how they can work better together. I mean, I think the reality is what we all want is we don't want to have to ever intervene. We want the communities to do that themselves and then, you know, we don't even know. That's when we get to the ultimate stage but I think what we're trying to do with the Homeland Security Advisory Council recommendations with some of the law enforcement training that we're doing with the partnership building that we're trying to do at a very local level with the local and law enforcement. So this is not being done with the federal law enforcement. It's you're working in Seattle or Portland or LA with the cops that are always gonna be there. And that's what we're trying to build so that we can hopefully provide another option. But I think that there is certain elements that you're never gonna be able to deal with that and we're gonna have to get, you know, better discussions and transparency on how these things happen. Let's go here and then here. I'm Elaine Cireo. I'm a Franklin Fellow at the Department of State for Public Diplomacy for South Asia. And I very much appreciate the issue of bringing in how do we bring it to the public's awareness. I mean, I think that so much has been said there's been the voices but they've been at such levels where you're not hearing them on a broad national basis. As we're hearing other voices, the counter voices drumming constantly about how the extremists exist. And this is what the Muslim community is about in America and it's not. When you mentioned the issues of, you know, how do we get this blooming? I think the way you do it is, again, very much of what Hedy is saying, we need to reach out to all of the communities. It has to be at the threshold level. It has to be repeated and take a page literally as you again pointed to the Tea Party or post World War II, the Jewish American community. It started, it did not have a cohesive voice prior to World War II. It was only post World War II that that voice became a very constructive, very planned, very American approach to building a cohesive voice to move issues forward that are important to that community. We may not think that all the things that they move forward for were the best things. That's debatable. But nevertheless, that process did work. And I think it's just, it's not about inventing the wheel. I think the wheel is already there. Just take it and use it. With regard to the Muslim community, while I'm not versed in the history of the Muslim community in the United States, what I have been dealing with is it's a fragmented community. It's not an organized community. It is a community that a lot of people prefer to sit, to stand back and not be identified with, despite the fact that they're Muslims. Now that may be for a variety of reasons, but now I think it's a time for them to look at how they have to start to work together to bring about a cohesive voice. And this is not just addressed at one level, but a whole host of issues. And when that happens, I think your point, Juan, will be that the media will start to take an interest and we will start to see it at the levels. Because as you said, Mr. Copel has had a number of forms and you had to have just have recently spoken on NPR and so many other places. But in some ways, that's preaching to the choir. The audiences at NPR are already interested. All right, they're aware. I'm not saying that not to talk, but you're not getting it on, I hate to say it, Fox News. And you really, that's where the rest of the, if you just look at the ratings of Fox News numbers and people and whether people agree with Fox News or not, that's where people are listening. So when they beat that drum, they're only beating one side of the drum. They're not beating the other side. And can you take that forward into how would you see take organizing it to be more effective? Any thoughts you don't have? Very helpful comments. Right here. I'm Janice here, I work for US Northcom. You seem to favor the approach for the UK. I'm curious, what are the measures of success, the metrics that indicate that their approach is in fact working compared to France and Saudi Arabia? And a brief question too. What about the Muslim community reaction to the treatment of women in the Middle East? Why isn't that an issue on this conversation? Peter, do you wanna address the UK? Can I just say again that at least personally, I don't think the UK model is necessarily the best model. There are lots of problems with that model. It's just that they have done a lot of stuff and that allows us to kind of pick ideas and to talk about it in a structured way. It's absolutely right that they have very different approaches operating in Europe and the Dutch approach is completely, in many ways, different from UK or Danish or French approach. And if you're actually interested in understanding some of the differences, I recommend a paper that was published yesterday, in fact, and written by Lorenzo Vidino, came up with USIP, which is called Lessons for America or something like that, and talks about different counter-radicalization programs in different European countries. But I'm not necessarily endorsing the UK approach. Similarly for me, I just have extensive experience working with the UK program and I think that's why Peter and I keep adding the caveat that there are lessons learned, there were a lot of mistakes made, but they're just really proactive. They're very, very knowledgeable about the different Islamic ideologies, oftentimes I fiercely disagree with their approach, but they're very, very engaged. And I think staying engaged, being involved is important. So that's the only reason I focused on that. And in terms of women's issues, we just, we didn't focus on any one particular issue other than countering radicalization and that was just the focus point of the report. Let me take the moderator's prerogative and ask one last quick question. Tim, this is for you, put you on the spot. Is the US government considering putting out a public domestic counter radicalization strategy? And I ask in part because it strikes me that if the government and the administration does, that may be the point at which the national dialogue that Hedya has asked for begins and it may be the point at which you start getting more attention. Thanks for the easy question. The lead for determining how a strategy will be developed or how it will be implemented or the extent to which it will be made public is with the White House. And right now there are a lot of discussions on those very issues. What they are looking at is how it will best be implemented in the US. Is it the best thing for us to be doing? To what extent are there lessons that we learned from what happened in Prevent? Are there lessons that we're learning from our Canadian partners who are also talking about the same issues? So there is an active discussion of that. It's at a level much higher than mine. But there is a discussion and I think that at some point we are gonna have decisions made on how best to proceed. I don't know if that will lead to a formal document or a public document. But what I can say is that the White House and the administration is certainly leading the coordination of the efforts that I talked about from a DHS standpoint as well as efforts that other people are doing. So they're determining that. Tim, that's a very politic answer. I liked it. Well with that, I wanna thank Hedya and word for the very important and timely report. I wanna thank the panelists for their insights, their expertise and for their time. And thank all of you for braving the weather. I hope this has not only enlightened you but furthered the discussion that we will no doubt be having as a country on radicalization and the role of communities of interest. So thank you again and thank you from all of us here at CSIS. Have a good day.